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INTRODUCTION 
 
BEING JUDGMENTAL 
 
This project examines the role that emotions can and should play in morality and moral 
theory. I examine the popular notion of emotional intelligence and argue that it converges on the 
moral notion of virtue. In some ways emotional intelligence and virtue are the same thing; in 
other ways, either can be shown to be a prerequisite for the other. Of course, the ultimate 
formulation of the relationship will depend on the definition we give to emotion. If we see all of 
our experiences as being emotional, then we will see emotional intelligence and virtue as the 
same thing; if we believe that only a subset of our experiences count as emotional, then only a 
part of virtue has to do with emotional intelligence. Either way, I show that the value of 
emotional intelligence is morally based, if we understand morality in its properly expansive 
sense. 
Although Kantian moral theory is thought to be not so expansive, limited to a rights-
based rather than virtue-based approach, I show that Kant’s theory of virtue illuminates the 
connections between morality and emotional intelligence. Most people are coming to accept that 
the standard interpretation of Kantian moral theory is mistaken. I give more evidence to tip the 
scales, showing that Kant goes some distance toward giving us a fruitful theory of emotional 
intelligence. 
This dissertation explores the ways that being a good person overlaps with having 
psychological/mental health. Although most people immediately assent that there is such an 
overlap, the specificities of this relationship are not often discussed. Part of this neglect might 
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come from the distance between the two disciplines. When moral theory and psychology do 
overlap, as with moral psychology, the endeavor is assumed to be empirical rather than 
prescriptive. Still, I think that we must confront some degree of resistance when attempting to 
make psychology prescriptive. In fact, it might be the case that psychological normativity offers 
a cover for moral normativity because we often do not feel comfortable acknowledging our own 
moral judgments. Moral discourse, and the inevitable disagreements that it threatens, is 
necessarily challenging. Indeed, part of the goal of this project is to convince the reader that 
taking oneself and one’s moral judgments seriously, in a way that is respectful to oneself and to 
others, is necessary for one’s psychological well-being. We must have courage in challenging the 
status quo, whether it be calling attention to the feelings of an individual or attempting to 
convince people to make different choices. Courage is needed in our culture of polite relativism, 
where most moral judgments are offered cautiously, if at all, and peppered with qualifiers like 
“for me” and “I feel.” Courage, an emotionally intelligent behavior, is necessary for being 
judgmental in a way that affirms the worth of those judgments and ourselves. 
I voice this call for courage early on because I suspect that this resistance to being 
judgmental has stunted the philosophy and psychology of emotion.1 In discussing the 
relationship between morality and emotion, I go beyond the idea that emotions either simply 
inform or impede moral thinking. I consider both the moral evaluation of emotions and the role 
that emotions play in moral discourse, i.e., the emotionality of morality. Many theorists currently 
interested in the ways that emotions inform moral thinking (Damasio and Nussbaum, to name the 
two most high-profile examples) do not devote much consideration to the obvious ways that we 
should and do evaluate our emotions. Instead, philosophy and psychology are currently pre-
                                                
1 I find it very telling that Robinson chooses to call cognitive theory of emotion “judgmentalist” theories. Jenefer 
Robinson, “Startle,” Journal of Philosophy 92, no. 2 (1995): 53-57. 
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occupied by the simple idea that emotions are good. These projects are partly polemical, aiming 
at overcoming what they take to be the deficiencies of Western (and, I might add, Eastern) 
thought. Western philosophy is thought to pit reason against emotion, and to maintain that the 
former is good and the latter is bad. To argue that the emotions are good is thought to be a 
radical stance that requires gesturing back to a forgotten past (ancient Greece) or a censored 
philosopher (Spinoza). To be fair, Damasio and Nussbaum do not deny that some emotions have 
content that changes with reflection; but they choose not to focus on what they take to be only 
one type of emotions. I do not deny that some emotions are intelligent in the sense that they 
provide intuitive knowledge that surpasses explicit knowledge. Instead, I focus on the 
relationship between those experiences that are thought to be emotional and those experiences 
that are thought to be rational, and I show that neither is more likely to be “ready to use” on its 
own terms. Both reason and emotion call for moral reflection. 
We must not only push our theories of emotion to engage with theories of reflective 
moral judgment; we must push our theories of reflective moral judgment to take up the topic of 
emotion in an emotionally sensitive way. Unfortunately, much of the philosophical discipline 
that goes by the term “ethics” has, ironically, become abstract and disconnected from the 
improvement of real lives. Ethics focuses too much on paradoxes and dilemmas rather than the 
moral presence of the everyday. The question “what should I do?” becomes “what should one 
do?” and the sense of urgency is lost.2 Even “applied ethics” is doomed from the start insofar as 
it assumes that ethics is something that either may or may not be “applied.” In order to get ethics 
off the ground, or to get it on the ground, we must assume that people have some kind of natural 
                                                
2 This evasion is evinced by the fact that there is thought to be such a thing as “meta-ethics” at all: questions about 
the questions of morality can only be construed as being on a different level if they are taken to be for some other 
purpose than answering the original questions, but if the original questions are already relaxed and hypothetical, 
then we can multiply levels of questions as many times as we like. Otherwise meta-ethical questions are simply 
more in-depth ethical questions.  
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ethical abilities. A moral sense need not be fixed and limiting, but rather the natural moral sense 
we bring to moral discourse is exactly the personal orientation and personal experience that is 
itself the content of the discussion. In other words, we must see that there is already, in principle, 
a unity between particularity and universality. (Both the method of reflective equilibrium and the 
theory of practical reason mean to express this fact.3) Personal experience is not only an 
acceptable arena of ethical decision-making; it is the only arena of ethical decision-making. 
In merging psychology and moral theory—making a normative moral psychology—I do 
not mean to follow the tradition of moral sense theory or emotivism. My project can be 
understood through a contrast with Prinz’s Humean tri-partite approach to philosophy, with what 
he takes to be an affective theory of emotion and its foundation for moral sense theory. In fact, as 
we shall see, Kant’s rejection of moral sense theory is at the heart of his theory of emotion and 
his ethics. In general, moral sense theory, which I (and Hume) take to be the reduction of moral 
theory to psychology, has regained popularity. No matter how hard we try, we seem to fall 
continually into the common prejudice that emotions are one type of thing and moral judgments 
are another. But we have emotions because we have certain thoughts, beliefs, theories, 
prejudices, and assumptions. Similarly, we have certain thoughts and theories because we have 
certain emotions and emotional habits. Both are revisable and yet natural. Both should be subject 
to evaluation. 
The ideas that motivate this dissertation might be subsumed under the idea of character or 
virtue, as these concepts unite moral rectitude and psychological health. Yet previous theories of 
character and virtue have not seriously considered the extent to which the analysis and working 
                                                
3 See Elijah Millgram, Ethics Done Right (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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through of emotions is necessary for the cultivation of virtue.4 A moral theory that does not 
engage in psychology and the analysis of emotion leaves us in the dark about the moral nature of 
the majority of our moral lives. For Aristotle the rational and the irrational parts of the soul 
should have the relationship of master and slave or parent and child. This project, on the 
contrary, is interested specifically in the ways that the emotions are themselves intelligent. 
Furthermore, the idea that a virtuous person comes about by being brought up in a good state is 
completely useless to us, not because we find ourselves in corrupt political environments but 
because it is simply not true. We no longer believe that the intellectuals must command the 
manual laborers and army or that the soul must control desire and appetite; even if we did, we do 
not believe that having good laws is sufficient to induce virtue, nor do we think they should be. 
Virtue ethics is a good start, but if virtue is taken to simply mean “the correct habits,” without 
telling us how we know they are correct or how we go about getting them, then virtue ethics does 
not rise the level of normative ethics at all. 
Instead, I take the meeting point between an emotionally sensitive moral theory and a 
morally informed philosophy of emotion to be the notion of emotional intelligence. My argument 
is that emotional and moral experience are analytically united: a consideration of emotion leads 
to a theory of emotional intelligence, and an analysis of theories of emotional intelligence leads 
to moral theory. 
In chapter 1, I argue that emotions are a part of subjective processes of reflection and 
learning. I seek to transcend the ossified debate in the philosophy of emotion that seeks to 
                                                
4 The point of the doctrine of the mean, according to Young, is that virtue should not be understood as being 
opposed to vice since there are two corresponding vices to every virtue. Charles M. Young, “The Doctrine of the 
Mean,” Topoi 15, no. 1 (1996): 89-99. Annas argues that, other than this point, there is very little content to this idea 
that is not tautological, i.e., to hit the mean is just to do the right amount, especially since sometimes, what appears 
to be an excessive amount, is proper. Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 61. 
 6 
determine whether emotions are affects or judgments. The philosophy of emotion is largely pre-
occupied by the question “What is an emotion?” but has lost sight of the reasons that this 
questions matters, as well as the reasons that it does not. I argue that the affective-cognitive 
debate is itself largely illusory, but the implicit tendency to argue that the emotions should either 
be praised or blamed continues to motivate it. Emotions, and the breadth of emotional 
experiences, are more complex than either of these dichotomies allow. Emotions are an integral 
part of, not just the objects of, moral theory. 
Any consideration of the nature of emotions inevitably leads to the idea of emotional 
intelligence, which is explored and defined in chapter 2. This chapter also serves to introduce 
those working in the philosophy of emotion to the literature on emotional intelligence, with 
which they are usually unfamiliar, to the effect that the question “What is an emotion?” might be 
rejoined with a consideration of its practical implications. After surveying existing theories of 
emotional intelligence, I provisionally define emotional intelligence as the analysis and better 
understanding of one’s own emotions for the sake of acting on and expressing them. These 
expressions and actions must also be tied to good outcomes and psychological well-being. 
Emotional intelligence also involves understanding and discussing the emotions of others in the 
same pursuit and, additionally, creating an emotionally open and healthy environment that 
promotes emotional intelligence for all, but we shall see that, contrary to appearances, the 
emotional health of others is not a separate component of emotional intelligence since, in this 
respect at least, there is a deep symmetry between the self and others, as Kantian moral theory 
helps to explain. Resisting the tradition of intelligence studies, my definition highlights 
behaviors, rather than purported latent abilities, that we can call emotionally intelligent. The 
notion of emotional intelligence provides a bridge between the philosophy of emotion and moral 
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theory, because emotional experience is itself self-evaluative and seeks advice about which ways 
of experiencing emotions are better than others. The notion of emotional intelligence provides 
this advice, but it must itself be grounded in moral theory, since emotional questions are often 
moral questions. 
Chapter 3 begins the engagement with Kant that promises to fill the gaps left by current 
psychological consideration of emotional intelligence. In order to couple the philosophy of 
emotion with Kantianism—two topics that have been previously adversarial—I explicate Kant’s 
theory of emotion, which is often misunderstood due to a confusion of terms. Kant holds a 
cognitive theory of emotion; I argue that he goes some distance in articulating a successful 
theory of emotional intelligence, a fact that is often overlooked because consideration of Kant’s 
theory of emotion is often limited to his comments about affects. 
There are a number of reasons that Kant has earned a bad reputation. First, scholars have 
failed to take seriously the Metaphysics of Morals, which provides a more mature and well-
rounded version of Kant’s moral theory. (Surprisingly, even when people do read the 
Metaphysics of Morals, they give all of their attention to the “Doctrine of Right,” even though 
Kant specifically states that virtue is the realm of ethics proper and right is merely the sphere of 
legality.) Second, Kant’s comments about sympathy in the Groundwork are polemical and lead 
him into trouble. Still, most of the criticism he faces is not the product of a generous reading but 
instead part of the need to quickly dispense with opposing theories. Kant’s tendency to write 
architectonically and expound di- and tri-chotomies, especially in the first two Critiques, makes 
him an easy target. Third, Kant’s theory of emotion is amazingly complex, infused both with 
psychological insight and many latent psychological ideas; it is intricately connected to his moral 
theory as well. There has simply not been enough interpretive effort directed at providing 
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anything more than a stereotyped account of Kant’s theory of emotion. Ultimately, chapter 3 
argues that Kant believes that we have a moral duty to reflect on our emotions for the sake of 
better understanding them and better fulfilling the emotional needs of ourselves and others. 
Chapter 4 goes beyond mere injunction and uses Kantian moral theory to demonstrate the 
ways that this moral/emotional engagement should occur. The first section of the chapter 
considers the emphasis Kant places on self-scrutiny and shows that it is a pre-requisite for 
emotional intelligence: we must know our motivations in order to understand our emotions and 
to develop virtue. This discussion leads to an analysis of Kant’s theory of self-esteem, as I argue 
that self-scrutiny and moral concern do not amount to neurosis, as some might fear, but help us 
to be happier. Any theory of self-esteem that psychologists take up must, like Kant’s, be morally 
informed; otherwise it will be groundless. The second section contains a theory of emotional 
universalism, showing that we must morally evaluate our emotions but that doing so does not 
amount to eradicating particularity. The third section takes up the topic of respect as it applies 
both to morality and emotional experience. Respect is not just a negative constraint, but a part of 
the duty to promote the happiness of others. Empathy, which is a part of emotional intelligence, 
as well as learning to seriously engage difference, are necessary components of respect. The 
fourth section considers the ways that moral reason is subjectively integrating and hence 
therapeutic. Psychological benefit comes not just from rational reflection, but, more correctly, 
truly moral reflection. 
Chapters 5 and 6 address Kant’s critics, including some of the mistaken interpretations 
that have precluded an understanding of the emotional dimension of his moral theory. I reject 
those interpretations that appear most natural (as in chapter 5, wherein I argue that it does not 
make sense to call Kant’s moral theory “formal” even though he does so himself). I argue that 
 9 
Kant’s notion of purity is based on a confused and unsuccessful application of an idea from his 
theoretical philosophy to his practical philosophy. I also argue that his notion of autonomy 
should be understood in terms of universality, and I criticize it for reinscribing a psychologically 
problematic model of subjectivity. These interpretive amputations are not only useful for my 
project; they help Kant’s theory itself to be more coherent. Although a possible objection is that 
“creative” interpretations are always less successful than the original itself, I show that in both 
cases Kant’s theory reaches a juncture at which we must privilege some parts of the text over 
others. The more faithfully we follow the text, the more we are forced to reject parts of it. 
Within the legacy of Kantianism we have those who are working to show that morality 
amounts to psychological health. These types of theories—I am not sure whether to call them 
moral theories or theories about morality, i.e., moral psychology5—offer an answer to the 
question “Why be moral?” Unfortunately, in making the argument that morality simply is good 
reasoning, they fall prey not only to moral corruption (a problem that is always on Kant’s mind); 
they also overlook that which is particular about moral reasoning, viz. the categorical imperative. 
I provide a close reading of what I take to be some of the most important aspects of Kantian 
moral theory, not so that I can claim some kind of privileged historical lineage, but because I 
believe that Kant, for the most part, is right. Sadly, I have heard the history of philosophy 
compared to the history of science, which is to imply that both are largely obsolete. Such is a 
spurious parallel not only because the majority of Americans remain in the Medieval period, but 
also because the history of philosophy is not over. As we shall see, one very one-sided reading of 
Kant is at the heart of our culture’s current misunderstanding of emotional intelligence and the 
                                                
5 For example, J. David Velleman, Self to Self: Selected Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); 
David Schmidtz, Rational Choice and Moral Agency (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
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relativistic denial of its moral importance. It is in returning to Kant—setting the record straight, 
as it were—that we can form a new model for virtue, one that does justice to emotion.
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CHAPTER I 
 
WHAT IS AN EMOTION? 
 
 Many who study emotion believe that they must first define it; yet defining “emotion” is 
not as necessary for productive discussion as one might think. Furthermore, defining “emotion” 
risks arbitrarily limiting and skewing our discussion, as well as taking emotions out of the mental 
and social contexts necessary to understand them. We shall see that more expansive discussions 
illuminate attempts to isolate and exclude a special class of phenomenon, even though the latter 
come off as more “scientific.” Currently the philosophical study of emotion is engaged in a 
debate over the definition of emotion, but this debate is more a product of differing goals of 
study rather than a real disagreement over subjective phenomena, which are themselves 
extremely varied. Rather the implication is that some things should or should not count as 
“emotions.” Should purely automatic, physical responses, such as the startle reflex, count as an 
emotion? Should relatively abstract preoccupations of thought count as emotions? I argue that 
the relative role that cognition and affect should play in the definition of “emotion” is not really 
what is at stake in this debate. Affective and cognitive theories should be seen as differing 
mostly in terms of the perspective they take, as cognitive theories tend to be more introspective, 
and affective theories take up a biological, third-person perspective for the sake of speculating 
about environmental adaptations rather than therapeutically altering the subject.  
In the first section of this chapter I discuss the affective/cognitive debate in the hopes of 
overcoming it. I do this by situating each position in the practical context of the individual’s 
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response to his or her emotions and the implicit moral evaluation of emotion. This gestalt shift 
involved in employing the pragmatic maxim helps us to see what is at stake in adopting either 
approach and to sympathize with both sets of motivations. When we reframe the debate this way, 
it becomes evident that, if there is a real disagreement, it is between the more Romantic view that 
emotions should largely be heeded and a more Rationalist view that emotions are often flawed. 
My insistence on connecting the philosophy of emotion to moral evaluation should not be 
surprising, since emotions have always been seen as somehow related to morality. Recent work 
in the philosophy of emotion largely sides with the Romantic view and expresses this 
relationship between emotion and morality with the idea that emotions are themselves moral 
evaluations. The second section of this chapter summarizes the most prevalent contemporary 
attempts to link emotion and moral theory, not only by means of the idea that emotions give us 
information about value, but also via moral subjectivism and moral sense theory. I argue that 
these attempts are insufficient because they fail to grasp that emotions are not fixed, pre-
theoretical evaluations but are themselves informed by moral thinking.  
The third section begins to develop the theory of emotion that motivates the rest of the 
dissertation. While I take up the cognitive approach’s focus on reflection and self-criticism, my 
goal is to overcome the cognitive legacy of Stoicism—the assertion that emotional judgments are 
always false—along with the idea that emotions are always true. Furthermore, calling emotions 
judgments, while partly illuminative, gives the false impression that emotions are fully self-
transparent, with relatively fixed boundaries. That the majority of emotional judgments are 
largely unconscious—a thesis that most philosophers of emotion accept, although for different 
reasons—casts doubt on this assumption. Instead, it is necessary to view emotions as processes 
of feelings and thoughts working together toward the impossible goal of self-understanding. I 
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consider the ways that emotions are involved in subjective processes of expression and re-
integration that aim at understanding and improving the whole self. If we are to truly understand 
the role that emotions play in our lives, we must account for the entire psychological context of 
the emotional experience. I tend toward inclusivity in my discussion of emotion, resisting the 
tendency to identify emotions with only a “part” of the self (cognition, affect, or desire)—indeed, 
resisting the tendency to think in terms of “parts” of the self at all. Emotions are interesting 
exactly because they reside at the intersection between the mind and the body, the space where 
the mind and the body overlap. They show the way that thoughts affect feeling and feeling 
affects thought. If we do continue to assume along with common parlance and folk psychology 
that emotion and reason are sufficiently different processes, approaching emotions in this holistic 
way demonstrates the ways that emotions and reasons are, nonetheless, integrally related. Given 
the integration between reason and emotion, and that emotions track the most important themes 
in our relationship to ourselves and our relationships with others, experiencing them calls on 
rationalist moral theory. This is one of the over-arching themes of this dissertation: that 
rationalist (Kantian) moral theory is internal to the experience of emotion.  
 
I. Cognitive and Affective Theories 
 Beginning a work on the role that emotional intelligence should play in moral theory with 
an orientation in the history of the philosophy of emotion serves to remind us that the topic of 
psychological self-improvement has not always been relegated to the anti-academic realm of the 
self-help genre. Nor was the study of virtue (and the science of self-improvement) classically an 
exclusively theoretical affair; in classical ethical texts, the study of virtue is always connected 
directly to pedagogy and the concrete pursuit of improving real people. The pursuit of virtue is 
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central to the pursuit of philosophy, and virtue, regardless of the theory, is always described as 
some form of emotional comportment. Whether it is said to be unemotional reason or the ecstatic 
overflowing of positive emotions, the topic of virtue involves emotion. The way that one answers 
the question of the relationship between virtue and emotion depends on the definition that one 
gives to “emotion” and the correlative definition that one gives to reason.  
 A survey of the history of the philosophy of emotion usually results in its summary in 
terms of the division between cognitive and affective theories of emotion. Roughly speaking, 
cognitive theories hold that emotions are cognitions; affective theories hold that emotions are 
affects. We might also remark that there can be as many different types of theories of emotion as 
there are seen to be parts or faculties of the mind. So, for example, we can also say that there are 
conative theories of emotion, i.e., theories that hold that emotions are desires (or states of action 
readiness). This fact about classifying theories of emotion already demonstrates something 
fundamental about emotions: even though they may be related to one part of the mind more than 
others, they can be seen as related to all parts of the mind.1 
 Aristotle and the Stoics are taken as forerunners of the cognitive theory of emotion 
because Aristotle held that the emotions are based on beliefs and the Stoics held that the 
emotions are (nothing but) judgments. The Stoic theory of emotion is simpler than Aristotle’s, 
and there is more reason for calling it a cognitive theory.2   
An Aristotelian theory of emotion comes mostly from the Rhetoric and the 
Nichomachean Ethics. In the former, Aristotle outlines the situations (both subjective and 
                                                
1 Prinz cleverly constructs a table to illustrate this, putting the “emotion episode component” alongside the theory of 
emotion that takes it as its paradigm: conscious experiences; feeling theories, change in body and face; somatic 
theories, action tendencies; behavioral theories, modulations of cognitive processes; processing mode theories, 
thoughts; pure cognitive theories. Jesse J. Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion (Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 10. One might argue that even this list is incomplete. 
2 For an argument that Aristotle’s theory does represent purely cognitive theory and that it is comprehensively 
constructed, see chapter 1 of W. W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1975). 
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objective) that tend to cause certain emotions. His emphasis is on teaching lawyers to sway 
jurors in ways conducive to their case. His discussion demonstrates that emotions are stirred by 
beliefs.3 Drawing from Aristotle’s discussion of emotion in the Rhetoric, Cooper argues that, for 
Aristotle, emotions involve three elements: a feeling that is either pleasurable or painful (or 
both); beliefs that arise “from ways events or conditions strike the one affected,” and a “desire 
for a specific range of reactive behaviors or other changes in the situation.”4 This definition of an 
emotion combines aspects from the affective, cognitive, and conative orientations of the mind.5 
Still, it is not clear from the Rhetoric whether beliefs operate a force over emotions or whether 
emotions operate force over beliefs. Aristotle writes: “Emotions are things through which, being 
turned around, people change in their judgments” (1378a 24-27). Perhaps the mutual causality 
between belief and emotion indicates a deeper-level identity. 
A quick review of Aristotle’s ethics will remind us that he believes that the emotions are 
in some ways susceptible to discursive reason and in some ways not.6 The Nichomachen Ethics 
                                                
3 The context in which we find the lion’s share of Aristotle’s discussion of emotion (pathos) is particularly 
significant and is mostly responsible for the fact that Aristotle is thought to have a cognitive theory of emotion. The 
goal of the Rhetoric is to teach lawyers how to sway jurors. It is no surprise that an “Aristotelian” theory of emotion 
holds that emotions are beliefs that are based on some kind of evidence: the giving of evidence is the only means a 
lawyer has of stirring emotions. Furthermore, jurors are in a position to judge a defendant, although not to actually 
interact with the defendant. It is no coincidence that Aristotle’s discussion of emotion portrays emotions as 
dispositions to actions, such as the disposition to help another with no benefit to oneself (charis), that are 
disconnected from the actions themselves: one can feel charis (or gratitude) toward a person without doing anything 
about it. See David Konstan, “The Emotion in Aristotle Rhetoric 2.7: Gratitude, not Kindness,” in Influences on 
Peripatetic Rhetoric: Essays in Honor of William W. Fortenbaugh, ed. David C. Mirhady (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 
2007), for an argument that charis should be translated as gratitude.) It is possible that the problem in translating this 
term comes from exactly the point about context to which I refer, namely the fact that charis is an emotion that is 
normally connected to some action (as is grace, or gratis) but is disconnected from its action in this context.) The 
juror is in a position to act regarding the defendant, but in a way that is removed from a direct relationship. 
4 John M. Cooper, Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), 422. Note that this three-part description is similar to Dewey’s, but Dewey 
focuses on the consciousness of the feeling rather than the consciousness of the situation that leads to the feeling. 
John Dewey, “The Theory of Emotion. (2) The Significance of Emotions,” Psychological Review 2 (1985): 13-32. 
5 Aristotle also considers one way that emotions relate to desires: anger is usually the result of a frustrated desire, 
and so one is “carried along by his own anger by the emotion [the desire] he is already feeling.” (1379a13). 
6 Cooper argues that Aristotle’s account of a long list of emotions in the Rhetoric is merely a “dialectic 
investigation” meant to prepare the way for a “scientific” theory, and not such a theory itself. Cooper, Reason and 
Emotion, chapter 19. 
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paints virtue as a type of pre-rational emotional disposition. Aristotle states that the virtuous 
person feels pleasure and pain at the right things; this is the difference between virtue and mere 
continence that Annas has accused Kant of missing.7 Aristotle’s tripartite theory of the soul holds 
that emotions originate in the non-rational soul and must be educated by reason. This picture of 
the soul makes us question whether or not we should attribute a cognitive theory of emotion to 
Aristotle, since, on this model, emotions are usually non-rational desires.8 The very fact that 
Aristotle holds that emotions are susceptible to rational argumentation and evidence makes us 
wonder why he places them in the non-rational/animalistic soul in the first place. Nevertheless, 
his account of akrasia rejects Plato’s assumption that total rational convincing of the passions is 
possible. As with all Ancient and Hellenistic theories of virtue, Aristotle sees virtue as a process 
of self-training. Emotional training is direct in the cases wherein the emotions are susceptible to 
reason, and it is indirect in the cases wherein the emotions are not susceptible to reason. 
Furthermore, the latter kind of training (behavioral training), which must occur continuously 
through proper influence and practice from infancy on, is the foundation for the former kind. In 
other words, the emotions can only become susceptible to reason if the person has already 
reached a certain level of intelligence and virtue, which are predicated on understanding through 
example.  
Stoicism, which is arguably the most important historical source for our contemporary 
approach to emotions.9 The Stoics present the most extreme form of a cognitive theory of 
                                                
7 Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
8 Sokolon’s argument that Aristotle believes that emotions can also sometimes be rational is based on a confusion 
between irrational and non-rational (19). Something that does not originate from reason (the non-rational) need not 
be opposed to reason (irrational).  
9 It is important to note the Christian legacy of Stoicism as well as its parallels with Buddhism. Nevertheless, 
Sherman argues that Buddhism also holds that reason can itself be a dangerous object of attachment. Nancy 
Sherman, Making a Necessity of Virtue: Aristotle and Kant on Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 115. Therefore, Buddhism is more like Pyrrhonism than Stoicism, which also aims at ataraxia. Nevertheless, 
Stoicism and Pyrrhonism share similarities. 
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emotion: they held that emotions are simply beliefs and that our prejudice that emotions are more 
than beliefs is simply a mistake.10 Following Aristotle, Stoics maintain that when you change 
your beliefs you change your emotions. Emotional beliefs always ascribe value to some person 
or thing outside of the individual’s control; hence emotions are always false beliefs, for the 
Stoics, since the truth is that the transitory world is without value (neither good nor bad). The 
Stoics were convinced of the necessity of eliminating anger and its negative effects on society. 
They believed that accomplishing this would similarly require weakening all of the emotions, 
since each emotional tie is a bond over which someone might become angry. As we will see in 
the next chapter, our current cultural assumptions about emotion are still very much preoccupied 
with worries about anger. We can see that the conviction that emotions are judgments is 
necessary for the prescription of apathy. If emotions are not judgments, it is not clear how we 
can be said to have control over them and how we might go about ridding ourselves of them.  
Nearly all contemporary cognitive theorists of emotion follow the Stoic line: that beliefs 
are necessary and sufficient for emotions while physical affects are neither necessary nor 
sufficient. Yet contemporary cognitive theorists do not agree with the Stoics that the emotions 
are necessarily mistaken judgments; they believe that they can inherit a Stoic account that is 
more friendly toward the emotions. For example, in Nussbaum’s Aristotelian/Stoic account, 
emotions are value judgments. Nussbaum uses the titular metaphor from her book Upheavals of 
Thought to describe emotions, holding that they are typically conscious mental preoccupations. 
She does not mean that we must constantly attend to them; rather she means that they have 
cognitive content. She identifies emotions with eudaimonistic judgments:  
So we appear to have type-identities between emotions and judgments—or, to put 
the matter more elastically, looking ahead, between emotions and value laden 
cognitive states. Emotions can be defined in terms of these value laden 
                                                
10 Annas, Morality of Happiness, 62; Diogenes VII 116. 
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recognitions alone, although we must recognize that some feelings of tumult or 
‘arousal’ will often accompany them, and sometimes [affective] feelings of a 
more type-specific kind, and although we must recall that they are at every point 
embodied. If we want to add this very general stipulation to the definition, we 
may do so though the proviso that we are talking about only the likely case, in 
order to retain the possibility of recognizing nonconscious emotions.11 
 
Nussbaum agrees that emotions often involve affective states, but she rejects the idea that 
affective states should be given definitional necessity. In addition to her example of the 
unconscious fear of death, which she holds to be an emotion, she gives the example of anger 
at/after her mother’s death that lasted for days, sometimes presenting no physical manifestation 
yet at other times expressing itself through physical symptoms. This example highlights a salient 
difference between cognitive and affective approaches: affective approaches tend to hold that 
emotions follow stimuli extremely quickly and that they are rather short-lived (emotions that 
hang on for days are defined as moods or dismissed as emotional remnants). Nussbaum, on the 
other hand, identifies an emotion, the fear of death, that lasts a lifetime. Although we by no 
means frequently disassociate the cognitive content from the bodily feeling, cognitivism captures 
the insights that we would not deny that someone is sad in the absence of certain privileged 
bodily feelings—simply saying “I am sad” would presumably be enough—although we would 
deny that a person is sad in the absence of a reason or occasion for sadness. In such a case we 
would look harder for a reason, or we would deny that the person is really sad; perhaps he is just 
tired? (Depression, if it is taken to mean sadness for no reason, is thought to be an emotional 
disorder.) 
 For Solomon, another contemporary follower of the Stoic (turned Sartrian) philosophy of 
emotion, “emotions are judgments” (“normative and often moral judgments”).12 But this does not 
                                                
11 Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 64. 
12 Robert Solomon, “Emotions and Choice,” in What is an Emotion? Classic Readings in Philosophical Psychology, 
ed. Robert C. Solomon and Chesire Calhoun (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 
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mean that emotions are propositional attitudes; rather, he claims that “emotions are subjective 
engagements in the world.”13 Solomon slides between talk of “judgments” and talk of 
“engagement” because both are intentional.14 Solomon focuses on the notion of emotional 
engagement to suggest that emotions can be willful or something we can be “caught up in.” 
Trying to include their affective aspect, he calls emotions “judgments of the body.”15 Solomon 
argues that feelings often accompany emotions, but he argues that emotions should not be 
identified with affects because affects are not intentional and emotions are. As we can see, 
contemporary cognitive theorists have moved to include affect in their theories, but they hold 
that emotions are better understood in terms of their cognitive content. 
 For Nussbaum, the moral upshot is that emotions teach us about ourselves and our values. 
The idea is that we often rationally or unconsciously ignore our relational attachments, and we 
ought not do this because they are our moral attachments. For Solomon, following Sartre, the 
moral implication of cognitivism is that we are always responsible for our emotions. Sartre, 
taking some lead (and license) from Freud, posits that even the most seemingly involuntary 
gestures are the products of preconscious wishes—“magical” incantations—and should therefore 
be subject to ethical scrutiny as though they were voluntary. Solomon, being a bit more practical, 
focuses on the way that emotional displays often serve unconscious purposes and should be 
taken to task on this score too.  
James is taken to be the forerunner of the affective theorists. In his “What Is an 
Emotion?” James argues that emotions are the conscious recognition of bodily responses that 
                                                
13 Robert C. Solomon, “Emotions, Thoughts, and Feelings: Emotions as Engagements with the World,” in Thinking 
about Feeling, ed. Robert C. Solomon (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 77. 
14 This is Sartre’s Heideggerian language, adopted by Sartre to respond to Heidegger’s criticism of (Cartesian) 
subjectivism. The idea of engagement is meant to imply that consciousness structures the subject and object at the 
same time. Note the parallel between this idea and James’s proto-Husserlian phenomenology. This continuity alone 
ought to be enough to obviate the cognitive-affective debate. 
15 Solomon, “Emotions and Choice,” 87. 
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follow from certain stimuli. His definition gives primacy to physical responses, such as crying, 
and it is often believed that he means to reduce emotions to these symptoms.16 James famously 
quipped that we do not cry because we are sad, but we are sad because we cry. In other words, 
the emotion should be identified with the bodily event, not with the mental event that may 
accompany, follow, or even precede it. Following James, affective theorists hold that feelings are 
a necessary element of any emotion. Without affects, we have merely thoughts, not emotions. 
For James, perception comes first, and then affect, and then the self-conscious perception of the 
affect. His point is that the feeling must come before the self-conscious perception of it. (On the 
other hand, James believes that the self-conscious aspect of emotion happens “the moment it 
occurs.”17)  
Most recently Prinz has offered a thorough and spirited defense of the affective approach 
in his Gut Reactions.18 In it he defends the view that emotions are “embodied valent 
appraisals.”19 He adopts Lazarus’s notion of “core-relational themes” and argues that emotions 
are perceptions of our body’s affective response to the perception of a core-relational theme.20 
Nevertheless, Prinz follows James in sometimes conflating the response with our awareness of it; 
hence he believes that we can have emotions (the bodily response) that are a part of phenomenal 
consciousness but still elude our current attention and thereby count as “unconscious” 
                                                
16 Solomon and Calhoun write that, for James, an emotion is a “physiological reaction.” Robert C. Solomon and 
Cheshire Calhoun, “Introduction,” in What is an Emotion? Classic Readings in Philosophical Psychology, ed. 
Robert C. Solomon and Chesire Calhoun (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 3. James’s essay is 
reprinted in this collection; the page numbers I give below refer to this edition. 
17 James, “What Is an Emotion?” 131. 
18 See also Jesse J. Prinz, “Embodied Emotions,” in Thinking about Feeling, ed. Robert C. Solomon (Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 44-58. 
19 Prinz’s survey of the affective and cognitive camps is much more complete than the brief one offered here and 
should be consulted by anyone pursuing further study.  
20 Richard Lazarus, Emotion and Adaptation (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). Prinz argues that 
we directly “perceive” core-relational themes, but, far from being counter-intuitive, this borders on tautological. 
Saying that feeling of sadness is the perception of personal loss does little more than tell us the definition of sadness. 
“Perception” and “feeling” are being used as synonyms.  
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emotions.21 Although Prinz agrees that emotions can be triggered by judgments and that they are 
amenable to cultural influence, he rejects the cognitive approach. Following James, as we will 
see shortly, he finds the machinery of the concept too clunky to account for what goes on in an 
emotion. He writes: “Forming the judgment that there has been a demeaning offense [involved in 
feeling anger], it would seem [according to cognitive theories], requires possession of the 
concept of being demeaning and being offensive.”22 This objection paints the cognitive theorist 
as being committed to the idea that emotions are always preceded by explicit, conscious 
thoughts, which is a dubious inference. Prinz makes the important point that “emotions can 
represent core relational themes without describing them… the complexity of that which is 
represented need not be mirrored by the complexity of the representation.” Furthermore, Prinz 
argues that cognitive theorists are united in holding that the cognitive components of emotion are 
“disembodied” because they hold that: 
the somatic concomitants of emotions must be distinguished from the concomitant 
propositional attitudes or appraisals. The cognitive components bound to our 
emotions are something above and beyond the bodily changes.23 
 
He points to the counterexamples of feelings outlasting their judgments as well as emotions 
being triggered somatically to show that emotions are not identical to judgments.  
Prinz argues that the fact that “emotions are often contingent on having certain thoughts” 
should not be generalized to the claim that “thoughts or ‘cognitions’ are essential to emotions. 
One of the most convincing criticisms of the affective approach is the retort that affect is not 
enough; mere feelings are insufficient to tell us which emotion we are having or if we are having 
                                                
21 Prinz borrows Block’s distinction between “access consciousness” and “phenomenal consciousness”; Prinz, Gut 
Reactions, 203. See Ned Block, “On a Confusion Between a Function of Consciousness,” Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences 18, no. 2 (1995): 227-287. 
22 Prinz, Gut Reactions, 24. 
23 Prinz, Gut Reactions, 25. 
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an emotion at all and not just some other physiological experience.24 Prinz argues that the 
affective theorist can take the cognitive context of the feeling into account, but that the feeling is 
still the core of the emotion. As we will see, Prinz would accuse my approach of falling prey to 
what he calls “the Problem of Plenty,” or identifying everything to which emotions are related 
with the emotions themselves. Instead, he takes a minimalist, essentialist approach that is 
predicated on a distinction between “state emotions” and “attitudinal emotions,” the latter being 
emotions that can go without affects but are instead dispositions to have certain affects. Prinz 
also makes use of Damasio’s idea of the “as-if loop” to explain instances where emotions “by-
pass the body.”25 These two caveats explain away Nussbaum’s example of the anger at/about her 
mother’s death that sometimes went without an affective expression. This conciliatory version of 
an affect theory sees Nussbaum’s examples as merely not the best example of an emotion. 
The best candidate for an emotion, on the affective view, would be something like the 
surge of adrenaline that one gets from being startled. For example, while spotting my toddler son 
as he climbs up and down the stairs, my heart will jump if I see him begin to fall. Prinz counts 
the fact that I may remain a little jumpy—or my adrenaline might be channeled into 
excitement—even after I see that he has caught himself as evidence that affects have a life of 
their own and should not, therefore, be linked to judgments. 
In his textbook on emotion, Emotion Explained, Rolls devotes chapters to hunger, thirst, 
drug addiction, and sexual desire (as he assumes that sexual desire is a purely biological drive).26 
                                                
24 Cannon was the first to express this argument that “the same visceral changes appear in a number of different 
emotions.” See W. B. Cannon, “The James-Lange Theory of Emotion: A Critical Examination and an Alternative 
Theory,” American Journal of Psychology 39 (1927): 10-124 (reprinted in The Nature of Emotion, ed. M. B. Arnold 
(Harmondworth, England: Penguin, 1968.). Quotation from The Nature of Emotion, 18. 
25 Prinz, Gut Reactions, 71. It is not clear whether this phrase is meant to refer to emotions that occur without affects 
or emotions that are triggered by judgments. Part of the confusion comes from Prinz’s tendency to use the term 
“disembodied” to refer to things that are merely in the brain.  
26 Edmund T. Rolls, Emotion Explained (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 21. Rolls fails to offer 
an argument that one can “explain” emotion without referring to any emotion, but instead referring to affective 
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The biological drives that Rolls includes with emotions are never given that classification in 
common discourse. We can also see this in the case of startle. Startle is physiologically identical 
to fear, but is not, for that reason, the same as fear.  
Robinson, on the other hand, has defended the opposite position.27 She criticizes what she 
calls the “judgmentalist” philosophical theories of emotion for ignoring the “primitive side” of 
emotion.28 Following Ekman and the Darwinian tradition, she argues that startle should be 
considered an emotion because it involves a characteristic pattern of neural firing and a 
characteristic facial expression. She argues that it is a “developmentally early form” of fear and 
surprise. Although Robinson uses LeDoux to challenge the idea that emotions require conscious 
thought, she argues that the startle response is an implicit judgment and that, because of this, it 
should be taken as the prototypical emotion:  
Emotional response should be thought of, on the model of the startle response, as 
a response that focuses our attention on (makes salient) and registers as significant 
to the goals (wants, motives) of the organism, something in the perceived 
(remembered, imagined environment); this response characteristically consists in 
motor and autonomic nervous system change… 29 
 
This sounds like a possible definition of emotion but an unlikely definition of startle, 
since we are startled well before we know whether or not the event is relevant to our desires and 
for that reason the startle response is often mistaken. Ekman, on the other hand, holds that startle 
is not an emotion because it cannot be inhibited or simulated, and because it is reliably caused by 
a loud noise and emotions are not reliably caused by any one general thing.30 Robinson’s 
                                                
states that even the author does not call “emotions.” It is one thing to attempt to replace ordinary language with more 
precise theoretical definitions or make the case that people are often confused in their experience; it is quite another 
thing to simply swap one concept for another, perhaps while giving the explanation that one is rejecting “folk” 
theories of emotion, as LeDoux does (p. 16). 
27 Jenefer Robinson, “Startle,” Journal of Philosophy 92, no. 2 (1995): 53-57. 
28 Robinson, “Startle,” 53: she singles out Gabriele Taylor’s and Patricia Greenspan’s work. 
29 Robinson, “Startle,” 62. 
30 Paul Ekman, “Expression and the Nature of Emotion,” in Approaches to Emotion, ed. K. Scherer and P. Ekman 
(Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1984), 329. 
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argument is motivated by supposedly anti-affective accounts of emotion, but she appears to be 
straw-manning her opposition, since it is not evident that “judgmentalist” theories of emotion 
would deny that startle is a “proto-emotional response.”  Many emotions seem to involve 
physiological arousal, but that does not make startle an emotion, much less the prototypical 
emotion, as LeDoux seems to assume with his work on the fear response. 
We have seen that affective and cognitive theories take two very different types of 
emotion as their models for emotion in general. Cognitive theorists hold that it makes sense to 
say that someone can be angry without feeling angry; affective theorists think it makes sense to 
say that someone can feel angry without having something to be angry about. Yet, I think that it 
is obvious that both cases, either emotional affects without intentionality or emotional 
intentionality without affects, are rare and occupy the margins of emotional phenomena. Even if 
emotions are a “natural kind,” there must be some good reason for counting some things as 
emotions and ruling out others; and it the reasons for privileging some emotions over others that 
we must examine. 
This argument about the way we should define emotion, if it boils down merely to 
privileging some instances of emotion and excluding others, does not constitute an interesting 
debate. The first and simplest step we can take in overcoming the cognitive-affective debate 
involves refusing to squabble over which emotions should or should not count as an “emotion.” 
There can be no rational debate about how to cut the psychological cake. The only type of reason 
that can be offered in this debate comes from observations about the way we use the word 
“emotion,” but contradictory reasons about the way that we should use the word “emotion” count 
as well. It is common to point out that the current use of the word “emotion” is a relatively recent 
linguistic development and that the term “passion,” with its connection to passivity, is 
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historically more prevalent. “Emotion,” on the other hand, is formed from an active verb. These 
etymological musings are ultimately inconclusive; perhaps the recent linguistic development 
reflects progress in the latent theory of emotion.31 I think Prinz is right to argue that we usually 
use the term emotion to refer to the affect, rather than to the thoughts, but the point of the 
cognitive approach is to illuminate emotional experience, not to reflect on natural language. 
Furthermore, the criticism that affects alone cannot tell us which affects count as emotions—or 
which emotions they represent—still holds sway. If emotions are affects, they must be emotional 
affects, and if emotions are judgments, they must be emotional judgments. Hence, the first step 
of identifying emotions with one or the other does not yet tell us very much. 
Cognitive and affective theorists are sometimes not even interested in the same kinds of 
emotional phenomena. Affective theorists, such as Rolls, often include hunger and sexual 
excitement among emotions (because they are focusing on physiological processes); whereas 
cognitive theorists tend to focus on those emotions that affective theorists would call moods or 
dispositions.32 These different definitions are a product of different approaches: one sees itself as 
more scientific, focusing on “observable” phenomena, while the other privileges introspection. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of James’s theory, from his own perspective, is that it follows 
in the foot-steps of Darwinism. He writes that the “nervous system of every living thing is but a 
bundle of predispositions to react in particular ways upon the contact of particular features of the 
environment.”33 Darwin observes physiological emotional responses, yielding a behavioral 
theory of emotion, and speculates about their original adaptive value. So, for example, he 
                                                
31 See James Averill, “Emotion and Anxiety: Sociocultural, Biological, and Psychological Determinants,” and 
Amelie Rorty, “Explaining Emotions,” both in Explaining Emotions, ed. Amelie Rorty (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1980). 
32 In focusing on evolutionary explanations, affective theorists tend to resort to the idea that emotions are out-dated 
adaptations. This tendency yields the difference that affective theorists tend to hold that emotions are “wrong” 
because they are not appropriate to the situation, more than cognitive theorists do.  A more complete discussion of 
this difference is found in chapter 2.  
33 James, “What Is an Emotion?” 129. 
 26 
hypothesizes that crying is a way to protect the eyes during violent expiration. The fact that 
James is a part of this general trend in philosophy might help explain why he is associated with 
more scientific approaches to emotion, such as neurobiology.34  
The full significance of the Darwinian influence on affective theories of emotion must be 
appreciated. Biologists have more interest in demonstrating the law-like fixity of universal 
emotional phenomena.35 They observe emotions from a third-person perspective, focusing on the 
relationship between the subject and the environment.36 This viewpoint is the product of different 
goals and yields different forms of study than the cognitive viewpoint, which is more subjective 
and introspective. A biological approach focuses on the way that the human is determined by, or 
adapted to, the environment. It holds a certain fascination with determinism, and so the affective 
theorist holds that affects are caused by the environment (even when the “environment” refers to 
subjective thoughts, as Prinz concedes). It is thought that in order to study something 
“scientifically” it is necessary to reduce it to this level of cause-and-effect determinism.  
Most neurological approaches to emotion focus on the idea that emotions are out of our 
control and yet, controllable after the fact. Rolls, for example, makes a distinction between 
emotions, which are initiated by stimuli in the external environment, and affective states, which 
are caused by a change in the “internal milieu,” where hunger is an example of the latter and 
sadness is an example of the former. Furthermore, he believes that this difference is not 
                                                
34 Were we to draw a line between psychology and biology, James himself would fall onto the former side, since in 
his The Principles of Psychology he tells us that he follows the “psychological method of introspection.” In fact, this 
proclamation represents a criticism of and turn away from behaviorism, and so it is somewhat ironic that he is taken 
to be the father of the affective approach. 
35 Affective theorists often object that if emotions are judgments then it would not be possible for animals to have 
emotions, and yet they do. We need not deny that there are universal emotions or that humans share some forms of 
emotional expression with other animals, or that emotions have their manifestation in the autonomic nervous system, 
in order to maintain that emotions also contain latent, useful (not irrational or simplistic) cognitive content. 
Nussbaum is sensitive to this point. 
36 Ekman’s work is a particularly clear example of this tone. See, e.g., Ekman, “Expression and the Nature of 
Emotion.” 
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sufficiently alienating, making it reasonable to study one and draw conclusions about the other. 
Clearly, Rolls’s strategy for explaining emotions “scientifically” is to cut out their cognitive 
content in order to explain them biologically.  
It is common to level the following criticism at neurology when it pretends to be able to 
ground the study of emotion: Neurology cannot do without or even come before psychology or 
ordinary language and their theoretical or folk theories of emotion because neurology must rely 
on first person reports in order to correlate neurological phenomena with emotions in the first 
place.37 The neurologist might counter that he can do without the term “fear” and can instead 
show that fear responses, which can be observed without subjective reports, reliably correlate to 
amygdalal activity. We might up the ante and demand that the neurologist demonstrate that these 
bodily fear responses actually occur in humans experiencing fear. It is likely that they do occur 
in a portion of the cases that would be self-reported as “fear” and do not occur in the others (the 
neurologist would likely state that he is not interested in those other cases, although some other 
neurologist might be); and that we must split the term “fear” into, at least, two types: 
physiological and non-physiological fear (such as Nussbaum’s example of the constant un-
conscious fear of death). So far the neurologist has made a pretty good case. Still, neurology is 
not likely to inform a theory of emotion if it is not mixed with introspection. As we have seen, 
LeDoux’s conclusion that fear responses are “unconscious” is belied by introspection. Neurology 
also demonstrates the unfortunate, “scientific” tendency to strip the human (and the animal for 
that matter) of her human properties. Introspection is an important part of human life and the 
experience of emotion, even if it is not a part of neurology. 
Nevertheless, we must keep in mind that the role that freedom and determinism play in 
both of these approaches is not a falsifiable hypothesis, but a set of discipline-specific 
                                                
37 Nussbaum articulates this criticism. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 8.  
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assumptions set out for the sake of study. Affective theorists are interested in the causes of 
emotions and cognitive approaches are interested in the intentionality of emotion. The latter 
naturally leads to analysis—to the question, “what are you angry about?”  
My argument is different than Rorty’s argument that biological and cognitive 
explanations figure differently in the explanations of different emotions.38 Aside from that fact, it 
is also the case that the best way to understand the difference between biological and 
psychological explanations is not necessarily in the type of explanation given, but in the general 
assumptions and direction of the endeavors. Gesturing back to Aristotle’s comment in De Anima, 
we must notice that one can study an emotion either from a biological or a psychological 
perspective.39 It is important to note that affective theorists focus on affects insofar as they are 
observable, attempting to image and measure the more elusive affects. Scientists focus on affect 
and desire, or behavior, because affects are thought to be more physical and objective than 
thoughts. A biological study of emotion takes the point of intercourse between the subject and 
the environment as its object of study, and so it focuses on the affects that most immediately 
occur as reactions to stimuli. While the biological approach is pressured to yield implications for 
therapy, its implicit emphasis does not lie in changing the phenomena it studies.40 (It is quite 
ironic that the biological approach is interested in classifying and categorizing normal emotional 
responses, when currently, in the case of neurology, its primary research objects are pathological 
                                                
38 Rorty, “Explaining Emotions.” I do generally agree with the conclusions expressed in Amelie Rorty,  “Enough 
Already with ‘Theories of the Emotions’,” in Thinking about Feeling, ed. Robert C. Solomon (Oxford, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004). 
39 “Accordingly, a physicist and a dialectician would define each [attribute of the soul] in a different way. For 
instance, in stating what anger is, the dialectician would say that it is a desire to retaliate by causing pain, or 
something of this sort, whereas a physicist would say that it is the rise in temperature of the blood or heat round the 
heart” (403a25-33).  
40 Affective theorists are not opposed to therapy, nor do they hold that changing emotional responses is impossible. 
Rather, they focus on behavioral training, which the cognitive approach will have to admit is sometimes necessary, 
as with the case of phobia. Aristotle’s notion of virtue, and, as we shall see in chapters 3 and 4, Kant’s as well, 
recognizes that emotional therapy must take the form of both theoretical understanding and habitualizing practices. 
One without the other would yield either coldness or mindlessness. 
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cases—not to mention animals—while the cognitive approach, being introspective, has the most 
access to prosaic emotions (Freud aside) and yet is more interested in therapy.) 
Taking up either a biological or an introspective perspective leads to certain tendencies in 
the study of emotion. The biological approach, more so than the introspective approach, tends to 
yield lists of the discrete emotions, assuming that each emotion is a natural kind. It may seem 
surprising that Frijda’s book The Laws of Emotion is exactly such a list, since he follows Lewis 
in holding that emotions are “self-organizing cognitive appraisals.”41 Yet Frijda holds that 
emotions are “states of action readiness,” underscoring the extent to which conative theories, 
even though they include both affective and cognitive aspects of emotion, are closely aligned 
with affective theories because of their third-person perspective of the relationship between the 
subject and environment. Neu, on the other hand, who represents a more cognitive approach, 
argues that the emotions do not qualify as natural kinds; they are determined by thoughts and 
hence are too numerous to classify in only but the most general groupings. Cognitive theorists 
tend to focus on individual and cultural variability instead of universality. Rorty concurs, and 
adds that emotions cannot be “sharply distinguished from moods, motives, attitudes, [and] 
character traits.”42 Again, in this difference between the two approaches, we do not see a 
disagreement about the facts about emotion—Frijda’s “laws” of emotion are not wrong, they are 
simply very general and open to the criticism of tautology—but a difference in focus and goal. 
The goal of therapeutic self-analysis necessarily sees emotions as fluid and indistinct since it is 
familiar with the relationship between emotions and the ways that one emotion can turn into or 
reveal itself to contain another. 
                                                
41 Nico Frijda, The Laws of Emotion (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2007); Marc D. Lewis, “Self 
Organizing Cognitive Appraisals,” Cognition and Emotion 10 (1996): 1-25; Marc D. Lewis, “Bridging Emotion 
Theory and Neurobiology through Dynamic System Modeling,” Behavioral and Brain Science 28 (2005): 105-131. 
42 Amelie Rorty, “Introduction” in Explaining Emotions, Amelie Rorty (ed.) (University of California Press, 1980). 
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II. A Synthesis 
In order to discover whether or not there is a substantive disagreement between cognitive 
and affective theories of emotion, we must rule out those disputes that are merely verbal. 
Existing debate has relied on a good deal of straw-manning, the most obvious and prevalent 
example of which come from the cognitive side. 
Most cognitive theorists dismiss the affective approach by reducing it to what Prinz calls 
a “feeling theory.” The affective position is often caricatured, with references to poetry or 
common idioms, as holding that emotions are mere feelings and that they are not about anything 
at all. Although the title of his book might suggest otherwise, Prinz distances himself from this 
position and is not able to provide a reference to anyone who does hold it.43 James’s position 
might be taken for a brute feeling theory, but, as we shall see, that would be a mistake. 
According to the affective approach, emotions are not mere feelings; they are more like 
perceptions or immediate responses. The idea that the emotion is itself the evaluation is similar 
to Nussbaum’s theory, a connection she herself might have made had she bucked the tendency to 
misrepresent the affective approach.  
Another unfair characterization comes with Prinz’s insistence that cognitive approaches 
hold that emotions are “disembodied.” Contra cognitive approaches, Prinz writes: “We should 
not feel compelled to supplement embodied states with meaningful thoughts: instead we should 
put meaning into our bodies.”44 We have already seen that both Nussbaum and Solomon 
characterize emotions as being “embodied.” Solomon’s label of “judgments of the body” seems 
identical to Prinz’s point, and yet it seems that Prinz would argue that judgments are necessarily 
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“disembodied” because they involve concepts. Emotions, for Prinz, “represent” core-relational 
themes, but they do not count as “judgments.”45 The idea seems to be that conceptual thinking 
cannot be “embodied,” or it cannot have a feel to it, because concepts are abstracted from 
immediate experience.  
Calhoun objects to the cognitive approach because, as she argues, emotions and beliefs 
and “logically and ontologically” distinct categories.46 This objection is not only question-
begging for an affective approach, but it is far too strong and is not upheld by Calhoun’s 
analysis.47 Emotions are interesting precisely because, although we commonly assume a 
dichotomy between physical and mental experience—this dichotomy is a normal part of folk 
psychology—even an unsophisticated account of a simple emotion belies it. Most emotional 
affects are obviously psychosomatic: we commonly recognize that we are able to “worry 
ourselves sick” or “work ourselves into a fury.” Thoughts like these are obviously embodied. 
Regulating one’s affects by means of one’s thoughts is an everyday occurrence; so is regulating 
one’s thought by means of externally manipulating affects. Freud founded modern psychology 
on the idea that physical symptoms might contain latent thought content; Averill, adapting a 
psychoanalytic approach, argues that one source of the apparent passivity of affect is 
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ed. Robert C. Solomon and Chesire Calhoun (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 328. Much of 
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dissociation.48 True, the relationship between beliefs and emotions does not entail an equation, as 
Calhoun points out, but such an equation is not “logically and ontologically” ruled out either. 
Still, it is not clear what Solomon and Nussbaum mean by asserting that emotions are 
“embodied.” Even though Nussbaum and Solomon insist that affects should not have definitional 
priority in “emotion,” given examples of affect-less emotions, it seems that what they really 
mean to say is that, to the contrary, all thoughts are “embodied” and have concomitant affects 
simply because they are experienced. This is a Heideggerian idea—the idea that Dasein is 
always in a mood—and, as we shall see, it is at home in James’s proto-phenomenological 
philosophy. (Hume’s notion that experience is distinguishable from thought by the feeling of its 
liveliness presages James and suggests a way in which empiricism might lead necessarily to an 
affect-based phenomenology.) 
It is also possible to argue that, not just present experience, but also memories are 
affective. Carruthers, in her study of medieval rhetoric, argues that: 
Some traditions in ancient philosophy also recognized an emotional component in 
all memory. Memory images are composed of two elements: a ‘likeness’ 
(similitudo) that serves as a cognitive cue or token to the ‘matter’ or res being 
remembered, and intentio or the “inclination” or “attitude” we have to the 
remembered experience, which helps both to classify and retrieve it. Thus, 
memories are all images, and they are all and always emotionally ‘colored’.49 
 
This is understandably not a popular position among those who seek to define emotion, since it 
seems to take us one step further away from coming up with that which is unique to emotions. 
Both the affective and cognitive sides would seem to agree that the specific thought-affect 
combinations that are termed “emotions” as opposed to “thoughts” are so because they fit certain 
                                                
48 James Averill, “Emotion and Anxiety: Sociocultural, Biological, and Psychological Determinants,” in Explaining 
Emotions, ed. Amelie Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). Averill classifies emotions both on a 
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49 Mary Carruthers, The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400-1200 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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proto-typical response patterns. We might say that emotions are very lively, lively ideas, or that 
they are not just hot, but burning hot, impressions. (Of course, this suggestion verges on parody 
because I remain unconvinced that defining emotion is an interesting philosophical enterprise in 
the first place.)  
We might instead follow Calhoun and concede that affects and beliefs are different, or at 
least at opposite ends of a spectrum. Still, we have seen that no one would willingly assent to the 
proposition that emotions are “disembodied.” Nussbaum, at least, would agree with Prinz that we 
need to “put meaning into our bodies.”50 Her emphasis on emotional insight demonstrates this 
conviction: she might rather say that we need to become aware of the meanings that are in our 
bodies already. Solomon’s focus, on the other hand, is critical; this is a significant difference to 
which we shall return shortly. In the meantime, it is important to note that being critical of one’s 
emotions —at least if one is skeptical that they are agents of existential denial—seems to entail 
that they are more, not less, meaningful than previously thought. It is still an open question 
whether or not said meaning would reside “in our bodies,” but this prolonged attempt to find the 
line between the mind and the body begins to contradict the original spirit of “embodiment.” 
Prinz’s epithet reveals itself to be really about the role that “concepts” play in emotions. 
His point that “the complexity of that which is represented need not be mirrored by the 
complexity of the representation” is an important one. It seems to be the case that calling 
emotions “judgments” cannot shake the implication that the thoughts that underlie emotions must 
be conscious; yet, they are often neither conscious nor explicit. Might the cognitive theorist 
merely say that emotions “involve” or “imply” judgments in order to get out of this unfelicitous 
connotation? Whatever strategy they take, no cognitive theorist is committed to the idea that 
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emotional judgments must be explicit and conscious. If the problem with judgments is that they 
are thought to require slow, conscious mental acts for their deployment, then we cannot say that 
emotions involve judgments. Nevertheless, this does not seem to be the reason that cognitive 
theorists latch onto the model of judgment in order to describe emotions. The majority of 
theorists agree that emotions can occur rather quickly, as if they were not connected to conscious 
thoughts, i.e., that there can be snap judgments. 
Prinz agrees that emotions involve appraisals, but he aligns these appraisals with 
perception rather than judgment. Both James and Prinz take perception as the model for emotion, 
but we cannot conclude thereby that they take emotions to be any less conceptual. James would 
likely protest that emotions do not involve concepts, but this is due to his derogatory view of 
concepts, not of emotions. Throughout his life James became more skeptical of the legitimacy of 
explicit conceptual thought and more convinced that truth was conveyed immediately through 
practice. In his Varieties of Religious Experience, James’s discussion of truth borders on 
mysticism. He describes religious conversion, at least the more spontaneous type, as the 
achievement of a more harmonious integration of beliefs and feelings. In other words, 
conversion is the most important, although just one, example of a case for which feelings are a 
better guide than reason. For James, concepts refer to more abstract mental processes, not 
instruments that facilitate normal experience. James follows Pierce in understanding the beliefs 
that inform normal decision-making processes as mental habits; in “The Sentiment of 
Rationality,” he comes close to arguing that rationality itself is merely a sentiment. Toward the 
end of his life he became more suspicious of conceptual thought in general, suggesting in his “A 
Pluralistic Universe” that it has a tendency to distort reality.51 
                                                
51 See Russell Goodman, “William James,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), ed. 
Edward N. Zalta, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/james/>. 
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James’s theory of perception in based in his neutral monism, which holds that the “mind” 
and “body” are abstractions that refer to one underlying thing that is itself neither mental or 
physical. Similarly, his descriptions of experience combine what we would normally take to be 
both mental and physical aspects.52 Perception, for James, is nearly indistinguishable from 
conscious recognition because perception itself already represents a cognitively organized form 
of sensation.53 Emotions can only be so closely tied to perceptions because perceptions are not of 
the given, as Quine argues that empiricists would have it, but are already cognitively formed. 
Just as Kant takes his model for experience from judgment, James’s account of perception 
includes what we would normally refer to as conceptual recognition. If we follow Solomon in 
asserting that judgments need not be propositional attitudes but are rather ways of representing 
objects, then we can argue that James’s notion of perception similarly offers a theory of 
“engagement” with world. 
In calling emotions “embodied appraisals,” Prinz sounds a lot like Solomon or 
Nussbaum, but in the affective camp.54 Prinz’s argument shows, perhaps inadvertently, the way 
that the affective position is cognitive, or conceptual, on its own terms. The affective account is 
conceptual: it relies on the complex meaning of the environmental or internal cue to cause the 
affect. It seems that a cognitive theorist should be willing to accept a robust revision of James’s 
theory of perception in place of the role that “judgment” or “belief” is intended to play in the 
theory.55 In response to the affective position that affects precede judgments, Solomon retorts, 
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“there is still cognition there,” referring obviously to the possibility of giving a rational account 
of the situation, not to the presence of conscious beliefs.56 Clearly, the difference between the 
cognitive and affective approaches must be characterized differently than in terms of conceptual 
context.57 Just as Prinz exposes with his discussion of the perception of core-relational themes, 
having an emotion involves the employment of concepts. It is not just that we see a box outside 
of the door; we see the box as a gift that we have been happily anticipating.58 It is the latter 
conceptual meaning, not the box itself, that is a necessary component of an emotion. Using the 
term “conceptual” instead of “cognitive” represents progress in overcoming the debate, because 
cognitive theorists are not committed to the idea that the content of emotions has already been 
explicitly cognized before the emotion occurs, but merely to the idea that it is there and can be 
made explicit, even if only after the fact. In the example of the gift, the person most likely does 
not explicitly think “There is the gift from my mom that will probably contain my grandmother’s 
necklace that I used to love trying on when I was a little girl,” and yet all of those thoughts (and 
more) are in some sense present.  
This misunderstanding about the debate might be the reason that cognitive theories 
appear irksome to affective theorists. To the affect theorist, the cognitive theorist is obstinately 
asserting that people are somehow consciously and antecedently aware of the judgments that 
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He assumes that the jurors will be rather easily made to feel one emotion or another (and so having two strong but 
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56 Solomon, “Emotions, Thoughts, and Feelings,” 79. 
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contribute to an emotion. They are right to object that such a position could not allow for the 
quickness of emotions, nor does it ring true from experience. Thus, affective theorists often 
caricature the cognitive approach as arguing that all emotions are like false, affected emotion.59 
In reality, it is not at all an important feature of a cognitive theory that the subject be consciously 
aware of the beliefs and judgments that are related to an emotion. What is important to the 
cognitive theorist is that the emotion be cognitively analyzable. In this way, emotions can be 
shown to be related to beliefs and judgments after the fact, and their genesis can be constructed 
into an intelligible psychic narrative, even if their causes remain unconscious psychic 
mechanisms.  
Here, in the discussion of the way that we represent emotions to ourselves after the fact, 
we are beginning to approach one real difference between cognitive and affective approaches. 
Prinz denies that emotions are cognitive because he takes cognition to involve an act that is 
within the subject’s control. I do not think that cognitive theorists would accept this definition of 
cognition, but it does seem to get at a peculiarity of the cognitive approach that is a hold-over 
from Stoicism, viz, the fact that it seems to suggest that we can change our emotions by changing 
our judgments. This difference can also be expressed in terms of the passivity or activity of the 
emotion or in terms of freedom and determinism, which, as we have already seen, is related to 
different disciplinary assumptions.  
 Prinz retreads some Aristotelian ground in briefly admitting that there is a sense in which 
emotions are under our control and a sense in which they are not under our control: 
Emotions are voluntary in a double sense. Thinking about something in the right 
way can certainly influence our emotions, and calibration files can be modified 
through education and experience. We exert control over emotions by choosing 
what to think about, and by cultivating calibration files. But emotions are also 
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involuntary in a double sense. First, the thoughts and images contained in an 
established calibration file may set off emotions automatically. If one happens, by 
choice, to activate a representation in a calibration file, an emotion will ensue. 
Second, once an emotion has been initiated, we cannot alter it by direct 
intervention. Initiation pathways and response pathways both operate without the 
luxury of control.60  
 
I hesitate to challenge Prinz’s last point because I do not want to spoil the spirit of honest 
reconciliation, but I feel compelled to point out that, if there is a difference between the initiation 
of an emotion and our response to it, it is surely in the fact that the latter is more under our 
control. Of course, it often feels like we are in the grip of an emotion, but that does not make it 
so. Rather, emotions are involuntary because, once they have begun, they feel involuntary, and 
are not changed as quickly as thoughts are. (Still, I think it is important to challenge the extent to 
which conscious thought is under our control. If cognition is an evolutionary adaptation, it is not 
radically open to variation in function. Nor do we often experience ourselves as directing 
cognition; it is rather the case that the topic or experiences at hand direct cognition.) Also, 
emotions are involuntary because the “calibration files” or past experiences that inform them 
were not in our control at the time, nor can we change the past. Still, as Prinz says, we can create 
new experiences to rival and trump the experiences that we have already been given.  
Still, this fully refined point uncovers a further, and perhaps the most important 
difference between affective and cognitive approaches: a moral difference. A further possible 
difference between “perception” and “judgment” is the degree of subjective responsibility. We 
assume that perceptions are caused by objects and judgments are caused by subjects. 
Furthermore, perceptions are not thought to involve “truth-claims” because they tell us 
something about the subject, not about the object, and judgments can be wrong because they are 
about objects. Cognitive theorists have thought that they differed from affective theorists in 
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holding that emotions are “about” something, but, as we have seen, no one maintains that 
emotions are not “about” anything. Rather, the salient difference between perception and 
judgments is whether or not we focus on their truth. Perceptions can be mistaken, but those who 
study perception do not focus on this fact; instead they focus on what perceptions tell us about 
the subject. Everyone seems to agree that emotions are evaluations, but some theorists wish to go 
further and consider the ways that we do and should evaluate these evaluations.  
For James and for Prinz, as well as for the more conciliatory, anti-Stoic, cognitive 
approaches, it is important that we not try to alter our emotions. If the emotions presents itself as 
absolute, it is perhaps with good reason. Just as Hume uses skepticism to advance empiricism, 
James can sometimes appear to be a biological reductionist, but this polemic is in the service of 
advancing a psychological monism and moral naturalism. Calling himself a radical empiricist, 
James is suspicious of those thought-processes which take themselves to be “pure.” Instead, the 
most important intellectual truths are intuitive, and they are products of our natural, 
psychological engagement with the world. It is not hard to see that James’s pragmatism 
represents a dissatisfaction with the primacy given to reason in the history of philosophy, and so 
one defense proffered for the “lower” faculties comes in the form of a Romantic inversion of 
value. James seems to want to defend emotion from the imperialist perversion of reason, and his 
strategy for doing so is to assert that emotions are more rational than reasons. This move is 
certainly not novel, and it is enjoying much current popularity. In fact, if we phrase the debate in 
these terms it seems that alliances are re-drawn and many more cognitive approaches, like 
Nussbaum’s, end up agreeing with James and Prinz. Prinz’s assertion that emotions are 
embodied must be understood as the idea that moral theory must be embodied, or that the body 
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must play a foundational role in moral theory, as we can see with the new moral sense theory of 
his The Emotional Construction of Morals.61  
It is becoming popular to defend the “rationality” of emotions, not by assimilating them 
into the rational mind but by arguing that they take precedence over the rational mind. Two 
related lines of argumentation have become common in linking emotionality to morality in this 
way; both are based on the idea that emotions help unemotional reason make decisions. The first 
is that emotions help us to act morally. Some versions of this argument hold that morality is 
grounded in natural moral feelings, like empathy, and it is therefore similar to the moral sense 
theory of Hume or Hutcheson. We have already seen that James and Prinz take this approach. 
The second is that emotions give us information about out values. This argument also tends 
towards moral sense theory, although less directly. 
Neurobiologists who study emotion speculate that emotions are important for reasoning 
and moral behavior. Damasio’s work is the most well known in this regard.62 Damasio studies 
people with frontal-lobe brain damage who, although they behave normally in other ways, 
behave in an irresponsible way that is inconsistent with their pre-trauma personalities. They have 
trouble managing their finances, getting to work on time or going at all, and following through 
with required job tasks. They violate social conventions, sometimes breaking laws, and they 
show a lack of empathy with their spouses.63 Previously these behaviors had been explained as 
an impairment of reasoning or memory abilities, but Damasio argues that these explanations are 
not satisfactory and speculates that the problems are caused by a breakdown of emotional, not 
cognitive functioning. He argues that the patients fail to bring to mind the appropriate emotional 
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memory that would help them behave properly or make an effective decision. Damasio uses this 
idea to argue that feelings are “rational,” i.e., they are beneficial to good reasoning. His argument 
is similar to De Sousa’s defense of the “rationality” of emotion, which holds that emotions help 
us both to answer questions of salience and to break stalemates in rational decision-making.64 
Damasio’s view of emotion is based on what he calls the “somatic marker hypothesis” of 
decision-making.65 It holds that emotions are “integral to processes of reasoning and decision-
making” because the “mechanisms of reasoning” are normally affected by “signals hailing from 
the neural machinery that underlies emotion.”66 Bechara’s work in conjunction with Damasio, 
especially the article “Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy,” 
helps to illuminate the full force of the idea that emotions are rational. This article describes an 
experiment in which people with prefrontal brain damage (and decision-making defects) and 
people without brain damage were asked to play a gambling game in which certain choices were 
riskier than others. The people without brain damage, after playing for a while, had a hunch that 
certain decks of cards were riskier. Many of them, after playing for even longer, could articulate 
the reason that those decks were riskier. The entire non-brain damaged group avoided the risky 
decks. The group with prefrontal brain damage did not report experiencing a hunch, even though 
later, almost half of them had conceptual knowledge of the reason certain decks were more and 
less advantageous. Surprisingly, no one from the brain-damaged group avoided the 
disadvantageous decks, even those who explicitly knew that that they were disadvantageous. The 
experiment, like the patients discussed above, demonstrates a gap between conceptual 
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knowledge and behavior. From this experiment, Bechara and Damasio conclude that human 
decision-making involves two possible paths: affective and cognitive, the latter borrowing from 
the former. They speculate that the affective path makes use of nondeclarative knowledge that 
draws on memory of rewards and punishments. Damasio refers to this as a “gut feeling.”67  
Of course, this model that posits two levels of decision-making does not explain the 
reason that the brain-damaged subjects failed to choose advantageously even when they had the 
conceptual grasp of the situation. The explanation would have to be that they did not care in the 
same way that the subjects without brain damage did. Similarly, in their lives, the reason for 
causing trouble in their marriages and jobs would have to be that they did not care about these 
things. The fact that those people without a hunch, or, in other words, with a feeling impairment, 
were not able to act on explicit conceptual decision-making suggests that cognitive decision-
making processes rely on affect, just as they rely on other types of information, not that there are 
two distinct processes. Furthermore, the fact that there can be a “hunch” that precedes cognition 
seems to demonstrate the ways that feelings are conceptual. Hence, there seems to be no 
evidence to posit a duality of reasoning systems. The hunch that the subjects displayed first may 
have been a precursor to conceptual knowledge, rather than an act of an essentially different kind 
of reasoning. Their recognition that somatic markers might be generated cerebrally 
acknowledges this possibility.68 Neurologists tend to argue that differing brain pathways count as 
evidence for differing faculties; they do not realize that this begs the question. 
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Damasio believes that affective reasoning is distinctly based on memory of reward and 
punishment; yet his gambling experiment is entirely a task of achieving reward and avoiding 
punishment, so, in effect, the lack of a control group disallows such a conclusion. Furthermore, it 
is not clear why conceptual knowledge would be insensitive to considerations of reward and 
punishment (or even why all reasons cannot be construed as rewards and punishments) and why 
a separate decision-making process is necessary to accommodate these considerations. Those 
people who had the hunch did not stop behaving advantageously as soon as they understood the 
reason for it. There is, in fact, no evidence that nondeclarative knowledge draws from a different 
kind of evidence, such as opinion, prejudice, or personal memory, than does conceptual 
reasoning. “Emotional knowledge” is being construed in a strange way, again like an unthinking 
impulse to action, if it is to be the thing that can account for the fact that certain brain-damaged 
patients fail to act on their conceptual knowledge in certain situations.  
 Damasio studies the role that brain anatomy plays in the experience of certain moral 
sentiments, but his research has been taken further to draw conclusions for moral theory. In one 
experiment, brain-damaged people were more likely to make utilitarian hypothetical moral 
decisions than those without brain damage, who felt more beholden to the value of an 
individual’s life. Theorists like Kitcher and de Waal try to draw conclusions from this about the 
validity of Utilitarianism and Kantianism. Thankfully, they conclude that it is better not to have 
brain damage!69 Nevertheless, neurobiology is no basis for moral theory, and someone could 
easily draw the opposite conclusion. Ironically, many Kantian-inspired moral theories argue that 
moral reasoning is exactly that type of reasoning that is most rational. 
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This account of morality is similar to that of moral sense theory; Damasio and others who 
support his research even use the term “moral sentiments.”70 Indeed, Damasio is vulnerable to 
the same criticisms as Hume—turning Hume’s Law against Hume himself—that we cannot 
derive “ought” statements from “is” statements. Still, this is a common confusion. Damasio does 
not attempt to divide cases in which we should follow natural sympathy or our instinct to follow 
rules from those wherein it would be immoral to do so. As a biologist, Damasio does not pretend 
to be a moral theorist, but he does seem vulnerable to the temptation to explain and justify 
morality through biology and evolution.71  
Other theorists pick up the suggestion that emotions are useful for reasoning and 
similarly attempt to draw conclusions about morality. Murdoch, Nussbaum, Blum, and Walker 
all advance the idea that emotions help us with the problem of salience, or, since they reveal 
values, they help us to know that some things are more valuable than others, and thus they aid us 
in decision-making, especially moral decision-making.72 Yet the fact that emotions express 
personal values does not mean that they express moral values. The “information claim,” 
assuming along with Damasio that there are separate rational and emotional decision-making 
processes, represents a confusion about what reason, as well as moral theory, is. Simply to know 
that someone values such and such does not tell us anything about what that person should value. 
It similarly involves a straw-manning of the champions of moral reasoning, including Kant.  
Solomon might be taken as one of the only remaining critics of emotion because he 
continues to highlight the importance of making conscious choices of emotions, to have a 
“willingness to become self-aware, to search out, and challenge the normative judgments 
                                                
70 Damasio, Looking For Spinoza,163. 
71 Damasio refers to the WHO, UNESCO, and the United Nations (Looking For Spinoza, 169). 
72 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of the Good (London: Routledge, 1970); Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of 
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embedded in every emotional response.”73 Following Sartre, he argues that, since “normative 
judgments can be changed through influence, argument, and evidence, and since I can go about 
on my own seeking influence, provoking argument and looking for evidence, I am as responsible 
for my emotions as I am for the judgments I make.”74 Nevertheless, he joins the Romantic camp 
when he argues that the insight that emotions are values “wreaks havoc on several long cherished 
philosophical theses” like the idea that morality must be based on reason.75 
Stocker examines the evaluative dimension of emotion in his book Valuing Emotions, 
proposing to go beyond what he calls “the information claim” that emotions are demonstrations 
of or give information about personal values.76 He argues that emotions are not merely 
instrumentally useful, because “emotions are also essential constituents of life and value.”77 On 
the one hand, he means no more by this condition than to assert that human life is essentially and 
necessarily emotional. On the other hand, Stocker flirts with emotivism, even though he 
eventually rejects the emotivist claim that emotions are “internal to value.”78 Stocker argues that 
emotions teach us three things: the value of having emotions, adeptness in being emotional and 
having emotions, and the content of other people’s emotions.79 This idea about learning from our 
emotions is very much like the notion of emotional intelligence that I develop in the next 
chapter. Stocker similarly suggests that there are correct and incorrect modes of emotional 
engagement. Drawing from a connection between the Aristotelian notions of phronesis and habit, 
                                                
73 Robert C. Solomon, “Emotions and Choice,” in What is an Emotion? Classic Readings in Philosophical 
Psychology, ed. Robert C. Solomon and Chesire Calhoun (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 325. 
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an example of someone who argues that we are totally passive with regard to the passions; rather, he is inspired by 
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75 Solomon, “Emotions and Choice,” 313. 
76 Michael Stocker and Elizabeth Hegeman, Valuing Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 82. 
77 Ibid., 85. 
78 Ibid., 137. 
79 Ibid., 188-89. 
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he argues that correct emotional engagement reveals the correct values.80 This seems to be 
(tautologically) true, but Stocker does not venture to tell us anything about the nature of correct 
emotional engagement or correct valuing—doing so should be acknowledged as a difficult task 
that would presumably take us out of the realm of a theory of emotion and into moral theory. 
Nevertheless, I believe that we can show that moral theory is internal to emotional experience 
without resting on the conviction that emotions simply are values. 
 
III. Evaluating Emotions 
We have seen a redrawing of the lines of the debate between cognitive and affective 
approaches: some theorists from both camps are united in the assumption that the emotions are 
valuable and should be heeded. Nevertheless, flipping the evaluation of emotion from “wrong” 
to “right” does not entail fully overcoming of the Stoic legacy. We must reject both the idea that 
emotions are privileged sites of information and the idea that emotions are problematic, 
unthinking impulses. Indeed, I do not believe that emotions are any more natural or irrational 
than reason itself. The idea that the emotions give us information about our values, that they are 
or reveal values, cannot explain the way that emotions can provide objective ethical insights on 
their own. This section strives to uncover many of the more complex ways that moral theory is 
internal to the experience of emotion. 
Moral theory is internal to the experience of emotion to the extent that it is internal to 
experience in general. Most models of the subjective encounter with moral theory portray it as a 
form of rational deliberation. One question that is often asked is what role emotion should play 
in these thought-processes. It is thought that emotions are necessarily partial and hence resist the 
impartiality of moral reasoning. This concern continues to assume that emotion and reason are 
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two fundamentally different mental faculties. If we can show that emotion and reason are 
internally related, then the role that emotions play in moral reasoning will come into clearer 
view. 
Emotions are often thought to be irrational (not just foreign to rationality but actually 
opposed to rational thought) because, as with anger, they sometimes seem to cause us to act 
before we have a good plan of action. Imagine, for example, that a father is tending to his four-
year-old daughter at a public play yard. The play yard is quite busy, and among the children are 
some older boys running around carelessly, playing tag. Among them is a particularly tall boy, 
wearing combat boots that are easily as large and at the same level as many of the younger 
children. The father becomes worried that the young children might get kicked, and when one of 
the older boys inadvertently hits one of the children the father leaps up, as if to attack, with the 
goal of making the older boys leave the play yard. A verbal fight ensues, but the boys eventually 
leave. The father then feels vindicated, but also regretful, and wonders whether his actions were 
justified and optimal.  
Perhaps at this point he, or others, might blame the “emotion” of “anger” for causing him 
to act so attackingly instead of coolly addressing the boys and making them aware of the 
problem. Some affect theorists will point out that the action was a product of the “fight” response 
and an automatic result of the adrenaline coursing through his veins. On this model, the 
individual must find a way to control the feeling of anger. A functionalist account will adopt this 
same explanation but with a positive spin: were it not for the feeling of compulsion, the father 
might have done nothing, and someone might have gotten hurt. Perhaps the “fight” response was 
warranted, given the seeming prevalence of violent encounters in our society and the appearance 
of the boys. Greenspan argues that emotions are “rational” because they are quick and useful 
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impulses; but in this situation it is exactly the moral and pragmatic evaluation that is left 
undetermined.81 
Again, and now from different theoretical perspectives, we are faced with the dichotomy 
of “emotion” as either bad or good. This dichotomy misses several facts pertinent to the 
situation. First, the father was worried before he was angry. It is not likely that the father saw the 
boys as a threat in the same way that a cave-man sees a mountain lion as a threat: if that were the 
case, he likely would not have let his daughter play there. The worry was more likely a result of 
internal strife and fear of confrontation. Understood this way, we see the altercation with the 
boys as a brief episode in the life of the emotion, which was, for a much longer time, pre-
occupied with the questions: What should I do? and What should I have done? These questions 
were encapsulated in and accompanied by a variety of different affects, and both the affects and 
the thoughts gradually changed into other experiences. Still, during this one slice of time, we can 
see that the father was asking himself pragmatic and moral questions. In other words, what 
started out as an example of an emotion revealed itself to be an example of moral deliberation. 
I resist the tendency to call the emotion an impulse, or, rather, to call the impulse the 
emotion, because doing so causes us to ignore the broader and equally relevant situational 
context. There also seems to be no reason to assume that reason is inherently slow and that, 
therefore, the emotion must be the result of a substantially different faculty. If emotions are 
quick impulses that follow rational directives, what prevents us from saying that they are a 
manifestation of reason, an example of reason acting quickly? As we have seen from more fully 
considering Prinz’s theory of emotion, if an impulse is involved, it is the function of rational 
recognition.  
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Chapman and Hall, 1988). 
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In this one example of worry and anger about an interaction with another person, we can 
see that the emotion is itself an example of moral decision-making. The affects and the thoughts 
seem to go hand in hand. We can say that the thoughts caused the affects, but there is no 
evidence for that. It is just as likely, per Prinz’s theory, that the affects are what first spotted the 
trouble and the thoughts were scrambling to catch up. In other words, in this case we can see that 
the emotion is itself occupied with moral questions.  
Might the moral decision-making have gotten on better if the emotions did not exist? 
Would someone without any emotions at all have acted differently and more effectively? Most 
people now answer this question negatively, but that is because they believe that without 
emotion the father would fail to see the moral and pragmatic urgency in the first place. I think 
that that is not necessarily true. I think that an unemotional person might have done a better job, 
depending on how much he knows about moral reasoning. If we ask the man now, after the 
emotions have subsided, “What should you have done in that situation?” He will most likely say, 
“I don’t know.” He might come up with some hypotheses, but nothing about which he feels sure 
enough to say that he will try to do next time. Reason is only a good guide if reason is well-
versed in moral theory and human psychology, since the people involved did, in fact, have 
emotions.  
Still, it is possible that someone with a feeling impairment, provided that he still had the 
“feeling” of his daughter’s worth and the innate value of the other children on the playground 
(including the older boys), would have handled this situation better. Imagine someone high on a 
serotonin-producing drug: this person would not have experienced the worry about his own 
ability to handle the situation and the fear that a fight would ensue. The drug-aided father might 
have had a much easier time talking to these boys (if only because he might have distracted the 
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boys for other reasons). The fact that drugs might have helped the father overcome these beliefs 
might show that the affects need to be prevented in the future, or it might show that they the 
product of beliefs that are not very deeply entrenched. Perhaps the father was just in a bad mood. 
In fact, internal oscillation over whether or not he does actually have these beliefs may have 
further added to the indecision and worry. 
So, am I then conceding that the emotion, fear of conflict, is irrational? It is irrational in 
the sense that it is based on a false belief: the father is, in theory, capable of dealing with this 
situation. It is also irrational because it was dysfunctional, contributing to a less than optimal 
solution to the problem. Nevertheless, the emotion of fear is no less rational than the father’s 
belief about his own incapability. Both the belief and the affect are based on a very real lack of 
experience and knowledge. Perhaps they are even based on a number of experiences of past 
failures. Very few of us are any good at confronting and changing the behavior of strangers. We 
must not fall into the trap of thinking that “reason” is always perfectly rational. It is only 
prejudice that makes the question about the degree to which emotions are “up to us” look like it 
makes more sense than the degree to which thoughts are similarly “up to us.” In other words, it is 
not the affect that is at fault here—a computer might be similarly programmed to shut down in 
certain situations—but the complex, habituated thought-affect complexes. If the father did 
something morally blameworthy, the father is the one to blame. People, not faculties, are the 
objects of moral evaluation. (As Kant writes, we can act only under the assumption of free will.) 
As De Sousa remarks, judging whether or not an emotion is “rational” is a “complicated 
process [that] is at the center of our moral life.”82 This one example has shown that emotional 
experiences can themselves be concerned with moral questions. It also reminds us that even the 
moral evaluation of emotions is similarly emotional. This is what I mean in saying that emotions 
                                                
82 De Sousa, “The Rationality of Emotions,” 149. 
 51 
are self-evaluative. Especially with negative emotions like anger, we often feel that we should 
not feel them (and hence feel some type of guilt or frustration) even as we are feeling them. Of 
course, this self-evaluation may or may not be morally correct. 
Prinz tentatively attributes this “meta-cognitive” insight to Nussbaum, even though he 
eventually expresses it himself: “To assent to a value laden appearance, one must form another 
judgment, to the effect that this judgment is justified.”83 Therefore, “emotions are judgments 
about judgments.” In other words, emotions not only contain evaluations, they are self-
evaluative. In my mind, this fact parallels the relationship between a theory of emotion and a 
theory of emotional intelligence, which is itself a moral endeavor. The latter asks and answers 
questions about which emotions we should feel, while emotions themselves prompt these 
questions and provisionally assume answers. 
In the case of negative emotions, it is more often the case that we form the meta-
judgment that the emotion is not justified. A good example of this comes from St. Augustine’s 
Confessions. After his conversion, Augustine judges the feeling of grief a sin, since it reveals an 
attachment to the created and transitory world. With the death of his mother, he wills himself not 
to feel sad, and succeeds in only crying a little bit. He then uses sleeping and bathing to change 
the emotion. Instead of sadness, he is overcome with anxiety over the fate of his mother’s soul, 
and pleads with God to save her, even though he admits having no reason to worry. In this case 
we can see that the evaluation of the emotion changed the emotion itself, even in a way that 
exceeded Augustine’s conscious control and awareness. I believe that Augustine’s Christian 
evaluation of and experience with death is the most common model for grief in our culture, 
especially among people dealing with death for the first time or with the death of someone with 
whom they were not particularly close. Moral theory is called on to evaluate the meta-cognitions 
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that accompany and inform emotional experience and, in some cases, to therapeutically alter 
them. 
On the other hand, there are certainly cases in which the emotions themselves seem to be 
morally blameworthy, whether we evaluate them as such or not. Solomon gives us the example 
of a husband who picks a fight with his wife, and who ends up feeling very angry, in order to get 
out of going to a party to which he did not want to go. There seems to be something 
blameworthy about this dishonesty, and the selfishness that motivates it; the husband is either 
unaware of this moral dimension to his emotion or denying it. Discussing the disagreement about 
going to the party directly would have been less selfish, even though it would have more 
honestly disclosed self-centered desires. In this case, we would hope that the moral insight would 
be enough to change the experience of the anger, although, as we shall see, it may not be enough 
to motivate a more honest exchange. Regardless, I think it is interesting to consider the extent to 
which unconscious moral self-condemnation is internal to the emotion, perhaps even fueling it 
through transference. 
Sartre suggests that all emotions serve disavowed purposes. While this should be 
regarded as an empirical claim, we are nonetheless morally beholden to scrutinize our emotions 
on this score. The father’s anger did serve the purpose of scaring the boys away, after all. It is 
also possible that the assumption that anger and confrontation are socially unacceptable caused 
the expression of the emotion to take the form of an explosion that was calculated to override the 
internal censors. If that was his true goal, is he not somehow morally responsible for 
acknowledging it? In chapter 4 I argue that Kant’s theory of virtue suggests that one does have 
such a responsibility, and I agree. 
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 The topic of evaluating and changing our emotions logically leads to a discussion of the 
appropriateness of emotion. Emotional appropriateness appears under the guise of the natural, 
but there is moral normativity built in to this notion of the natural; and so moral theory is related 
to the experience of emotion in the sense that we should and should not feel certain emotions. 
Let us take the example of sadness at death. If someone proclaimed herself to be not very upset 
(the word “sadness” is not even strong enough) about the recent death of her mother, that she 
neither had sad thoughts nor sad affects, we should be very worried. Experience teaches us that 
such cases of disavowed sadness surface in psychosomatic ailments or harmful behaviors such 
irresponsible drug use and sexual behavior, violence, addictions, or vehicular accidents. We 
would attest that, in some sense, she is actually sad. (This example shows us one way that the 
emotions transcend both affect and cognition.) Not only is it necessary for psychological health 
that she feel sadness, it is also a moral expectation, both to recognize honestly the importance of 
one’s relationships and the identity of oneself, but also to, as is often said, “pay one’s respects.” 
It is possible that the latter moral demand promotes the psychological health of the individual 
through cultural dictate, since there seems to be something inherently difficult in experiencing 
negative emotions as well as recognizing the negative emotions of others. 
Western thought, being no stranger to the role of the commander, most frequently gives 
voice to this dimension of the relationship between emotion and morality, but we do not often 
see “natural” as itself a term of value. De Sousa defends this objective view of emotion: the idea 
that emotions perceive real (axiological) properties of the world.84 Adorno similarly develops an 
objective theory of emotion regarding aesthetic experience. My point here is to put the emphasis 
on what De Sousa calls the “paradigm scenarios” themselves, regardless of whether or not they 
elicit the paradigm emotions. Just as Aristotle tells us that the virtuous person feels happiness 
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and sadness at the correct things because he has been raised in a virtuous society, 
psychologically informed moral theory can tell us what these scenarios should be. The example 
of natural emotions does serve the point of the information claim: that emotions seem to ground 
values. Nevertheless, we can also say that natural values ground emotions. In both cases, it 
should be clear that the term “natural” is being used in a prescriptive, not an empirical, sense.  
 The example of natural emotions is also important for showing us one way that 
behavioral training and rational training overlap: both thinking and affective response are 
grounded in certain key evaluative experiences. I reject the line of thought, seen for example in 
De Sousa, that takes emotions to be “rational” because rationality in itself (being unemotional) 
would collapse for lack of direction without them. The example of natural emotions shows us 
that thoughts are often themselves inextricably connected to lived values. 
 In the event that we endeavor to alter our emotions therapeutically, it is likely that we 
will need to employ both rational insight and behavioral training. Returning to the experience of 
natural paradigm scenarios accomplishes both at once. So for example, the father might attempt 
to cultivate empathy or sympathy for the older boys by imagining himself in their position or the 
position of one of their fathers. Nevertheless, the possible difficulty of changing one’s emotional 
habits cannot be overstated. In this case if the father defers his own need to feel competent and 
safe in preference to the boys, the underlying problem-complex of the emotion will not be 
resolved.  
The cognitive approach too often ignores the role of nature in our emotional lives, and for 
this reason it backslides too easily into Stoicism. It would be wrong to try to bar instincts or 
drives from playing a role in a theory of emotion. In the style of Freud’s libidinal theory, we 
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might grant that emotions bear a special relationship to instinctual drives.85 For Freud, the 
instincts are oriented toward love, which is itself a drive for self-overcoming.86 If we keep in 
mind that we must understand emotions within the context of natural needs, we will not fall into 
the Stoic trap of thinking that emotions are so easy to explain away. In other words, a theory of 
emotion must have a robust appreciation of social and emotional needs, of love, or else the 
emotions will necessarily appear mistaken or dim-witted. Emotions express both needs and, as 
we saw earlier, they are often disassociations. This might be the case because needs remind us of 
our finitude. In the language of psychoanalysis, they belie our wish (of the ego-ideal) to be whole 
and self-sufficient. Freud writes that repression comes from the ego-ideal, and that feelings of 
guilt and inferiority accompany negative emotions.87 The narrative we construct in coming to 
understand our emotions might refer to relatively fixed, or natural, psychic laws, but these are 
laws that the subject can work with in coming to better understand herself, just as we do not 
create but work with the laws of logic and the facts of experience. What is important is the 
possibility of self-analysis, even if it is not, or even cannot in principle, be completed. 
The case of natural emotions shows us that moral convictions are sometimes emotional 
convictions, but this insight transcends the case of natural emotions and is complicated by more 
complex examples. It might be the case that we experience our convictions emotionally, as with 
the case of sympathy; hence there are moral emotions. (In chapter 4, I discuss Kant’s important 
distinction between moral sympathy and the mere feeling of sympathy.) There are also cases in 
which our more theoretical moral convictions are repressed and become emotional, lest they be 
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lost entirely. We might take the latter case as an example of emotions taking on the Sartrian 
“magical” functionality, accomplishing that which we do not feel consciously able to 
accomplish. One example of this might be my recent bout of self-inflicted hair traumas. I had a 
particular topic I needed to discuss with my stylist—a sort of apology I felt obliged to give—but 
I had been afraid to bring it up during the previous haircut. Cutting my own hair caused me 
(unconsciously) to have an excuse to see her again, and it gave me a further motivation to get the 
apology over with, lest I feel the unconscious need to cut my own hair again. Another example is 
a time when I fainted during a medical experiment in which I felt that the dignity of my body 
was being violated. I did not feel able to explicitly address the doctors running the experiment 
and rescind my consent, but fainting succeeded in rescuing me from the situation.  
These examples show us at least two things. One, we have a real, psychological need to 
follow through on our moral convictions. It is only the portraying of moral experience as any less 
“embodied” that leads to the pseudo-questions about the relationship between morality and 
emotion. And, two, these examples show us that we are not transparent to ourselves, and yet 
some degree of transparency (honesty) is demanded by morality. This topic is discussed in more 
depth in chapter 4. 
Both of these cases lead to fairly thorough resolutions. Unfortunately, there are also cases 
in which our moral/emotional convictions are repressed and transferred into different emotions 
entirely, such as sadness and anxiety. In this way emotional/psychological health is related to 
virtue. The notion of virtue itself entails courage, in my mind and in Kant’s, as he portrays it as a 
kind of strength or fortitude. Following through on our moral knowledge and conviction requires 
courage. This is not the courage to overcome emotions, but the courage to have emotions. Our 
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relationships with our closest loved ones provide countless examples of the necessity of this type 
of courage. 
It would of course be fallacious to conclude that all emotions involve moral questions. 
We should notice that many of the previous examples involve negative emotions. Positive 
emotions sometimes involve moral commitments, but they do so in a different way: obviously in 
a happy, rather than a troubled, way. I am perhaps embarrassed to admit that cases of purely 
positive emotions (not, for example, the fear of being happy) seem less relevant to a discussion 
of moral self-improvement and hence less interesting to me. I am not alone in focusing on 
negative emotions, but I do take myself to be an exemplar in admitting this bias. Many theories 
of emotion seem to take negative emotions for their paradigm since they are so much more 
gripping and concentrated, as well as seemingly in need of help from theory. 
After admitting that my insights about emotion do not necessarily apply to all emotions, I 
conclude this chapter by partially formalizing the theory of emotion assumed and developed in 
the rest of the dissertation. Mostly my approach is based on the conviction that emotions should 
not be identified with any one “part” of the self, and, to the extent that we can, we should stop 
thinking in terms of “parts” of the self entirely. Indeed, it is this compartmentalized way of 
thinking that leads to the simplistic idea that emotions can be judged wholesale. If an emotion 
represents just one part of the self, it makes sense to speak in terms of either “mastering” and 
“controlling” or “valuing” and “affirming” the emotions. If there are truly “parts” of the self, 
they might be afforded only such limited yes-or-no communication. Furthermore, one can only 
“master” and “control” something that is significantly different from himself. It is no doubt 
possible to believe just that, and to act as though there are two different selves; this 
schizophrenic or disassociating move is, I believe, part of the problem that needs to be overcome 
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in cultivating emotional intelligence.88 Chapter 2 is largely concerned with the discourse of 
“mastering,” but now is the time to speculate about what a theory of emotion that is based on a 
unified theory of subjectivity might look like.  
Different emotional experiences, positive and negative emotions, are significantly 
different. Even if we accept the idea that emotions form a natural kind, it would be more 
intellectually honest to begin with a survey of variety before we posit an exclusionary essence. It 
is sometimes the case that the affect comes first; other times the affect builds as if the thoughts 
themselves become more and more heated; sometimes the affects, if they are present at all, are 
not nearly as important as the thoughts. There is the still further possibility that both affect and 
thought are unconscious, although it means something different to say that affects are 
unconscious than it does to say that thoughts are unconscious, and manifesting themselves only 
indirectly. It is also the case that “affect” is not itself easy to pin down. To the question: “Am I 
now having an affect?” the answer must be “yes”; and even though there seems to be some 
distinction between emotional and other affects, I cannot begin to imagine how we could 
possibly make such a distinction in a way that relies only on the affects themselves. 
Taking all of these caveats in stride, it is beneficial to gesture toward an understanding of 
emotion that respects its context in experience and protects a unified model of subjectivity. I like 
to think of emotions as involved in processes of subjective development (Bildung), as processes 
involving immediacy, expression, and reflection.89  
                                                
88 Note that I am using the term schizophrenia to refer to a different problem than that for which Stocker uses the 
term (one’s motives not matching up with one’s necessary values), a sense that implies that his theory of emotion 
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International Publishing Group, 1976). 
89 Reflection should not be understood as stagnation. Emotions are usually calls to act, and simply “reflecting” rather 
than acting is to ignore the emotion, but so is action without an understanding of the reason for and the goal of the 
action, as well as, and most importantly, the best strategy for action. 
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A theoretical model of an emotion in general can put the affect first and then include its 
development into thoughts, but if we assume such a model, it is of the utmost importance to 
realize that the affect itself contains the germ of the discursive thoughts. It is this idea of latent 
content, favoring the move of analysis, that is at the heart of the cognitive approach. 
Understanding the relationship between affect and cognition in terms of expression is 
illuminative because it reveals an emotional need to externalize, or emote in some fashion, and 
the preoccupation we have with some, especially negative, affects. This idea is helpful, both to 
explain the normal course that emotions seem to take and to aid in diagnosing emotional 
maladies. The affects might themselves be the externalization, in the form of laughter, a smile, or 
tears, for example. Or the affect might be a feeling that is itself a desire, to scream or hug 
someone—conative theories call this a “state of action-readiness.” It is important to understand 
that, if we take emotions to be merely affects, emotions are always a call to some kind of 
expression. If this is true, emotional experiences are always a crisis of practical reason: they 
demand: “what should I do?” “what can I do?” or perhaps “what is the meaning of this?” In the 
case of negative emotions, whose affects usually begin internally, the question is more “what 
should I do now?” In the case of positive emotions, whose affects are usually expressed 
externally automatically, the question “what should I do?” is a call for mental action: a call to 
recognize, to reevaluate one’s commitments and identity, to, in the future, plan accordingly. 
Hence, emotions are taken to offer salience to certain situations. If a situation is “emotional” it is 
important, not because its meaning is given, but precisely because its meaning is contested.90 
Emotions sometimes point to thoughts that we have not yet thought.  
                                                
90 The argument that emotions are “modes of attention” that “track morally relevant news” strikes me as feeble 
(Sherman, Making a Necessity of Virtue, 39). It is comparable to responding to skepticism by praising the wonders 
of sight. First, it talks past the criticism of emotion. Second, it inadvertently reinforces the assumption that 
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Neither the affect, nor its immediate expression or translation into discursive thought, are 
the end of the story. Emotional experiences carry deeper implications for our lives, and so the 
next step of an emotional experience is the call for some form of self-consciousness. We may 
reflect on the action that we decided to take in the hope of gaining insight into the original affect, 
or we might still be in a process of deciding what to do about our thoughts and feelings. The call 
for expression is a call for self-development, even if, or perhaps especially if, the understanding 
or expression defuses or alters the originating affect. Emotions do not burn themselves out; they 
are reabsorbed and transformed for the sake of themselves being transformative. Emotions may 
be privileged sites of experience in the development of self-understanding, but they are in no 
way different from the normal life process of learning, adapting, and striving for improvement. 
Of course, this process often becomes obstructed or stalled, and so emotions often become stuck 
at the level of affect or impulse, but a theory of emotion necessarily takes a wider perspective. 
The upshot of this theory of emotion, partly inspired by German Idealism (a precedent for 
which can be found in Kant, as we shall see in chapter 3), is that emotions always call for 
expression and for reflection. They are a part of the human process of moral/psychological 
growth. Affect, thinking, and self-alteration are necessarily interconnected parts of a whole life: 
trying to understand one in isolation from the whole necessarily yields a distortion. 
 
We have seen that the idea that emotions tell us about our values does not tell us very 
much, especially when we accept the claim that emotions are themselves wrapped up with and 
are the target of moral evaluation. Most of the theorists who subscribe to “the information claim” 
about emotion acknowledge that there can be bad, as well as good, emotions, but they do not 
                                                
something like robot experience is possible. Third, it seems silly—like something out of Aristophanes’s The 
Clouds—to praise something that is so much a part of normal experience. 
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attempt to tell us how to judge between the two. Just as emotion helps with moral decision-
making, moral decision-making must first help us to have good emotions. Therefore, we must let 
a phenomenology of emotion lead us to ethics, provided that ethics is already reasonably 
knowledgeable about emotions and open to learning more. 
It is likely that these theories about subjective values do more than evade moral theory: 
they implicitly and sometimes explicitly promote moral subjectivism. They oppose thinking that 
something might be good or bad independently of subjective evaluation. In the case of emotions, 
which call out for an inquiry about the best mode of action, this turn yields nothing but a dead-
end. Apparently, this is the consequence that moral theory’s perceived lack of attention to moral 
psychology has caused. Correspondingly, we have seen a flood of attention to “context” and 
“particularity,” and the relationship between the subjective and objective in ethics, along with 
practical wisdom, which is said to be necessary to bridge this supposed gulf. In the following 
chapters I argue that there is no such gulf, at least not in the guidance offered to our emotions 
from Kantian moral theory. My view is that emotional intelligence is based on morality, not that 
morality is based on emotion, and that moral subjectivism, even though it seems to affirm the 
emotions, talks down to them and fails to take up the inherent challenge of self-improvement 
posed by emotions. As we have seen, the study of emotion inevitably leads to the evaluation of 
emotions. Such is the job of emotional intelligence, and the evaluation of emotions must look to 
moral theory for help. This conclusion, I hope, is obvious, since it has long been recognized that 
proper emotional engagement is necessary for virtue. What is new is the idea that this sense of 
“proper” might be gestured toward by emotional experience itself, and that Kantian moral theory 
can pick up where a study of emotion leaves off. The first idea is the subject of the following 
chapter and a discussion of the second idea begins in chapter 3.
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE MORAL IMPORTANCE OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
 
 The goal of this chapter is to clarify the relationship between moral theory and the 
psychological construct of emotional intelligence. Since I assume that my readers will be 
better read in philosophy than in psychology, I first introduce my reader to the notion of 
emotional intelligence. No doubt my reader has already heard the term and has some 
associations brought to mind by it, largely due to the prevalence of media attention given 
to the idea in recent years. Some psychologists are positively giddy at the amount of 
popular attention their field is receiving; others are suspicious and denounce the whole 
notion as “pop psychology.” Since I believe that it is useful to employ the term, I must 
necessarily engage this debate, reviewing the work that is being done on emotional 
intelligence in order to clarify the concept. We shall see that there is a great deal of 
disagreement between psychologists over the meaning of the term. I argue that some 
theories that stand out for their accuracy, while others, like Daniel Goleman’s book 
Emotional Intelligence (which led to the popularity of the term itself), are clearly 
problematic. 
I evaluate these approaches based on their theories of emotion and theories of 
intelligence. The word “intelligence” itself poses a trap, of course, suggesting that 
emotional intelligence might be innate and inalterable, since intelligence theories make 
similar claims for cognitive intelligence. This essentialism promotes a defeatist attitude 
about self-improvement as well as smugness for those who “make the grade.” There is 
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widespread consensus about the purpose of a theory of emotional intelligence: it ought to 
help individuals cultivate their own emotional intelligence, which should turn out to be a 
good thing for both the individual and the group. Definitions that focus on the 
unconscious and automatic nature of emotions prove unable to explain the means by 
which people might become more emotionally intelligent. In other words, cultivating 
emotional intelligence itself relies on having a good theory of emotional intelligence and 
a good theory of emotion, while a poor theory of emotional intelligence hinders its 
development. The idea that emotions must be “managed” and “controlled,” for example, 
risks promoting self-inflicted violence in the form of self-management and self-
discipline. 
After reviewing some of the ways that theories of emotional intelligence can go 
astray, I focus on some of the better models, which have made considerable progress in 
developing the notion of emotional intelligence. Ciarrochi’s idea of emotionally 
intelligent behavior, for example, resists positing a latent, innate ability and instead 
focuses on achieving psychological health. I understand “intelligence” in terms of 
“understanding” and “analysis”; thereby emotional intelligence is the analysis and 
understanding of emotions (including emotional thoughts, affects, and behaviors) that 
leads to their morally and pragmatically good expression and resolution. Emotional 
intelligence also involves empathy, i.e., intelligence not just about one’s own emotions 
but also about the emotions of others, as well as the ability to interact emotionally and 
about emotions with others. Again, the goal is to further pragmatic and morally good 
outcomes. Emotional intelligence is something like virtue—a stable character trait that 
we should develop—and it is thereby involved in promoting goodness, not just for 
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oneself and one’s close associates, but for all people, although of course, to a different 
extent and in different ways. When we see that emotional intelligence is like virtue, we 
see that it makes sense to focus on self-improvement. It is only by continually focusing 
on and seeking out the means by which we can improve that we will avoid associating 
emotional intelligence with IQ and will see instead that it is a need for all people: anyone 
who has emotions needs emotional intelligence. Also, a focus on improvement will bring 
out the true variety of ways in which people can have and can lack emotional 
intelligence. 
 The ultimate goal of this chapter is to show that emotional intelligence is 
inherently a moral concept. My definition posits it as such, but I defend this definition 
given the current work on the topic. Work on emotional intelligence dovetails with moral 
inquiry in many places, as with school programs that teach conflict resolution and prevent 
bullying. We shall see that moral inquiry lies at the heart of emotional intelligence. 
Without moral guidance, it is impossible to delineate emotionally intelligent behaviors 
from those that are emotionally coercive or sociopathic. In fact, any theory of emotional 
intelligence requires normative claims; but psychologists, being scientists, are often not 
comfortable navigating normative issues, and so they tend to emphasize the culturally 
relative nature of the expression of emotion. Yet intelligence is itself a normative idea, 
implying that having intelligence is better than lacking intelligence. In the absence of 
“experts” to decide on the value of an outcome or behavior, it is common for theorists, 
such as Goleman, to let the market, in the form of career success, decide the definition of 
intelligence. Obviously, the market is no more “objective” than are human theorists, even 
less so since it cannot give an account of its decision-making. 
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Instead, moral theory and a philosophical notion of well being can and must guide 
our search for emotional intelligence. It is the job of a philosopher to pick up where the 
psychologists leave off, uncovering and clarifying their moral assumptions and 
implications. Furthermore, the notion of emotional intelligence can inform moral theory. 
As we shall see, since emotional intelligence involves the health and happiness of the 
whole person and her ability to make good decisions, engage in healthy relationships, and 
prevent and resolve conflicts, it makes little sense to command moral behavior without 
commanding, and facilitating, emotional intelligence. 
 
I: Heterogeneity Amongst Definitions of Emotional Intelligence 
We begin with a survey of the current theories of emotional intelligence, 
remarking on the heterogeneity of the various definitions. There really is no way to give 
the current definition of emotional intelligence because there are so many definitions in 
use. Matthews et al. recommend that we consider emotional intelligence as an “umbrella 
term,” as it refers to a “variety of quite distinct constructs.”1 There are over sixteen 
different tests used to measure emotional intelligence or something like it for the sake of 
research, education, or profit. There is so much variety under this rubric that some 
researches acknowledge the shared feeling for the need for a moratorium on new tests.2 
In addition, there is little to no evidence that the tests correlate: the MSCEIT (Mayor 
Salovey Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test) and the EQ-i (Emotional Quotient 
                                                
1 Gerald Matthews et al., “What Is This Thing Called Emotional Intelligence?” in A Critique of Emotional 
Intelligence: What are the Problems and How Can They Be Fixed?, ed. Kevin Murphy (New York: 
Psychology Press, 2006), 11. 
2 Carolyn MacCann et al., “The Assessment of Emotional Intelligence: On Frameworks, Fissures, and the 
Future,” in Measuring Emotional Intelligence: Common Ground and Controversy, ed. Glenn Geher (New 
York: Nova Science Publishers, 2004), 26. 
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Inventory) were shown to have a correlation of .20 in one study.3 Those critical of this 
new construct argue that there is so much heterogeneity within approaches to the topic 
that it is impossible to know the meaning of emotional intelligence at all, and that it is 
misleading to suggest that there is one thing corresponding to the term that these different 
tests measure.4 Because those working on emotional intelligence face these sorts of 
criticisms, there is a tendency to close ranks and not criticize definitions different from 
their own, even sometimes failing to acknowledge their lack of agreement. Nevertheless, 
there are three prominent definitions of emotional intelligence: those by Salovey and 
Mayer, Bar-On, and Goleman.  
Salovey and Mayer originally defined emotional intelligence as “the subset of 
social intelligence that involves the ability to monitor one’s own and other’s feelings and 
emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one’s thinking 
and actions.”5 By “a subset of social intelligence,” they mean to refer to Thorndike’s 
notion of social intelligence, “the ability to understand and manage people,” and thereby 
they mean to tap into the history of work in intelligence studies.6 Salovey and Mayer’s 
definition is often broken up into its constituent parts, so that emotional intelligence is 
said to involve four distinct abilities: the ability to perceive and appraise emotion, the 
ability to use emotion to facilitate thought, the ability to understand and communicate 
                                                
3 Marc A. Brackett and John D. Mayer, “Convergent, Discriminant, and Incremental Validity of Competing 
Measures of Emotional Intelligence,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 29, no. 9 (2003): 1147-
1158. 
4 See Matthews et al., “What Is This Thing Called Emotional Intelligence?” 
5Peter Salovey and John D. Mayer, “Emotional Intelligence,” Imagination, Cognition and Personality 9, 
no. 3 (1989-1990), 189. 
6 Edward L. Thorndike and S. Stein, “An Evaluation of the Attempts to Measure Social Intelligence,” 
Psychological Bulletin 34 (1937), 275-85. 
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emotion concepts, and the ability to manage emotions in oneself and others.7 These 
abilities are measured by the MSCEIT. Those who attempt to work with this definition 
usually do one of two things: they either separate one of the abilities and study it in 
isolation from the others, or they take the general idea suggested by this definition and 
apply it to another field of research or therapeutic endeavor.  
When breaking the definition into its component parts, Mayer and Salovey define 
it as: “the ability to perceive accurately, appraise and express emotion; the ability to 
access and/or generate feelings when they facilitate thought; the ability to understand 
emotion and emotional knowledge; and the ability to regulate emotions to promote 
emotional and intellectual growth.”8 Yet the four parts are conceptually and practically 
interrelated.  The third ability, the ability to understand and analyze emotions, seems to 
be only a more complete form of the first. When we insist that they are two separate 
abilities, the first becomes a primitive ability, like the ability to read emotional 
significance in vocal acoustics or facial expression.9 It is hard to imagine the third ability, 
which is itself the better way of expressing the first, without the fourth: understanding 
and analyzing emotions requires some theory about the nature of the emotion, which 
includes implications about the value of specific emotions and the means by which they 
ought to be expressed. 
                                                
7 Lisa F. Barrett and Peter Salovey, “Introduction,” in The Wisdom in Feeling: Psychological Processes in 
Emotional Intelligence, ed. Lisa F. Barrett and Peter Salovey (New York: Guilford Press, 2002), 2. 
8 John D. Mayer and Peter Salovey, “What is Emotional Intelligence?” in Emotional Development and 
Emotional Intelligence, ed. Peter Salovey and David J. Sluyter (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 10.  
9 See Jo-Anne Bachorowski and Michael J. Owren, “Vocal Acoustics in Emotional Intelligence,” in The 
Wisdom in Feeling: Psychological Processes in Emotional Intelligence, ed. Lisa F. Barrett and Peter 
Salovey (New York: Guilford Press, 2002); and Hillary A. Elfenbein, Abigail A. Marsh, and Nalini 
Ambady, “Emotional Intelligence and the Recognition of Emotion from Facial Features,” in The Wisdom in 
Feeling: Psychological Processes in Emotional Intelligence, ed. Lisa F. Barrett and Peter Salovey (New 
York: Guilford Press, 2002). 
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The second ability, the ability to “generate emotions,” could be more simply 
worded as the ability to empathize; it seems that the conceptual divide is between the 
second ability and the rest, between the ability to engage one’s own emotions and the 
ability to engage the emotions of others. Perhaps someone who is more even-handed and 
understanding of others, not being biased toward herself, ought to be also at an advantage 
in her relationship with herself and able to understand her emotions more objectively. 
Similarly, someone willing to engage her own emotions would be better equipped to 
engage the emotions of others. Regardless of the connection, most theorists agree that 
“emotional intelligence” should also refer to an understanding of the emotions of others, 
whether this understanding is more immediate, in the form of sympathy, or theoretical, in 
the form of empathy or merely a sensitive awareness. 
On the other hand, the difference between generating and understanding emotion 
might imply one difference in the experience of emotion that we discovered when we 
considered cognitive and affective theories of emotion in chapter 1. Affective theories of 
emotion highlight the ways that affects affect thoughts. The ability to generate emotion 
might refer to the ability to self-consciously generate or regulate affects in order to 
promote one’s goals, such as exercising to treat depression, drinking coffee for 
intellectual focus, or breathing slowly to cope with stress. These cases are significantly 
different than those cases wherein one assumes that affects contain latent meaning. 
Moving on to the two other prominent definitions of emotional intelligence, we 
have the “mixed” models. Those grappling with the heterogeneity among definitions 
divide them into “ability-based” and “mixed” models. This categorization is a veiled 
criticism of the “mixed” models, implying that they are nothing more than a grab bag of 
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imagined traits and that, since they are measured by self-report, they are vulnerable to 
self-report bias. Perhaps the idea is that they do not correspond to any actual “ability.” 
Also, mixed models have been shown to overlap with measures of personality.10  
The models of emotional intelligence developed by Bar-On and Goleman are both 
characterized as “mixed.” Bar-On developed the emotional quotient inventory (EQ-i), 
which is based on fifteen subscales and aims to predict the degree to which an individual 
interacts with her environment in such a way as to promote her own psychological well 
being. Bar-On defines emotional intelligence as “an array of noncognitive capabilities, 
competencies, and skills that influence one’s ability to succeed in coping with 
environmental demands and pressures.”11 Describing each of his subscales proves 
tedious, so I will merely name them: self regard, self awareness, assertiveness, 
independence, self actualization, empathy, social responsibility, interpersonal 
responsibility, stress tolerance, impulse control, reality testing, flexibility, problem 
solving, optimism, and happiness.12 While I do not disagree that these qualities are all 
related to emotional intelligence, it seems counterproductive to give such an expansive 
and enumerative definition. Some of these traits are at the heart of the matter and others 
are merely symptoms that sometimes follow from emotional intelligence and sometimes 
do not. The idea of “emotional self-awareness”—“the ability to recognize and understand 
one’s emotions”—comes closest to the heart of the issue. I do agree, nonetheless, that, in 
these terms, emotional intelligence would promote successful coping with stress, 
especially as stress is often related to emotional “core-relational themes.” 
                                                
10 M. Zeidner and G. Matthews, “Personality and Intelligence,” in Handbook of Human Intelligence, ed. R. 
J. Sternberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
11 Reuven Bar-On, Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory: Technical Manual (Multi-Health System, 1997). 
12 Reuven Bar-On and J. Parker, eds., The Handbook of Emotional Intelligence: Theory, Development, 
Assessment, and Application at Home, School and in the Workplace (Jossey-Bass, 2000), 365. 
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Of course, if we want to equate emotional intelligence with emotional 
understanding, with which is almost synonymous, we would need to have a robust notion 
of understanding that includes everything that is meant by intelligence. Bar-On might 
object that someone might be aware of his emotions and still not be able to respect or 
express them and that we would not want to call that person emotionally intelligent. Such 
is conceptually possible, but premised only on a vitiated notion of understanding an 
emotion. Emotions contain layers of thoughts and information. To fully understand them, 
or to be committed to trying to understand them, is already a form of acceptance and 
expression, and involves analyzing the way that they should be further expressed. If we 
think that emotions are always so easily understood and expressed, then we have 
misunderstood the nature of emotion and the meaning of expression. For example, Pat 
hates his job—let’s say he feels that the company is complicit in immoral deeds—but he 
is not financially able to quit and knows that his family and friends would not support his 
decision. He is likely to be sad and angry at his situation. Actually, if Pat is sad and 
angry, he is relatively emotionally intelligent, since in this situation most people would 
be motivated by the unconscious desire to reduce cognitive dissonance and would deny 
or displace their sadness and anger, perhaps developing depression or an anxiety disorder 
or transferring these emotions to another person or situation. The important matter is that 
Pat remain confident in his understanding of his emotions, and that he not let external 
pressures make him lie to himself or ignore his emotional insights. Acting on the 
understanding of an emotion is not easy (What should Pat do?). Struggling to do so, 
while resisting the urge to lie to oneself about the content of the emotion in order to avoid 
addressing it, should be recognized as a genuinely difficult task. 
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Returning to the question of whether or not Bar-On’s definition of emotional 
intelligence is unnecessarily plentiful: Empathy, “the ability to be aware of, understand, 
and appreciate the feelings of others,” is also a necessary component of emotional 
intelligence, as Bar-On postulates. Nevertheless, it is possible that “the ability to establish 
and maintain mutually satisfying relationships” comes from those qualities of emotional 
confidence, such as not being afraid of one’s vulnerability, which may follow from self-
awareness, and that there is a sort of natural parallelism between the self and others, as 
we shall explore more in chapter 4. Similarly flexibility, “the ability to adjust one’s 
feelings…to changing situations and conditions,” follows from understanding one’s 
feelings as well as knowing where one stands. Focusing on self-awareness and 
understanding takes the emphasis off of “control,” but that is exactly my intention; as 
well shall see, understandings of emotional intelligence that are based on cognitive 
theories of emotion, unlike Bar-On’s and Goleman’s, make this possible. 
Goleman has also developed a “mixed” model. Most people outside the field of 
psychology associate the term “emotional intelligence” exclusively with Goleman’s 
book, or with media attention to his. For this reason, other theorists, like Salovey and 
Sluyter, use Goleman’s name to increase the popularity of their work while 
simultaneously rejecting his notion of emotional intelligence.13 Goleman is well known 
for his sweeping claims, such as the claim that emotional intelligence is more important 
than IQ in determining life success. Working with Boyatzis and Rhee, Goleman has 
developed a model that includes 25 different areas of competency.14 Clearly not aiming at 
                                                
13 Peter Salovey and D. Sluyter, eds., Emotional Development and Emotional Intelligence: Educational 
Implications (Basic Books, 1997). 
14 R. E. Boyatzis, D. Goleman, and K. Rhee, “Clustering Competence in Emotional Intelligence: Insights 
from the Emotional Competence Inventory,” in The Handbook of Emotional Intelligence: Theory, 
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one coherent definition, he refers to emotional intelligence in a variety of different ways: 
“self-control, zeal, persistence…the ability to motivate oneself”; “to reign in emotional 
impulse; to read another’s innermost feelings; to handle relationships smoothly”; “to 
persist in the face of frustrations, to control impulse and delay gratification, to regulate 
one’s moods and keep distress from swamping the ability to think; to empathize and to 
hope.”15 
Goleman suggests that emotional intelligence might also be called “character.” He 
often relates it to life success, describing it as a “meta-ability, determining how well we 
can use whatever other skills we have, including raw intellect”; he sometimes calls it 
“people skills.”16 The benefits of emotional intelligence include being able to learn and 
communicate effectively. Goleman’s positive description of emotional intelligence 
centers on the increased learning potential that comes with something we might normally 
call “having a good attitude.” He paints the picture of the contagiously good mood of a 
bus driver as an example of emotions working to better our lives. 
The bulk of Goleman’s discussion is dedicated to convincing his reader that 
emotional intelligence is an important quality; he does this by illustrating the problems 
that a lack of emotional intelligence may cause. Goleman describes those who lack 
emotional intelligence as “those who are at the mercy of impulse—who lack self-
control.”17 Seemingly taking anger as the prime example of emotion, he posits that those 
without emotional intelligence are those who “lose it” or are subject to an “emotional 
                                                
Development, Assessment, and Application at Home, School and in the Workplace, ed. Reuven Bar-On and 
J. Parker (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000). 
15 Goleman, Emotional Intelligence, xii, xii, 34.  
16 Ibid., 36-37. 
17 Ibid., xii. 
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hijacking.”18 His notion of a lack of emotional intelligence is even broader than his 
notion of emotional intelligence, and includes marital discord, insensitivity and general 
meanness, stress, abuse, trauma, and homicide. Given this laundry list of inarguably bad 
things, it is very easy for Goleman to convince his reader that people would be better off 
if they were schooled in emotional intelligence.  
 Goleman has worked with others to develop the “Emotional Competence 
Inventory” (ECI). This is a personality-based approach, as opposed to an ability-based 
measure, because it overlaps with traits measured by personality tests such as 
conscientiousness, emotional stability, extraversion, and openness.19 The ECI measures 
four dimensions of emotional competence: self-awareness, social awareness, self-
management, and social skills. Conte and Dean report that “no empirical, peer-reviewed 
journal articles are presented to support the validity of the ECI.”20 They also conclude 
that there is little evidence that the ECI is able to discriminate reliably between people or 
to predict socially relevant outcomes. 
Although there is disagreement over the definition of emotional intelligence, the 
idea itself is in many ways nothing new. As Murphy and Sideman note “EI is often seen 
as a new name for constructs that have been studied (sometimes with limited success) for 
decades.”21 This repetition is the reason that many researchers give for believing that 
emotional intelligence makes intuitive sense. It is also possible that the notion of 
emotional intelligence is intuitive to psychologists because, as emotional intelligence 
                                                
18 Ibid., 14. 
19 Jeffrey Conte and Michelle Dean, “Can Emotional Intelligence Be Measured?” in A Critique of 
Emotional Intelligence: What are the Problems and How Can They Be Fixed?, ed. Kevin Murphy (New 
York: Psychology Press, 2006). 
20 Kevin Murphy and L. Sideman, “What Is This Thing Called Emotional Intelligence?” in A Critique of 
Emotional Intelligence: What are the Problems and How Can They Be Fixed?, ed. Kevin Murphy (New 
York: Psychology Press, 2006), 63.  
21 Murphy, A Critique, p. xii. 
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presumably requires psychological insight—those who study emotion should hopefully 
be able to increase our emotional intelligence—it is in the business of keeping 
psychologists in business. Not only does emotional intelligence have a more recent 
ancestor in the study of intelligence, in many ways it refers to the basic idea behind 
clinical psychology: the idea that people can improve their lives by gaining insight into 
their behaviors and motivations. For this reason, it seems preferable to turn away from 
the construct of emotional intelligence in favor of terminology that is better situated 
within the history of psychology. Most new work on emotional intelligence realizes this 
need and attempts to connect emotional intelligence to traditional areas of research, such 
stress, addiction, family and marriage relationships, child development, or personality 
development. 
 
II: Evaluating Theories of Emotional Intelligence 
In order to hone the notion of emotional intelligence that will be used in this 
project, I will consider a number of ways that theories of emotional intelligence can go 
astray. I would like to distinguish my work from the problems associated with emotional 
intelligence from the beginning, so that I will not be misunderstood. Singling out these 
problematic notions will also help us to understand the necessary features of a good 
working definition. By discussing the problems associated with some definitions we shall 
see that a good definition will include the following traits: 
1. A good definition will not fall into the trap of thinking that emotional intelligence, 
like traditional notions of intelligence, is an innate and inalterable quality of a 
person. Instead it will focus on the teachable knowledge that allows for 
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emotionally intelligence behavior. It will acknowledge that all people, even—
perhaps especially—the most intelligent have trouble behaving with emotional 
intelligence regarding certain intimate emotions and contexts, and that 
improvement comes from understanding the individual’s specific emotional 
history, rather than from knowing his or her score on a test for general emotional 
intelligence.  
2. A good definition will not insist on a dichotomy between cognition and affect. 
Instead, it will seek to understand the ways that emotions are created by and 
reciprocally influence many different mental faculties. 
3. A good definition will not insist that emotions are outside of conscious influence. 
Instead it will seek to understand the mental, as well as physical, dimension of 
emotion and the ways that individuals can understand, act on, and alter their 
emotions.  
The second two points follow from the first. It may very well be the case that there is a 
species of emotional intelligence that is innate. I do not think that there is, but I am not 
concerned with disproving this idea. Instead, I argue that there is a kind of emotional 
intelligence that we can cultivate, and that people can come to act with more or less 
emotional intelligence and can go through experiences that can influence them either for 
the worse or for the better. It is certainly strange for me to argue that emotional 
intelligence is something corrigible before I seek to define emotional intelligence, but, as 
we shall see, the definition rests on this point. Most theorists who are currently working 
with this construct agree that it should be thought of as something that is corrigible, but 
many do not see that this conviction disallows certain other convictions, such as the idea 
 76 
that emotions are purely affective and caused automatically by certain objective stimuli 
(points 2 and 3). 
The word “intelligence” connotes innateness. “Intelligence” is defined as an 
“ability”; even though an ability is not necessarily an innate quality, the field of 
intelligence studies has come to believe that intelligence is innate. Likewise, models of 
emotional intelligence that posit it as an “ability” similarly imply that it is innate. As we 
have seen, Salovey and Mayer’s model is “ability-based,” while Goleman and Bar-On’s 
theories mix an ability-based account with other measures that largely track personality. 
Researchers who study intelligence refer to it as g (general intelligence), the 
element for which all tests of cognitive ability test, since there is a high correspondence 
between any two tests of cognitive ability. Although IQ tests were first designed by 
Spearman to measure educational achievement, intelligence has come to be thought of as 
an inherited trait.22 G has become an infamous concept, as it is notoriously accused of 
reductionism, determinism, racism, classism, and conservatism.23 Those who study 
intelligence largely agree that it is genetically determined: twin and adoptive sibling 
studies have demonstrated this.24 
It is no surprise, then, that arguments against g and in favor of a broader, more 
egalitarian notion of intelligence are popular. Gardner, Sternberg, and Goleman all offer 
                                                
22 C. Spearman, “‘General Intelligence,’ Objectively Determined and Measured,” American Journal of 
Psychology 15 (1904): 201-293; A. Binet and T. Simon, “Methodes nouvelles pour le diagnostic du niveau 
intellectual des anormaux,” L’Annee Psychologique 11 (1905): 191-244. Brody argues that heritability is 
wrongly confused with immutability, where long-term population wide changes, known as the Flynn-effect, 
show that intelligence is malleable in principle. James Flynn, “IQ Gains Over Time: Towards Finding the 
Causes,” in The Rising Curve: Long-Term Gains in IQ and Related Measures, ed. U. Neisser (Washington 
DC: American Psychological Association, 1998), 25-66. 
23 Stephen J. Gould’s popular The Mismeasure of Man (W. W. Norton & Co: 1996) makes a number of 
these arguments.  
24 R. Plomin, J. C. DeFries, G. E. McClearn, and P. McGuffin, Behavioral Genetics, 4th ed. (New York: 
Freeman, 2001). 
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such arguments. Gardner was the first to offer a model of multiple intelligences. He 
posits a variety of different types of intelligence—at least eight kinds: logical, linguistic, 
spatial, musical, kinesthetic, naturalistic, interpersonal, intrapersonal—rather than just the 
logical and linguistic intelligence that is represented by g.25 Part of the social goal of this 
theory is to change the educational system so that more children can succeed. Rather 
ironically, the idea is not that intelligence is corrigible, but that teachers need to do a 
better job drawing out the various innate forms of genius.26 
Goleman takes himself to be working in the tradition of Gardner, but he takes his 
notion of emotional intelligence to trump g.27 He attempts to steal the glory of the most 
problematic versions of g by arguing that emotional intelligence determines success, 
defined by health, interpersonal relationships, and job success. His later book, Working 
with Emotional Intelligence, is designed to parlay the idea of emotional intelligence into 
success for businesses. Like theories of traditional intelligence, Goleman’s notion of 
emotional intelligence claims to predict success in the traditional, economic sense of the 
term. Goleman argues that emotional intelligence is not innate, and he devotes a 
                                                
25 Howard Gardner, Intelligence Reframed: Multiple Intelligences for the 21st Century (Basic Books, 
1999). 
26 See Thomas Armstrong, Awakening Your Child’s Natural Genius (New York: Putnam, 1991). Not only 
is intelligence thought to constrain potential, discouraging educative effort, it ironically also dampens the 
effort spent on those thought to be intelligent. The accolade of “intelligent” logically serves to take 
attention away from students, and it may have this hidden deleterious effect (especially with parents). 
Although it is intended to secure them more attention, since intelligent students are more capable of 
learning on their own (even by Goleman’s definition), they would require less attention and one-on-one 
instruction. In reality, the idea of intelligence has no place in the classroom, where we must assume that all 
students need to be taught. See Nathan Brody, “Beyond g,” in A Critique of Emotional Intelligence: What 
are the Problems and How Can They Be Fixed?, ed. Kevin Murphy (New York: Psychology Press, 2006); 
See also Harold Stevenson and James Stigler, Learning Gap: Why Our Schools Are Failing And What We 
Can Learn From Japanese And Chinese Education (New York: Touchstone, 1992). For a contrary 
argument see L. Cronbach and R. Snow, Aptitudes and Instructional Methods: A Handbook for Research 
on Interactions (New York: Irvington, 1977). 
27 Much of the success and popularity of Goleman’s work can be explained in this way: Americans want to 
believe that they are above average in some way, and parents, especially, want to believe that their children 
are above average; the more kinds of intelligence there are, the more kids that get to count as intelligent. 
Here we can see that the vagueness and broadness of Goleman’s notion is actually its selling point, like a 
horoscope, giving people more ways in which they can identify with the definition. 
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considerable amount of time to the current pedagogical attempts to inculcate it. 
Nevertheless, much of the research from which he draws suggests that the qualities he 
identifies with emotional intelligence are fixed throughout an individual’s life. Although 
he stresses that emotional intelligence depends on our upbringing, defining it by its 
relationship to IQ has the effect of inadvertently making it seem innate. Goleman falls 
into this trap himself, referring the emotional intelligence differences among four-year-
olds, although surely a four-year-old is still learning how to understand and express her 
emotions.28 Goleman makes clear that he intends his notion of emotional intelligence to 
replace the traditional notion of intelligence when he writes:  
At age four, how children do on this test of delayed gratification is twice 
as powerful a predictor of what their SAT scores will be as is IQ at age 
four… This suggests that the ability to delay gratification contributes 
powerfully to intellectual potential quite apart from IQ itself. (Poor 
impulse control in childhood is also a powerful predictor of later 
delinquency, again more so that IQ.)29 
 
Goleman clearly hopes to show that EIQ can replace IQ. 
                                                
28 Goleman identifies emotional intelligence with the ability to delay gratification and discusses an 
experiment designed to show that the degree of this ability is constant from age four on to late adolescence. 
This experiment tests four year-olds by asking them if they would rather have one marshmallow at the 
present time or wait fifteen to twenty minutes for two marshmallows. Reported in Yuichi Schoda, Walter 
Mischel, and Philip K. Peake, “Predicting Adolescent Cognitive and Self-Regulatory Competencies From 
Preschool Delay Gratification,” Developmental Psychology 26, no. 6 (1990). Those who choose to wait are 
labeled as possessing the ability to delay gratification. The researchers then correlated this ability with later 
traits, such as ability to cope with stress, concluding that those who exhibited the ability to delay 
gratification were better off later in life. Goleman uncritically accepts the methodology and conclusions of 
this study, writing: “which of these choices a child makes is a telling test; it offers a quick reading not just 
of character, but of the trajectory that child will probably take through life.” (P. 81.)  Goleman goes further 
and suggests that this test illustrates the essence of emotional intelligence, which is self-control. Nowhere 
does Goleman suggest that instruction in marshmallow choice would be possible. 
29 Goleman, Emotional Intelligence, 82; citing Jack Block’s unpublished manuscript from research 
conducted at UC Berkeley.  
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Salovey and Mayer’s MSCEIT correlates modestly with g, as they believe it 
should.30 They write, in the tradition of intelligence studies, that a “new” intelligence 
ought to correlate with g to a moderate degree: “no correlation at all could suggest the 
new ‘intelligence’ is so different that it is not an intelligence at all,”31 and a high degree 
of correlation suggests that the new intelligence is not new at all. Salovey and Mayer 
seem to be conflicted: they want to make sense of the notion by drawing on intelligence 
models, but they insist that EI ought to be learnable, even when their intelligence-derived 
notions turn out not to support such conclusions.32 Caruso, Beinn, and Kornacki doubt 
that the MSCEIT model allows for corrigibility;33 yet Salovey and Mayer do not seem to 
recognize this consequence of their association with IQ.34 Furthermore, as an “ability” 
test, the MSCEIT supposedly measures latent ability. Salovey and Mayer have yet to 
prove that said “ability” actually translates into concrete behaviors.35 
Those who study general intelligence agree that it is highly stable over time and 
that attempts to inculcate it have little long-term effect; yet all who study emotional 
intelligence agree that it can and should be taught in public schools. If there is truly a 
connection between g and emotional intelligence, it is not clear what it is. There is no 
evidence that any definition of emotional intelligence is capable of replacing g as a 
measure of ability or rivaling IQ as a construct that refers to the separate mental system 
                                                
30 Brody draws this conclusion from research conducted by M. J. Schulte, M. J. Ree, and T. R. Caretta, 
“Emotional Intelligence: Not Much More than G and Personality” Personality and Individual Differences 
37 (2004): 1059-1068. 
31 J.D. Mayer and P. Salovey, P. “What is emotional intelligence?” In P. Salovey & D. Sluyter (Eds). 
Emotional Development and Emotional Intelligence: Implications for Educators (New York: Basic Books, 
1997), 6. 
32 Brody, “Beyond g,” (2006). 
33 D. R. Caruso, B. Bienn, and S. A. Kornacki, “Emotional Intelligence in the Workplace,” in Emotional 
Intelligence in Everyday Life (2nd edition), ed. J. Ciarrochi, J. Forgas and J. D. Mayer (Philadelphia: 
Psychology Press, 2006), 202. 
34 Murphy and Sideman (2006), 39. 
35 Matthews et al., “What is This Thing Called Emotional Intelligence?” 27. 
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of emotion, especially since there is no evidence that there is a separate mental system of 
emotional functioning in the first place.36 Damasio, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
would reject this idea, arguing instead that there are separate systems of emotional and 
cognitive processing. Those working within the field of emotional intelligence, on the 
other hand, do not understand it as merely the experience and memory of pleasure and 
pain. 
If EIQ cannot replace IQ, as Goleman hopes that it can, and it cannot relate to 
emotion as IQ does to cognition, then perhaps there is an internal relationship between g 
and emotional intelligence, as Salovey and Mayer assume. Brody argues that it makes 
sense to think that spatial visualization aids in working with emotional information just as 
it has been shown to help in paragraph comprehension, and that “emotional intelligence is 
likely to be one component of g, not a substitute for g.”37 It is also possible that some 
minimal degree of intelligence is necessary for emotional intelligence. Another 
possibility is that general intelligence does aid in emotional intelligence, because 
emotions tend to be complex and understanding them can be just as difficult. On the other 
hand, it is also possible that less intelligent people have less complex emotions, and 
therefore have no more or less difficulty understanding them than intelligent people do. 
At any rate, it is not clear that there is any real similarity between the two notions aside 
from the term; models that are based on measurements for g have had trouble measuring 
anything other than g. Some believe that, when intelligence and personality are controlled 
                                                
36 Matthews et al., “What is This Thing Called Emotional Intelligence?” 28. 
37 Brody, Beyond g, 178-179. 
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for, emotional intelligence, as it has henceforth been measured, cannot be shown to cause 
social outcomes.38 
While I am cynical about the motivation behind the idea of multiple intelligences, 
I am not interested in whether or not such a thing as g, or its various replacements, exists. 
Still, the idea of general intelligence implies genetic heritability, while emotional 
intelligence is believed to be corrigible. We must go beyond ability-based and mixed 
models in order to account for this corrigibility. 
Promising work is being done in this regard, often dropping the name of 
“emotional intelligence” and using terms such as “emotional literacy” and “emotionally 
intelligent behavior” instead. These theories of emotional intelligence excel in their 
careful self-distancing from the tradition of intelligence studies. For example, Ciarrochi 
et al. insist that we should be referring to “emotionally intelligent behavior,” not a latent 
ability.39 They describe emotional intelligence not as excelling, but rather as achieving 
normalcy or health in a world in which “33% of people have a diagnosable mental 
disorder and 50% of us seriously contemplate suicide at some point in our lives…[and in 
which] we have developed increasingly inventive ways to wage war and kill one 
another.”40 They define emotional intelligence in terms of peace and happiness, and the 
addressed emotional needs that make these possible. Although they do not deny the 
ability component of emotional intelligence, they choose to focus on emotionally 
intelligent behavior because they believe that such a focus is more productive: 
                                                
38 Nathan Brody, “What Cognitive Intelligence Is and What Emotional Intelligence Is Not,” Psychological 
Inquiry 15 (2004): 234-238. 
39 J. Ciarrochi et al., “Improving Emotional Intelligence: A Guide to Mindfulness-Based Emotional 
Intelligence Training,” in Applying Emotional Intelligence, ed. J. Ciarrochi and J. Mayer (New York: 
Psychology Press, 2007). 
40 Ciarrochi et al., 89. 
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Simply put, emotionally unintelligent behavior occurs when emotions and 
thought impede effective action, and emotionally intelligent behavior 
occurs when emotions and thoughts do not impede effective action, or 
when they facilitate effective action.41 
 
I agree with this definition, as long as it is not taken to lead back to Goleman’s way of 
defining emotional intelligence as the rational mind’s control over the emotional mind. 
Emotionally intelligent behaviors occur when the emotions are present and addressed and 
thereby lead to a greater understanding of the people and the situation at hand. 
Others prefer the word “competency” or “literacy” to “intelligence” in order to 
focus on learning. Brackett and Katulak discuss “emotional literacy” and argue that 
having an emotional vocabulary enhances one’s ability to think about emotions and 
engage in emotionally intelligent behavior.42 They also mean to call to mind something 
like “emotional fluency,” or a kind of comfort and ease with having emotions. Saarni and 
Buckley have developed the notion of “emotional competence” in order to focus on 
learnable skills: “The skills of emotional competence are learned; their acquisition is 
influenced by family, peers, school, media, societal scripts, and folk theories of how 
emotion ‘works’.”43 Furthermore, they eschew the tendency to think in terms of rational 
mastery and stable dispositions by emphasizing the fact that emotions always take place 
in the context of a fluid relationship:  
Emotional competence is not solely about cognitive understanding of 
emotional experience, but subsumes a set of affect-oriented behavioral, 
cognitive, and regulatory skills that emerge over time as a person develops 
in a social context. In other words, how our emotional functioning 
develops in a social context, how it is revealed in our everyday life 
                                                
41 Ciarrochi et al., 90. 
42 Marc A. Brackett and N. Katulak, “Emotional Intelligence in the Classroom: Skill-Based Training for 
Teachers and Students,” in Applying Emotional Intelligence, ed. J. Ciarrochi and J. Mayer (New York: 
Psychology Press, 2007). 
43 M. Buckley and C. Saarni, “Skills of Emotional Competence: Pathways of Development,” in Emotional 
Intelligence in Everyday Life, 2nd edition, ed. J. Ciarrochi, J. Forgas, & J. Mayer (New York: Psychology 
Press, 2006), 52. 
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depends on the ongoing exchange between a person and her environment. 
Individual factors, such a cognitive development and temperament, do 
indeed influence the development of emotional competencies. Yet, skills 
of emotional competence are also influenced by past social experiences, 
and learning, including an individual’s relationship history, as well as the 
system of beliefs and values in which the person lives. Thus, we actively 
create our emotion experience, through the combined influence of our 
cognitive developmental structures and our social exposure to emotion 
discourse. Through this process we learn what it means to feel something 
and to do something about it.44 
 
This focus on one’s developmental history and ongoing relationships helps us to get at 
the heart of emotional intelligence, and to that which is involved and at stake in 
developing and maintaining it.45 
Ciarrochi’s notion of emotionally intelligent behavior provides an interesting 
contrast to Goleman’s notion of emotional intelligence. Goleman believes that emotional 
intelligence causes life success; Ciarrochi does too, but he clearly means something 
different by success than Goleman does. It seems odd to suggest a relationship between 
emotional intelligence and job performance.46 There is, in fact, no support for this claim 
in its broadest form. There is some evidence that emotional intelligence, as it is measured 
by a short version of the MEIS, correlates with customer service skills, although perhaps 
at the expense of productivity.47 It is perhaps easy to confuse the idea of emotional 
intelligence with the idea of “people skills,” as does Goleman, and it is perhaps strange 
that his model of emotional intelligence demonstrates an overlap with the personality trait 
of extraversion. Furthermore, the dimension of EI related to “understanding emotions” 
                                                
44 Buckley and Saarni, “Skills of Emotional Competence,” 55-56. 
45 Fitness notes that it only takes one emotionally intelligence partner to bring emotional intelligence to a 
marriage. This supports the conclusion that emotional intelligence is learnable. J. Fitness, “The Emotionally 
Intelligent Marriage,” in Emotional Intelligence in Everyday Life (2nd Edition), ed. J. Ciarrochi, J. Forgas, 
and J. Mayer (New York: Psychology Press, 2006). 
46 See Matthews et al., “What is This Thing Called Emotional Intelligence,” for a review of the literature. 
47 A. E. Feyerherm and C. L. Rice, “Emotional Intelligence and Team Performance: The Good, the Bad, 
and the Ugly,” International Journal of Organizational Analysis 10 (2002): 343-362. 
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has been shown to correlate with the tendency to fake positive emotions.48 It seems more 
intuitive to think that emotional intelligence should correlate with job success in jobs that 
require emotional labor, such as the helping professions. Emotional labor is defined as 
“managing emotion in the service of one’s job.”49 We would hope that emotional 
intelligence correlates with less job stress in the case of work that requires a considerable 
amount of emotional labor, such as those who work with children or adults who are not 
fully responsible. Clearly, there is a difference between faking positive emotions while 
suppressing negative emotions in order to coerce a customer, and consciously attempting 
to defer one’s own anger and frustration for the sake of helping others uncover the root 
cause of their emotions, in order to resolve a conflict. Basing a notion of emotional 
intelligence on traditional intelligence, conceived in terms of g, blurs this distinction. It is 
also quite likely that a morally informed notion of emotional intelligence will correlate 
negatively with job success in many careers, since many occupations demand immoral 
and psychologically unhealthy behavior from their employees. Only a morally informed 
notion of emotional intelligence can adequately discriminate between different notions of 
“success.” 
Now that we have shown that those theories of emotional intelligence that are 
modeled on theories of g cannot allow for corrigibility, we can move on to the next 
characteristic of a good definition: that it be based on a theory of emotion that holds that 
emotions involve both affect and cognition. Theories of emotional intelligence that align 
                                                
48 T. Cage, C. S. Daus, and K. Saul, “An Examination of Emotional Skill, Job Satisfaction, and Retail 
Performation,” presented at the 19th Annual Society for Industrial/Organizational Psychology (Washington, 
DC, 2005); discussed in Daus (2006). 
49 See A. R. Hochschild, The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, Berkeley, 1983). See Daus (2006) for a discussion of emotional labor and emotional 
intelligence. 
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emotion exclusively with affect similarly posit emotions to be out of the subject’s control. 
Hence they inadvertently undermine corrigibility. 
Beginning with the first point, Salovey and Mayer posit that emotions ought not 
to be held in distinction from cognition: “we view emotions as organized responses, 
crossing the boundaries of many psychological subsystems, including the physiological, 
cognitive, motivational, and experiential systems.”50 Later, they argue “definitions of 
emotional intelligence should in some way connect emotions with intelligence,” as the 
mind is divided into the cognitive, affective and conative subsystems.51 In this later work 
they describe their definition of emotional intelligence as a combination of  “the ideas 
that emotion makes thinking more intelligent and that one thinks intelligently about 
emotions. Both connect intelligence and emotion.”52 It is unclear whether or not they 
wish to consistently maintain that the emotions in themselves ought to be conceived of as 
distinct from cognition and motivation, since their new definition remains vague on the 
key point of the theory of emotion. Emotions can make thinking more intelligent because 
they focus or facilitate thought, perhaps through emotional states of mind that are 
conducive to thinking, or because they provide useful, emotional information for thought. 
One can think intelligently about emotions by analyzing and better grasping the thought-
content of emotions, or one can think intelligently about emotions by attempting to 
control them. Salovey and Mayor’s insight that the definition of emotional intelligence 
should connect the notion of emotion with the notion of intelligence is important, but that 
still does not tell us enough about what emotional intelligence entails. 
                                                
50 Salovey and Mayer, “Emotional Intelligence” (1990). 
51 Salovey and Mayer, “What Is Emotional Intelligence?” 4. 
52 Ibid., 5. 
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 Considering the problems with Goleman’s non-cognitive account will help to 
illuminate the reasons that a good theory of emotional intelligence must be based on a 
cognitive theory of emotion in order to ensure that it provides for the possibility of 
rationally instructive content. If the emotions are purely affective reflexes, then there is 
no possibility of internally merging emotion and intelligence; we are left only with the 
possibility of “controlling” our emotions, which is theoretically and psychologically 
problematic. Still, Goleman’s theory of emotional intelligence replays the popular 
stereotypes of and biases against emotionality; this is likely the very reason that it has 
achieved such widespread popularity.  
Goleman believes that emotions come from and represent a distinctly different 
part of the mind than does rational thought. This view is what Jagger calls “The Dumb 
View” because it assumes that emotions are, in themselves, unintelligent.53 Goleman 
employs the popular clichés of “head” and “heart” to refer to “the rational mind” and “the 
emotional mind.” In an appendix devoted to explaining his theory of emotion, Goleman 
posits that there are two types of emotional responses: those in which thoughts come first 
and those in which physiological responses come first. He devotes the most attention to 
the latter and gives acting, as with the tears brought on by an actress on stage, as an 
example of the former. His main argument is that the rational mind can be “hijacked” by 
the emotional mind and that the rational mind must fight back to subdue these irrational 
forces. Tellingly, Goleman is not able to find any flaw in dealing with one’s emotions 
through repression.54 
                                                
53 Jagger, Alison. “Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology” in Gender, Body, 
Knowledge. Alison Jagger and Susan R. Bordo (eds.). Rutgers University Press, 1989. 
54 Goleman, Emotional Intelligence, 75-77. 
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Goleman argues that we can understand the dichotomy between “head” and 
“heart” scientifically, in conjunction with the fact the brain has different parts. This 
assumption is common in neurobiology, as we have seen from the last chapter’s 
discussion of Damasio and as we will see with Goleman’s reliance of the neurological 
theories of LeDoux. This dichotomy relies on an “evolutionary” argument; Goleman 
considers the brain stem to be the less evolved and more emotional part of the brain.55 
Goleman writes that the brain stem and neocortex can be “at war” with each other.56 
Following, LeDoux, Goleman believes that emotions evolved to give the organism a 
quick way to respond to danger by bypassing conscious thought. “Because it takes the 
rational mind a moment or two longer to register and respond than it does the emotional 
mind, the ‘first impulse’ in an emotional situation is the heart’s not the head’s.”57 This 
leaves to the “rational mind” the role of controlling emotions after they occur, as a kind 
of damage-control. The assumption is that, because we no longer live in the Pleistocene, 
emotions are no longer adaptive. After an “emotional hijacking,” the rational mind is left 
to make sense of what happened, and it usually attempts to rationalize the occurrence.58 
Goleman’s account not only portrays emotions as primitive and simplistic 
responses; it relies on the assumption that emotions are, in civilized society, often wrong 
about their object. Emotions need to be “controlled” because they should not be heeded. 
They should not be heeded because they are maladaptive and simplistic. So, for example, 
there might be an emotional impulse to kill someone who has threatened our child, but 
                                                
55 Ibid., 10. 
56 Ibid., 9. We will see that Goleman tends to translate LeDoux’s findings into a more extreme dichotomy 
than they suggest. For example, Goleman finds evidence for the fact that we have “two minds” from the 
fact that “emotional areas are intertwined via myriad connecting circuits to all parts of the neo-cortex.” 
Ibid., 12. 
57 Ibid., 293. 
58 Ibid., 296 
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since we no longer live in an environment of predators, this emotional impulse is 
mistaken, and so must be overridden.  
Yet, one of Goleman’s examples of an “emotional hijackings” seems to be better 
described as a case of being startled. Goleman gives the example of “Matilda Crabtree,” 
who was shot by accident by her father because she jumped out from a closet and yelled 
“boo” while her parents had been expecting to see an intruder in the house.59 It would be 
odd to say that her father had intended to shoot a burglar but had been mistaken. It seems 
more likely that his startle response caused him to pull the trigger involuntarily, perhaps 
even jerking his finger on the trigger for him. Can we really say that the father should 
have or could have better controlled his emotions, that he should not have been afraid that 
there was an intruder in his house and should not have been startled by his daughter 
jumping out at him? We might say that he should not have intended to kill the burglar, 
had it been a burglar, and then he would not have been prepared to shoot, or that he 
should not have had a gun in the house at all; but those conclusions seem to be merely 
changing the subject. I think most of us would agree that it seems strange to say that “Mr. 
Crabtree’s” accidental killing of his daughter was an emotional act, exactly because it 
was not accompanied by any beliefs or intentions; it was an accident.  
If we assume, against Goleman, that most emotions, which are usually very 
different than the case of being startled, are neither simplistic nor wrong-headed, i.e., if 
we assume that emotions contain an element of “cognition” even in an unconscious form, 
we have a different, more enlightening picture of the situation. First off, anger is not 
really an impulse to kill someone. If the person in question really thinks about killing, 
special therapeutic attention is necessary. Anger is an impulse to act based on a 
                                                
59 Ibid., 4. 
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perception of a need to act. Perhaps there is something to the argument that speed is 
needed, but as we saw from the last chapter’s discussion about the relationship between 
perception and cognition, there is no reason to conclude that cognition cannot have a 
quick-moving manifestation in impulse. Goleman would argue that it is the anger itself 
that is prone to irrationality, but a simple impulse cannot account for the kind of 
complicated perceptions, thoughts, and disagreements that usually accompany an anger. 
Ignoring the role that “cognition” plays in the impulse makes the impulse look less 
complex than it is. Anger should not be seen as an “emotional hijacking;” it is a healthy 
and important emotional response.  
Salovey and Mayer similarly criticize the notion of an “emotional hijacking,” as it 
merely replays the simplistic stereotype of emotions as an “intrinsically irrational and 
disruptive force.” Instead, as we can see in the revised example of an “emotional 
hijacking” the disruption of thought that emotion entails may or may not be useful, but it 
is always meaningful, and is no more likely to be mistaken than is an explicit judgment.60 
It is not surprising that this folk understanding of emotion as “hijacking” is so 
pervasive. I venture that negative emotions, since they call us to change something about 
the environment and are themselves painful experiences, are inherently prone to 
resistance, and that the easiest way to avoid expressing them is to deny their 
meaningfulness. The problem is that anti-cognitive views implicitly, although perhaps 
unintentionally, encourage this type of repression. 
Goleman’s theory of the emotions as primitive responses is really more of a 
picture of a primitive emotional response, or of someone who lacks the ability to 
understand the meaning and importance of her emotions and feels overwhelmed by them. 
                                                
60 Salovey and Meyer, “What is Emotional Intelligence?” 9. 
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The theory of the brain at war with itself is really a picture of a person at war with 
himself. In other words, Goleman’s theory of emotion serves us by offering a glimpse 
into the world of emotional un-intelligence. Goleman’s theory of emotional intelligence 
is doubly wrong: wrong about the emotions and wrong because it cannot promote 
emotional intelligence. The sort of person who has an explosive temper and reacts by 
attempting to then hold his anger in because he is trying to practice Goleman’s theory of 
emotional intelligence may be “controlling” the emotion, but he is not making progress in 
understanding it and is not demonstrating an emotionally intelligent behavior.  
We should not follow Goleman in his talk of “controlling” and “mastering” 
emotions. In addition to overlooking the important and positive role that emotions play in 
our lives, this approach precludes the intuitive likelihood that emotions themselves 
contain rational directives, i.e., that they might themselves be intelligent. Instead, 
emotional intelligence should be cast as understanding, not controlling, emotions. Talk of 
“understanding” underscores the ways that reason and the emotions are related and on a 
continuum; talk of “mastering” reinforces the unfounded idea that they are two 
substantively different faculties. Ciarrochi et al. point out that it is exactly the strong 
repressive reactions that individuals have to their emotions that need to be overcome in 
striving for psychological health.61 
Goleman’s affective theory of emotion is largely based on LeDoux’s work on 
conditioned fear responses in rats, and, for this reason, it relies on the strange idea that 
emotional responses are largely “unconscious.” In his book, The Emotional Brain, 
LeDoux explains the brain pathways that allow for “unconscious” fear conditioning: the 
amygdala can transmit information from the visual or auditory systems to the thalamus 
                                                
61 Ciarrochi et al., 2007. 
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and bypass the cortex, and, hence, consciousness.62 Studies have shown that people can 
become conditioned to respond to unconscious or subliminal stimuli.63 For example, by 
administering a puff of air into the eye, triggering a blink, at the same time that an image 
is presented for a fraction of a second (too quick to be registered in consciousness), the 
subject becomes conditioned to blink at the subliminal image even when the air puff is 
turned off. 64 LeDoux concludes from these studies that the emotion of fear response, 
which includes freezing, increased blood pressure, release of stress hormones and the 
startle reflex, is based on an unconscious neurological process. LeDoux speculates about 
the relevance of the unconscious fear response to the psychological disorders of phobia, 
PTSD, and panic attacks, suggesting in each case the likelihood that a subcortical 
(unconscious) neural pathway is involved.65 He hypothesizes that “because of genetic 
predisposition or past experiences, phobic learning [might] involve the subcortical 
pathway to a greater extent than the cortical pathway.”66 
                                                
62 We ought not to overlook the fact that LeDoux’s work shows that a slower, cortical response is necessary 
to judge whether or not there is a legitimate reason to be afraid. An unconscious process may cause the 
physical fear response, but there is no reason to privilege the physical fear response in our discussion of the 
nature of fear. Also, the fact that a process is subcortical, or unconscious, does not mean that it does not 
contain a latent judgment: we usually become afraid because we believe that there is some reason to be 
afraid, even though we might not know what that reason is as soon as we feel fear. 
63 LeDoux discusses these studies on pages 53-70, including work by Zyjonc (1980), Bornstein (1992), 
Bruner and Postman (1947), Erdelyi (1974, 1985, 1992), Greenwald (1992), McGinnies (1949), Dixon 
(1971), Lazarus and McCleary (1951), Packard (1957), Eagly and Chaiken (1993), Murphy and Zyjonc 
(1993), Ionescu and Erdeli (1992), Bowers (1994), Bowers and Meichenbaum (1984), Shervin et al (1992), 
Shervin (1992), Bargh (1990, 1992), Jocoby et al (1992), Merikle (1992), Kihlstrom, Barnhardt, and 
Tataryn (1992b). 
64 Specifically the eye-blink conditioning: Warrington and Weiskrantz (1973). 
65 LeDoux’s use of fear conditioning is out of place in the case of phobia and panic disorders, since it is not 
clear that in those cases an original fear conditioning event is necessary. Insofar as humans are not 
normally subjected to subliminal stimuli, much less subliminal conditioning, it is difficult to show that the 
results from tests about subliminal conditioning sufficiently generalize. Furthermore, we must question 
whether or not LeDoux is right to generalize from the fear response to fear-based emotions. We must not 
forget that LeDoux is hoping to apply a case of learning, where stimuli are repeated over and over thus 
strengthening the correlate neural pathways, to a case where the unconditioned stimulus was only 
experienced once, if at all. 
66 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 254. 
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We saw in the previous chapter that calling an emotion “unconscious” can refer to 
a number of different phenomenon, depending on the theoretical approach, but LeDoux’s 
conclusion that the conditioned fear response is “unconscious” rests on a confusion. 
Drawing from experiments involving subliminal stimuli and rats, he confuses the notion 
of self-consciousness, which we normally de facto deny to animals, with conscious 
awareness. The idea is that since animals have the fear response and animals are not 
“conscious” (meaning self-conscious, since, of course the animals experience their lives, 
at least for the first part of his experiments), then it follows that the fear response must be 
“unconscious.” Therefore, in humans, processes of the “animal brain,” which, operating 
“below” the neo-cortex (the special human brain part of self-consciousness), must 
similarly be “unconscious.” In likening the human brain to animal brain (the only kind of 
brain allowed in the laboratory for these kinds of experiments), and by assuming that 
animal brains lack “consciousness” because they lack language, neurological theories of 
emotion tend to focus on the animalistic, or purely physical, elements of emotion. 
Taking the physiological fear response as his primary example of emotion, 
LeDoux hopes to generalize from fear to all emotions in arguing that emotions should be 
understood as bodily—not conscious—events. Yet it is a mistake to think that something 
is unconscious just because it is physical. Surely even conscious thoughts are bodily 
processes! LeDoux does not argue for the idea that most, or even some, human emotions 
are not registered in consciousness; instead this conclusion seems to follow from the 
assumption that emotions are best understood by identifying them with neurological 
processes. He defines consciousness as working memory and as activity in the cortex, but 
he does not prove that our awareness of bodily states correlates to either of these things. 
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We are obviously aware of the fear response, and so LeDoux must have another meaning 
of “unconscious” in mind. Instead, he equates consciousness with the ability to “control” 
an emotion. A general LeDouxian theory of emotion would draw from the idea of 
emotional memory: the emotional memory encompasses all of the automatic emotional 
responses that we have that are conditioned from past events.67 
We can see that Goleman obtains his assumption that emotions usually involve 
mistaken judgments from LeDoux. Insisting that an emotional response is unconscious 
also means, for LeDoux, that the emotion is not just non-rational, but irrational. When 
discussing the fact that emotions tend to preoccupy us (“are accompanied by intense 
cortical arousal”), LeDoux explains that this might have been useful for an animal in the 
Pleistocence, but is a nuisance for humans.68 Perhaps LeDoux would have it that, in the 
case where the fear trigger is conditioned, the emotion is also “irrational” since it is now 
divorced from its natural, unconditioned cause. It would then make sense, on LeDoux’s 
model, to call the response “unconscious” since it would not make it through the cortical 
fear circuit and would therefore need to rely entirely on the subcortical process.69 Yet, the 
mere fact that an emotion is irrational does not make it any less cognitive, since many 
thoughts are irrational. Ironically, in cases where people are not aware of the cause of (or 
reason for) a case of generalized anxiety of phobia we have even more reason to believe 
that there is an, albeit latent, cognitive content to the affect. Of course, if we think 
                                                
67 In the effort to show that the emotional memory and declarative memory are distinct, LeDoux discusses 
studies done on amnesiacs, showing that they are still capable of fear conditioning though they are not 
capable or remembering the original unconditioned stimulus. 
68 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 289. 
69 Still there is not as much evidence that the cortical and subcortical pathways are distinct as LeDoux 
would like. Even LeDoux recognizes that rabbits cannot be trained to respond only to a certain tune and not 
another only when their cortexes have not been damaged; this fact suggests that conceptual discrimination 
plays a role in the “automatic” fear response even for animals, as we know that it does for humans from 
experience. 
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emotions are irrational or evolutionarily outdated, it is easier to ignore their cognitive 
content, making analysis look futile. Again, for this reason, a good theory of emotional 
intelligence holds open the possibility for emotions to become conscious. In this vein, 
Parrott argues that the view that takes negative emotions to be usefully analyzed allows 
for their greater functional utility and should therefore be more associated with emotional 
intelligence.70 
Goleman and LeDoux are not able to formulate the idea of latent cognitive 
content, and so do not consider more complex ways that emotions might be 
“unconscious.” In these theories, as we have seen, there is a clear distinction between the 
“heart” and the “head,” or the amygdala and the neocortex. Freud’s notion of the 
“preconscious,” or latent conscious thoughts (a sort of unconscious consciousness), 
which is popular in cognitive science as well as in the history of philosophy, may help us 
connect emotions to their cognitive content. Similarly, Freud’s notion of repression may 
help us make sense of emotions of which we are only partially or not at all conscious but 
which still affect behavior.71 It is ironic that LeDoux takes himself to be verifying Freud: 
Freud’s unconscious is bodily, but it is also cognitive. 
There is some danger is moving directly from neurology to psychology. In some 
ways these two approaches are incommensurable. Neurology examines the material cause 
of emotions: the brain and limbic system. The brain contains and brings about the 
mechanisms “underlying emotion,” as Rolls phrases it. Psychology examines the formal 
                                                
70 W. G. Parrot, “The Functional Utility of Negative Emotions,” in The Wisdom in Feeling: Psychological 
Processes in Emotional Intelligence, ed. Lisa F. Barrett and Peter Salovey (New York: Guilford Press, 
2002). 
71 Many times people know cognitively that they are having a certain emotion, say nervousness, and will 
speculate calmly that they are having that emotion for a reason that makes perfect sense, and yet they will 
fail to connect that feeling to their everyday conscious decisions and behaviors, though an outside observer 
would clearly judge that they are connected. This behavior might come close to having an unconscious 
emotion, though the feeling is very much the purview of our conscious/mental lives. 
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causes of emotions, the conceptual content that informs the essence of an emotion. As we 
discussed in the previous chapter, neurology takes on a third-person, physicalist 
perspective. A person might take this perspective on herself, and she does in the case of 
physical processes such as pain; we want to know about the physical processes at work in 
our bodies so that we can manipulate them. An emotion does have a physical basis, as do 
thoughts, but that does not mean that we need to take a physicalist perspective in order to 
engage them. We often do manipulate our emotions in this indirect way, but as we have 
seen, the neurological approach, since it does not study the introspective, conscious 
dimension of emotion, has the tendency of not only overlooking it but denying its 
existence entirely. LeDoux takes an unnecessarily extreme stance against the idea that the 
emotions are “conscious” processes: he disparages introspection and argues that 
“introspective knowledge provides a highly inaccurate window into the mind.”72 To 
interact with one’s emotions, indeed, with oneself, in this purely one-sided way is very 
strange: this is surely the perspective of an outsider, not of the subject herself. Yet this 
approach is perhaps not so strange when we examine the history of philosophy and 
Christianity, which take the mind and the body to be two separate substances. (In this 
way, the theory of emotional intelligence might find itself up against a good part of the 
history of Western thought.) 
A neurological foundation for the notion of emotional intelligence risks 
undermining one of the key aspects of the idea: the idea that people can become more or 
less emotionally intelligent. Even Goleman, whose attention is clearly directed toward 
developing emotional education programs, makes the mistake of summarizing emotional 
                                                
72 LeDoux attempts to redefine “talk-therapy” as a way to enact neurological cures: “These observations 
give us a different kind of understanding of therapy. Therapy is just another way of creating synaptic 
potentiation in brain pathways.” LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 245, 265. 
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disorders in terms of neurological disorders. His discussion is peppered with “insights” 
from current pharmacology and neurology, treating the physical basis of the emotion as if 
it were the proximal cause.73 If differences in emotional intelligence are only explainable 
as differences in brain chemistry, little can be done to change individual abilities other 
than pharmacological or surgical intervention. In giving an example of the way that 
“continual emotions distress can create deficits in a child’s intellectual abilities,” he 
writes:  
In one study, for example, primary school boys who had above-average IQ 
but nevertheless were doing poorly in school were found via these 
neuropsychological tests to have impaired frontal cortex functioning. They 
also were impulsive and anxious, often disruptive and in trouble—
suggesting faulty prefrontal control over their limbic urges. Despite their 
intellectual potential, these are the children at highest risks for problems 
like academic failure, alcoholism, and criminality—not because their 
intellect is deficit but because their control over their emotional life is 
impaired.74 
 
The skeptical consumer asks “why is the frontal cortex of these boys impaired?” but it is 
more often the case that “impaired functioning,” which is a neurological basis of an 
emotional state, is taken to be the cause of the problem and that such a cause seems to 
require a neurological solution. Indeed, Goleman goes no further than this suggestion. It 
is especially difficult to pass beyond neurological bases in our culture because we often 
lack the resources for any other kind of intervention. Families are becoming more and 
more isolated from one another and so more and more responsibility falls on parents (or 
one parent) for modeling behavior. Schools lack resources and are not reliable sources of 
                                                
73 We see the common flaw in the logic of neuroscience in the following: Goleman writes: “by the logic of 
neuroscience, if the absence of a neural circuit leads to a deficit in an ability, then the relative strength or 
weakness of that same circuit in people whose brains are intact should lead to comparable levels of 
competence in that same ability.” It is quite possible, on the other hand, that the brains of brain-damaged 
people do not work the same way that normal brains do. 
74 Goleman, Emotional Intelligence, 27. 
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traditional education, much less psychological education. Even if a pediatric neurologist 
were trained in child and parent psychology, which would be extremely rare, she would 
find it impossible to tell parents that their parenting styles have caused “impaired frontal 
cortex functioning” and that they ought to try be better models of healthy emotional 
behavior.75 Surely, it is easier to write a prescription. Similarly, Goleman does not 
compare the benefits of implementing emotional intelligence education programs over 
simply medicating the children. 
LeDoux similarly suggests medical manipulation of brain chemistry in order to 
change one’s emotions. For example, since the fear response is facilitated by the body’s 
production of adrenaline, he suggests:  
[R]escue workers and soldiers in battle are often traumatized by the 
memories of the horrific scenes they witness. Perhaps, it may be possible, 
immediately after the experience, to block the effects of the adrenaline and 
spare them the effects of the anguish later.76  
 
LeDoux does not consider the likely moral and social consequences of further 
emotionally numbing soldiers. He also does not consider the moral question of whether 
or not people who witness horrific events should feel horrified. Is it possible to lessen the 
emotional disturbance without lessening its moral significance? Is it possible to make a 
drug that makes it easier for people to kill other people and ensure that it is only used for 
morally necessary killing? These are the kinds of moral questions that demonstrate that a 
theory of emotional intelligence must be based in moral theory. We will return to this 
                                                
75 Of course, it is much easier to blame the parents when the parent is the mother since women have the 
tendency to react with sadness rather than anger at an affront. Furthermore, when the responsible for child-
rearing falls solely on the mother, she is the most obvious one to blame, even though it is not a reasonable 
expectation that one person could take on this responsibility herself. 
76 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 207. 
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connection after we reflect on the forgoing considerations and use them to make the 
definition of emotional intelligence as clear and accurate as possible. 
 
III: Summary of A Good, Working Definition of Emotional Intelligence 
After this consideration of the ways that we can evaluate different theories of 
emotional intelligence, it is time for me to pledge my allegiance to a good, working 
definition. A preliminary definition of emotional intelligence might sound something like 
this: emotional intelligence is the analysis and better understanding of one’s own 
emotions for the sake of acting on and expressing those emotions for the sake of seeking 
good outcomes and psychological well-being, as well as understanding and discussing the 
emotions of others in the same pursuit and, additionally, creating an emotionally open 
and healthy environment that promotes emotional intelligence for all.77 
Analysis, understanding, and expression are the meanings of “intelligence” that 
apply to emotional experience. These are behaviors that can be called “intelligent,” both 
in the honorific and in the cognitive sense; they are not latent abilities. This definition is 
based on the theory of emotion that was explored in the previous chapter: it does not take 
“intelligence,” vis a vis emotion, to be a function of only one mental subsystem, or “part” 
of the mind, but exactly the site of interaction between the mind and body, cognition and 
affect, abstract moral evaluation and concrete needs. It includes the ways that emotions 
can be intelligent and the ways that intelligence can be emotional, but it also strives to 
overcome a compartmentalized theory of subjectivity in the service of speaking to the 
quality of lived experience. 
                                                
77 Please see chapter 1 for a discussion of everything that might be involved in the “expression” of an 
emotion. 
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Emotional intelligence can involve all of the various individual directions of 
causality. For example, Daus, who defends ability models of emotional intelligence, 
argues that emotional intelligence ought to be construed as cognition directed at emotion, 
or using emotions as information.78 This might be one part of emotional intelligence, as it 
is one way that the emotions and intelligence interact, but it does not capture the whole of 
the definition and is deficient if taken in isolation. In the previous chapter, I discussed 
what it known as “the information claim” about emotion. Focus on “using emotions” as 
information to enhance cognition reifies the dichotomy between emotion and cognition. 
Affective “information” has a shoddy meaning if it is used to refer to feelings that have 
not yet been translated into well-grounded reasons79 or using emotional response 
categorization, which is little more than prejudice and bias. These “emotional” 
categorizations may be effective for making quick decisions, but they are morally 
problematic.80 (We will see this argument again in Kant’s criticism of sympathy.) There 
are a plurality of ways that the emotions interact with intelligent understanding; each of 
them can and should play a part in emotional intelligence, as long as it is based on a 
sufficiently wide model of emotional life. 
Those working within the field of psychology are, of course, not satisfied with 
simply giving a definition. A definition of a “psychological construct” should lead to a 
way to measure it. A construct is only sufficiently scientific if it can be measured with 
                                                
78 She contrasts this to emotions aiding cognition, as with negative mood allowing for better information 
processing. C.S. Daus, “The case for the ability based model of emotional intelligence” in A Critique of 
Emotional Intelligence: What are the Problems and How Can They Be Fixed?, ed. Kevin Murphy (New 
York: Psychology Press, 2006), 308.  
79 See Carol Gohm and Gerald Clore, “Affect as Information: An Individual-Differences Approach,” in The 
Wisdom in Feeling: Psychological Processes in Emotional Intelligence, ed. Lisa F. Barrett and Peter 
Salovey (New York: Guilford Press, 2002). 
80 See Niedenthal, Dalle, and Rothman, “Emotional Response Categorization as Emotionally Intelligent 
Behavior” in The Wisdom in Feeling: Psychological Processes in Emotional Intelligence, ed. Lisa F. 
Barrett and Peter Salovey (New York: Guilford Press, 2002).  
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reliability, content validity, predictive validity, consequential validity, and construct 
validity.81 The fact that I am not working in the field of psychology means that I am 
afforded some leniency that those pushing to define and measure this new construct are 
not, and I can question whether or not emotional intelligence is the kind of thing that 
should be measured in this way. If a test is designed to measure emotional intelligence 
“reliably,” for example, it will give people a score that will remain constant across 
various situations and over time. To push for a “reliable” measure seems like the exact 
way that emotional intelligence should not be understood. 
Following Saarni and Buckley’s notion of emotionally intelligent behavior, with 
its emphasis on the idiosyncrasies of one’s developmental history as well as the ways that 
we continually learn emotional scripts from our on-going relationships, it would be better 
to design a test that would seek out problem areas rather than posit a general score. Such 
a test might ask a person about his or her recent and past experiences with anger, or any 
other emotion, and whether or not he or she believes that she has handled these situations 
well, looking at the situation and others involved, as well as moral notions like self-
respect and fairness. We can see that, for such a test, measuring and changing emotional 
intelligence would be internally related, as the subject reflects on her experiences and 
tests out different ways of understanding them. It is only by continually focusing on and 
seeking out the means by which people can improve that we will avoid associating 
emotional intelligence with IQ—indeed, I wonder if IQ can be explained as the result of 
the need to test it “reliably”—and that we will see instead that it is a need for all people: 
anyone who has emotions needs emotional intelligence. Also, a focus on improvement 
                                                
81 See Zeidner et al.’s discussion in chapter 2, “Measure for Emotional Intelligence Measures,” of M. 
Zeidner, G. Matthews, and R. Roberts, eds., What We Know About Emotional Intelligence: How It Affects 
Learning, Work, Relationships, and Our Mental Health (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009). 
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will bring out the true variety of ways in which people can have and can lack emotional 
intelligence. 
Approaching the topic from a philosophical perspective is not intended to replace 
psychological and educational psychometrics, but to show instead that there is also a need 
for a more subtle treatment. The overarching theme of this dissertation is one of 
psychological and moral self-improvement; conceiving of emotional intelligence as a 
personality trait, a disposition, or, worse, an innate ability such as g, emphasizes the way 
that emotional intelligence is fixed, not variable and corrigible. For this reason I am even 
resistant to use the term “emotional intelligence” as an abstract noun, but prefer to always 
use it in an adjectival form, describing certain behaviors. For example, someone might 
say “I’m just not very emotionally intelligent… that’s not my strength” in the way that 
someone else would say “I just feel disgusted when I see two men kiss.” Both of these, 
supposedly introspective, confessions are meant to be the final word and are meant to 
shut down, rather than occasion, discussion. The different ways that people lack 
emotional intelligence is as varying as different life circumstances. I do not doubt that 
there might be general trends, like difficulties standing up for oneself or expressing grief, 
but these types of commonalities do not seem to rise to the level of scientific-ness 
demanded by the psychometrics of the broad, umbrella term, “emotional intelligence.” 
Ability-based measures tend to measure people at their best while self-report 
measures usually track typical functioning.82 Ability-based models of emotional 
intelligence ignore the fact that different people are likely to find different kinds of 
situations challenging and that all people have room for improvement. Since everyone 
has a different developmental history, everyone has learned different lessons about 
                                                
82 Ciarrochi, Emotional Intelligence in Everyday Life, 253.  
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emotions; although it makes sense that some emotional situations are inherently 
challenging, it also makes sense that everyone will have different problem areas. We 
might even find that emotional intelligence is indirectly improved by studying conflict-
resolution strategies, stress-coping techniques, or by improving decision making. If we 
focus too much on the affect of the emotion, or on emotions as they differ from other 
experiences, we ignore the fact that emotions are about something and that the majority 
of our experiences are emotional. Similarly, we cannot exclude the realm of desire and 
motivation when understanding an emotion. Similarly, the idea of emotional intelligence, 
if it is similarly taken out of the context of experience, might seem to imply that we can 
simply talk through and talk away all of our emotions. I seriously doubt that an ability-
based model of emotional intelligence, which hopes to discover and measure the essence 
of “emotional intelligence,” can address the true variety of life’s emotional challenges. 
The definition suggested here, simply because it retains the term “emotional 
intelligence,” can have the negative consequence of suggesting that emotional 
intelligence is something exotic or complex. It is important to keep in mind just how 
simple of an idea it really is. As Zeidner, Matthew, and Roberts point out, there is some 
overlap between the idea of emotional intelligence and successful coping with stress.83 
Negative emotions are similar to stress; stress may be a less conscious or longer-lasting 
form of negative emotion. Similarly, Brackett and Katulak’s idea of an emotional 
blueprint underscores the inherent simplicity of the notion of emotional intelligence.84 
“Creating an emotional blueprint” for a situation is just asking oneself questions about 
                                                
83 M. Zeidner, G. Matthews, and R. Roberts, eds., What We Know About Emotional Intelligence: How It 
Affects Learning, Work, Relationships, and Our Mental Health (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009). 
84 Bracket, M. A., & Katulak, N. A. “Emotional intelligence in the classroom: Skill-based training for 
teachers and students” in J. Ciarrochi & J. D. Mayer (Eds.), Applying emotional intelligence: A 
practitioner's guide (New York: Psychology Press, 2007. 
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the emotions involved in a situation, such as “how may each person feel?” and “how may 
I feel?”; “what may the person be thinking as a result of these feelings” and “how might I 
respond to my feelings?;” “what may be causing these emotions?” and “how might these 
feelings be addressed or managed?” The real difficulty of emotional intelligence is 
figuring out why it is so difficult to keep in mind this simple, enhanced perspective about 
emotions and emotional responses. We could blame the emotions and say that emotions 
are inherently disruptive, but it is often times the case that people do not know what to do 
about emotions even when they are not having them. It is instead the case that emotions 
often stand in for deep needs and desires, and, although these needs may be simple, 
failing to meet them is a significant threat, and so emotions stop us from simply turning 
our back on problems we do not know how to solve. 
Still, there might be resistance to my decision to retain the term “emotional 
intelligence” for a philosophically, not to mention morally, inclined theory of emotion. 
Although I do largely agree with Salovey and Mayer’s definition, if not their method of 
testing, the most productive work on emotional intelligence chooses to leave this term 
behind. Goleman has been very successful in linking this term in common parlance with 
the idea of having a business sense, and, yet, I use the term to mean almost the exact 
opposite. The term itself—“emotional intelligence”— is important for three reasons that I 
note in defending my choice to retain it. First, in the context of the philosophy of 
emotion, it serves to signify that emotion should not be understand in a limited sense to 
refer to some part of subjective experience but should be seen as connected to many 
aspects of experience as a process of development. “Emotional intelligence” refers to this 
more expansive notion; it is, as Goleman suggests, related to character. Second, the 
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notion of intelligence further provides evaluative and teleological pull: intelligence is 
something for which we should strive. 
Third, the term has the advantage of implying that the emotions are themselves 
intelligent. If we insist on continuing to oppose reason and emotion, as does Goleman, we 
miss the significance of the intelligence of the emotions entirely. The emotions are not 
“intuitions” from the “gut.” Nor are the emotions intelligent in a way that merely 
supplements reason, as recent philosophers of emotion like Greenspan, De Sousa, and 
Damasio, have argued. The emotions are not only values, latent beliefs for acting one 
way of another; they are a deep-seated form of reason that pulls us back to what is truly 
important while we are in the midst of attempting to evaluate it. Emotions speak for 
needs that might be denied, problems that must be solved, insights that must be had. To 
be emotionally intelligent means that we are adept in meeting the moral challenges of 
life. 
 
IV: The Connection Between Emotional Intelligence and Morality 
The idea of emotional intelligence is not new; it is also related to the idea of 
virtue. We have already seen moral considerations play a role in various parts of our 
discussion. The demand for emotional intelligence governs our relationship to ourselves 
and our relationship to others: self-understanding and empathy for the sake of promoting 
“good outcomes.” Furthermore, as we saw in the previous chapter, the evaluation of 
emotion that is an inherent part of emotional intelligence is not tied merely to social 
norms, but to moral notions of virtue, appropriateness, and responsibility. 
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Most theorists working to develop the construct of emotional intelligence agree 
that empathy should play some role in it. Empathy might be acceptable as a fully moral 
notion, or it might be seen as relating merely to moral psychology. Moral psychology can 
be defined either as the study of moral experiences as they are truly moral, such as with 
Kant’s discussion of the feeling of respect for the moral law, or as moral experiences as 
they are pre-moral or insufficiently moral, such as with Hume’s moral sense theory or 
studies that test the extent to which people are willing defy morality to obey authority 
figures. In the latter case the term “moral” would perhaps be better understood if it were 
to appear with quotation marks around it, since the psychologists studying it are 
bracketing the question of whether or not the behaviors actually are moral and whether or 
not there is such a thing as morality, it is rather the study of that which is called 
“morality” either by the subjects or by the researchers. Nevertheless, if those who study 
emotional intelligence hope to have it include empathy only in the latter amoral sense, 
they will run into the problem of lacking a good definition for empathy. Without a 
morally informed notion of empathy, nothing stops emotional intelligence from being the 
ability to effectively coerce people.  In her article on emotional intelligence in marriage, 
Fitness writes: 
It should be noted however that although this facet of emotional 
intelligence is potentially adaptive in marriage, someone who is skilled at 
reading other people’s emotions could just as well use this ability for 
destructive as for constructive purposes. For example, married partners 
could conceivably use their empathic awareness in a calculated way to 
identify their partner’s vulnerabilities and insecurities , and exploit these 
for their own purposes.85 
 
                                                
85 J. Fitness, “The Emotionally Intelligent Marriage,” in Emotional Intelligence in Everyday Life (2nd 
Edition), ed. J. Ciarrochi, J. Forgas, and J. Mayer (New York: Psychology Press, 2006), 132. 
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Yet it goes without saying that such should not count as emotional intelligence. Similarly, 
the definition of emotional competence developed by Boyantzis and Sala, in conjunction 
with Goleman’s model, which is “an ability to recognize, understand, and use emotional 
information about oneself or others that leads to or causes effective or superior 
performance,” lends itself just as easily to coercion and dishonesty as it would to honesty 
and fairness. 
 Empathy, and its correlate self-respect, are moral notions. By this, I mean that 
they are morally required, and that we need other moral guides to tell us when we have 
achieved them. For example, how do we know when we are sufficiently empathetic? We 
do not measure empathy by the number of tears that we cry, but by making reference to 
ideals like equality and respect, as well as by considering our duties to promote the 
happiness of other and our own self-perfection to the extent that we are able. We can also 
ask this question about emotional intelligence in general: how do we know when we have 
reached a good understanding of an emotion or of a situation? To answer these questions, 
we need both psychological and moral information. 
It may be less controversial to argue that the notion of emotional intelligence is 
essentially tied to the normative notion of health. Many of the researchers I have 
surveyed rely on the normative notion of health to formulate or critique ideas of 
emotional intelligence. For example, there are a number of myths about emotionality and 
emotional intelligence, like the idea that working through one’s emotions is always 
helpful and necessary or that crying is always cathartic. In the event that a preoccupation 
with certain emotions diminishes physical and psychological health, it is easy for us to 
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conclude that such is not emotionally intelligent.86 Surely, a program aimed at inculcating 
emotional intelligence cannot simply adopt an “emotions are good” approach and hope to 
achieve psychological health.87 Emotions cannot themselves take the place of the good or 
the goal, but can only make sense in the context of understanding good goals. Health is 
easy to accept as one such goal because it often has inherent moral worth and does not 
frequently conflict with other moral goals. Nevertheless, unless we are packing an entire 
moral theory into the notion of “health,” there is more to emotional intelligence than 
health. 
Many of the researchers suggest a connection between emotional intelligence and 
morality. Saarni draws a connection between wisdom and emotional intelligence.88 She 
defines emotional competence as “the demonstration of self-efficacy in emotion-eliciting 
social transactions.”89 Self-efficacy means that the “individual has the capacity and skills 
to achieve the desired outcome.” Although it often goes unsaid, it is clear that 
determining what “the desired outcome,” as with conflict resolution, comes under the 
purview of morality. Saarni further argues that moral character is a part of emotional 
competence, as she likens it to a virtue. She remarks that emotional skills, divorced from 
a moral sense, would not yield emotional competence because “emotional competence 
entails ‘doing the right thing’.”90 Fitness notes a connection between emotional 
intelligence and forgiveness.91 Tugade and Fredrickson argue that emotional intelligence 
                                                
86 For a discussion of this myth in the context of grief, see G. A. Bonnano, “Loss, Trauma, and Human 
Resilience: Have We Under-Estimated the Human Capacity to Thrive after Extremely Aversive Events?” 
American Psychologist 59 (2004): 20-28. 
87 See Mayer and Salovey, “What Is Emotional Intelligence?”(1997). 
88 C. Saarni, “Emotional Competence and Self-Regulation in Childhood,” in Emotional Development and 
Emotional Intelligence, ed. P. Salovey & D. Sluyter (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 35 and 39. 
89 Saarni, “Emotional Competence,” 38. 
90 Saarni, “Emotional Competence,” 39. 
91 Fitness, “The Emotionally Intelligent Marriage,” 133. 
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“is associated with higher quality interpersonal relationships among couples and 
friends.”92 Furthermore, 
positive emotions can produce increasing benefits over time… finding 
positive meaning amid stress can build personal resources, such as 
strengthened relationships and enhanced values (by inspiring more 
courage, tolerance, and wisdom).93 
 
Being morally cut off can lead to being emotionally cut off or to being emotionally off 
base. Emotions are based on values and emotional intelligence helps one pursue one’s 
values.94 Those who work on emotional intelligence seem to agree that part of the goal of 
their work is to help improve people and help people improve their lives. Mayer writes: 
It is my hope that emotional knowledge will have a greater positive than 
negative impact. Societies that recognize the importance of their citizen’s 
feelings may help create a more humane environment for those who live 
within them. When this emotional humanity is balanced with the other 
rights and responsibilities of the individual and society, the world may be 
better for it.95 
 
Indeed, we need moral judgment to help us hammer out the very idea of emotional 
intelligence. Emotional intelligence must answer moral questions: Should I favor 
confrontation at any cost? Or emotional conformity? Should I express this emotion 
although it will hurt another person? Should I promote this relationship? Should people 
lie to themselves in order to protect their self-esteem, established beliefs, and reduce 
cognitive dissonance? Or should honesty be the highest virtue (as it appears to be for 
anxiously attached couples)? Emotionally intelligent behavior involves the evaluation of 
                                                
92 See also Marc A. Brackett, R. M. Warner, and J. S. Bosca, “Emotional Intelligence and Relationship 
Quality among Couples,” Personal Relationships 12 (2005): 197-212; and P. N. Lopes et al., “Emotional 
Intelligence and Social Interaction,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 30 (2004): 1018-1034. 
93 M. M Tugade and B. L. Fredrickson, “Positive Emotions and Emotional Intelligence,” In The Wisdom in 
Feeling: Psychological Processes in Emotional Intelligence, ed. Lisa F. Barrett and Peter Salovey (New 
York: Guilford Press, 2002), 333, drawing from Tennen & Affleck (1999) and Janoff-Bulman (1992). 
94 Ciarrochi, Applying Emotional Intelligence.  
95 Mayer (2006). Salovey and Mayer acknowledge that conceiving of and measuring emotional intelligence 
requires that we have some “right answers” about emotional reactions. They choose to emphasize the 
extent to which these answers are not possible because of cultural relativity. Salovey and Mayer (1997), 9. 
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emotions: if emotions are not evaluated by moral standards, then any standards on which 
they are evaluated will lack an ultimate foundation. An emotional intelligence program 
that is not fused with moral theory often becomes too centered on the subjectivity of 
emotions and fails to address the real problems that the specific emotional situations 
present. In other words, a notion of emotional intelligence that ignores moral questions 
risks being totally ineffective. 
One might object that I have only shown that psychology needs moral theory, not 
that moral theory needs psychology or a notion of emotional intelligence. I must go 
further and argue that being emotionally intelligent is related to being a good person and 
that inculcating or conceiving of virtue without emotional intelligence is impossible. 
There is enough evidence to argue that a lack of emotional intelligence causes bad 
behavior and that one must practice emotionally intelligent behavior in order to avoid 
doing something morally wrong.96 I think we can take the argument even further and 
argue that, in some situations, it is morally unacceptable to ignore emotional 
communication and information. 
Imagine a situation, for example, where we would normally believe that consent 
is morally required; clearly, accepting merely verbal assent when there is emotional 
information to the contrary would be morally unacceptable. This might seem like a 
special situation, but it is necessary for us to take a step back and realize that all of our 
interactions and relationships are emotional, even those between relative strangers. The 
empathy referred to by the notion of emotional intelligence demands that we be aware of 
this unspoken dimension: it does not take a mind-reader to know what someone else 
might be thinking and feeling, and yet we are so often afraid to address it. We are morally 
                                                
96 See Ciarrochi et al. (2007). 
 110 
called on to accept and validate the reality of the unspoken, but, again, emotions are not 
just the unspoken, we are also morally called on to act with courage, and stand by our 
convictions, in our explicit, verbal exchanges. Without an understanding of the moral 
importance of emotional intelligence, morality comes to refer to an abstract and 
impersonal domain, if it does indeed leave us with any duties at all. 
Insofar as morality applies to relationships between people and human interaction, 
and emotions are a part of those relationships, it is morally necessary for us to cultivate 
emotional intelligence. We accept that the basic physical needs of food and shelter belong 
in a moral theory; the idea of emotional intelligence teaches us that people have 
psychological needs that are just as real and important as their physical needs. Emotional 
intelligence, then, must be provided for and included in any well-informed theory of the 
good life or right living. 
Like virtue, we expect emotional intelligence to involve both reflective and a pre-
reflective behaviors, as well as both behavioral and rational learning. It, as well as the 
philosophy of emotion, sheds light on moral theory when combined with it because 
considering all three topics together ensures that we see humans both as animals and as 
rational beings. We saw from the last chapter, and we know from the history of moral 
theory, that it is too easy to split up these qualities and view humans as only one or the 
other. The challenge is to retain both qualities and not collapse one into the other. 
As we saw in the first chapter, the idea that morality commands certain attitudes 
about the emotions is not new, but the attitude in particular that I am advocating is 
relatively new. We might look to Spinoza as an example of the way that the history of 
philosophy has engaged with the idea of developing proper emotional engagement and 
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the correct frame of mind regarding emotion. Spinoza asserts that the task of ethics is to 
achieve a firm grasp of truth so that one can retain this understanding during an 
emotional disruption. For Spinoza, passions are inadequate or confused ideas, or, perhaps 
we would put the point clearer if we say they are states of confusion. Passivity, for 
Spinoza, is the result of this confusion. Spinoza holds that even our thoughts are 
determined and that, for this reason, we do not have absolute control over our emotions, 
but he held that we can eliminate a passion by replacing the confusion with clear 
reasoning. We might still be made to feel affects passively as a result of determination 
from external objects, but we can eradicate those further emotional agitations that 
originate from our evaluation of the object. The task, then, is to maintain this Stoic 
calmness of mind during emotional disturbances. 
Discussing Spinoza sheds new light on the underlying problems with Goleman’s 
approach. Like Goleman, Spinoza holds that the task for emotional self-improvement is 
the overcoming of those emotions that “hinder the mind from understanding.”97 Although 
Spinoza is a determinist, his Ethics takes the goal of increasing the experience of 
freedom. Emotions, insofar as they are confused ideas, are out of our control and hence 
bad. In defining the terms of the inquiry, Spinoza writes, “I say that we suffer when 
anything is done within us, or when anything follows from our nature of which we are 
not the cause except partially.”98 Spinoza, like many in the history of philosophy, 
understands thinking as an activity and feeling as a passivity. The challenge for us now is 
to transform the prejudice that we have inherited from language and the history of 
philosophy and understand feeling as an activity. To call emotion a choice is too 
                                                
97 Spinoza’s Ethics, trans. Samuel Shirley, ed. Seymour Feldman (Indiana: Hackett, 1992), 260. 
98 Spinoza, Ethics, 128. 
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polemical; it is instead necessary to identity ourselves with our feelings the same way we 
identify ourselves with our thoughts. We do not choose our thoughts; we do not accept all 
of our thoughts wholesale as always correct or desirable. Nor need we accept all of our 
emotions. Still, we must overcome the impulse to reduplicate the disassociation of 
thought and repression of emotion in refusing theoretically to identify ourselves with our 
emotions. (We will revisit this problem in chapter 6 with Kant’s notion of autonomy.) As 
I have argued from the beginning of this chapter, our understanding of emotion is internal 
to emotional behavior and the theory of emotional intelligence. Emotional problems are 
writ large in the theoretical problems that then sustain them. A good theory of emotional 
intelligence is tied to the actual practice of emotional intelligence. My hope is that 
turning our attention to moral theory, and Kantian moral theory in particular, can promote 
that practice.
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CHAPTER III 
 
KANT’S THEORY OF EMOTION 
 
 Before I can proceed to my argument that Kantian moral theory works to promote 
emotional intelligence—Kant is aware of the moral importance of emotional intelligence, 
and Kantian moral theory can therefore support a theory of emotional intelligence—I 
must call into question the overwhelming prejudice against Kant and the received opinion 
of his theory of emotion. The majority of my readers will believe either that Kantian 
moral theory is incompatible with a theory of emotional intelligence, remarking that Kant 
would take the term “emotional intelligence” to be an oxymoron, or that Kant’s theory of 
“emotional intelligence” is essentially Stoic, holding that we become more emotionally 
intelligent the fewer emotions we have. It is true that Kant’s comments about emotion are 
often disparaging, but this appearance constitutes merely the outermost layer of his 
theory of emotion. Kant appears to accept the Stoic ideal of apathy, holding that emotions 
can be dangerous and that virtue requires their extirpation; yet this accepted 
understanding of his theory of emotion becomes more complicated when we realize that 
Kant’s starting point, his definition of emotion, is unnecessarily narrow and derogatory. 
When we limit Kant’s derogatory remarks about emotion to his limited notions of 
Affecten and Leidenshaften, we see that there are many aspects of emotionality, or 
phenomena that we normally associate with emotion, that Kant does not disparage. It 
becomes clear that Kant, like the Stoics, maintains a cognitive theory of emotion but that 
he, unlike the Stoics, does not hold that emotional judgments are necessarily false. 
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Neither does he hold that emotional judgments are likely to be wrong because of 
their lowly origins. The judgments that ground emotions can be integrated into the 
rational mind; this is exactly Kant’s recommendation. This fact opens up the possibility 
that emotions might be themselves helpful for discovering and choosing the most rational 
course of events. Furthermore, Kant would agree with the theory of emotional 
intelligence that I have set out: it is more rational to understand one’s emotions than to 
attempt to eliminate them or repress them with the “rational mind.” 
The first half of this chapter focuses on Kant’s criticisms of emotion and passion, 
as well as his well-known criticism of sympathy, showing that Kant’s evaluations are not 
unwarranted when we understand them according to his original limited definitions. The 
second half of this chapter focuses on those Kantian “feelings” (Gefühle) that rise above 
being emotions because of their rational nature, such as the moral feeling (the feeling of 
respect for the moral law) and moral feelings (such as properly grounded sympathy). 
These feelings play an important role in Kant’s moral theory. I then argue that Kant holds 
a cognitive theory of emotion, and I discuss various aperçus that gesture toward a 
Kantian theory of emotional intelligence. 
 
I. The Problem with Emotion 
 In preparing his English version of Kant’s Anthropology for the Pragmatic Point 
of View, Dowdell chose to translate the German word Affect as “emotion.”1 Kant 
contrasts Affect and Leidenshaft, or what is translated as passion. He defines both Affect 
                                                
1 It is useful to realize that, by “anthropology,” Kant means something much closer to what we mean by 
“psychology,” i.e., a study of human mental capacities and behaviors as they are common among humans.  
Kant defines psychology as the study of inner experiences as they fall under natural laws (A§7). Examples 
of such natural laws are the categories of the first Critique. This definition of psychology is closer to what 
we call philosophy of mind and what Kant calls transcendental psychology. 
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and Leidenschaft in terms of their irrationality. Both are a part of the faculty of desire 
(Begehrungsvermögen): 
The inclination which can hardly, or not at all, be controlled by reason is 
passion. On the other hand, emotion is the feeling (Gefühl) of pleasure or 
displeasure at a particular moment, which does not give rise to reflection 
(namely the process of reason whether one should submit to it or reject it). 
(A §73) 
 
Already we have hit a snag in Kant’s attempt to define emotions entirely derisively: 
elsewhere Kant asserts that we always implicitly judge a pleasure to be good or bad as we 
experience it (A §64). Nevertheless, we see that Kant is clearly attempting to define 
Affecten and Leidenshaften in opposition to reason. Emotion (Affect) is feeling before it 
has been consciously reflected on and evaluated; passions are more conscious and 
deliberate, but they are, for that reason, even less rational. 
Gregor similarly recognizes that Kant’s use of Affect and Leidenshaft are different 
than the English terms emotion and passion because he deliberately means Affect to refer 
to “a feeling (e.g., anger) which precedes deliberation and makes this difficult or 
impossible” and Leidenshaft to be closely associated with vice.2 We might consider 
translating Affect with the English cognate, “affect” because we tend to think of affects as 
more immediate, but the English term “affect” is less charged and more vague than 
Kant’s notion of Affect. Altering the term would also not help in case of “passion” even 
though we only rarely use “passion” in this purely negative sense. We talk about being in 
the “throes of passion,” but even this is not exactly what Kant means by passion, since 
Kantian passion never negates culpability and Kant’s description of passion is of a 
longer-term, habituated state. In English it is much more common for us to use the term 
                                                
2 Mary Gregor, Laws of Freedom: A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the 
Metaphysik der Sitten (Basil Blackwell, 1963), 73-74. 
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“passion” to refer to a constructive desire, or set of desires, such as having a passion for 
music or pursuing one’s cause passionately. Changing the term would have little effect of 
normalizing Kant’s definitions, so we should follow the accepted translation but keep in 
mind that these words mean something very specific for Kant. The further specificity of 
their meaning will become clearer when we consider the role they play in Kant’s moral 
theory, as the notion of passion is closely related to the notions of both vice and 
inclination (a term that also has a special meaning for Kant). 
Kant often opts for different terms for things that we would consider to be 
emotions but that do not fit his purely derogatory meaning. In cases where emotions 
originate in reason, as when a sermon stirs up moral emotions, these emotions do not 
count as “emotions.” In the case of intellectual vigor, Kant calls it “enthusiasm” 
(Enthusiasm). Kant makes the same point about courage, which becomes genuine bravery 
or moral courage, and hence outgrows its inferior status as an emotion, when it is 
instigated by reason. Kant clearly believes that the defining feature of emotion is the lack 
of rational reflection: “it is not the intensity of a certain feeling which creates the 
emotional state, but the want of reflection in the comparison of this feeling with the sum 
of all feelings (the pleasure or displeasure) in one’s own condition” (A §75). We shall see 
that when emotions play a positive role in Kant’s philosophy, they are usually referred to 
as “feelings” rather than “emotions.” 
Most people would agree that some emotions start out as vague feelings that are 
either pleasant or unpleasant; but it seems to be the case that usually, sometimes with 
great effort, we reflect on and make rational sense out of our emotions. Kant’s definition 
of emotion, then, limits it to the first, pre-reflective stage of an emotion. The initial vague 
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feeling of pleasure or displeasure could turn out to be good or bad, worth having or not 
worth having, but insofar as it has not been evaluated and reflectively understood, it is 
problematic. The emotion could easily remain in its pre-reflective state and instigate pre-
reflective action, and this is Kant’s main concern: 
Emotion is surprise through sensation, whereby composure of mind 
(animus sui compos) is suspended. Emotion therefore is precipitate, that is, 
it quickly grows to a degree of feeling which makes reflection impossible 
(it is thoughtless). (A §74) 
 
Kant uses the emotion of anger to illustrate, as he believes that anger is quick to strike 
and quick to pass: “What the emotion of anger does not accomplish quickly will not be 
accomplished at all. The emotion of anger easily forgets” (A §74). This does not sound 
like a very accurate description of anger, but it is useful to illustrate the type of 
psychological response Kant has in mind when he refers to emotions. Most of us have in 
mind something more like Kant’s notion of hate, which we will discuss shortly, when we 
think of anger, as we often are preoccupied by our anger.3 
Even if an angry action did not end up causing harm or being immoral—even if it 
were beneficial to those involved— it would still be morally dangerous for Kant, 
because, as pre-reflective, it is still unthinking and not the product of rational choice. 
Such a behavior is unprincipled and cannot be a recommended course of action since 
                                                
3 Somewhat contradictorily, since Kant believes that emotions lead to rash and harmful behaviors, Kant 
suggests that the best way to respond to emotions like anger and shame is to express them immediately so 
that they do not turn into resentment. Resentment must then be vented by people “verbalizing their 
concerns” (A §78). Kant rightly points out that such verbalization is difficult and that the emotions 
themselves seem to make it difficult. He concludes “for this reason these emotions present themselves in a 
disadvantageous light” (A §78). It is true that the negative emotions are difficult and unpleasant to 
experience for reasons over and above their content. They do, in fact, seem to frustrate the very purposes 
that they inspire. For example, if someone’s actions upset me, the most straightforward response is to tell 
that person that they are upsetting me and to perhaps ask them to stop. To be upset, though, is a negative 
emotion and difficult to express. The most unemotional person could simply state “I do not like to be 
teased; it upsets me; please stop,” or make a similar request, but the true-to-life emotional person simply 
becomes upset and stymied by her anger. Hence, it does seem that the negative emotion frustrates its own 
goal, but, as we discussed in the first chapter, such difficulty is probably not truly the fault of the emotion, 
but of the whole situation and of one’s subjective proclivities. 
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there is no guarantee it is morally acceptable. Furthermore, in being pre-reflective and 
automatic, there is a sense in which the behavior is degrading to our humanity. Although 
there are those who will speak in favor of spontaneity for its own sake, commonsense 
surely shows that it is better to think through one’s actions before one acts. In the case in 
which we decide to follow the original emotional impulse, taking the time to rationally 
evaluate the impulse need not water down the affect; it is only when we are compelled to 
pursue an action that is rationally unwise that we need to set about changing the impulse 
in some way or deferring it. 
Kant agrees with the Stoics that “the prudent man must at no time be in a state of 
emotion.” Not only are emotions irrational in the sense of being pre-reflective, they are 
irrational in the sense that they “make [a person] incapable of pursuing [his] own 
purposes” (A §75). Emotions are at cross-purposes with purposiveness. Kant argues that 
emotions, such as anger and shame, are “incapacitating because of their intensity” (A 
§78). If emotions do have an inchoate purpose, then, they cannot effectively serve it, at 
least not as emotions. To sum up, Kant lodges at least three criticisms against emotions: 
they are pre-reflective; they are internally conflicted; and they are imprudent and might 
be immoral. 
Kant writes: “to be subject to emotions and passions is probably always an illness 
of mind because both emotion and passion exclude the sovereignty of reason” (A §73). 
There are certainly a number of examples of cases in which people appear to act 
irrationally because they are in the throes of an emotion. Our language itself adopts this 
theory of emotion and takes the term “emotional” as a synonym for “irrational.” If we say 
that someone is behaving “emotionally,” we usually mean that he is giving a knee-jerk 
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response that is the product of intense feeling and not reasoning carefully. Nevertheless, 
as I have suggested, there is no reason to think that this way of speaking is anything more 
than sedimented prejudice against emotion, rather than an accurate psychological theory. 
There is no reason to think that a bad decision-making process is any more the fault of 
the emotion than it is the fault of reason and an individual’s poor judgment or learned and 
habituated means of experiencing emotions. It seems likely that someone who is 
prejudiced against experiencing emotion is more likely to respond to an emotion hastily, 
and someone who is open to feeling an emotion and exploring its meaning is better able 
to discover the best course of action, which may itself be suggested by the emotion. If it 
can be shown that Kant accepts a cognitive theory of emotion, and that there is no reason 
to think that the judgment that grounds an emotion is essentially more fallacious than any 
other kind of judgment, then we have opened the door to showing that emotions can be 
reasoned with and can even be a part of good reasoning. Indeed, as we shall see, Kant 
holds this to be true. The Kantian quest for rationality involves self-analysis and 
evaluation, which requires understanding and thinking through one’s emotions before 
acting. It may turn out that, for whatever reason, the judgments that ground emotions are 
more difficult to evaluate than impersonal judgments, but that does not mean that such 
evaluation is any less necessary or possible. As we shall see, Kant agrees with this 
conclusion. 
 
II. The Problem with Passion 
 Kant is even more condemnatory of passion. Kant holds that emotions strike us 
and fizzle out quickly, whereas passions last longer and become habitual inclinations 
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toward certain actions. “Emotion works like water that breaks through a dam; passion 
works like a river digging itself deeper and deeper into the bed” (A §74). Kant gives the 
example of the difference between anger and hate: anger is an emotion and is relatively 
short-lived, while hate is an inclination that can last for years and is therefore a passion. 
The fact that many of us are aware of the fact of being preoccupied by our anger only 
underscores the relationship between emotion and passion about which Kant is worried: 
emotions turn into passions if they are effectively dealt with or integrated into the (moral) 
rational mind. A passion is an emotion that has been integrated into the rational mind but 
in a way that is incompatible with our higher nature and human worth.  
 Kant’s comments on passion are more difficult to understand than his comments 
on emotion. Kant offers two distinct criticisms of passion, yet he fails to clearly 
distinguish between them: the first is that passion is necessarily an irrational 
preoccupation with and favoring of one inclination over all others motives; the second is 
that passion, even if an expression of clear-headed reasoning,4 is necessarily immoral. In 
the first case, Kant’s criticism of passion is the same as his criticism of emotion but Kant 
takes passions to be more recalcitrant to reflection: “inclination, which hinders the use of 
reason to compare, at a particular moment of choice, a specific inclination against the 
sum of all inclinations, is passion” (A §80). In other words, passions preoccupy us and 
continually lead to irrational decisions. Fridja lodges this criticism at “emotions” with his 
“law of closure”: 
Emotions tend to be closed to considerations that its aims may be of 
relative and passing importance. They are closed to the requirements of 
interests other than those of their own aims. They claim top priority and 
                                                
4 Kant gives a variety of names to the reasoning power that does not take up explicitly moral ends, which 
are all synonyms: prudential reasoning, pragmatic reasoning, techno-practical reason, etc. In contemporary 
terms, we would call this calculative or instrumental rationality.  
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are absolute with regard to appraisals of urgency and necessity of action, 
and to control over action.5 
 
Fridja writes that emotions similarly shirk a consideration of consequences. A passion, 
for Kant, is something like a drug addition; we can very effectively strategize ways to get 
the next fix, but the fact that this goal takes precedence over all, or many, of our other 
goals, is irrational. In using hate, as opposed to anger, to illustrate passion, Kant must be 
thinking of an experience closer to all-consuming hate, like Iago’s hate for Othello (if 
hate—rather than repressed erotic desire—is really the best description of Iago’s psychic 
state), rather than the simple evaluation that someone is contemptuous or even the 
disposition to avoid him and to speak spitefully to him. Unless we assume that all forms 
of hate are essentially irrational and/or immoral, we must assume that Kant is referring to 
a particularly all-consuming variety. 
Passions involve more reflection and choice than do emotions, and for this reason 
they are more blameworthy for Kant. When considering Socrates’s argument that it might 
sometimes be good to experience the emotion of anger, Kant writes: “passion, on the 
other hand, no man wishes for himself. Who wants to be put in chains when he can be 
free?” Kant suggests that the type of reason allowed by passion is still necessarily 
perverted or immoral: “passion always presupposes a maxim of the subject, namely, to 
act according to a purpose prescribed for him by his inclination” (A §80). Passion causes 
the privileging of one inclination over other concerns, and for this reason passion is 
essentially immoral. The moral meta-maxim, as we know from the Religion essay, is to 
always choose to follow the moral law over inclination whenever the two conflict; the 
immoral meta-maxim is to follow inclination always regardless of whether or not it 
                                                
5 Fridja, The Laws of Emotion, 15. 
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conflicts with the moral law. Passion, being preoccupied with itself, forces the subject to 
choose on its behalf over the moral law, should the two conflict, and it therefore sets up 
the subject for immoral behavior. 
Kant seems to conflate his two criticisms of passion. He describes passion’s 
tendency to promote the fulfillment of one inclination over a measured consideration of 
the sum total of inclinations (or “making one’s partial purpose the whole of one’s 
purpose”) as harmful for pure practical reason (A §81). Surely, pure practical reason, 
insofar as it is pure, does not allow for any determination by inclination. Kant’s two 
criticisms of passion are united: “The delusion consists in equalizing the mere opinion of 
someone regarding the value of a thing with the actual value of the thing” (A §82). A 
flaw of prudential reasoning (a sort of calculative myopia) may also become a flaw of 
moral reasoning (the inability to value correctly). In holding the fulfillment of one 
particular inclination up above all our other inclinations, we are failing to value correctly. 
A moral failing, involved in choosing to fulfill an inclination over following the moral 
law, is also an act of failing to value correctly. Although both are failures to value 
correctly, these two types of failure are nonetheless qualitatively very different. The 
elision of these two criticisms highlights the fact that Kant believes that there cannot be 
moral passions, as we shall see in our upcoming discussion of sympathy. The way that 
Kant defines passion negatively parallels his use of the term “inclination” (Neigung), 
which has a purely negative or selfish meaning (as we will discuss in chapter 5). Passions 
are desires, and “habitual sensuous desire is called inclination” (A §73). Often “passion” 
is synonymous with vice, for Kant; and the opposite of certain passions are virtues. 
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It should be noted that Kant’s remarks about emotion and passion in his explicitly 
moral works adopt this theory from the Anthropology. In the Metaphysics of Morals, 
Kant writes: 
Affects and passions are essentially different from each other. Affects 
belong to feeling insofar as, preceding reflection, it makes this impossible 
or more difficult. Hence an affect is called precipitate or rash (animus 
praeceps), and reason says, through the concept of virtue, that one should 
get hold of oneself. Yet this weakness in the use of one’s understanding 
coupled with the strength of one’s emotion is only a lack of virtue [as 
opposed to a vice], as it were, something childish and weak, which can 
indeed coexist with the best will. It even has one good thing about it: that 
this tempest quickly subsides. Accordingly, a propensity to an affect (e.g., 
anger) does not enter into kinship with vice so readily as does a passion. A 
passion is a sensible desire that has become a lasting inclination (e.g., 
hatred as opposed to anger). The calm with which one gives oneself up to 
it permits reflection and allows the mind to form principles upon it and so, 
if inclination lights upon something contrary to the law, to brood upon it, 
to get it rooted deeply, and so to take up what is evil (as something 
premeditated) into its maxim. And the evil is then properly evil, that is, 
true vice. (MM 166) 
 
Putting Kant’s theory of emotion into the context of his moral theory, we can see that 
passions bear a striking resemblance to vices. Kant’s list of the passions—ambition, lust 
for power, and avarice—is a list of vices (A §82). (Although, strangely, Kant includes the 
natural passion for freedom in his discussion of passion, and he does not criticize this 
natural passion in any way, describing its natural, moral development.6) The insight that 
passions are vices sheds new light on recurrent attempts to explain and defend Kant’s 
criticism of sympathy. 
 
                                                
6 Kant believes that moral thinking helps the natural inclination for external freedom develop into the 
concept of justice. He describes this transition as a strengthening, not a sublimating, of the passion. In the 
case of freedom, reason and passion work together: “reason alone establishes the concept of freedom and 
passion collides with it” (A §82). 
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III. The Problem with Sympathy 
Kant’s elision of his two criticisms of passion prevents him from considering 
moral passion; yet his discussion of one moral feeling in the Groundwork, viz. sympathy, 
has been chiefly responsible for the bad reputation of his philosophy of emotion. (Note 
that the fact that sympathy is a feeling (Gefühl), and not a passion, allows for its 
resolution with reason, of which we shall see Kant is very much in favor.) Since any 
mention of Kant’s theory of emotion most commonly calls to mind Kant’s criticism of 
the moral motivation of sympathy, it is best that we devote some time to elucidating his 
position.  
Henson and Herman have debated the correct reading of Kant’s take on those 
inclinations, such as sympathy, which cooperate with a respect for duty and jointly bring 
about moral action.7 Henson argues that Kant would allow that moral actions can be 
determined by both respect for the moral law and inclinations at the same time—a thesis 
referred to as “overdetermination.” The idea of overdetermination holds that any one of 
the motives acting alone must be strong enough to cause the action by itself. Henson 
suggests that Kant did not see the possibility of overdetermination and that when we 
bring up this possibility it helps to make sense of the difference between an action having 
moral worth and an action conforming to duty, since an action can conform to duty and 
yet not have moral worth. Given the assumption that moral worth only accrues to actions 
that are done only out of respect for duty, with no cooperating motivations, Henson 
argues that it is clear, based on the Groundwork, that an action without moral worth can 
                                                
7 In Richard Henson, “What Kant Might Have Said: Moral Worth and the Overdetermination of Dutiful 
Action,” The Philosophical Review 88, no. 1. (1979): 39-54; and Barbara Herman, “On the Value of Acting 
from the Motive of Duty,” The Philosophical Review 90, no. 3. (1981): 359-382. 
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still be moral and, thereby, praiseworthy.8 On the other hand, Henson downplays the 
importance of moral worth for Kantian moral theory, since it seems to require dire 
situations in which one has lost all moral feeling. 
Herman argues that Henson’s notion of overdetermination is simplistic and that 
respect for duty should be seen as a meta-motivation or a “limiting condition” on 
motivation, i.e., a motivation that checks our other motivations.9 She holds that Kant 
would grant moral worth to an overdetermined action if the moral motive were the 
motive upon which the agent acted.10 This discussion is further complicated by the fact 
that Kant believed that it is nearly impossible to be sure that one has not unconsciously 
chosen out of inclination instead of out of respect for duty. 
                                                
8 Note that Henson conflates act and agent evaluations. I do not think that this in itself constitutes a major 
flaw with his thesis. 
9 Herman, “On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty,” 373. 
10 Guyer, in Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, rejects both these solutions because he argues that 
inclinations are not “potentially independently motivating factors in the first place” (293). Guyer argues 
that, for Kant, reason is always involved in acting and we choose to act on an inclination and can even 
choose to have or not have inclinations. He cites Allison’s “Incorporation Thesis” interpretation as 
evidence for this reading. Therefore, if there are cooperating inclinations contributing to a moral action, 
they should be seen as products of the respect for duty. Guyer is mistaken to think that the “Incorporation 
Thesis” relates to this issue. It may be the case that Kant believes that an agent must always choose to make 
an inclination a reason for his action, as Guyer argues. That does not tell us anything about whether or not 
we can choose based on two reasons, or if an action only has moral worth for Kant when we choose to have 
only one reason for doing it, viz., respect for the moral law. Guyer argues that, like Herman’s idea of a 
“limiting condition,” people always employ one out of two meta-maxims: “the maxim always to do, out of 
respect for duty, all and only what duty requires or permits, and thus to act as an inclination would suggest 
only if so doing in compatible with or conducive to doing what duty requires; or the maxim always to do, 
out of self-love, what inclination suggests, even when so doing is incompatible with doing what duty 
requires”(295). Guyer bases this conclusion on Kant’s discussion of moral dispositions from Religion 
Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. This focus on an agent’s fundamental character (good or evil) 
makes it so that inclinations themselves can never cooperate or conflict with duty and makes the agent (“to 
some extent”) responsible for his inclinations. To support this interpretation, Guyer draws on the discussion 
of the moral need to cultivate moral feelings in the Metaphysics of Morals. Although Guyer emphasizes his 
distance from Herman here, in other chapters of Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness he emphasizes her 
point that applying the categorical imperative, as it is a limiting condition, requires other motives in order 
to make it effective. Guyer uses the terminology of form and content. Either way, the point is that we 
cannot read Kant’s theory of moral action as a rejection of the moral worth of determination through 
inclination because an action requires a motivation and all such really motivating motivations come from 
inclination. Guyer does not square this argument with the Groundwork, and that seems to be necessary at 
this point, since we seem to have gone astray from the original goal of making sense of Kant’s claims about 
moral worth that appear to pit it against determination through inclination.  
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It is clear from the text that Kant intends to make a distinction between actions 
that are done for the sake of duty and actions that merely conform to duty. Henson’s 
conclusion is that the latter have more value for Kant. That is obviously false. Acting 
from duty alone may be difficult to do, comprehend, and recognize, but we can conceive 
of it through the thought experiments that Kant offers and be edified. Perhaps that is one 
point often overlooked: the thought of acting out of the pure respect for duty ought to 
inspire respect. Although an occasion to act out of respect for pure duty would definitely 
be the product of a bad situation, as Henson notes, the action would still be praiseworthy 
and edifying because it demonstrates the human potential to elevate morality and 
rationality over personal benefit and instrumental rationality. Kant makes the distinction 
between behaviors that merely accord with duty and those that are done for the sake of 
duty in order to elaborate that which is special about acting from duty: it is categorically 
different than acting from inclination. (I argue in chapter 5 that Kant often assumes that 
inclinations are inherently selfish.) This distinction explains the most important concept 
in the philosophical understanding of morality: pure respect for duty, which turns out to 
require the pure thought of lawfulness and, therefore, comprehension of the moral law. 
Without the latter, one has not understood the essence of morality at all and merely 
remains at the level of a pre-philosophical intuition of morality, lacking true moral worth 
and being constantly vulnerable to corruption since one’s behavior and convictions lack 
grounding in true moral principle. 
Herman is right that actions motivated by inclination have no moral content. 
Inclination does not track morality and inclination is therefore an inconsistent guide to 
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moral action.11 Herman gives the example of feeling sympathy for someone carrying a 
heavy load: according to Kant’s analysis, the mere feeling of sympathy is not mixed with 
a rational reflection about the principles and circumstances involved, such as being a 
hooded figure at the back door of an art museum struggling to bring out a large 
rectangular object at night.12 Sympathy is an unacceptable ground of moral action not 
because it does not sometimes lead to the right end, but exactly because it must only do 
so sometimes. 
Annas criticizes modern ethical theory, of which Kant is her main example, for 
holding that virtue must always correct emotions, and she argues that Ancient ethics is 
superior because it accepts that sometimes feelings can lead independently to the right 
result.13 Annas argues, against Sidgwick’s argument that we are not responsible for our 
feelings and so they do not belong to ethical theory, that we are responsible for our 
feelings, although not in the moment. She gives the example of working to break a bad 
habit.14 As we can see, this is not a very accurate criticism of Kant. The problem with 
pre-reflective feelings is not that they are vicious but that they are pre-reflective. As we 
shall see, Kant does not deny the importance of natural moral feelings as well as their 
proper cultivation, but he does define moral worth in terms of correct understanding. 
Sympathy, according to Kant’s defined usage, is not based on reasoned reflection 
and does not attain the level of principled moral action necessary for what Kant believes 
is the essential component of morality. Furthermore, respect for the moral law is itself 
                                                
11 See also Paul Guyer, Kant and the Experience of Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and Morality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 337-351. 
12 Herman, “On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty,” 364. 
13 Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 53. 
14 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Hackett Publishing, 1981, 1874); Annas, The Morality of 
Happiness, 56. 
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necessary for moral worth. Even if one’s sympathetic actions miraculously always 
matched the moral requirements of the situation, which is not likely unless the feeling of 
sympathy had itself already been produced by rational reflection, such a person would 
still lack genuine moral feeling (respect for the moral law) and, therefore, genuine moral 
worth on Kant’s account. In the “Preface” to the “Doctrine of Virtue,” Kant calls 
following moral feeling instead of moral reason “blindness.” We are reminded of his 
remark in the first Critique that intuitions without concepts are blind. It is not that moral 
feelings are bad, wrong, or unnecessary; they simply cannot be the whole story of moral 
understanding and decision-making. 
Kant begins the Groundwork discussion in question by stating that an 
examination of the concept of duty will help him and the reader reach a better 
understanding of the concept of a good will. In order to form a clear idea of the essence 
of duty, he uses a process of elimination. He first excludes from considerations all actions 
“which are recognized as opposed to duty,” since that is the most obvious first step. Next 
he draws on a distinction between actions that are in accord with duty yet not done from a 
“direct” inclination (only “another” inclination) and those actions, similarly in accord 
with duty, but done from a “direct” inclination. The merchant example serves as an 
example of the former, while the normal care we give to the preservation of life is an 
example of the latter. Kant seems to rank the latter as better than the former and calls the 
merchant “selfish,” but he does not use this epithet for the natural preservation of life. 
(Kant does refer to the natural preservation of life as selfish in other texts, which is not to 
say that it is evil, but possibly morally dangerous.) Kant states that it is easy to see that a 
behavior done for selfish reasons is not done out of duty, but “it is far more difficult to 
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note this difference when the action is in accord with duty and, in addition, the subject 
has a direct inclination to do it”(G 397). We might ask: why is it difficult? One answer is 
that Kant is aware of the possibility of overdetermination. He might be stating that such 
actions could be determined both by respect for the moral law and by direct inclination. 
That does not seem to be his meaning. Instead, when we take into consideration the fact 
that he sees the argument as progressing from the commonly held conception of the good 
will to the more-difficult-to-ascertain principles of philosophy, it is clear that Kant 
recognizes a difficulty here because it is likely that we would normally, in our everyday 
apprehension of moral goodness, fail to make a distinction between the inclination to be 
kind, or the feeling of sympathy, for example, and the estimation of genuine moral worth. 
We normally think that the sympathetic inclination does confer genuine moral worth. 
Kant’s main point here is that it does not. Inclinations as such do not have moral worth.15 
Nevertheless, it is a mistake to jump from that conclusion to the idea that a moral 
action cannot be done with inclination. As Kant continues with his discussion of moral 
worth, he almost explicitly protects himself from this reading by referring to the moral 
requirements to cultivate certain inclinations. The next paragraph begins: “To secure 
one’s own happiness is at least indirectly a duty,” and in it Kant argues that reason and 
respect for the duty to secure happiness is a better and more noble means to this end than 
by following inclination (G 399). The point of these paragraphs is to argue that reason is 
a better guide to morality than is inclination and that, following the insight that the only 
thing that is good without condition is a good will, morality bears a special relationship to 
reasoning. 
                                                
15 Beck discusses the fact that choosing duty over inclination is an illustration of morality, not morality 
itself. Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason (Illinois: University of 
Chicago Press, 1960), 228. 
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Next, Kant discusses the commandment to love our neighbor, although he makes 
a distinction between love as an inclination (pathological love), which he claims cannot 
be commanded because it is merely an immediate feeling, and practical love, which is 
under our control and is commanded. Those who would accuse Kant of believing that 
moral actions must be devoid of supporting inclinations must assume that Kant would 
interpret this biblical passage as a command to practically love our neighbors and, at the 
same time, as a command not to pathologically love them. Such is absurd. (Note that 
pathological love of one’s neighbor should be classed as a feeling, not an emotion or a 
passion.) Clearly, the common-sense reading is that it is perfectly acceptable and 
admirable to love your neighbors pathologically, yet it is not, and cannot be, a moral 
command, because moral commands only have to do with reason. (We shall further 
discuss the relationship between command and the immediacy of feeling shortly.) 
Inclination is amoral, not immoral. Already, the exclusion of inclination from moral 
worth has consequences for our discussion of emotional intelligence, but it is not the last 
word in the story. 
This discussion of sympathy shows that Kant’s criticism of emotional impulse is 
consistent between his works. Sympathy, insofar as it is not informed by moral principle, 
is a bad guide to moral action, just as emotion is a bad guide to action because it is pre-
reflective. It does not follow from this that Kant believes that we must extirpate all moral 
feelings; in fact, quite the opposite is the case. 
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IV. Kant’s Theory of Emotion, Take Two: The Virtuous Feelings 
Hursthouse expresses the common prejudiced understanding of Kant’s theory of 
emotion: Kant does not allow that emotions can be part of our rational nature, nor can 
they be morally significant.16 Perhaps, if we limited our understanding of Kant’s theory 
of emotion to only that which has already been said, we would agree with this reading. 
Yet I have already shown that Kant’s limited definitions of Affect and Leidenshaft 
preclude accepting his comments about them as the whole of a theory of emotion. It is 
not surprising to see Kant criticize pre-reflective impulses and vicious pre-occupations. 
Affecten are merely the first and most immediate level of emotional experience. A 
consideration of Kant’s positive theory of emotion offers two points in opposition to the 
common, prejudiced reading of Kant. First, a consideration of the feeling of respect and 
other intellectual feelings shows that feeling is an essential part of Kant’s moral theory. 
Second, this discussion will lead to a discussion of moral feelings considered more 
broadly, and it will become clear, as it has already begun to, that feelings can and should 
become integrated into the rational mind and that they are an essential component of 
virtue. 
Even though Kant argues that natural sympathy cannot be the foundation of moral 
theory, he does hold that some natural moral feelings do track proper moral 
comprehension. The moral law naturally inspires the feeling of respect. Of course, in the 
Groundwork, Kant attempts to defend his move to “seek refuge…in an obscure feeling” 
with the retort that this feeling is different in kind from all other feelings (G 4:401n).17 A 
                                                
16 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 109. 
17 There is some reason to think that it is Kant’s own dualism that makes him believe that reference to a 
feeling is necessary because his notion of “pure” reason cannot itself be practical. Regardless, Kant’s 
notion of respect definitively shows us that he believes that feelings can be based on reason. In the 
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more considered examination of the role that intellectual feelings play in Kant’s texts 
demonstrates that respect is in no way singularly special. Even though Kant explicitly 
denies that “intellectual feeling” is possible at all (because, he argues, something cannot 
be both intellectual and a feeling at the same time), it is clear that he believes that there 
are feelings that follow from rational comprehension. I am not sure what to call these if 
not “intellectual feelings.” It is to a discussion of this supposedly different kind of feeling 
that we now turn, demonstrating that a feeling does not lack moral worth for Kant 
because it is natural, but because it is not well grounded in reason. Certain natural 
feelings, like respect for the moral law, play a necessary role in Kant’s moral theory as 
they help him to demonstrate that humans are naturally called to develop their moral and 
rational faculties. 
In explaining the cultivation of virtue, in the “Doctrine of Virtue” Kant argues 
that some aspects of morality cannot be described as virtues, for they are simply natural: 
There are certain [natural] moral endowments such that anyone lacking 
them could have no duty to acquire them—They are moral feeling, 
conscience, love of one’s neighbor, and respect for oneself (self-esteem). 
There is no obligation to have these because they lie at the basis of 
morality, as subjective conditions of receptiveness to the concept of duty, 
not as objective conditions of morality. All of them are natural 
predispositions of the mind (praedispositio) for being affected by concepts 
of duty, antecedent predispositions on the side of feeling. To have these 
predispositions cannot be considered a duty, rather, every human being 
has them, and it is by virtue of them that he can be put under obligation.—
Consciousness of them is not of empirical origin; it can, instead, only 
follow from consciousness of a moral law, as the effect this has on the 
mind. (MM 6:399) 
 
                                                
Groundwork’s discussion of the feeling of respect, Kant hesitates precisely because he considers the 
objection that feelings are not based on rational concepts and are reducible to inclination and fear. Here, 
even though the concept of feeling (Gefühl) seems to be the larger class of which emotions are only a 
smaller part, his criticisms of emotions apply to feelings. Gefühl and Affect can both be translated as 
emotion. As in English, the words feeling and emotion are not clearly differentiated. See Mark Packer, 
“Kant on Desire and Moral Pleasure,” Journal of the History of Ideas 50, no. 3 (1989): 429-442, for the 
argument that Kant’s emphasis on respect shows that emotions must play a role his theory or autonomy. 
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As “subjective conditions of receptiveness,” these feelings do not constitute a “moral 
sense” as theorized by the moral sense theorists, because they are subjective affectations 
of objective rational comprehension. The moral feeling of respect is inspired by 
comprehension of the moral law; therefore, it is beholden to the moral law, not the other 
way around, and it is based in intellectual comprehension. MacBeath argues that the 
feeling of respect is felt as an imperative and not just an inclination because it 
presupposes reason.18 Kant writes:  
But though respect is a feeling, it is not one received through any 
influence but is self-wrought by a rational concept… What I recognize as 
a law for myself I recognize with respect, which means merely the 
consciousness of the submission of my will to a law without the 
intervention of other influences on my mind. (G 400) 
 
Respect is a worth that “thwarts my self-love”(G 401). Note that respect is not here 
described as itself morally motivating, as it might be construed, but rather the 
accompaniment to moral motivation. 
The importance of the feeling of respect is a well-discussed aspect of Kant’s 
ethics, as it plays a central role in Kant’s account of moral motivation, but commentators 
                                                
18 A. Murray MacBeath, “Kant on Moral Feeling,” Kant-Studien 64 (1973): 289. MacBeath calls Kant’s 
theory of moral feeling “breathtakingly absurd” because he believes that it is a “fiction conjured up out of a 
defective view of rational action.”  Kant’s view is supposedly defective because reasons do not need 
feelings in order to be effective; ibid., 313-314. MacBeath only re-asserts the dichotomy between reason 
and emotion by arguing this.  In reality, the idea of an a priori, universal feeling that is based on a sense of 
shared humanity, is sublime, not absurd. Reasons do not need feelings in order to be effective, hence, moral 
feeling is not commanded, but a natural, human response. Kant’s theory of moral feeling sits at the edge 
between moral psychology and moral theory: it is a part of his theory of human nature on which his moral 
theory is partly based. Kant does give the feeling of respect as part of the answer to the question, “how is 
pure reason practical?” Nevertheless, this question was poised for an answer from moral psychology. The 
question should not to be understood as pointing to the castrated nature of reason, but only to its weakness 
relative to pragmatic incentives. The questions asks about our freedom from the standpoint of the worry 
about determinism. The question asks: how is it that people would ever choose to follow the moral law 
when there is always a strong inclination pulling us in the direction of selfish benefit? The answer is: 
because we have moral feeling. We are psychologically convinced of the necessity of the moral imperative. 
MacBeath’s interpretation is clearly mistaken, as it implies, as he himself remarks, that all reasons need 
feelings in order to be effective and Kant clearly does not hold this. Furthermore, MacBeath’s reasoning is 
unnecessarily dualistic: reasons and feelings can and do operate together, with reasons shifting into feelings 
and vice versa. We need not define feelings as irrational impulses; that is altogether an unacceptably 
narrow definition and cannot capture the phenomena of decision-making.  
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do not often point out the similarities between respect and the other Kantian intellectual 
feelings.19 In defining the feeling of respect as a feeling that mixes fear and attraction, 
Kant draws a connection between the feeling of respect and the feeling of sublimity.20 
This is an important connection for us to grasp in order to see the true character of 
Kantian morality, because, as with a subject’s relationship to the sublime, when 
confronted with the moral law, the subject feels both a loss of his own subjectivity and a 
strengthening of his rational power. A commitment to the moral law is a commitment to 
sacrifice oneself if it is necessary, a commitment to act without regard to consequences, 
whether they be to oneself or others. For example, one must not lie even to save one’s 
own life. Therefore, proper comprehension of the moral law rightly inspires fear for our 
own survival, but also freedom from slavishly serving the goal of survival. Instead, we 
feel a sense of our higher, moral purpose. 
Kant mentions that we feel a sense of the sublime in the face of the moral law in 
both the Critique of Judgment and in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and 
Sublime, and so we might argue that the feeling of respect for the moral law is only an 
instance of the feeling of the sublime. Kant remarks that contemplating a noble character 
is an occasion for feeling the sublime: 
The noble ground remains and is not so much subject to the inconsistency 
of external things. Of such a nature are principles in comparison to 
impulses, which simply well up upon isolated occasions; and thus the man 
of principles is in counteraction with him who is seized opportunely by a 
                                                
19 See, for example, William Sokoloff, “Kant and the Paradox of Respect,” American Journal of Political 
Science 45, no. 4 (2001): 768-779; and Mark Packer, “Kant on Desire and Moral Pleasure,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 50, no. 3 (1989): 429-442. 
20 The feeling of the sublime is similarly morally instructive because it reinforces the worth of human 
dignity. Unlike with beauty, sublimity can be connected to moral interest. Objects arouse the feeling of 
sublimity when the make us aware of our own limitless worth and rational vocation. Guyer argues that the 
feeling of sublimity is very much like the feeling of respect, but the feeling of the sublime involves a 
subreption, so that we project sublimity in the object. Guyer, Kant and the Experience of Freedom: Essays 
on Aesthetics and Morality, 221. 
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goodhearted and loving motive. But what if the secret tongue of his heart 
speaks in this manner: ‘I must come to the aid of that man, for he suffers, 
not that he were perhaps my friend or companion, nor that I hold him 
amenable to repaying the good deed with gratitude later on. There is now 
no time to reason and delay with questions; he is man, and whatever 
befalls men, that also concerns me.’ Then his conduct sustains itself on the 
highest ground of benevolence in human nature, and is extremely sublime, 
because of its unchangeability as well as of the universality of its 
application.21 (O 65)22 
 
Kant often calls the notion and the feeling of freedom sublime. The notion of 
freedom is closely related to the moral law because autonomy is the expression of the 
highest form of freedom for Kant. In the third Critique Kant makes the connection 
between the sublime and the feeling of respect for the moral law, as well as the feeling of 
freedom, more explicitly. Kant defines the dynamic sublime as “an aesthetic judgment [in 
which] we consider nature as a might that has no dominance over us” (CJ §28). The 
feeling of respect for the moral law, which is akin to a mixture of fear and inclination, 
makes us feel that nature, specifically physiological determination, holds no power over 
us. The feeling of the sublime allows us to feel our independence from nature, an 
independence that keeps “the humanity in our person from being degraded” (CJ §28). If 
we consider relegating the feeling of respect to merely an instance of the feeling of the 
sublime, we should also consider the possibility that autonomy and the moral law are 
paradigmatically sublime: 
Hence, if in judging nature aesthetically we call it sublime, we do so not 
because nature arouses fear, but because it calls forth our strength… to 
regard as small the objects of our natural concerns: property, health, and 
life, and because of this we regard nature’s might (to which we are indeed 
subject in these natural concerns) as yet not having such dominance over 
                                                
21 In the second Critique, Kant warns against merely imitating noble and sublime actions because then the 
performance of such acts would not be based on principle, but here we see that the feeling of the sublime is 
a recognition of virtue based on principle (CprR 84-85). 
22 Page numbers of the Observations of the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime refer to John Goldwaith’s 
translation (University of California Press, 1960). 
 136 
us, as persons, that we should have to bow to it if our principles were at 
stake and we had to choose between upholding or abandoning them. (CJ 
§28) 
 
The fact that we can choose to obey the categorical imperative over a competing 
hypothetical imperative is the condition for the possibility of the feeling of the sublime.  
The feeling of respect follows naturally from a comprehension of the sublimity of 
the moral law; we do not need to try to make ourselves feel it.23 Kant’s ethics relies on 
this degree of natural moral sensibility. Kant calls the feeling of respect “self-wrought,” 
but this does not mean that the bond between the cause of moral comprehension and the 
effect of the feeling of respect is any less strong. It is brought about by the self in the 
same sense as moral actions are autonomous: they conform to rationality and are not 
instinctual responses. We naturally feel respect when we conceive of the moral law, even 
though the moral law is not a product of nature, but of reason. Is it paradoxical that we 
have a natural feeling of our independence from nature? Answering that question would 
take us too far afield and, most likely, into an examination of Kant’s political writings 
and his theory of teleology. Still, it is this seeming contradiction that makes Kant’s notion 
of the sublime a continually interesting notion. Sokoloff argues that,  
respect is neither completely sensible nor completely intelligible but both 
and neither at the same time. It is a transient that eludes both poles of the 
binary opposition reason/feeling that inaugurates Western metaphysics.24  
 
For this reason Sokoloff maintains that Kantian respect is a paradox and reading it as 
such can help us suspend the tendency of “cognitive domination.”25 If the feeling of 
respect is truly successful in eluding the reason/feeling dichotomy, why is it a paradox? It 
                                                
23 Guyer gives the compelling argument that Kant’s moral theory relies on and is open to psychological 
insight.  For example, the fact that the moral law inspires respect is a psychological fact, not a metaphysical 
fact. Guyer, Kant and the Experience of Freedom, 366. 
24 Sokoloff, “Kant and the Paradox of Respect,” 769. 
25 Ibid., 777. 
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seems to me that this conclusion itself fails to truly challenge dichotomous thinking. If 
reason can itself be naturally linked to feelings, then the feeling of respect does not 
constitute a “paradox” but an occasion for us to realize that it is only a deficiently 
understood brand of cognition that threatens domination. 
Aesthetic feeling is another example of a feeling that is occasioned by intellectual 
activity. As such, it is neither irrational nor tends toward immorality. In the Critique of 
Judgment Kant discusses the means by which the natural aesthetic response can help one 
develop a sense of shared humanity and thereby a comprehension of the importance of 
mutual respect and the moral law. Furthermore, aesthetic feeling is based on disinterested 
observation; it cannot be determined by natural impulses, such as Kant’s passions. Kant 
calls the beautiful the “symbol of the morally good” because both require pure 
intelligibility, the experience of freedom, the unity of the theoretical and practical 
powers, as well as the idea of the supersensible substratum of nature that allows for its 
harmony with freedom (CJ §59). Lest one disparage aesthetic judgment for being merely 
a symbol of moral judgment, we must note that aesthetic judgments exemplify many of 
the key features of moral judgments. For example, aesthetic taste is morally instructive 
because it teaches us to have a purely intellectual liking (CJ § IX). 
Thus we have examples of a number of feelings that naturally follow from reason. 
(In the next chapter I discuss the feelings of proper self-esteem and morally worthy 
happiness.) We may be thrown off by Kant’s continued insistence in the “Doctrine of 
Virtue” that feelings cannot be commanded. Kant argues, for examples, that it is 
nonsensical to proscribe a duty to have a conscience: “To be under obligation to have a 
conscience would be tantamount to having a duty to recognize duties”(MM 6:400). 
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Nevertheless, this is the case only because Kant believes that we all already do have a 
conscience. If moral feeling is wanting, we can attempt to cultivate it “through wonder at 
its inscrutable source” (MM 6:400).26 In other words, the presence of moral feeling is 
natural, but we can enhance it through rational contemplation, which is also its source. 
The fact that Kant holds that feeling cannot be commanded shows that natural feelings 
are very important for Kant’s theory and are the starting point of sound reasoning. It also 
opens up the possibility that feelings, like the feeling of conscience, that play a role in the 
development of rational comprehension might also have an unconscious rational basis. 
The defender of passion will probably object that these intellectual feelings all 
pale when compared to real feeling. If we believe, contra Beck, that the feeling of respect 
is not meant to supplement Kant’s account of moral motivation, then this criticism seems 
appropriate.27 The intellectual feelings may seem like feelings that arise without much 
commotion and subside without causing much of a stir. Real emotions are motivating, the 
objection might run: Can feeling also play an active role in Kant’s account of rational and 
moral behavior? One might further object that, even though these feelings are supposedly 
inspired by rational comprehension, there is no discussion of the possibility that rational 
comprehension might be wrong. Is the feeling of respect meant to obscure this 
possibility, making it more akin to hubristic might than a vulnerable and sensitive 
                                                
26 The reference to an inscrutable source here is akin to Kant’s use of the argument from design in his 
discussion of beauty, in the third Critique, as evidence nature and reason are compatible and, indeed have 
the same underlying cause, guaranteeing that our actions are effective and that there is reason to hope that 
moral behavior will not go unrewarded. 
27 From the Metaphysics of Morals, the Religion essay, and the Lectures on Ethics, Beck concludes that “all 
determination of the will proceeds (a) from the representation of the possible action (b) through the feeling 
of pleasure or pain (through taking an interest in the action or its effect) (c) to the act.  The aesthetic 
condition, the feeling, is either pathological or moral: the former if the pleasure precedes the representation 
of the law, the latter if it follows it an is, as it were, pleasure in the law.” Beck, A Commentary on Kant’s 
Critique of Practical Reason, 224. 
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recognition?28 If the feeling of respect exists only as an effect of rational activity, like a 
switch that is turned on or off, then we have reason to worry that it is blind in the same 
way that natural sympathy turned out to be blind. On the other hand, if we take seriously 
Kant’s decision to integrate a feeling into the highest level of rational deliberation, we 
can trust that the feeling of respect is not like the passions that we discussed earlier; the 
feeling of respect is conducive to reason and need not be “trusted” or blindly followed 
anymore than reason itself needs to be “trusted.” “In fact,” Kant writes, 
no moral principle is based, as people sometimes suppose, on any feeling 
whatsoever. Any such principle is really an obscurely thought metaphysics 
that is inherent in every human being because of his rational 
predisposition. (MM 6:376)  
 
Kant does not advocate taking any feeling at face value, but instead that we understand 
the thoughts that are contained therein. Kant’s integration of feeling and reason follows 
from his need to show that practical and theoretical reason function cooperatively, and, in 
the spirit of this integration, he develops his theory of the virtuous moral feelings and the 
necessity of their cultivation in both his Lectures on Ethics and the “Doctrine of Virtue” 
in the Metaphysics of Morals. 
Although Kant continues in his insistence on the immediacy of feeling, writing 
that we cannot be commanded to feel something, Kant acknowledges that we can be 
commanded to cultivate certain feelings. It is necessary to cultivate moral feelings 
because, as Kant recognizes, feeling can be a powerful instigator of moral action and, as 
he therefore argues, we have a duty to increase our ability to behave morally. This fact 
combines with the evidence that, unlike the Stoics, Kant believes that there are healthy 
                                                
28 Kant writes that we cannot speak of erring in judgments of conscience, not because practical reason 
cannot be wrong, but because a judgment of conscience only refers to whether or not the act has been 
submitted to internal judgment (MM 6:401). 
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emotions, in demonstrating that Kant does not reject the importance of emotion for 
rationality and morality; he simply holds that some emotional responses are better than 
others.29 In fact, Kant recognizes the moral importance of emotional intelligence.  
 The “Doctrine of Virtue,” being based on the rational humanity formulation of the 
categorical imperative, explains the necessary ends of morality: one’s own perfection and 
the happiness of others.30 Kant addresses the cultivation of moral feeling when he 
discusses our duty to perfect ourselves.31 In the duty to promote self-perfection, we have 
the duty to cultivate our faculties or “natural predispositions,” such as moral feeling. In 
striving for our natural perfection, we must cultivate “any capacities whatever for 
furthering ends set forth by reason”(MM 6: 392). Cultivating these “crude dispositions of 
… nature” enables one to use them as means to realize the ends that one sets for oneself 
(MM 6: 392).  
                                                
29 In his guidebook to Kant’s philosophy, Guyer enumerates six connections between aesthetics and ethics, 
some of which overlap with our discussion here: one, “aesthetic experience can present morally significant 
ideas in an imaginative and pleasing way;” two, “the experience of the dynamical sublime so centrally 
involves the intimation of our capacity to be moral;” three, “there are significant parallels between our 
experience of beauty and the structure of morality;” four, “in the experience of beauty we can actually feel 
that the world is consistent with our aims, including our ultimate moral aim;” five, quoting Kant, “the 
beautiful prepares us to love something… without interest” (CJ, general remark following §29); six, “the 
cultivation and realization of common standards of taste in a society can be conducive to the realization 
of… ‘lawful sociablity’.” Guyer, Kant, 324-328. 
30 Kant argues that we do not have a duty to promote our own happiness because we naturally seek it and 
because we ought not value our happiness over morality. Such a duty may be construed if our own 
prosperity is for the sake of securing our moral compliance, since poverty occasions temptations to violate 
one’s duty (MM 6:388). We do not have a duty to promote the perfection of others because that would 
entail paternalism and we must treat others as rational beings capable of making their own moral choices. 
This is tricky distinction to make, and Kant holds that we can refrain from helping others in their purposes 
that we judge to be immoral. Furthermore, we have a negative duty to promote the “moral well-being” of 
others in that we must refrain from setting a bad example and “giving scandal.” 
31 Guyer examines the Metaphysics of Morals for evidence that Kant believes that we have a duty to 
cultivate moral feeling. He argues that, first, the duty to outwardly conform to duty may require feelings to 
perform. Second, we have a duty to know ourselves and know whether or not we are motivated by duty. 
This requires psychological knowledge. Third, duty for duty’s sake should usher in moral feelings. Fourth, 
duties of respect require we refrain from emotionally injuring others. Guyer, Kant and the Experience of 
Freedom, 382-384. 
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  “Moral feeling,” in a narrow sense, refers to respect for the moral law, as we have 
already seen, but in a broader sense it refers to a general sensitivity to the demands of 
morality, and, in the broadest sense, it refers to the feelings, like properly grounded 
sympathy, that these demands require. So, in the narrow sense, moral feeling refers just to 
a proper grasp of duty: 
A human being has the duty to carry the cultivation of his will up to the 
purest virtuous disposition, in which the law becomes also the incentive to 
his actions that conform with duty. This disposition is inner morally 
practical perfection. Since it is a feeling of the effect that the lawgiving 
will within the human being exercises on his capacity to act in accordance 
with his will, it is called moral feeling, a special sense (sensus moralis), as 
it were. It is true that moral sense is often misused in a visionary way, as if 
(like Socrates’s daimon) it could precede reason or even dispense with 
reason’s judgment. Yet it is a moral perfection, by which one makes one’s 
object every particular end that is also a duty. (MM 6:387) 
 
In its widest sense, the feeling of respect for the moral law and other moral feelings, such 
as sympathy, collide. In the case of virtue, we respect and take up the ends that are also 
duties: self-perfection and the happiness of others. So when we promote someone else’s 
happiness we are pleased with ourselves both because we know we have done what is 
right and because we share in her happiness. Kant writes that “sweet merit” is the feeling 
of pleasure at having promoted another person’s happiness in a way that directly makes 
the other person happy, “for consciousness of [the other’s happiness] produces a moral 
enjoyment in which human beings are inclined by sympathy to revel.” If the situation is 
such that beneficiary of one’s efforts is not grateful, one’s moral contentment can only be 
a “bitter merit” (MM 6:391). So, in its widest sense, a moral feeling is any feeling that 
follows, however indirectly, from the representation of the moral law, just as love and 
respect are “the feelings that accompany the carrying out” of our duties to others (MM 
6:399, 448). Furthermore, since the impulse to virtue relies so much on natural moral 
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feeling, Kant explains that virtue itself is a find of aesthetic orientation, which includes 
also the feelings that accompany negative moral judgments like disgust and horror (MM 
6:405). 
Kant defines virtue as strength in overcoming those inclinations that oppose the 
moral law. We gain this strength both by contemplating the moral law and by acting 
virtuously (MM 6:397). So, for example, even though we cannot have a duty to feel 
benevolently, we have a duty to act benevolently, and it is likely that benevolent feelings 
will follow: 
Beneficence is a duty. If someone practices it often and succeeds in 
realizing his beneficent intention, he eventually comes actually to love the 
person he has helped. So the saying “you ought to love your neighbor as 
yourself” does not mean that you ought immediately (first) to love him 
and (afterwards) by means of this love do good to him. It means, rather, do 
good to your fellow human beings, and your beneficence will produce 
love of them in you (as an aptitude of the inclination to be beneficent in 
general). (MM 6:402) 
 
Although Kant thinks that duties to sympathy and compassion should not really ask us to 
suffer for the other person and that they should not turn into pity, he clearly believes that 
the feelings of compassion and sympathy are important for virtue, as is their cultivation. 
Kant famously remarks that we have a duty not to avoid places where poor and sick 
people are likely to be, “sickrooms and debtor’s prisons,” because the feelings that these 
places naturally inspire are good and instrumental for spurring virtuous actions (MM 
6:457). 
Kant addresses our duties to cultivate moral feeling when he discusses our duties 
to others because, contra Schiller’s worry, we owe people not just proper behaviors, but 
proper feelings, such as due concern and gratitude. Kant argues that we have a duty not 
only to respect, but to love others: to joy in their joy and sorrow in their sorrow. 
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Furthermore, we must consider the probable feelings of others, e.g., if we must make 
them the beneficiary of our generosity, we must not make them feel servile and try to 
spare them humiliation by acting as though it is only a slight service and freely given.  
In the Lectures on Ethics, Kant argues that active obligations (obligatione activa) 
include the obligation to have a certain disposition, or character (Gesinnung).Of course, 
the notion of having a good character is very close to the notion of virtue. Here we see 
that reason and sensibility cannot be cut off from one another since reason must play a 
role in sculpting proper sensibility. Selfish feelings often oppose moral motivation, and it 
is therefore our duty to bring our feelings in line with duty in order to secure the 
consistent adherence to duty. Although the Kant of the Lectures is steadfast in his 
distinction between pathological causes and intellectual causes, these two causes must 
nevertheless work in cooperation to bring about a moral action:  
There are actions for which moral motives are not sufficient to produce 
moral goodness and for which pragmatic, or even pathological causae 
impulsivae are wanted in addition; but when considering the goodness of 
an action we are not concerned with that which moves us to that goodness, 
but merely with what constitutes the goodness in and of itself. (L18)  
 
Here Kant seems to be preempting Schiller’s later criticism, viz., that Kant’s moral theory 
requires that we extirpate natural moral feeling. Instead, Kant suggests that we sometimes 
have a duty to have moral feelings.32 Morally legitimate moral feeling comes when 
understanding determines sensibility (L 46). Once an understanding of moral worth has 
been established by reason, moral feeling naturally does and should follow.  
In the Lectures Kant remarks that pure practical reason cannot in itself be 
sufficiently motivating.33 In other words, the Kant of the Lectures holds that 
                                                
32 The Kant of the Groundwork agrees: “to be kind where one can is a duty” (G 398). 
33 Guyer believes that this is Kant’s considered opinion on the topic. 
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overdetermination is necessary.34 Kant did not yet entertain a possible connection 
between pure motivation and transcendental/transcendent freedom. He calls the 
possibility of pure practical reason acting on its own accord “the philosopher’s stone”:  
The understanding, obviously, can judge, but to give to this judgment a 
compelling force, to make it an incentive that can move the will to 
perform the action—this is the philosopher’s stone! (L 45).35  
 
Although the Lectures do not seem to hold that pure reason can of itself be 
practical, they do make a distinction between motivation and stimulation (per motiva and 
per stimulos) and hold that the moral law is the only proper moral motivation although 
there may be other stimuli prompting moral actions. The Lectures hold that pathological 
motivation is a psychologically necessary cause of moral actions, but we must guard 
against it perverting our notion of morality, which must always be based on the thought 
of pure principle:  
The lessons of morality must be learnt: it ought not to be mixed with 
solicitations and sensuous incentives; it must be taught apart and free from 
these; but when the rules of morality in their absolute purity have been 
firmly grasped, when we have learnt to respect and value them, then, and 
only then, may such motives be brought into play. They ought not, 
however, to be adduced as reasons for actions, for they are not moral and 
the action loses in morality on their account; they ought to serve only as 
subsidiara motiva calculated to overcome the inertia of our nature in the 
face of purely intellectual conceptions. (L 76)  
 
                                                
34 It is interesting to note that, far from being a moral theory more sensitive to moral psychology, as many 
commentators believe, the theory of the Lectures presupposes more of a dichotomy between reason and 
sensibility than the later version of Kant’s moral theory. We see Kant speaking in terms of the head and the 
heart: “The supreme principle of all moral judgment lies in the understanding: that of the moral incentive to 
action lies in the heart. This motive is moral feeling. We must guard against confusing the principle of the 
judgment with the principle of the motive. The first is the norm; the second the incentive. The motive 
cannot take the place of the rule. Where the motive is wanting, the error is practical; but when the judgment 
fails the error is theoretical”(L 37). In holding that “purely intellectual conceptions” cannot in themselves 
overcome the influence of inclination, Kant pits these two faculties at odds with each other. His later 
writings, which holds that pure practical reason is a kind of practical reason and that reason, paint it as 
physical faculty.  
35 It may appear that Kant is confusing Reason and the Understanding, but the fact that these judgments of 
the understanding refer to intentions to act shows that they are the work of practical reason.  
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In other words, the efficient cause of an action is not the same as the principle that makes 
it morally worthy, which may be likened to the formal cause, in Aristotelian terms. He 
writes “grounds for decision are, therefore, objective, but grounds for execution can also 
be subjective”(L 23).   
Some commentators have argued that there is a salient difference between the 
account of the Lectures and the Metaphysics of Morals and that the earlier theory is 
preferable. Even though in his later moral writings, Kant believes that moral freedom 
involves freedom from determination by sensibility, this new position is less of a 
contradiction with the Lectures than it at first appears.36 In the second Critique Kant 
holds that humans can be determined to act directly by the pure law of reason, but we can 
see continuity with his earlier position in the belief that the feeling of respect follows 
from proper cognition of the law and a sense of our obligation, and that the notion of the 
Highest Good, which is happiness proportionate to morality, can serve as the goal of 
morality. Both texts extol both a proper, rational grasp of morality and the feelings that 
naturally accompany it.  
                                                
36 Guyer argues that Kant maintains this theory of pathological determination into his later works and that it 
develops into the conviction that moral feeling is necessary for morality. Guyer, Kant and the Experience of 
Freedom, 30, 337. Guyer argues that the prize essay Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and 
Sublime suggest that feeling may be the basis of morality and that the first Critique also seems to say that 
an “operative cause” is necessary for morality—the idea of happiness. Then, he points out that the 
Duisburg Fragment 6, written after the first Critique, gives happiness a moral definition: happiness is 
“well-ordered freedom.” The operative cause then becomes the worthiness to be happy. “This fragment 
constitutes a transition from a dualistic to a monistic theory of moral motive.” (p. 215) Previously the 
cognitive and the conative factors had been kept separate. After this though, autonomy and not moral 
happiness is the moral incentive (Triebfeder). Kant abandons the distinction between incentive and motive. 
All incentives are subjective, but they need not be sensuous; there is a higher and lower faculty of desire. 
Therefore, the rational principle itself is the moral motive. Guyer argues that Kant initially believed that, in 
moral actions, reason is applied to desire, as a form is to content, but later Kant developed the idea that 
reason is applied to freedom. The idea that moral judgments require both form and matter comes from 
Kant’s early essay An Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and 
Morality. Guyer believes that Kant maintained the requirement of subjective determination throughout his 
mature philosophy and that the feeling of respect takes over this role from other moral feelings. Guyer’s 
more general thesis is that the goal of morality is universal happiness though universal freedom. Guyer 
argues that, for Kant, freedom is the essential value of morality and that freedom promotes happiness. 
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Now that we understand the important role moral feelings play in Kantian moral 
theory, we can address a common, contemporary criticism of Kantianism, viz., in holding 
that virtue is a kind of strength and fortitude, Kant mistook mere continence for virtue. 
Annas gives this a reason for preferring Ancient ethics over modern moral theory.37 First, 
we must note that Kant characterizes virtue as a kind of fortitude against the continued 
resistance from inclination, not as an emotion or feeling. Virtue necessarily opposes “that 
which opposes the moral disposition within us”(MM 6:380). Emotions, as we have seen, 
are pre-reflective impulses for Kant, and are neither essentially selfish, nor do they make 
reflection impossible, although they might make it difficult. Virtue necessarily opposes 
the passions because, as we have seen, Kant defines “passion” very closely to “vice.” 
Even though passions and selfish inclinations are related in Kant’s mind, feeling, and to a 
lesser extent, emotion is not. When we confuse “inclination,” which does connote 
immorality for Kant, and “feeling,” which does not, we are tempted to similarly oppose 
feeling and reason. Doing so leads to the defense that highlights the role of impurity, as 
opposed to the holy will, in Kant’s ethics.38 In this way, we might argue that Kant 
championed pure reason, but that he made concessions for the human case because we do 
not have divine wills and are thus a mixture of pure reason and 
inclination/emotion/feeling. This defense paints an overly austere picture of “pure 
reason,” which need not and does not exclude feeling, as we have seen. (It is this mistake, 
confusing feeling with inclination, that leads Gregor to think that Kant would prefer 
holiness, which she describes as the lack of feeling, over virtue. There is no reason to 
                                                
37 Annas, The Morality of Happiness, 53. 
38 See Robert B. Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings (Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002); and Sherman, Making a Necessity of Virtue, Introduction. Gregor 
similarly refers to man as a “moral being with an animal nature”; Gregor, Laws of Freedom, 128. 
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think that holiness equates with the lack of feeling instead of with the lack of temptations. 
In other words, there is no reason to think that Kant mistook angels for robots.)39 
Still, Kant calls virtue fortitude—later, he calls virtue a “strength of resolution” 
(MM 6:390).) In my mind, the jury is still out over whether it is better and more accurate 
to think of immoral inclinations as relatively intractable or as easily overcome. (This 
discussion is taken up again in chapter 5.) Perhaps it is better to conceive of virtue as a 
struggle in order to emphasize that we are constantly pursuing virtue, unlike Aristotle’s 
assumption citizens of a good state are already virtuous, resting on their laurels, as it 
were. Kant writes:  
But virtue is not to be defined and valued merely as a aptitude and … a 
long-standing habit of morally good actions acquired by practice. For 
unless this aptitude results from considered, firm, and continually purified 
principles, then, like any other mechanism of technically practical reason, 
it is neither armed for all situations nor adequately secured against the 
changes that new temptations could bring about. (MM 6:383-4) 
 
And: “Virtue is always in progress and yet always starts from the beginning” (MM 
6:409). Aristotle puts the emphasis on proper upbringing and taking one’s lead from 
virtuous institutions, Kant emphasizes reform; but Annas argues that Aristotle is also 
concerned about reform, and we know that Kant is also dearly worried about proper 
upbringing. In arguing that Aristotle recognizes that good habits must be based in proper 
moral understanding, as Annas does, the sharp contrast between Kant and Aristotle on 
this score seems to fade.40 Annas takes it to be a point in favor of an Aristotelian moral 
theory that it holds that the emotions can naturally lead to moral outcomes. This clearly 
overlooks the role that natural moral feelings play in morality for Kant. Annas’s 
                                                
39 The Laws of Freedom, p. 175. This assertion also comes from the worry that Kant’s emphasis on moral 
feeling represents a back sliding away from duty to heteronomy as the moral motivation. 
40 Lest we find the constant threat of back sliding into mere self-control or the assumption that emotions 
have a miraculous parallel with virtue; Annas, The Morality of Happiness, 67. 
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characterization of Aristotle’s theory seems to include the idea that it would be desirable 
to try to use feeling exclusively as a guide, attempting to cut it off from all rational 
reflection, as if such a thing were even possible.  
Furthermore, we must appreciate the context of Kant’s characterization of virtue: 
he is explaining the way that the “Doctrine of Virtue” similarly involves constraint, as 
does the “Doctrine of Right” since “all duties involve a concept of constraint through a 
law”(MM 6:394). So, “what essentially distinguishes a duty of virtue from a duty of right 
is that external constraint to the latter kind of duty is morally possible, whereas the 
former is based only on free self-constraint”(MM 6:387). If it is in fact the case that Kant 
believes that “rational natural” beings are always tempted by pleasure, and that the moral 
law is not simply technically a constraint but also always felt as a constraint (because he 
draws attention to constraint in this context), he nevertheless emphasizes that it is a self-
constraint, and therefore simultaneously voluntary and affirmed (MM 6:379).41   
Cheerfulness, not continence, is the ideal of Kantian virtue. Kant argues that we 
will not be successful in achieving morality if we merely forbid ourselves to follow our 
immoral inclinations. Instead we must find a way to reduce the strength of these 
inclinations by confronting them on their own turf, as it were. If reason simply tries to 
overpower feeling, it will lose because feelings and immoral inclinations are too strong. 
The duty to “rule oneself” goes beyond “forbidding [one] to let [oneself] be governed by 
[one’s] feelings and inclinations” (MM 6:408). We must find ways to make our feelings 
                                                
41 The relationship between duty and constraint is a topic that requires further inquiry. Kant writes that we 
do not have the duty to promote our own happiness only because we do so naturally and not “reluctantly” 
and so it is not a constraint (MM 6:386). It remains to be seen whether or not he means anything more than 
the idea that the notion of “duty” or “command” seems to require as content a behavior that we were not, 
necessarily, going to do already, just as we can only have as a duty something that is possible. If it is not 
merely a semantic point, it seems to have strange and unsettling consequences, such as something no longer 
being a duty when we want to do it. If it is merely a semantic point, the degree of argumentative weight it 
carries is unjustified. 
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follow reason. Kant criticizes “monkish ascetics,” which aim merely to dominate and 
repress sensual inclinations.42 He argues that if we do not find pleasure in moral behavior 
we will shirk from our duties:  
The rules for practicing virtue (exercitiorum virtutis) aim at a frame of 
mind that is both valiant and cheerful in fulfilling its duties (animus 
strenuous et hilaris).  … what is not done with pleasure but merely as 
compulsory service has no inner worth for one who attends to his duty in 
this way and such service is not loved by him; instead he shirks as much 
as possible occasions for practicing virtue (MM 6: 484).  
 
In this discussion, Kant sides with Epicurus over the Stoics: it is not enough to merely put 
up with misfortune, one must enjoy life. Furthermore not having conflicting motivations 
makes us happy. This kind of happiness is surely an expression of the Highest Good.  
We have considered the ways that Kant relies on the naturalness of many feelings 
in his moral theory. Furthermore, it is clear that we can enhance these feelings and 
cultivate other, properly grounded, moral feelings through correct understanding and 
virtuous behavior. Being necessary for virtue, feelings play this direct role in Kant’s 
moral theory, but they also play a more indirect role, as the previous discussion began to 
insinuate. In focusing on the explanations that Kant gives for the importance of 
cheerfulness and social interaction for the cultivation of morality, we must not overlook 
that Kant’s discussions of these topics are not entirely focused on instrumentality. In the 
Anthropology, as with many of his more light-hearted discussions, Kant discusses some 
of the more prosaic aspects of life. Having died a bachelor, Kant did not often write about 
the joys of family life, but he was no stranger to the joys of friendship, specifically in the 
form of the dinner party. Although Kant lived alone, he was not a loner: he enjoyed the 
                                                
42 See Gregor, Laws of Freedom, 171. 
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company of his friends and acquaintances. He clearly saw social enjoyment as an 
important part of life.   
 Kant discusses the dinner party in the Anthropology as the highest ethicophysical 
good: “The good living which still seems to harmonize best with virtue is a good meal in 
good company (and if possible with alternating companions)”(A§88). Obviously, this 
idea is not as important as the Highest Good of the second Critique, but it is still 
surprising to see him give such high praise to dinner parties. He discusses the ways that 
dinner party conversation complements and promotes philosophical thought: “Eating 
alone (solipsimus convictorii) is unhealthy for a philosophizing man of learning, it does 
not restore his powers but exhausts him… it turns into exhausting work and not the 
refreshing play of thoughts”(A§88). Kant values dinner parties so highly that he engages 
in many Emily Post-type recommendations for their success, concerning, e.g., the proper 
number of guests and rules for successful conversation (A§88).43 Kant believes that many 
simple pleasures add to the value of life and promote psychological well-being:  
The cynic’s purism and the hermit’s mortification of the flesh, without 
social good-living, are distorted interpretations of virtue and do not make 
virtue attractive; rather being forsaken by the Graces [whom Kant has 
already suggested represent the proper number of guests at a dinner party], 
they can make no claim on humanity. (A§88) 
 
In the “Doctrine of Virtue” Kant also explains that enjoying social interaction 
itself constitutes a virtue. There he makes a connection between social intercourse and his 
moral notion of cosmopolitanism: “while making oneself a fixed center of one’s 
                                                
43 It is interesting to observe Kant’s discussion of conversation and keeping polite society come into 
conflict with his moral theory. It is important to treat those with whom one disagrees respectively, but it is 
okay to refuse to keep company with those whom one finds immoral. One gets the impression that Kant 
was not fond of having moral debates at dinner parties (see, e.g. A§88). In addition, Kant refers to the 
“sanctity and secrecy” of the dinner party environment that requires that people not gossip about things that 
were said there (A§88). Of course, Kant does not advocate lying about what was said, but he surely does 
not advocate the total transparency that seems to be at the base of his other discussions of lying. 
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principles, one ought to regard this circle drawn around one as also forming part of an all-
inclusive circle of those who, in their disposition, are citizens of the world”(MM 6:473).  
He explains that the social virtues lead indirectly to an ideal world, or, we might say, the 
Kingdom of Ends. It is a duty of virtue to cultivate “a disposition of reciprocity—
agreeableness, tolerance, mutual love and respect (affability and propriety, humanitas 
aesthetica et decorum)”(MM 6:473). He is careful to distinguish between merely having 
good manners and having true social virtue. Being a member of a Kingdom of Ends 
involves conceiving of oneself and others both as legislator and subject. It is a vision of 
equality founded on respect; it is similarly toward this type of relationship that the social 
virtues strive.  
Kant often refers to the ideal of true friendship. True friendship is one that is not 
based on a passing appreciation of someone’s pleasant company, but one that has 
weathered the test of time and is a moral expression of mutual respect and aide. Kant 
calls it “moral friendship.” Kant calls true friendship “the most intimate union of love and 
respect”(MM 6:469). Kant calls true friendship “unattainable in practice,” but to strive 
for it is a “duty set by reason” nonetheless (MM 6:469). Concerning Schiller’s criticism, 
it is very important to note that friendship requires the “equal balance” of feeling and 
duty, and that one must be very careful to strive for this balance lest one err on the side of 
coldness or on the side of disrespect: “for love can be regarded as attraction and respect 
as repulsion, and if the principle of love bids friends to draw closer, the principle of 
respect requires them to stay at a proper distance from each other” (MM 6:470). 
Friendship is manifested in helping one’s friend, and this help is an expression of “inner 
heartfelt benevolence”(MM 6:471). Friendship also involves two people sharing their 
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feelings with each other: “moral friendship (as distinguished from friendship based on 
feeling) [zum Unterschiede von der ästhetischen] is the complete confidence of two 
persons in revealing their secret judgments and feelings [Empfindungen] to each 
other”(MM 6:471).   
 Of course, Kant would not use the words Affecten or Leidenshaften to explain the 
enjoyments one gets from pleasant conversation or a close friendship because, as we have 
already seen, these words bear a largely derogatory sense for Kant. He argues that the 
“love” of friendship cannot be an Affect because Affecten are blind and transitory (MM 
6:471). Nevertheless, it is hard to deny that friendly affection and spirited intellectual 
engagement do involve emotions in the normal sense of term, and necessarily so. 
Even in his discussion of Affect proper, Kant occasionally wavers in his condemnation. 
For example, even though Kant argues that emotions are necessarily rash and 
experienced as a hindrance, Kant states that some expressions of emotion seem to 
promote physical health. Laughter, weeping, and anger all seem to facilitate a release. 
Laughter exercises the diaphragm, aids digestion, and promotes society. Surely Kant 
recognizes that emotions, even in their pre-reflective state, are human and a valuable part 
of life.   
 
V. Kant’s Cognitive Theory of Emotion 
In the second Critique, as well as in other places, Kant calls an intellectual feeling 
a contradiction in terms.44 Hopefully, the preceding discussion succeeded in convincing 
the reader that Kant’s moral theory relies on and references at least eight intellectual 
feelings: moral feeling, conscience, love of one’s neighbor, respect for oneself (self-
                                                
44 CPrR 117. 
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esteem), the feeling of freedom, the feeling of respect for the moral law, the feeling of the 
sublime, and the feeling of aesthetic enjoyment.45 In these cases, it is clear that feeling 
follows from and is a product of reason. Now I am going to take the argument further and 
consider evidence that Kant’s discussion of emotion assumes that all emotions are 
intellectual feelings; in other words, I believe that Kant holds a cognitive theory of 
emotion.46 
Even though the majority of Kant’s comments about Affecten and Leidenshaften 
are disparaging, his assumptions about emotions lead one to believe that he holds a 
cognitive theory of emotion. As we saw in chapter 1, a cognitive theory of emotion holds 
that emotions should be explained primarily in terms of their cognitive content. Merely 
maintaining this, however, does not rule out also believing that the emotions are 
necessarily irrational.47 The Stoics, for example, believed that emotions are judgments, 
but necessarily false judgments.48 A judgment such as “it matters that my child died,” 
                                                
45 Guyer points out that in the Critique of Judgment Kant remarks that respect is the only feeling that “we 
cognize fully a priori”(CPR 5:73).  This does not mean that respect is the only feeling that is determined by 
reason, as Guyer worries, only that respect is the only feeling caused by pure reason. Guyer, Kant and the 
Experience of Freedom, 361. 
46 The difference, perhaps, between cognitive emotions and intellectual emotions is that the latter implies 
conscious awareness of the thoughts that form the intentionality of the emotion. As we have seen from 
chapter 1, the former does not.  
47 For example, Kant discusses the role of imagination and empathy and in heightening emotional 
experiences, even if only to criticize it.  For the most part he takes these experiences to be silly.  He 
considers the case in which someone, staying up late, becomes excited about various emotional ideas, only 
to find that they have faded from memory in the morning: “therefore, the taming of one’s imagination, by 
going to sleep early in order to rise early, is a very useful rule for the psychological diet” (A §33).  
48 Sherman argues that Kant “did not avail himself of the shared ancient view that emotions are not brute 
sensations, but states that have evaluative content. This might have made it easier for him to let go of 
certain rhetoric against the emotions and appreciate even more fully just how reason’s project can work 
through the emotions.” Sherman, Making a Necessity of Virtue, 120. This constitutes a significant 
difference between our projects. I think that it is only possible to maintain this if one limits one’s 
understanding of Kant’s theory of emotion to a very limited consideration of his comments about Affect. If 
you take his statement that Affecten make reflection “difficult or impossible” to mean that they literally 
make reflection fully impossible, then you have some support for denying him a cognitive theory of 
emotion. Even still, the case would not be closed since Affecten might still have cognitive content from 
which we are necessarily cut off from. Nevertheless, the most commonsensical interpretation of this 
passage is that emotions make reflection difficult and are often not reflected on at all. 
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which grounds the emotion of grief, is false for the Stoics and the product of an unhealthy 
attachment to the transient world. A cognitive theory of emotion denies that emotions are 
arational, not that they are irrational. Nevertheless, as we have already begun to 
understand, Kant does not go as far as the Stoics and does not believe that all emotional 
judgments are false; instead he believes that many emotions, i.e., Affecten, tend to cause 
poor reasoning. 
Cognitive theories of emotion oppose the tendency of affective theories to define 
emotions primarily in terms of physical feelings. As we saw in chapter 1, this 
disagreement is partly the result of a false dichotomy and partly hinges on the definition 
of “emotion,” as it does with Kant. Those who hold cognitive theories of emotion do not 
wish to deny that emotions are by and large a special type of thought that occurs with/in 
bodily feelings; and those who hold affective theories of emotion, by and large, cannot 
deny that emotions are usually the result of a perception—in the robust sense—of 
important content. Kant, on the other hand, takes a position that is rather far on the 
cognitive end of the spectrum: he does not identify emotions (die Affecten) with physical, 
bodily feelings at all: “certain interior physical feelings are related to the emotions, but 
they are not identical with them since they are only momentary and transitory, leaving no 
trace behind”(A §79). Surprisingly, given the modern debate between cognitive theories 
and affective theories, Kant has no problem defining emotions in abstraction from their 
physical states. Of course, he does not deny that emotions and physical feelings are 
related. It is simply rather the case that these physical feelings do not tell us about the 
essence of the emotion, which can only be understood in terms of an intellectual 
evaluation. 
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Although very few current theories of emotion deny that some animals can have 
emotions and that some emotional responses are common to all humans, affective 
theorists follow the biological-functionalist tradition of Darwin more closely, while 
cognitive theorists believe that the subjective response has more to do with creating the 
subjective response than the objective situation. Kant, again taking up a position that is 
farthest on the cognitive extreme, focuses on the passions that are uniquely human (and 
their relationship to vice, as we have seen) (A §82). Furthermore, Kant focuses on the 
relationship between being in a state of emotion or passion and the capacity for 
reflection. His definition, which includes hindering reflection, cannot possibly apply to an 
animal. Kant divided passions into those that are innate and those that are acquired. The 
acquired passions, ambition, lust of power and avarice, have objects that are unique to 
human beings. Even the innate passion for freedom has a complex cognitive structure (A 
§82). 
 Kant describes emotions and passions as aspects of the faculty of desire 
(Begehrungsvermögen), not as a part of our capacity for “pleasure and displeasure” (Lust 
and Unlust). Emotions and passions involve the desire to either promote or hinder their 
own existence, as pleasures and displeasures do, but they are significantly more 
complex.49 Emotions are reactions we have to socially meaningful situations, but unlike 
mere reactions they contain an implicit directive for action. “Begehren” is often used to 
mean “to seek after something,” which implies a more conscious and active plan of 
action than the verb “to desire,” which to our ears sounds more like the passivity implied 
                                                
49 Even pain and pleasure are always mediated by the understanding, for Kant, since they include an 
evaluation of the pain or pleasure and a consequent submission, but Kant does call taste and smell the 
senses of pleasure (A§ 21). This fact is important to keep in mind when evaluating Kant’s “incorporation 
thesis.” See chapter 5. 
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by the German “Lust.” We must keep in mind that Kant, in classifying both emotions and 
passions with the conative faculty, aligns them with practical reason. Kant’s analysis 
suggests that emotions and passions include either latent or explicit thoughts, desires, and 
evaluations, not merely sensations. 
In his description of emotion, Kant argues that an emotion thwarts its own 
purpose. In objecting that emotions do not effectively serve their own purposes, Kant, 
perhaps unwittingly, acknowledges that they do have a purpose. It might be the case that 
Kant wishes to argue that their purpose may be misguided; yet he implies that the 
purpose in the case of anger, at least— to avert the perceived evil—is constructive (A 
§78). If an emotion did not have a worthy purpose, it would be of no consequence that it 
did not effectively promote it. Many affective theorists define emotions in terms of states 
of action readiness, such as that being angry makes one likely to yell. This model 
suggests that emotions have evolved to serve their purposes, but that the emotions of 
civilized people are often triggered by non-natural stimuli and are therefore ineffective 
and inappropriate. Kant’s notion of an emotion’s purpose is not the same as this idea of 
action-readiness. The fact that Kant believes that a reasoned response could better serve 
the purpose, even the purpose of self-preservation, than an emotional response shows that 
he believes that emotions cannot be best understood as biological adaptations. Instead, 
emotions are latent thoughts. Surely, though, emotions can be quite complex, and even 
the person who experiences them may not be aware of their cognitive content. In other 
words, an emotion might be experienced as an affective upheaval, but Kant’s discussion 
of them suggests that, at their core, emotions are not only compatible with the rational 
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mind, as we can rationally weigh all of our desires, but they are also inherently rational, 
and seem to contain a best, most rational directive, even if they are not able to pursue it.   
One possibility is that emotions make reflection difficult because they are 
occasioned by thoughts of which we are not entirely aware in the first place. In the 
section “On the Ideas We Have Without Being Aware of Them” Kant argues that “it is as 
if just a few places on the vast map of our mind were illuminated.” He goes on to write: 
“This can inspire wonder at our own being, for a higher power would need only cry “Let 
there be light” and then without further action… there would be laid open before the eyes 
half a universe”(A 135). The examples Kant gives in this section are of perceptions that 
we do not fully perceive or beliefs we do not fully affirm. Also, unconscious ideas can be 
repressed thoughts since “we have an interest in removing objects that are liked or 
disliked by the imagination” (A 137). Since “emotion is surprise through sensation 
whereby the composure of mind is suspended” it is plausible that negative emotions are 
difficult to reflect on precisely because they involve pain (A 252). It may be the case that 
we are unaware of the ideas in the first place because we have tried to push them out of 
consciousness.  
Such an account would be a significant improvement on Aristotle’s theory of 
emotion since it can explain the reason that emotions do not always match up with their 
corollary situations. Aristotle and Kant both discuss the emotion of anger. Aristotle holds 
that it is a response to the judgment that one has been slighted. Kant agrees, but he 
qualifies it by explaining that the surprise comes from “embarrassment at finding oneself 
in an unexpected situation” (A 261). I think that Kant is right to suggest that negative 
emotions are accompanied by some degree of embarrassment and that this furthers the 
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disruption of thought. The causes of the embarrassment are necessarily personal, but 
without this suggestion that we have become aware of something we would prefer to 
hide, such as our own feeling of insecurity, we cannot explain why some slights are 
angering while others leave us unscathed.  
Passions are cognitive states, in a way that is more explicit than for emotions. 
Emotions are pre-reflective, for Kant, but passions necessarily require reflection and 
explicit cognitive involvement and commitment, and for that reason they are more 
blameworthy. Kant defines passion as a kind of mental preoccupation:  
since the passions can be coupled with the calmest reflection, one can 
easily see that they must neither be rash like the emotions, nor stormy and 
transitory; instead, they must take roots gradually and even be able to 
coexist with reason.(A §80)   
 
Here, however, we must make a distinction between emotions and passions. The main 
problem with emotions, for Kant, is that they thwart their own purposes. The main 
problem with passions, on the other hand, is that they cause the subject to focus 
obsessively on them to the detriment of other pursuits, both pragmatic and moral. It is not 
the case, then, that a passion ought to be handled by discovering its inchoate purpose and 
better serving it, but by eliminating it, or perhaps by pursuing it in a way that is consistent 
with reason and morality.  
Our discussion of intellectual feeling and the relationship between feeling and 
reason opens up the possibility that Kant sees emotion on a spectrum with reason. Many 
of Kant’s comments, especially his distinction between autonomy and heteronomy, 
suggest a hard and fast dichotomy between causality from inclination and causality from 
reason. (Fully addressing this aspect of Kant’s moral theory and its consequences for our 
understanding of his theory of emotion is the main topic of chapter 6.) Nevertheless, there 
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are reasons for thinking that Kant believes that sensibility, understanding, and reason 
must cooperatively work together. Their interdependence suggests that Kant cannot insist 
on a dichotomy between reason and emotion. 
Kant’s discussion of the role of sensibility in the construction of speculative 
knowledge in the first Critique shows that there is no functional trichotomy between 
reason, the understanding, and sensibility.50 Although Kant is concerned about leaving 
himself open to the criticism of idealism, and continually asserts that sensibility is passive 
and receptive, a careful reading of the “Schematism” shows that the forms of sensibility, 
space and time, are interconnected with the categories.51 In other words, we cannot have 
an experience of space and time that is not also a product of the concepts of the 
understanding. Their mutual implication goes deeper still, as we realize that categories 
become objective precisely by being represented in space. Even in the Anthropology, we 
see that Kant does not favor a dichotomy between the “rational” capacity of reason and 
the “irrational” capacity of sensibility. Kant does not embrace the typical ruse of 
skepticism, the worry that the senses are deceptive and deleterious for knowledge (A §10 
&11). Instead, it is clear that sensibility is a part of the rational capacity: Kant holds sense 
to be the lowest level of the cognitive faculty, and, as such, it is a necessary part of 
                                                
50 There is no guarantee that Kant’s theory of sensibility from the first Critique remains consistent in his 
other works. Furthermore, the term “sensibility” does not have the same meaning throughout Kant’s 
philosophy since in the first Critique it is examined in its role in the construction of speculative knowledge, 
and in the second Critique, it is examined in its role in the construction of practical knowledge. In all cases 
though, it bears the weight of Kant’s worry about determinism since it is receptive to natural causes, either 
determination by experience of the external world or determination through the natural causes of natural 
desires. 
51 My reading of the first Critique takes Kant at his word when he says that he is outlining the conditions 
for the possibility of experience (Erfahrung).  Already this prejudices me toward a more idealist reading, 
and sets me against many interpreters who believe that Erfahrung only refers to propositional judgments.  
They take the “subject” and the “object” to refer to linguistic entities, not also to epistemological entities.  I 
disclose my approach since my reading of Kantian sensibility is likely dependent on it. 
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cognition (A§ 28).52 This developmental model of the relationship between sensation and 
reason parallels the way that emotions can contain latent, unconscious thoughts.  
Upon first reading Kant, one is struck both by his tendency to taxonomize and 
make distinctions, categories, and faculties. Nietzsche’s joke about Kant is that whenever 
he runs up against a difficult philosophical problem he creates a new faculty. If we take 
Kant at his word, he is surely a very rigid thinker, and his philosophy is rife with 
dichotomies and trichotomies. When diving deeper into his thought, however, we realize 
that he does not, and can hardly be expected to, consistently adhere to his own strict 
distinctions. Sensibility plays a role in the understanding; feeling plays a role in reason, 
happiness plays a role in morality, and, as I have tried to show here, cognition plays a 
role in emotion. Please do not misunderstand me: Kant’s distinctions are important and 
cannot be overlooked, but they should not be taken out of context or as the final word on 
the subject. The goal of the next section is to move on from the insight that Kant does not 
reject the importance of emotion for happiness and morality wholesale and consider 
Kant’s insights about emotion and his recommendations for better understanding and 
responding to one’s emotions. In other words, we will consider Kant as a theorist of 
emotional intelligence. 
 
VI. Kant’s Theory of Emotional Intelligence 
In Baron’s Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology, the lone apology is offered 
for Kant’s deficient treatment of moral affect.53 Even though Baron, to my mind 
                                                
52 To offer further evidence of this tendency we might point out that the third Critique argues that a 
judgment can be either theoretical, practical, or aesthetic. In its preface the third Critique is presented as the 
link between the first two Critiques because judgment has the power to “give the rule a priori to the feeling 
of pleasure and displeasure,” which is “the mediating link between the cognitive power and the power of 
desire”(CJ 5). 
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successfully, defends Kant from the charge of moral coldness, as I have also done here, 
she argues that Kant still sides with the Stoic against compassion, since “there cannot 
possibly be a duty to increase the ills in the world” as the sharing the feeling of another’s 
suffering would suggest (MM 6:457). To continue to fault Kant on this score, after 
everything we have seen, is, I think, a failure of philosophical flexibility, especially since, 
directly after this remark, Kant writes: 
But while it is not in itself a duty to share the sufferings (as well the joys of others), it is 
duty to sympathize actively in their fate; and to this end it is therefore an indirect duty to 
cultivate the compassionate natural (aesthetic) feelings in us, and to make use of them as 
so many means to sympathy based on moral principles and the feeling appropriate to 
them. (MM 6:457) 
 
It is clear that Kant is struggling with his Stoic heritage. It is plainly wrong to call Kant a 
Stoic, as his point here, about the proper, principled counter-part of feeling, since it is his 
consistent refrain, should be clear enough. 
Now that we have see the great importance that Kant places on natural feeling, we 
are in a position to better understand his comprehensive position on emotion: affects are 
kinds of feelings, but it is only a lack of virtue that fails to advance them to a state of 
better understanding (MM 6:408). On the other hand, passions and inclinations—two 
very similar notions—are usually assumed to be opposed to the moral maxim. Kant 
argues that the person who is caught up in a passion cannot be happy because he naturally 
feels the inclination toward freedom and yet feels controlled by the passion and so feels 
torn by his inconsistent behavior (A §81). In other words, Kant recognizes that virtue is 
related to emotional health.  
 When we compare Kant’s comments about emotion to Goleman’s theory of 
emotional intelligence, we can easily make the argument that Kant has a theory of 
                                                
53 Marcia Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995). 
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emotional intelligence. In fact, at first blush, Kant and Goleman look surprisingly similar. 
Kant continually states that the rational mind must control or dominate the emotions in 
order to cultivate virtue. In the “Doctrine of Virtue” Kant defines virtue as the strength to 
overcome the obstacles posed by natural inclination. Kant calls it being one’s own master 
and ruling oneself (MM 6:407) (Meister und Herr zu sein). Just as Goleman speculates a 
division between “heart” and “head” (or the amygdala and the hypothalamus, to put it in 
official terms), Kant seemingly postulates a division amongst the faculties to allow for 
the existence of pure practical reason. Plus, we are reminded that Goleman calls 
emotional intelligence “character,” making his theory of emotional intelligence appear 
remarkably similar to Kant’s discussion, in the Religion essay, of the conversion 
experience that leads a person to choose principled moral action over following 
inclination and therefore to have a good character. 
Of course, my discussion in the second chapter of Goleman’s Emotional 
Intelligence was largely critical, even to the point of denying that Goleman’s theory 
refers to something that deserves to be called emotional intelligence. We must ask 
whether Kant can do better. The goal of this dissertation is not to show that he can, since 
Kantian moral theory can still offer direction for the cultivation of emotional intelligence 
even if Kant himself did not have an adequate theory of emotional intelligence, but, still, 
I believe that Kant’s offers an improvement over Goleman. My main complaint with 
Goleman is that he represents the emotions as though they are in themselves irrational 
and emotional intelligence as though it is primarily a matter of restraint and rational 
domination. Kant clearly believes that the emotions are powerful, but he does not believe 
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that they are immune to reason. In his discussion of the struggle between virtue and 
inclination, in the Anthropology, Kant writes: 
force accomplishes nothing in the struggle against sensuality and the 
inclinations; instead we must outwit these inclinations and, as Swift says, 
in order to save the ship, we must fling an empty tub to a whale so that he 
can play with it. (A§ 14)  
 
This is a funny image. It suggests that the emotions are both powerful and stupid, 
threatening to capsize the ship. (The metaphor of the ship and the ocean is a common one 
in Western thought to emphasize the opposition between the steady control of reason and 
the chaos of the emotions through which reason must navigate.) The emotions are so 
powerful that, even though Kant sometimes uses metaphors that imply that they might be 
overpowered, he does not believe that the emotions can be dominated into rational 
submission: they must be met on their own terms. Even if it is possible, Kant, unlike 
Goleman, does not believe that repression is desirable (as we see in his example of 
unexpressed anger turning in to hate). Dealing with one’s emotions requires knowledge 
of psychology, or animal psychology, as, like the whale, they sometimes must be out-
smarted. In this twist, Kant differs from Goleman, and this difference is productive in that 
it makes room for us to wonder about the ways that the emotions might be tricked, or 
trained, most effectively. Elaborating Kant’s theory of emotional intelligence requires 
discovering means of behavioral training, but, as we shall see, it is not limited to this 
direction of causality.  
The metaphor of the whale, or of the master and slave, takes us straight to the 
heart of our worry about Kant’s theory of emotion: within the framework of reason and 
moral decision making, does Kant respect emotion and the other natural needs of humans 
or does he deal with them harshly, as though they were, in fact, inimical to morality and 
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psychological health? Answering this question requires that we examine Kant’s moral 
theory on its own terms and not just through his comments on emotion. I will take up this 
task in chapter 5, after having further explained the reasons that I believe that Kantian 
moral theory can help promote emotional intelligence, even if only in spite of itself (in 
chapter 4). Kant defines emotions as irrational and passions as immoral, but I have shown 
that there are other emotions—things we, not Kant, would call emotions—that are neither 
irrational nor immoral. Furthermore, Kant does not give us any reason to think that 
emotions, even though they begin in a pre-reflective state, might not easily become 
rational by having our conscious thought directed at them. By defining the pre-reflective 
state of an emotion as problematic, Kant seems to be implying that we ought to reflect on 
our emotions and integrate them into the rational mind. A sailor cannot reason with a 
whale, so we should not hastily conclude that Kant holds the emotions to be animalistc. 
In fact, we have already seen that he believes that affects and passions are uniquely 
human.   
Kant defines intelligence as the faculty of discovering the universal from the 
particular (A §44). We might express this as learning from experience. He later defines it 
as the uniting of “heterogeneous ideas, which often … lie apart from each other” (A §54). 
Were we to formulate a Kantian theory of emotional intelligence, then, it might involve 
rationally processing emotional impulses and gathering emotional knowledge about 
ourselves so that me might learn from our emotional experiences and respond more 
rationally in the future. 
Guyer concludes, in examining the discussion of freedom and inclination in the 
“Doctrine of Right” that,  
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there is nothing intrinsically wrong with inclinations, but inclinations are 
just a part of the ordinary ebb and flow of nature, and there is therefore 
nothing uniquely valuable about them either. Human beings achieve their 
unique moral value by elevating themselves above their inclinations, 
which is not to say by eradicating their inclinations but by ruling them 
through reason.54  
 
Perhaps a Kantian theory of emotional intelligence would involve precisely this rational 
comprehension and control of one’s emotions, with the “free” cultivation of morally and 
intellectually important emotions thrown in (MM 6:456-7).55 (In exploring the idea that 
we have a duty to rationally instruct feeling, Guyer revisits Williams’s drowning wife 
example. (Williams famously argues against moral theory in general that rationally 
considering whether or not one should save one’s wife over some other person introduces 
“one thought too many” into the moral decision-making process.) Guyer humorously 
introduces the possibility that one may not want to save one’s wife at all.56 Perhaps there 
is the inclination to save a younger woman on the ship with whom this imaginary cruise-
goer has been flirting. Clearly, then, following one’s inclination involves having “one 
thought too few,” and rationally evaluating one’s feelings is preferable both morally and 
pragmatically.) 
Guyer’s interpretation is plausible, but I suggest that there might be even more 
reason to think that feeling and reason are not inimical: again, there may be an internal, 
developmental connection between them. My argument that Kant holds a cognitive 
theory of emotion, and my speculations about Kant’s theory of the unconscious—an 
unconscious in which pre-reflective thoughts reside—open up a further dimension of a 
Kantian theory of emotional intelligence. Kant believes in an unconscious, and many 
                                                
54 Guyer, Kant and the Experience of Freedom, 350. 
55 See Gregor, Laws of Freedom, 198. Sherman expresses this distinction in terms of the “immediate” 
versus the “practical”; Sherman, Making a Necessity of Virtue, 33. 
56 Guyer, Kant and the Experience of Freedom, p. 393. 
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aspects of his philosophy reinforce this belief, counting everything we see and yet are not 
aware of as unconscious perception (A §5).57 His notion is not far removed from Freud’s 
notion of latent or pre-consciousness. Furthermore, Kant does not believe that those 
things of which we are unaware are any more animalistic than those of which we are 
aware.58 In other words, he does not posit any particular difficulty in making unconscious 
thoughts conscious, except for the possibility that we might not want them to be. 
Remarkably, Freud is similarly aware that the unconscious may be the playground for 
underdeveloped or confused intellectual ideas, as his theory of dream interpretation 
makes clear. Kant’s point is that these obscure ideas can still affect our behavior. This is 
an important insight to keep in mind when seeking to understand the ways that we work 
through our emotions: an emotion can also be a product of a confused idea or false 
assumption.  
In concluding, I will point to some of, what we might call, Kant’s 
recommendations for cultivating emotional intelligence. For example, if one avoided the 
“passions” that Kant describes as vices, then one would, it seems, be more emotionally 
intelligent. Furthermore, emotional intelligence does seem to require the well-ordered 
value scheme that Kant praises along with overcoming of selfishness. For example, one 
should work to transform one’s selfish desire for vengeance—a vicious passion—into a 
universal concern for justice. One could do this by discovering that the natural and 
rational sense of justice sits at the root of the passion for vengeance, as Kant speculates, 
                                                
57 For example, the argument from the first Critique that all phenomena have a thing-in-itself that we do not 
experience, which applies also to the self and internal perception. There is a thing-in-itself that underlies 
inner sense. This idea is clearly similar to the notion of an unconscious.  
58 Surprisingly, in his section “On the Ideas We Have Without Being Aware of Them,” Kant considers the 
cultural dissembling involved in obscuring the purpose of having sex unconscious since they are obscure 
and confused ideas compared to their real intent.  
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and by striving to bring the emotion of vengeance more closely in line with its latent 
cognitive origin. The benefits of such work would not be merely moral, but also 
psychological.  
One should not try to put oneself above others by controlling them with honor, 
authority, or money—as one does in the case of ambition, lust for authority, and 
avarice—but rather one should value other people as highly as one values oneself and 
have a sense of self-worth that is based on the mutual worth, not the deprecation of 
others. It is difficult to say whether these vices are caused by a lack of emotional 
intelligence or are themselves the manifestations of such a lack, but it seems that, in 
either case, working to overcome these vices—although, to be effective, such work may 
require other forms of psychological therapy—would promote both emotional 
intelligence and morality.   
Kant speaks out against emotional delusion. By “delusion” he understands “the 
internal practical deception of taking subjective reasons for objective ones”(A §86). Kant 
gives over-valuing past-times and superstition as examples of delusions. It seems that 
many contemporary behaviors fit under this characterization. Indeed, there are probably 
more examples of this now than in Kant’s time. Certain common behaviors in our culture, 
like shopping for recreation, are not only mistaken for important activities, but also come 
to be associated with psychological maladies. The, perhaps joking, term “retail therapy” 
indicates that consumerism is believed to be a treatment for sadness and other negative 
emotions. Kant’s analysis seems to be closer to the truth, that these frivolous compulsions 
are more often an emotional expression gone awry or the harmful perpetuation of 
emotional consternation rather than any form of therapy. 
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 Kant discusses “mental ailments,” like “melancholia” and “mania,” as well as 
many other habits of thought in the first section of the Anthropology, “On the Cognitive 
Faculty,” and many of his observations are relevant to our discussion of emotional 
intelligence. Although he believes that emotions and passions are a part of the conative 
faculty, not the cognitive faculty, the discussion of these emotional ailments of the 
cognitive faculty shows that emotions are cognitive. In his section “On Self-
Observation,” Kant warns against self-indulgent, or narcissistic, introspection:  
To scrutinize the various acts of the imagination within me, when I call 
them forth, is indeed worth reflection, as well as necessary and useful for 
logic and metaphysics. But to wish to play the spy upon one’s self, when 
those acts come to mind unsummoned and of their own accord (which 
happens through the play of the unpremeditatedly creative imagination), is 
to reverse the natural order of the cognitive powers, since then the rational 
elements do not take the lead (as they should) but instead follow behind. 
(A §4)  
 
Kant’s description of melancholy is similar to his description of hypochondria (A §50). 
Melancholics allow their moods to hold court instead of rationally evaluating them. This 
theory might serve therapists who find that introspection seems to be making their 
patients more solipsistic. It also applies to those who might believe that pre-reflective 
emotions are more authentic. For example, it is a common belief that many forms of 
“letting it out,” such as “journaling,” help one work through emotions. Kant’s 
observation, on the other hand, suggests that simply expressing or observing our 
emotions is not sufficient to work through them and enact positive behavioral changes.  
Of course, self-observation is a necessary part of self-discovery, which Kant 
counts as a talent of the cognitive faculty. He defines “sagacity” as discovering 
“something (that lies hidden either in ourselves or somewhere else)”(A §56). In order to 
achieve successful self-discovery, he advises that one start with a hypothesis and test it, 
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playing the scientist to oneself. Of course, self-discovery is also a moral duty since Kant 
places such supreme importance on being aware of one’s motivation. The first command 
of duties to oneself is to know oneself (MM 6:441).   
The Anthropology suggests that the practice that leads to habituation is the best 
means of educating one’s negative emotions. There Kant equates freedom and habit in a 
way that strictly opposes the criticisms of Aristotle offered in the Metaphysics of Morals. 
He writes “such a habit [achieved in overcoming shyness] produces freedom of mind”(A 
§78). He supports Hume’s advice for the fear of public speaking: begin with groups in 
which one feels totally comfortable and gradually increase the level of discomfort until 
one feels confident in front of strangers (A §78). Nevertheless, contra Aristotle, virtue 
must be based on a rational comprehension of the moral law, not unthinking habit.59  
Kant states that the “greatest sensuous pleasure (Sinnengenuß), which is not 
accompanied by any loathing at all, is found under healthy conditions of resting after 
work”(A §87). This statement deserves assent if we assume that he refers to work that is 
taken to be worthy by the worker. Doing work that one deems pointless, demeaning, or 
coerced, leaves one feeling annoyed and resentful. This characterization of the “highest 
physical good” parallels the “Highest Good” or “highest ethicophysical good” because 
each describes a pleasure that is predicated on self-satisfaction. The “highest 
ethicophysical good” is “good living that is curbed [or regulated] by virtue” (A§ 88). 
When taken as an expression of emotional intelligence, Kant highest physical good and 
                                                
59 Kant also criticizes the practice of cultivating virtue by instilling good habits in the first section of the 
Anthropology, § 12. This does not seem to be a contradiction, because Kant’s recommendation that we 
form good habits does take them to be based on reason. Furthermore, not all action is moral action and so 
not all action need to be based on a rational comprehension of the moral law. There is no reason to think 
that the majority of our behaviors should not be based on habit. In the Lectures Kant does recommend 
developing good moral habits (p. 46), which does contradict his criticisms of Aristotle in the “Doctrine of 
Virtue.” 
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highest ethicophysical good show us that psychological health and happiness can be 
achieved when the expression of emotion matches the subjective, moral evaluation of the 
emotion and both match up to an honest representation of the situation. 
Of course, even with all of these psychologically astute comments from the 
Anthropology, it may still seem like a stretch to grant that Kant has a theory of emotional 
intelligence. One goal of this dissertation is to show that Kantian moral theory promotes 
emotional intelligence, even if only in spite of Kant’s explicitly negative evaluation of 
emotion. This chapter has shown that even Kant’s explicit theory of emotion is not as bad 
as it looks and goes some distance in itself informing a theory of emotional intelligence.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
KANTIAN MORAL THEORY AND EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
 
In this chapter I argue that Kantian moral theory helps us to better understand the 
nature of emotional intelligence. This chapter offers the crux of the dissertation’s 
argument: moral concern, as Kant describes it, helps one to be emotionally intelligent. 
Indeed, virtue, i.e., Kantian virtue, and emotional intelligence are closely intertwined 
concepts. This argument will strike many as clearly wrong, since Kant is most often 
criticized for failing to grasp the moral importance of emotion. Although I do not find 
every aspect of Kantianism acceptable, we will see that most of the common criticisms of 
his account of emotions are wrong-headed and based on the dualistic prejudice that the 
emotions cannot be intelligent. Nevertheless, my argument here calls for a considerable 
amount of interpretative work, as I defend Kant against common misunderstandings and 
criticisms, as well as separate off those of Kant’s statements that are unacceptable and 
show that Kantian moral theory can function coherently without them. 
In order to give my reader a sense of what is to be gained by my argument, I 
begin this chapter as if the interpretive work had already been accomplished, explaining 
the ways that Kantianism promotes emotional intelligence and postponing the lion’s 
share of my defense of Kantian moral theory until the next two chapters. Kantian moral 
theory has been described as cognitivist, universalist, and formalist.1 Kant’s formalism is 
seen by many to be most disagreeable; along with his notion of autonomy, it is taken to 
                                                
1 Most notably by Jürgen Habermas, in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian 
Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen, Introduction by Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 1995). 
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imply that the emotions should not play a role in moral decision-making. I delay my 
discussion of formalism and autonomy until the fifth and sixth chapters, respectively, and 
focus here on moral cognitivism and moral universalism. My reader will, therefore, have 
to combine the ideas presented in this chapter with the interpretive work contained in the 
next two. This may require some amount of patience; nevertheless it seems more 
interesting to begin with the positive. 
Overall, this chapter discusses the benefits Kantian moral theory stands to offer 
both to a theory of emotional intelligence and to the practical task of developing 
emotional intelligence. This chapter is overflowing with ideas and could be a project by 
itself; so as a chapter it is necessarily limited and schematic, filled with starting points for 
further discussion. In the first section I explain Kantian cognitivism, and I show that it 
facilitates self-analysis and self-improvement; furthermore, it yields self-esteem. I argue 
that Kant’s notion of self-esteem is the most productive one for a theory of emotional 
intelligence. Acknowledging and prioritizing moral value in our lives puts us on the right 
path for developing true self-esteem, as well as better understanding our emotions. In the 
second section I explain Kantian universalism, and I argue that it entails a process of both 
moral and psychological therapy, moving from the unconscious and possibly selfish to 
the well-understood and inclusive perspective. I liken the emphasis Kant places on 
truthfulness to the psychological virtue of transparency. The third section further 
develops this discussion of respect by exploring the interrelatedness of respecting oneself 
and respecting others, as well as the psychological reasons for selfishness that undermine 
respect. I argue that Kantian respect must have a positive as well as a negative meaning 
and that respect is an integral part of developing close relationships as well as navigating 
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all varieties of conflict. In the fourth section I explore the ways that moral self-
development creates a more harmoniously integrated self, and the ways that Kantian 
moral theory in particular is able to provide an account of the way that moral worth is 
teleologically organizing. In conclusion, I reflect on the Kantian value of consistency, 
especially in the face of the many unachievable, yet virtuous, ideals. Morality is a 
function of reason for Kant, and we must remember that reason is a process. Total 
consistency is stagnancy, and it is the inevitable fluidity of life for which moral and 
psychological health equip us. 
 
I. Cognitivism: Self-Scrutiny and Self-Esteem 
 Kantian moral theory is cognitivist, i.e., it holds that moral statements have truth 
conditions. Non-cognitivists hold that moral judgments are forms of non-cognitive self-
expression, such as desires or statements of approval or disapproval. We can see 
immediately that moral non-cognitivism assumes a non-cognitive theory of emotion; 
Kant, as we have already seen, has a cognitive theory of emotion. Statements of approval 
or disapproval are taken to be non-cognitive by the non-cognitivists because they cannot 
be rationally justified. Morality is grounded in subjective attitudes or prescriptions, for 
the non-cognitivist, not the other way around. In other words, emotions and other 
subjective states are taken to be the ground floor of subjectivity, below which one cannot 
get. Kant, on the other hand, is a moral realist: he believes that behaviors and intentions 
really are good or bad, they are not merely subjectively thought or felt to be good or bad.  
 The idea that moral judgments express facts about the world does not quite 
capture the full force of cognitivism. Cognitivist moral theories imply that moral 
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judgments are things about which we should do something. If a moral judgment is not 
really a judgment at all, but merely an expression of my own personal taste, as the 
expressivist holds, then my judgment that dog-fighting is wrong, for example, does not 
compel me to enter into a discussion with you about dog-fighting if you disagree with 
me.2 I can simply say: to each his own. If I see dogs being fought then, even though I feel 
that it is wrong, I need not be compelled to stop it. I would just think: “Oh, they might not 
think it’s wrong; I should just leave so I will not have to be confronted with my feeling of 
its wrongness.” It is this moral denial, or moral weakness or cowardliness—you will 
support these strong terms if you agree with moral realism—that is a genuine moral, and, 
as I will argue, psychological problem.  
 It is my contention that cognitivism, with its encouragement to seriously engage 
in moral discourse and enquiry, promotes the development of emotional intelligence. The 
means by which I will make this argument is clearly question-begging: There really are 
moral truths and so taking them seriously requires that we express and promote our 
                                                
2 I do not believe that Stevenson’s theory of emotivism is recognizable as emotivism; see C. L. Stevenson, 
Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944). In Stevenson’s own words, his theory is 
an “analytic or methodological study” of normative ethics and not itself normative (p. 1.) Although 
emotivism is also clearly a metaethical theory, it is also normative, as it implies that moral argumentation is 
irrational insofar as it entails attempting to change people’s values, not just their beliefs about facts. 
Stevenson’s emotivism has no such implication, as he agrees with the Rachels’ account of moral reasoning 
(See, for example, 27, 36, 139; see 173 for a discussion of the logical-like validity of ethical judgments). 
Stevenson’s emotivism is more of an empirical study of ethical discourse and does not tell us anything that 
runs counter to common sense.  Nor is it particularly interested in emotion as a key concept. Still, 
Stevenson argues that his own theory has much in common with Ayer’s, except for that it does not intend 
to disparage ethical argument and inquiry as unscientific. We can see that that which it shares with Ayer 
falls to the same criticisms as Ayer, and his differences, as he strays from non-cognitivism, make him 
unrecognizable as an emotivist. In addition, Stevenson seems to be even lass equipped to maintain a 
distinction between the expression, or what he calls “giving vent” to (37-38), and assertion of emotion. It is 
unclear whether he intends to uphold Ayer’s distinction, since he translates ethical statements into 
statements about subjective approval. One might argue that his distinction between descriptive and emotive 
meaning, or the disposition of words to affect cognition and the disposition of words to affect feeling (71), 
equaling roughly a distinction between denotation and connotation, does this job. Although, for Ayer, the 
assertion of emotion counts as a factual statement, and therefore has descriptive meaning in Stevenson’s 
sense, Stevenson’s notion of emotive meaning is a property of the sign, not of the speaker, making it more 
like a connotation, and is therefore unrelated to Ayer’s distinction. 
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convictions, helping us to forge a harmonious relationship between our internal and 
external lives. This argument will do nothing to win over the non-cognitivist. He, in fact, 
holds the opposite to be true: those who believe that there are moral truths tend to be 
stubborn and judgmental; they have difficulty being sensitive to differences of opinion 
and situation, and they usually cling to their belief-system at the expense of their 
happiness and psychological well-being, not to mention their relationships. In fact, the 
desire to dampen destructive moral argumentation seems to be one of the main 
motivations behind non-cognitivism. It is this idea that we must keep clearly in focus as 
the main objection. Still, in order to prevent this criticism from winning over the reader 
from the beginning, we must ask whether or not we usually mount this kind of assault 
against those with whom we agree or if it is not rather the case that people mount an 
attack against those who are stubborn and self-righteous only when they disagree with 
them, and yet cheer on people who have equally strong convictions, but whom they take 
to be right. Still, the moral non-cognitivist will always be uncomfortable with this 
absolutist talk of “wrong” and “right,” and I do not think that I can come up with an 
argument that might convince a non-cognitivist that there are moral truths. My argument 
will retain this question-begging aspect, but I do think that I can shed some light on the 
psychological element of the debate.  
 To a certain extent, cognitivism expresses pre-reflective moral experience. We 
normally take moral judgments to be objective, and we normally believe that we must 
adjudicate moral disagreements with reasons. On the other hand, how often do we make 
decisions based on moral reasons as opposed to pragmatic reasons or preferences? How 
often do we endeavor to defend our beliefs in the face of opposition? Or risk something 
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in order to do that which we know to be right? Of course, some people do these things 
more often than others, but for all people the demands of morality are experienced as 
compulsions, yet following though on these demands poses a challenge. Hence moral 
relativism, or backing down from defending one’s beliefs, is an equally natural stance. 
Additionally, part of the non-cognitivist’s objection to moral realism and argumentation 
is that zealous attempts to convert another person are often insensitive to the validity of 
the opposite position. Perhaps if we change the focus away from moral argument toward 
seeking and pursuing the truth, both in communication and alone, part of this objection 
will fall away.  
 Kant sees morality as a challenge. He exhorts that we must fulfill our moral duties 
not because they happen to suit some other agenda we may have, but because we respect 
them as moral duties. For Kant, the supreme condition of moral goodness is a good will; 
yet a good will is something toward which we must continually strive. He is skeptical that 
anyone can simply know that he or she has a good will; instead, Kant believes that it is 
always likely that we choose to conform to the demands of morality merely because it is 
easy for us or because we have some other cooperating motivation. For this reason, 
morality requires both self-scrutiny and self-improvement. It is difficult to see how one 
can be motivated to morally improve oneself if one does not seriously believe that there 
are moral truths.3  
                                                
3 One might object that we can strive to improve relative to subjective goals. This is true, but I am not sure 
how satisfied we can be with these goals if we do not perceive them to transcendent. For example, take the 
goal of being a good mother. If I believe that my idea of being a good mother is purely relative to me 
(which is not the same thing as believing that different families and different children have different needs) 
why would I think that my idea is worth pursuing? Perhaps my child might have another idea of what I 
should have done when he grows up, or perhaps my own mother keeps telling me that I have the wrong 
idea. Why would I pursue my idea unless I thought it were the right idea? 
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Kantian cognitivism inspires, and requires, self-improvement, which is based on 
self-understanding. In the “Doctrine of Virtue” Kant argues that “the first command of all 
duties to oneself” is “to ‘know (scrutinize, fathom) yourself’”(MM, 6:441).  
That is, know your heart—whether it is good or evil, whether the source of 
your actions is pure or impure, and what can be imputed to you as 
belonging originally to the substance of human being or as derived 
(acquired or developed) and belonging to your moral condition. (MM, 
6:441). 
 
Here Kant makes use of a dichotomy between nature and morality in order to recommend 
categories for judging ourselves: either a motivation is derived from our nature as a 
human being or it is pure and moral. Still, morality must be developed from nature. Kant 
continues:  
Moral cognition of oneself, which seeks to penetrate into the depths (the 
abyss) of one’s heart which are quite difficult to fathom, is the beginning 
of all human wisdom. For in the case of a human being, the ultimate 
wisdom, which consists in the harmony of a human being’s will with its 
final end, requires him first to remove the obstacle within (an evil will 
actually present in him) and then to develop the original predisposition to 
a good will within him, which can never be lost. (Only the descent into the 
hell of self-cognition can pave the way to godliness.)” (MM, 6:441) 
 
Self-knowledge is the foundation of all wisdom. Of course, we have the Delphic Oracle 
and not Kant to thank for this gem, but it remains as persuasive an idea—even more so in 
the Modern era where knowledge becomes more completely based in the subject rather 
than the polis. Kant similarly conceives of virtue subjectively, in terms of one’s 
intentions, and writes that self-scrutiny is the first step to “the ultimate wisdom” because 
it makes personal change possible. We must uncover our motivations so that we can 
make sure that they accord with our “final end,” which is the Highest Good, or morally 
worthy happiness. Oftentimes our motivations are hidden. Especially if we have selfish 
motivations or feelings that we unconsciously judge to be unacceptable, we try to hide 
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them from ourselves. The “evil will” that Kant refers to is one that resolves to seek 
personal interests over fulfilling one’s moral duties. We often fight against learning that 
we harbor selfish desires, and being forced to realize that we have them can be painful. 
This is why Kant calls self-cognition a “hell.” 
 In the “Doctrine of Virtue” Kant outlines the duties one owes to oneself and the 
duties one owes to others: to ourselves we owe the duty of seeking our own perfection; to 
others we owe the duty of promoting happiness. Pursuing one’s own perfection requires 
the development of one’s understanding and the cultivation of one’s will. The goal of this 
cultivation is a good will:  
(1) A human being has a duty to raise himself from the crude state of his 
nature, from his animality (quoad actum), more and more toward 
humanity, by which he alone is capable of setting himself ends; he has a 
duty to diminish his ignorance by instruction and to correct his errors.  
And it is not merely that technically practical reason counsels him to do 
this as a means to his further purposes (or art); morally practical reason 
commands it absolutely and makes this end his duty, so that he may be 
worthy of the humanity that dwells within him. (2) A human being has a 
duty to carry the cultivation of his will up to the purest virtuous 
disposition, in which the law becomes also the incentive to his actions that 
conform with duty and he obeys the law from duty. This disposition is 
inner morally practical perfection. Since it is a feeling of the effect that the 
lawgiving will which the human being exercises on his capacity to act in 
accordance with his will, it is called moral feeling, a special sense (sensus 
moralis),4 as it were… it is a moral perfection, by which one makes one’s 
object every particular end that is also a duty. (MM, 6:387) 
 
As we can see, there are two levels of self-cultivation. First, we must cultivate our ability 
to think rationally in general: we must become more self-conscious in our setting of ends 
for ourselves, and we must strive to overcome our mistaken judgments. This level might 
be seen as being purely pragmatic, but Kant argues that there is a moral dimension to it 
since we owe it to ourselves to treat ourselves with this degree of self-respect. Here  
                                                
4 Here Kant is obviously referring to a “sense” as in a mental ability, not the “sense,” or meaning, of the 
term, as he does in Groundwork 442. 
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we are reminded of the discussion in the Groundwork about the duty to cultivate one’s 
talents.  
Second, setting ends for oneself requires—recalling the duty to scrutinize 
oneself—that one be aware of one’s ends as they stand so that one can know if one truly 
affirms them. In the quote above we see the opposite side of the coin: only when one is 
truly capable of self-consciously setting ends for oneself, can one strive to take on the 
fulfillment of duty as one’s end. It may seem redundant to argue that one has a moral 
duty to make oneself able and willing to perform moral duties, but drawing this 
connection between moral action and intention and the entirety of one’s personality 
shows us the special, yet natural and teleological, role that moral reason plays in human 
consciousness. 
In reflecting on Kant’s requirement that we scrutinize ourselves and try to morally 
improve ourselves, might the non-cognitivist object that Kant takes morality too 
seriously, demanding far too much of us and prompting neurosis? That would be a good 
criticism if Kant held that morality commands us to actually achieve perfection. Instead, 
we are only commanded to take perfection as our end. Following Aristotle, not the Stoics, 
Kant takes virtue to be a stochastic skill.5 (Kant’s conviction that we cannot achieve 
perfection is a premise in his—admittedly strange—argument for an afterlife.) Even 
understanding this, many moral theorists still allege that Kant places the bar for morality 
too high, arguing that a moral theory should have a category of the supererogatory (those 
actions that are good but not required by duty, and, hence, optional).6  
                                                
5 I am swayed by Jakob Klein’s argument, in his “The Stoic Archer,” that Aristotle, and not the Stoics, 
takes virtue to be a stochastic skill, (paper presented at Colgate University, February 2009).  
6 Supererogationists include J.O. Urmson, David Heyd, and Roderick Chisolm. 
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There is a genuine disagreement between Kant and the supererogationists, who 
believe that duty is something with which we should sometimes be finished and that 
morality is a constraint on our lives that is at the same level as other constraints, such as 
needing to work or complete other chores, and must be negotiated accordingly. Although 
it is the legacy of liberal Kantianism that inspires the supererogationist view of morality, 
as we have seen, Kant understands morality and moral duty in terms of virtue and 
character, which involves the orientation and development of all of our human abilities, 
and the purity of the good will. Character is something that underlies all of our choices; it 
is not a task among others, but the way that we approach all tasks, indeed, our lives in 
general. To ask that we might sometimes be able to leave off with moral duties is simply 
to misunderstand the nature of virtue. Morality is the condition for the worth of 
happiness, and our lives in general; it is always in effect.  
One might think that the meaning of “wide” and “imperfect” duties is that they 
are more lax.7 The opposite is closer to the truth. The duties to oneself and others 
corresponds to needs that are unending. Virtues are imperfect duties because it is 
impossible for a moral theory to tell us which people we should help when or exactly 
what needs to be done in order to perfect ourselves. Not only is it unfeasible for morality 
to give such specific advice, it is undesirable. Applying to our inner lives, virtues 
necessarily involve practical reason, in other words, being virtuous is a product of 
thinking for oneself. Of course, the importance of thinking for oneself does not mean that 
anything goes, but every situation will be different and negotiating those differences day 
                                                
7 Hill argues that Kant’s notion of imperfect duties takes the place of the category of the supererogatory 
because it involves the choice of when one is to fulfill them. As Baron suggests, this is not entirely true, 
because, we are always required to take them on as our maxims. In other words, we cannot choose to 
sometimes have a virtuous character and sometimes not. 
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by day is a necessary part of living and having relationships. Also the very idea of having 
an answer to the question of “how much?” should appear strange when we consider our 
normal, moral engagements. I cannot imagine a life wherein there is such an answer. It 
seems as though having an answer would entail that one stops feeling the unending need. 
Not feeling this need would undermine moral feeling altogether. We feel the needs of 
other people and ourselves, we are morally commanded to feel these needs, and, yet, we 
cannot address them completely, nor are we morally commanded to address them 
completely. Understandably, this is a hard reality for people to live with, and so having a 
good moral attitude is also necessary, and actually feeling that one is progressing and 
succeeding in helping other people helps to secure this good attitude. 
Kant does not offer guidance for deciding how much of our lives we should 
devote to others: in the Religion essay he states that we should do as much good as we 
can. Still, the fact that moral duty is always in effect does not mean that we must devote 
all of our time to cultivating self-perfection and promoting the happiness of others. 
Instead, it means that we must always be the kind of people who cultivate self-perfection 
and promote the happiness of others. Roughly speaking, we engage in the specific actions 
that contribute to fulfilling these wide duties when there is a need (in the case of self-
perfection) or (in the case of promoting the happiness of others) whenever we can. Again, 
I cannot possibly even begin to give a more specific answer to the question of “how 
much?” Still, even when we are not doing something that is easily recognizable as 
perfecting ourselves or helping others, the maxims to do so are still active in our lives, 
informing all other actions and values. A maxim is a guiding principle, and moral 
principles are the ones that should guide one’s entire character. Baron argues that Kant is 
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a rigorist when it comes to perfecting ourselves, i.e., that we should always strive to be as 
good as we possibly can, but that we are allowed more latitude when it comes to helping 
others.8 The duties that we owe to ourselves are more fundamental since a good character 
is a condition for carrying out the duty to help others, since it facilitates feeling the moral 
need and judging when and whom to help.9 
Does Kant’s statement that it is our duty to scrutinize ourselves in the effort to 
cultivate a morally good character lead to neurosis? Does it lead to a person who thinks 
about morality too much? Kant does not think that this is the case. First of all, as Baron 
points out, Kant criticizes the moral fanatic, i.e., the person who makes amoral choices, 
such as what color of shirt to wear, into moral choices. Clearly, some things require 
moral deliberation and others do not. The problem is that, in this age of global trade 
wherein our choices implicate us in thousands of relationships of which we are mostly 
unaware, we are confronted with legitimate moral questions everywhere we turn and we 
cannot possibly address all of them. The supererogationist would have us ignore these 
moral demands that are beyond our realm of reasonable achievement. This strikes me as 
hailing insensitivity and ignorance. Not only must we think for ourselves, but, more 
importantly, hammering on the question “but how much do I have to do!?” betrays a 
stingy character that is only interested in doing the bare minimum. It seems that we will 
always feel that there is more to do, and that we will always feel regret for not being able 
                                                
8 Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology, especially chapter 1, “Kantian Ethics and the 
Supererogatory” and chapter 2, “Minimal Morality, Moral Excellence, and the Supererogatory.” 
9 See Baron, “Latitude in Kant’s Imperfect Duties” in Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology. 
 183 
to do more.10 This feeling goes along with the earnest attempt to do all that we can and 
causes us to continue to ask ourselves whether or not we could possibly do more.11  
It is important that we not think that the person who is overfull with moral 
demands will necessarily lose hope. Continually questioning whether we could do more 
does not preclude some degree of moral self-satisfaction. While he may look neurotic to 
those who are morally apathetic, the Kantian moral agent will not be given to despair: 
indeed, it seems that working for progress is the only way to overcome despair. Making 
this point highlights the extreme difference between the moral notion of self-esteem and 
the popular, almost empty notion of self-esteem. True self-esteem is not only compatible 
with, but dependent on, self-scrutiny and self-criticism. Self-esteem is based on self-
respect, and self-respect, for Kant, is based on respect for the moral law.  
The term “self-esteem” has recently fallen out of favor in popular discourse 
because it has proven itself to express a hollow idea. Public psychologists used to argue 
that adolescents needed positive self-esteem, and now they argue that adolescents are full 
of themselves for having been praised without warrant. Aside from the fact that it is 
unhealthy for one to irrationally hate oneself, there is little content to the idea that one 
                                                
10 In my mind Oskar Schindler is shown to be a truly good person only at the end of the Holocaust when he 
emotionally regretted not having done more. This feeling is not a sign of neurosis; it is the pain of loss and 
vulnerability that is a necessary part of any love, in this case, the love of humanity.   
11 Urmson argues that if a moral code is not simple to understand and fulfill, people will give up on being 
moral entirely. Kant, on the other hand, holds that it is not the job of a moral theory to make decisions for 
people.  Kantian moral theory provides guidance for moral reasoning, not the answers.  If it is the case that 
our duties can be prescribed in their detailed specificity without us having to think about them, then it 
would be possible for people to only feel the call of duty when they should and will fulfill it.  On the other 
hand, in the real world, where the fulfilling of our imperfect duties requires practical reason, it makes sense 
that one’s feelings of moral compulsion will not always equate with one’s decision to act, both because 
good characters will feel a call to help others before they adjudicate whether or not such is the proper time, 
and because it is not possible to say when it is objectively morally required that we fulfill our imperfect 
duties.  Kant does not let us off the hook easily: if everyone does not feel that fixing the problems of the 
world is her responsibility, then there is no chance that moral progress will ever be made. Thomas Auxter, 
Kant’s Moral Teleology (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1982). I am indebted to Marcia Baron for 
this reference. 
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should like oneself: What is there to like? Kant, on the other hand, gives this notion its 
proper content, as he spends a considerable amount of time discussing its proper meaning 
and, since it must be conditioned by moral worth, its means of achievement.12   
Positive self-esteem has two meanings, or perhaps we might say, two-levels of 
ascending meaning for Kant. First, positive self-esteem comes from self-respect, or 
dignity, that one owes to oneself simply because one is human.13 Kant argues that we 
have a duty to respect ourselves, just as we have a duty to respect humanity in general. 
This general duty translates into our behaviors in a variety of concrete ways: “Be no 
man’s lacky.—Do not let others tread with impunity with your rights.—…Do not be a 
parasite or a flatterer” etc… (MM, 6:436).14  In addition, we should treat our bodies with 
respect, never as a mere means. This idea of self-respect is not just a feeling, but a 
command to treat oneself in certain ways: to stand up for oneself and not to harm oneself, 
for example. We owe this to ourselves no matter what. Humans, as persons, have value 
and deserve respect because they are capable of morally practical reason. It does not 
matter that a person may have behaved badly in the past, she is still capable of morally 
practical reason and has inherent value because of it.  
This orientation for self-esteem is important because it rescues us from trying to 
base our worth on comparisons with other people, on acquiring material goods, or the 
satisfaction of other inclinations. Judging that one is better than someone else in some 
respect, or accomplishing a certain goal, may make one feel good, but this feeling is 
                                                
12 Robert Gressis discusses two false notions of self-esteem that lead to the justification of evil: the idea that 
one is as good as or better than one’s peers, and the idea that one deserves a break from moral rules 
sometimes. Robert Gressis, “How to Be Evil: The Moral Psychology of Immorality,” in The New Kant, ed. 
Pablo Muchnik (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008). 
13 When discussing gratitude in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant refers to “real self esteem” as “pride in the 
dignity of humanity of one’s own person”(6:459).  
14 In his discussion of lust, Kant argues that “complete abandonment of oneself to animal inclination… 
deprives him of all respect for himself”(6:425).   
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destined to be fleeting since we must necessarily question the worth of this other person 
or of the goal. Unless we tie our self-regard to inherent moral worth, we will discover that 
it is flimsy. Self-respect is not something that we owe to ourselves because we are 
special, nor is our respect for other people contingent on their past behaviors or 
achievements. Kant argues that recognizing that all people have a moral nature and 
respecting them because of it will “dispel fanatical contempt for oneself” and make us 
realize that humanity can never be held contemptible (MM, 6:441). For example, Kant 
believes in the death-penalty because he holds that this punishment best respects the 
humanity of the criminal, not because he takes her to be contemptible. We might disagree 
about whether or not attempts at criminal reform can better demonstrate respect for 
humanity, but the point is that the punishment is addressed to the rational nature of the 
criminal, not his past deeds. We must always see ourselves in this light: in terms of our 
inner worth and potential, not in terms of performance or a comparison with other 
people.15  
The first level of self-esteem is a duty we owe to ourselves.16 The second is 
something that we achieve: we can feel good about ourselves when we have done 
something good. The second level of positive self-esteem follows from our duty to know 
and judge ourselves: when we succeed in behaving morally we feel our moral worth and 
esteem ourselves positively. To morally evaluate oneself is a duty: 
Impartiality in appraising oneself in comparison with the law, and 
sincerity in acknowledging to oneself one’s inner moral worth or lack of 
                                                
15 This suggests that children do not need activities at which to succeed in order to have self-esteem; it is 
failures, not successes, which offer the best opportunity for teaching real self-esteem. 
16 Kant seems to be self-contradictory on this point, arguing first that self-esteem is a member of the class 
of natural feelings that we cannot be said to have a duty to acquire (6:399) and then that “self-esteem is a 
duty of man to himself”(6:435). Furthermore, if we did not naturally respect the moral law, we would have 
no basis for self-respect (6:402). 
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worth are duties that follow directly from this first command to cognize 
oneself. (find this citation.) 
 
Kant argues that the concept of virtue contains the idea that the moral disposition is itself 
“sublime”(MM, 6:435). When we conceive of self-esteem in this way, it makes it clear 
that it is subordinate to morality; indeed, Kant argues that self-esteem contains the feeling 
of humility within it because it implies a comparison of ourselves with the moral law, in 
comparison to which one always feels subordinate.17 Self-esteem is closely related to that 
form of self-respect we feel for ourselves, not just because we are human, but because 
we, in fulfilling our duties, feel our own freedom, which makes us feel that we have 
worth.18 
Proper self-esteem is the ability to be satisfied with oneself and be at peace 
because one believes that one has accomplished that which is most important. It is like 
resting after a hard day’s work.19 Of course, this does not mean that we can ever be 
finished with the demands of morality, rather cultivating a good will ensures that we will 
be vigilant in pursuing virtue. Without this commitment we are plagued by thoughts of 
our inadequacy:  
[A] righteous person cannot think himself happy if he is not first conscious 
of his righteousness; for, with that attitude, the reprimands—which his 
own way of thinking would compel him to cast upon himself in the case of 
transgressions—and the moral self-condemnation would rob him of all 
enjoyment of the agreeableness that his state might otherwise contain. 
(CPr R, 116)  
 
Even for those without the virtuous attunement between happiness and morality, all 
people experience compulsion by the moral law, and therefore fulfilling it carries some 
                                                
17 Ibid. 
18 See the Critique of Practical Reason, 161. The second Critique is, in general, more focused on the 
dichotomy between inclination and duty, and so it casts self-esteem in terms of the special status that 
humans achieve through being aware of their ability to transcend, and so transcending, all inclinations. 
19 In the Anthropology, Kant describes resting after work as the “highest physical good”(§87). 
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amount of satisfaction for most people. In other words, even those people who 
irrationally hate themselves can hopefully gain the second level of self-esteem, although 
it will perhaps have a shaky foundation.20 
Kant’s contrast between happiness, a term that is not necessarily positive for him, 
and morally worthy happiness can help us to further understand the true meaning of self-
esteem.21 Self-satisfaction is distinct from happiness, the latter of which he believes is 
only a product of the fulfillment of the inclinations, if this is even possible.22 Kant argues 
that inclinations vary and the pursuit of their total satisfaction always only creates “an 
even greater void than one had meant to fill” (CPrR 118). Self-satisfaction, on the other 
hand, is a true respite, as it is based on proper moral understanding and estimation—the 
understanding that inclination is not as important as morality. Self-esteem is the feeling 
of being happy and deserving it; or, we might say that, self-esteem is the feeling of 
desert.23 It requires that we distinguish between the pleasing and the disagreeable, on the 
one hand, and good and evil, on the other.24 The second is an objective, moral evaluation 
that is not dependent on the amount of pleasure something promises to give. Kant argues 
                                                
20 Rather than facilitating activities at which children can succeed, then, it would be more conducive to 
positive self-esteem to have them practice doing good deeds. 
21 § 83 of the third Critique shines some particularly helpful light on Kant’s meaning of the word 
happiness: happiness is a “mere idea” to which we attempt to make ourselves “ adequate under merely 
empirical conditions (which is impossible.” It is a deficient idea that is necessarily tied to the short-
sightedness of passion/inclination and those things to which one is naturally/automatically directed. Even 
the term “true happiness” for Kant still involves the exclusion of moral reason. Why does Kant insist on 
defining happiness derogatorily? It seems as though it is merely a polemical device aimed at sharpening our 
attention to the sublimity of morality, as well as separating himself from other moral theories he deems 
flawed.  
22 Morally worthy happiness may be a strange idea.  What value is left for the fulfillment of inclination if 
one recognizes that the inclinations must be subordinate to morality? It seems that morally worthy 
happiness must assume some higher definition of happiness, not just the synthetic idea of happiness 
conditioned on prior moral goodness. Kant does consider the ways in which virtue is its own reward, and 
hence its own brand of happiness, as we shall see shortly. 
23 It may seem strange that someone deserves to be happy, and Kant more properly means that if one 
happens to be happy, then one can feel good about it.  Nevertheless, there is little difference between this 
and the idea that someone deserves to be happy.  It may seem strange, but it is also empowering.   
24 See Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 57-67.  
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that it is easy to get caught up in seeking our own happiness, as it often seems that 
“everything hinges on our happiness.”25 He agrees that we cannot fail to attend to our 
happiness, but that it is morally necessary that we also judge as moral beings and make 
moral worth the supreme condition of our happiness. This conditionality means three 
things: 1) that we limit our practical maxims when they conflict with the moral law, 
making it our meta-maxim to always follow the moral law above all others; 2) that we 
cultivate morally worthy practical maxims as our indirect duties require; and 3) that we 
judge happiness to be morally good only when we have also achieved moral worth. This 
last meaning is the highest definition of self-esteem: we can and should be pleased with 
ourselves only when we have achieved moral worth. Moral worth comes from having a 
good will; a good will is one that is determined above all by the moral law.  
Happiness and virtue are linked in the idea of the Highest Good, which is the 
object of pure practical reason.26 Virtue is the condition of the worth of happiness, but if 
we have virtue without happiness, our goodness is still incomplete. “The highest good of 
a possible world” consists in “happiness distributed quite exactly in proportion to 
morality”(CPrR 110). By “happiness” Kant means physical prosperity, not self-
satisfaction, and so he argues that the concepts of happiness and virtue are not 
analytically connected. In other words, there is absolutely no guarantee that good things 
will happen to good people. Kant faults the Ancients (the Epicureans and the Stoics) for 
linking the concepts of goodness and happiness, believing either that goodness makes one 
happy or that happiness is the good. Kant remarks that, unfortunately, neither is the case. 
                                                
25 Ibid. 
26 The Highest Good is the object of pure practical reason, but it is not the determining basis since pure 
practical reason must be determined by the form of the will alone, universality, and no object at all. This 
means that, when we have a good will, we do not act because we want to achieve self-esteem, but because 
we know that our action is the right thing to do, and self-esteem follows. 
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In solving the antinomy occasioned by the necessity of a synthetic connection between 
the two concepts, Kant argues that virtue cannot produce happiness in the world of sense, 
but it can produce happiness in the noumenal, rational world whereby we are pleased by 
our moral actions. Therefore, we see that, Kant describes the satisfaction that one 
receives from moral behavior in a number of different ways. Not only does one feel 
above the caprice of inclination and deserving of happiness, but moral behavior is, in a 
more direct sense, its own reward.27 We experience joy in acting morally because, as 
Beck puts it, “reason’s interest is being furthered.”28 It is difficult to explain the reason 
that we feel good when doing good, even if doing so is extremely difficult for us, but 
Kant holds that this is the case. If such is in fact the case, it would evince an underlying 
unity between reason and sensibility that Kant rediscovers in the third Critique under the 
name of aesthetic feeling and he, perhaps mistakenly, theorized in the first Critique, by 
making the categories of the Understanding dependent on the forms of intuition (as we 
discussed in chapter 3). 
Instead of causing stubbornness and neurosis, moral cognitivism facilitates self-
esteem. In taking morality seriously, one is inspired to scrutinize oneself in order to better 
perfect oneself and promote the happiness of others. Self-understanding, self-respect, and 
self-satisfaction are, perhaps, general pre-requisites for emotional intelligence as they 
stand in for general psychological well-being. Next we shall consider the ways that moral 
theory informs our emotional experience more specifically.  
 
                                                
27 Drawing an analogy with the Stoics, Beck calls this loftiness “equanimity”; Beck, A Commentary on 
Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, 230. 
28 Ibid., 229. 
 190 
II. Moral and Emotional Transparency; Moral and Emotional Universalism 
 Self-scrutiny implies some degree of self-transparency, and Kantian moral theory 
places a great deal of emphasis on transparency, but this fact is often missed because 
attention is diverted by the too fine of a point Kant puts on the injunction not to lie. The 
notion of personal and political transparency is used to explain universalism: capable of 
being seen and understood by all and capable of being acceptable to all are, in practice, 
related since things are kept hidden oftentimes because they are, or are feared to be, 
unacceptable. In the realm of emotion, pre-conscious ideas can be repressed either 
because they are unacceptable or because they are not fully understood. In both cases, 
making them conscious can help to promote the subject’s explicit goals and promote 
psychological harmony. Our need to make our emotions conscience parallels and is 
informed by the moral command to make sure that one’s intentions are publicizable. 
As is well known, the first formulation of the categorical imperative states that 
one must never act in such a way that one could not also will that the maxim of the action 
be a universal law (G 402). Kant explains this maxim test both through the notion of 
contradiction in willing (as with the refusal of charity example) and through the notion of 
contradiction in conception (as with the lying example). He unites these two different 
methods by identifying a universal law with a law of nature. Many of Kant’s critics have 
tried to punch holes in the categorical imperative, arguing that it is too vacuous to track 
morality’s requirements or that it cannot guide action at all. There are other means of 
expressing Kant’s notion of universalism if this one is not successful.29 In the end, the 
                                                
29 I agree that the many formulations of the categorical imperative are all intended to elaborate the same 
idea, but for the purposes of this section I focus on the first since it is most closely tied to Kant’s 
universalism. Nevertheless, we shall see that starting with any one articulation of the categorical imperative 
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notion of universality is best treated generally, not as a fool-proof method of directing 
specific actions, but as a general guide for moving from an amoral to a moral perspective.  
Habermas explains universalism thusly: universalism holds that moral 
justifications must be, in principle, acceptable to all rational beings.30 Habermas means to 
exclude reasons that cannot, in principle, be acceptable to all rational beings because they 
are based on something essentially particular to one person or group, such as faith or 
other shared practices. A stronger reading of this notion of “acceptability” posits that all 
rational beings would find the same thing acceptable, since they are all rational, and there 
is presumably a most rational answer, if it can be found. Arendt interprets Kantian 
universalism in the spirit of pluralism, arguing that universality is achieved by taking on 
many different perspectives. Arendt’s formulation expresses Kant’s emphasis on the 
importance of overcoming selfishness.31 
 Arendt draws a connection between the universal law formulation of the 
categorical imperative and, what she calls the “transcendental principle of publicness” 
from Perpetual Peace. Therein Kant states: 
All actions relating to the right of other men are unjust if their maxim is 
not consistent with publicity … [for a] maxim which I cannot divulge 
publicly without defeating my own purpose must be kept secret if it is to 
succeed; and, if I cannot publicly avow it without inevitably exciting 
general opposition to my project… the opposition which can be foreseen a 
priori is due only to the injustice with which the maxim threatens 
everyone. (PP 129-130) 
  
                                                
leads to the others and if we attempt to exclude the insights of the others, then the one becomes 
nonsensical.  
30 Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 120.  
31 Also see Robert Kane’s Through the Moral Maze for such an interpretation. 
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Publicly communicating an unjust maxim would arouse opposition and would therefore  
cause others to prevent the action. Kant believes that people have an innate sense of 
justice. Arendt quotes from The Strife of the Faculties:  
Why has a ruler never dared openly to declare that he recognizes 
absolutely no right of the people opposed to him? The reason is that such a 
public declaration would rouse all of his subjects against him; although, as 
docile sheep, led by a benevolent and sensible master, well-fed and 
powerfully protected, they would have nothing wanting in their welfare 
for which to lament. (SF 145)  
 
Describing Kantian morality as the “coincidence of the private and the public,” 
she goes on to demonstrate that Kant’s aesthetic philosophy also expresses this value of 
publicity.32 
Can we say that the “transcendental formula of public right” is a formulation of 
the categorical imperative? We can preliminarily note that the mere fact that it is political 
principle does not prevent it from also being a moral principle since true politics and 
morality cannot be in conflict for Kant: “for true politics must bend the knee before right” 
(PP 125). Kant calls the transcendental principle of publicness an ethical and juridical 
principle,33 and the categorical imperative, as we see from the Metaphysics of Morals, is 
also both an ethical and juridical principle.  
Kant’s “deduction” of the transcendental principle of publicness (TPP) is 
incredibly similar to his deduction of the first formulation of the categorical imperative: 
he abstracts from all the material aspects of “public right” and is “left with the formal 
attribute of publicness” (PP 125). Recall section One of the Groundwork, in which Kant 
                                                
32 Arendt, Lectures, 49. 
33 We have a moral duty to promote perpetual peace; yet this end is co-guaranteed by Nature or Providence.  
As with Kant’s regulatory notion of the afterlife offered in support of our moral duty to promote the 
Highest Good, he seeks to show the ways that progress towards Perpetual Peace is naturally attained in 
order to demonstrate to his reader that it is not a hopeless goal. 
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begins with the formal idea of lawfulness as such in order to derive the moral idea of 
lawfulness. There we have the mere idea of lawfulness and here we have the mere idea of 
publicness. A law is essentially public, just as morality is essentially the government of 
all people, or individuals as they are rational beings. The TPP seems closer to 
Habermas’s description of universalism than to Kant’s first formulation of the categorical 
imperative since one would keep something a secret because it is not, in principle, 
acceptable to all rational beings, while, on an ungenerous reading of the universal law 
formulation, we can universalize something that might not be explicitly acceptable to all 
and vice versa. The TPP may be seen as more stringent than the universal law 
formulation since it gives the capacity to dissent to others, and the universal law 
formulation allows the individual actor to decide herself, in conducting a thought 
experiment, on behalf of others. One would hope that the moral decision-maker would 
decide in the same way that the other person would if the latter were given a chance to 
speak for herself, but such is not necessarily the case, and so we might conclude that the 
TPP formulation actually does a better job of respecting autonomy than the universal law 
formulation of the categorical imperative because it requires real, not imagined consent. 
Nevertheless, both require a transition from the judgment of acceptability made by one 
person to the judgment of acceptability made by all. 
The TPP does seem to express the same sentiment as the categorical imperative, 
and it helps us to gain a more intuitive grasp of Kantian universalism. Universalism is 
best understood as requiring impartiality and the overcoming of selfish motives. Arendt 
argues that the “bad man,” for Kant, is the one who “makes an exception for himself.”34 
                                                
34 Ibid, 17. Arendt does not consider that we might hold ourselves to a higher, not a lower, moral standard. 
In theory there would be nothing wrong with this, but, as we shall see with out discussion of the equation 
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Universalism also implies an expanded perspective of one’s goals and motivations: they 
must be evaluated not merely as they relate to oneself but as they relate to everyone.  
To come to see one’s motivations from an expanded perspective is also the goal 
one takes up in understanding and evaluating one’s emotional experience. Hence, 
emotional intelligence involves something like emotional universalism. Both the process 
of achieving moral universalism and the process of achieving emotional universalism, if 
it can be called that, encourage us to take on other people’s points of view and to look at 
ourselves from the outside in, as happens in many forms of therapy. Moral universalism 
is itself a form of therapy: in striving for universalism we achieve a better understanding 
of our standpoint, and, in some cases, overcome it.  
Often emotions themselves harbor selfishness. Reflections on emotional 
selfishness are, perhaps, necessarily personal and idiosyncratic. Emotions are not 
specifically prone to selfishness because they are feelings and self-oriented (such an 
assumption would involve a confusion between “selfish” and “self-regarding” or “self-
referential,” since we often have feelings about our emotions), but they may be 
specifically prone to selfishness in that they are pre-reflective and, hence, selfishness may 
be more easily able to sneak by in them under the radar of conscience. Emotions such as 
angry resolve and vindictive bitterness, i.e., emotions that resolve to remain in the form 
of emotion and actively resist change and the calming force of reflection, may be the 
most likely vehicle for hidden selfishness. The reasons behind our emotions may be 
                                                
between self-respect and other-respect, there is something psychologically dangerous about it. Holding 
ourselves to a higher standard may imply either that we think we are better than others or that we think we 
are worse than others and must pay a penance. It may also imply that we are afraid to engage in moral 
discourse, not wanting to share or attempt to discover the inner moral life; such is a fear of intimacy.  
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repressed, as Averill suggests, for the very same reason that the despot will not announce 
publicly that he holds his subjects in sheer contempt.  
The phrase “emotional universalism” may be misleading because it sounds as 
though it implies that everyone should have the same emotions. There is reason not to 
adopt the term in the fact that Kant faults feeling for not being universal:  
The capacity for having pleasure or displeasure in a representation is 
called feeling because both of them involve what is merely subjective in 
the relation of our representation and contain no relation at all to an object 
for possible cognition of it (or even cognition of our condition). While 
even sensations, apart from the quality they have (of, e.g., red, sweet, and 
so forth) because of the nature of the subject, are still referred to an object 
as elements in our cognition of it, pleasure and displeasure (in what is red 
or sweet) express nothing at all in the object but simply a relation to the 
subject.”35   
 
Pleasure may not be a quality of a peach, just as respect is not a quality of the moral law, 
but there is still an objective, law-like connection between some experiences and some 
feelings or emotions. We might even say that a peach has the quality of being able to 
cause a certain taste when paired with human taste buds. The fact that the feeling is “in 
us” need not mean that it is disconnected from the object. (Kant, of all people, certainly 
understand this.) Adam Smith argues that proper emotions are those that would be had by 
a detached observer.36 This suggests that there is much that is common amongst 
emotional responses (within a culture) and that these commonalities ought to be seen as 
                                                
35 MM, 12. We might agree that emotions do not tell us anything about objects, but does that mean that 
they cannot be universal, or that they do not tell us anything about the “cognition of our condition.”  It 
seems patently false that emotions and/or feelings do not tell us about ourselves and our nature.  Therefore, 
we ought not interpret this clause in that way.  Instead, it seems that by arguing that feelings cannot be 
connected to the “cognition of our condition” he means to contrast them to feelings that claim universality 
because they refer to the human condition, or cognition in general, such as aesthetic feeling.  In the MM 
Kant also accepts that moral behavior yields moral feeling.  Such a feeling should also claim universality, 
as the moral law is itself universal (see CJ, 125). 
36 Theory of Moral Sentiments: I.1.5 and II.1.5 
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normative. Nevertheless, Smith’s account is backwards: it is not the commonality that 
grounds morality, but morality that grounds the affirmation of the commonality.  
 Focusing on the way in which emotions are subjective, private experiences also 
runs the risk of thwarting the call to universalism. In the last chapter we saw Kant warn 
against the desire to “play the spy upon one’s self,” which “is to reverse the natural order 
of the cognitive powers.”37 We can imagine someone who is protective of her emotions, 
someone who insists on her “right” to have them, since in the fact that she is having the 
experience she cannot be mistaken. Of course, feelings are subjective experiences, just as 
thoughts are, but feelings, just like empirical and cognitive experience, are imbued with 
inter-subjective content and reference to objective states of affairs. In many ways, another 
person may be able to understand our feelings better than we do or even can. For the most 
part, emotions are natural reactions to certain perceptions and events. There are a vast 
array of possible situations and events, but, for the most part, all people understand the 
law-like connection between them and emotions. In most cases, the person having the 
emotion is in the worst position to understand its causes, because emotions often involve 
their simultaneous denial. “Emotional universalism,” then, would just refer to coming to 
an understanding of the connections between one’s emotion and the universal laws that 
connect it to its causes. This understanding entails making the emotion transparent and 
grasping its cognitive content. If we have a “right to our feelings,” it is only in the sense 
that we have a “right” to think freely, but all to often such a “right” is understood as a 
license not to think at all.  
Still, universalism, in the case of emotion, is predicated on comprehension, not 
similarity. Emotions are not judged in a vacuum, but must be judged on their fit to the 
                                                
37 Anthropology, §4. 
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situation and by their intentions. The idea of emotional universalism should not imply 
that we must ask ourselves how another person would feel in our situation and take on 
that person’s imagined emotions instead of our own. A therapist should never 
instructively remark: “I would feel such and such” or “you should feel such and such,” 
even though he may suspect that the person does in fact feel such and such and refuses to 
admit it. Instead, therapy is a process of making one’s thoughts and feelings public for 
the purpose of gaining a more comprehensive, rational perspective on them. Again, the 
more rational perspective is not necessarily transcendent: often the goal of therapy is to 
better feel one’s emotions and to better serve their objectives or to resolve internal 
contradictions and forces of repression. Emotional universalism, then, should be seen as 
gaining greater perspective on one’s emotions, but not another person’s external 
perspective, but a perspective others might have if they were in the same situation. In 
other words, we should try to imagine, not a detached, but a very affected, spectator. 
Differing perspectives may bring to light a number of things: ways that we are limiting 
our experience of emotions, an understanding of the reasons that we have the emotions 
that we do or of the unconscious purposes our emotional habits serve, facts or feelings 
that our emotions imply, ideas in responding to our emotions, etc.  
So far is it from needing to control the emotions with reason that we might even 
say that it is the voice of the emotion that must be included in order to achieve 
universalism. Simply making our emotions self-transparent, or public, as if we were to 
explain them to someone, sets off the chain reaction of better understanding and 
evaluation. One of the most important psychological aspects of the progression toward 
emotional universalism is that, in taking on an external point of view, we are forced to 
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articulate and face our emotions in the first place. Many emotions are too painful to 
acknowledge. Acknowledging them makes us feel “needy,” childish, vulnerable, 
defective, etc. Some people feel as though they are hurting someone else by having a 
negative emotion. Acknowledging and accepting an emotion is often the most important 
step. 
Kant’s moral theory is often associated with the injunction not to lie, even for 
“philanthropic” purposes. This aspect of Kantian moral theory is often seen as one of the 
more extreme and less defensible propositions. Less often is it seen as a part of Kant’s 
general emphasis on transparency, as by Arendt.38 Kant’s insistence on truthfulness needs 
to be understood in the context of achieving self-knowledge and a transparent, 
democratic political community. In his discussion of moral character in the 
Anthropology, he argues that truthfulness is a necessary prerequisite to character:  
Briefly, as the highest maxim, uninhibited internal truthfulness toward 
oneself, as well as in the behavior toward everyone else, is the only proof 
of a person’s consciousness of having character. (A 295)39  
 
What does it mean to have “uninhibited internal truthfulness toward oneself”? This 
sounds rather intense, not to mention naïve after we have accepted the insights of Freud. 
Furthermore, Kant’s belief that we can never be fully aware of whether of not we have a 
purely good will seems to suggest that total internal truthfulness is impossible. 
                                                
38 Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982). 
39 It would be a mistake to conclude that Kant believes that we should share all of our thoughts with others.  
In the last paragraph of the Anthropology, Kant considers a hypothetical species in which there was no 
difference between thought and language.  He concludes that humans could not live in peace under such 
conditions, “hence, it is part of the original composition of a human creature, and it belongs to the concept 
of the species, to explore the thoughts of others, but to conceal one’s own” (A 332).  Kant suffers no 
shortage of tips for polite dinner party conversation that confirm this requirement that we limit the 
disclosure of thought.  Nonetheless, in the Anthropology, Kant goes on to write that this natural tendency to 
conceal leads to lying and that we must, as rational beings, combat this consequence.  Therefore, it seems 
that Kant leaves the distinction between polite concealment and lying up to the rational subject. 
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Nevertheless, the duty of self-knowledge requires that we strive for it. If we can never 
fully be aware of our intentions, then the effort to be truthful with oneself, or not to lie to 
oneself, needs to be constant. We need not be paranoid, but it is simply the case that self-
lies undermine morality, which, for Kant, is based on rational self-understanding. An 
intention of which we are unaware cannot be tested for its universality. Lying to oneself 
is just as immoral as lying to others because, not only do we not consent to our behavior, 
we are not fully responsible for it, because we have not completely chosen it. 
Furthermore, lying to oneself threatens the possibility of communication just as lying to 
others does. The goal of communication is community, and a community of rational 
beings is achieved through rational transparency; no communion can be reached if that 
which has been shared and understood is false.40 Self-transparency obviously helps in the 
ability to analyze emotion: we cannot come to understand emotions and thoughts unless 
we are first aware of them.  
Critics of Kant may be aghast at this point, objecting that moral universalism and 
emotional universalism are not correlates, but are mutually exclusive: moral universalism 
requires that we overcome all particularity, which includes all emotion. This criticism is 
based on a confusion about what it means to overcome particularity. Moral universalism 
requires that our action be, in principle, acceptable to all rational people, not that all of 
our actions become uniform. Similarly, emotional universalism does not mean that 
everyone must have the same emotions, but rather that I check to see if my emotions 
                                                
40 In taking up this Kantian idea, Habermas is often criticized for his naiveté, and I am opening myself up to 
this same set of criticisms. Of course, the goal of any given speech act can be a number of different things, 
especially the achievement of power over the other person, situation, or vis-à-vis the institution. I 
sympathize with Habermas and his political/psychological idealism, and I am here speaking normatively 
about our psychological/epistemological need for recognition on which other types of communication 
depend. Hopefully, I will be able to continue this topic and better defend these assertions in the future. 
 200 
would be judged acceptable by all rational/emotional beings. Nevertheless, it is necessary 
to formulate the precise meaning of this “rational acceptability” in the case of emotion, 
especially since emotional intelligence has been misunderstood, and taken to mean 
rational repression.   
Consider the following example of evaluating whether or not an emotion is 
universalizable: Suppose the maxim of my action is to refuse to make time to visit and 
comfort a grieving friend. The emotions at work here may be a sort of anxiety, guilt, or a 
transferred arrogance and defensiveness about the importance of whatever it is I happen 
to be doing instead. The goal of emotional transparency would be to understand the 
maxim that occasions the emotions, and the goal of emotional universalism is to evaluate 
it. This maxim is immoral because people need comfort in certain situations and my 
refusal to provide it makes an exception of myself: I cannot deny that people sometimes 
need comfort, nor that I will sometimes need it, but instead I want to opt out of being the 
one who must provide it, hoping that someone else will do the work for me. My maxim 
would necessarily be that everyone should provide comfort for grieving friends, except 
for me. The right thing to do, then, is to comfort my grieving friend. In this case, I will 
need to judge some of my emotions as defective, and I will need to judge some other 
emotions, such as fear about facing sadness, and sadness itself, as important and requiring 
expression and, in this case, behavioral therapy (the behavioral therapy involved in facing 
one’s fears so as to become more comfortable in certain situations). In this situation 
universalism is not blind to particularity: It does not matter that someone else, who is not 
friends with my friend, does not have the duty to comfort him. What does matter is that 
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anyone can see that I, being the particular person that I am and in the particular situation 
that I am in, do have a duty to behave thusly in this situation.  
  Emotions can be very idiosyncratic, and a product of very particular facts about 
oneself, such as the particular personalities of one’s parents. Therefore, there is reason to 
think, at first blush, that universalism conflicts with emotionality. Nevertheless, concern 
for oneself and idiosyncrasy are not inherently immoral; they are a problem only when 
they trump moral concerns. In other words, when we gain a more universal perspective 
on our principles and beliefs, we may decide not to overcome them or we might instead 
be strengthened in them. Emotions are a feature of individual experience, it is true, but so 
are beliefs, convictions, and principles. Universalism does not mean that all individual 
experiences must be traded in for some kind of universal experience, whatever that could 
possibly mean. Our particular experience must be evaluated from a universal perspective, 
but the universal perspective remains a view of our very individual and particular life. 
(This defense of Kantian impartiality will be re-addressed in the next chapter’s discussion 
of formalism.) 
Emotional universalism requires acceptance of the fact and demands of 
emotionality, just as moral universalism requires acceptance of the fact and demands of 
morality. There is an easy transition to be made from becoming more aware of one’s own 
emotional needs and the moral requirement of respect: self-denial often takes a moral toll. 
In other words, people often deny the needs of others because they deny their own needs; 
they also deny harms caused to others because they deny harm caused to themselves.41 In 
other words, recognizing our own emotions teaches us something about emotions 
                                                
41 Adorno and Horkheimer discuss this parallel in Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: Continuum 
International Publishing Group, 1976). 
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(although a proper theory of emotions also plays a role), and accepting our own 
emotionality promotes a feeling of equality. We become more emotionally literate in 
general and more comfortable with the fact that emotions are a part of humanity, as well 
as more sensitive to them.  
Moral sensitivity and emotional sensitivity, a component of emotional 
intelligence, merge at this juncture: one simply cannot promote the happiness of others if 
one cannot recognize emotional harm, and one cannot recognize emotional harm and 
health in others if one is closed off to this part of herself. We do sometimes, of course, 
help others in a more distanced way, by giving money, for example. We can imagine 
someone who only helps others in this way: this person would have no close 
relationships, since closeness necessarily entails emotional involvement. Although Kant 
had many close friends, his own life may have tended in this direction, falling short of 
virtue. We can see that having close, emotional relationships and sufficiently caring for 
the people with whom one is involved is morally necessary, and even the best way to 
direct the majority of one’s efforts in promoting the happiness of others. Kant’s argument 
for the reciprocal need to promote the happiness of others shows us that we similarly 
need to have and take care of close relationships since we all need them. Historically 
much of the moral work of caring for the psychological and physical health of people has 
fallen to women, but such an arrangement is not psychologically optimal and, in any 
case, no longer sustainable in our culture. Instead of having the cultural collapse of close 
relationships, all adults must take up the slack of providing the physical and 
psychological care that we all need. In this way we can see that emotionality is a 
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necessary dimension of universalizability, and a theory of emotional intelligence must be 
a part of moral theory.  
The duty to promote the happiness of others through caring emotionally is 
intimately connected to the duty to perfect ourselves. Kant’s illustration of universality, 
the Kingdom of Ends, posits a systematic unity of people who are treated both as means 
and as ends, and emotional universalism teaches us that our emotions are often the 
counterparts of other people’s emotions. When we are angry at someone, that person is 
perhaps angry at us too. When we are hurt by someone, it is sometimes the case that that 
person was previously hurt by something we did or that he or she is need of sympathy in 
another respect. This realization does not in any way diminish the importance of our 
personal emotional needs, but it helps us to see them as a part of a relationship and a 
community of reciprocal caring. When we become aware of the ways that our emotions 
are a part of relationships, we are forced to address other people’s emotions in order to 
fully understand and address our own. The result of this expanded, relational perspective 
is equality and shared respect. The same thing happens with moral judgments: in 
achieving a universal perspective we come to see others as equal to us, and we come to 
see harms as equally bad, no matter to whom they occur. In both cases, this expanded 
viewpoint makes us more mature. In ceasing to demand special status for our moral 
judgments, or for our emotions, we put ourselves in a position of equality with other 
people. It is this mutual recognition that makes us citizens of a common state. We realize 
that we are no more valuable, and, what is sometimes more important, yet related 
psychologically, no less valuable.   
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III. Overcoming Selfishness; Achieving Emotional Egalitarianism and Respect 
As we have seen, universalism requires that we recognize the equality between 
ourselves and others. The second formulation of the categorical imperative is better 
known for expressing this sentiment: act so as to always treat people (rational beings) as 
ends in themselves, never as merely a means (G 429). All of the formulations of the 
categorical imperative are meant to express different facets of the same idea, and, we can 
see that, overcoming selfishness plays as big of a role in respecting others and oneself as 
it does in achieving universality. Respecting other people requires that we grant them a 
right to govern themselves as much as we are able to govern oneself. Here more 
explicitly we see the inter-relation of self- and other- respect. Furthermore, respecting 
others requires that we engage them emotionally; in other words, it requires and is a part 
of emotional intelligence. 
The notion of selfishness plays a major role in Kant’s thought, an even bigger role 
than it should because he often assumes that selfishness and hedonism are at the heart of 
all immorality. We can follow Kant in recognizing the importance of overcoming 
selfishness in the cultivation of morality as long as we do not let it hinder the pursuit of 
self-respect, as Kant’s derogatory view of our “animal nature” sometimes seems to. 
Selfishness is by definition immoral. Kant often uses the term “self-love” (Eigenliebe) as 
a synonym for selfishness, and this is unfortunate. In our culture, “self-love” sounds more 
like the antidote to “self-hate” and akin to self-respect, which is a moral duty, not a 
temptation. Nevertheless, selfishness, for Kant, entails taking up the immoral maxim, 
privileging inclination over the moral law. As we have seen, all self-worth and self-
respect are premised on respect for morality.  
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To value the fulfillment of one’s inclinations over the moral law means that one is 
willing to trample another person’s (or one’s own) dignity in order to fulfill a personal 
goal. Disrespect might take the form of lying, coercion, or simply a failure to 
communicate with another person and gain consent. Selfishness can be understood as 
valuing one’s own goals too highly or as a failure to empathize and recognize the equal 
worth of other people’s goals. Selfishness can also result from a lack of skill, that which 
is informally referred to as “social skills.” Such skill is required for recognizing a person 
as a person in the first place. Without this recognition it is possible to live in an 
artificially de-populated moral world, caring about a few people perhaps, but ignoring 
many others. When others do impinge on the consciousness, they are seen as obstacles, 
not as people. Insensitivity to the demands of morality is then a kind of mental self-
centeredness.42 
Paradoxically, the antidote to selfishness may be proper self-esteem since it is 
often not the result of a puffed up sense of self, but of feelings of hurt and vulnerability 
that makes us justify selfishness as a fulfillment of the need for self-protection. As with 
the previous reflection on false notions of self-esteem, these thoughts may contribute to a 
moral psychology of evil.43 Indeed, a good part of the development of emotional 
intelligence may involve hammering out the difference between self respect and 
selfishness. Attempting to understand one’s emotions at all may strike some as selfish 
because it requires the devotion of time and attention to oneself. Nevertheless, this kind 
of self-centeredness is required by the duty to perfect oneself. Others may think that the 
fact that we have a privileged relationship to ourselves—because we have the 
                                                
42 See MM 6:450, §26. 
43 See Gressis, op. cit. 
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aforementioned duty to ourselves and not to others—means that Kantian universalism is 
flawed. Kant nowhere insinuates that having a privileged location, being one self and not 
another, is problematic. Kant does think that we have a tendency to take our self-
favoritism to an immoral length, but this does not mean that the mere fact that we have a 
different relationship to ourselves than we do to others is problematic. Indeed, it is the 
choice and responsibility that is enable by the first person perspective that makes 
morality possible. To know oneself and to be aware of one’s own special needs does not 
constitute selfishness. Again, it is all too often the case that not being able to recognize 
and vocalize her opinions, preferences, and needs causes a person to feel threatened by 
and shut out the opinions, preferences, and needs of others or to blame other people for 
the fact that she has failed to respect herself. In such a case, respecting others is clearly 
not even a possibility, even though the person might act very giving, even self-
abnegating.  
Kant’s distinction between promoting the happiness of others and promoting the 
perfection of others offers an interesting parallel here. We might be working very hard 
for others—indeed, devoting our entire lives to them—and still be failing to respect them. 
Kant argues that we have a duty to promote the welfare of others and a negative duty to 
promote their moral well-being. In other words, we must refrain from corrupting people 
but need not be their moral teachers: 
For the perfection of another human being, as a person, consists just in 
this: that he himself is able to set his end in accordance with his own 
concepts of duty; and it is self-contradictory to require that I do (make it 
my duty to do) something that only the other himself can do”(MM 6:386). 
 
In other words, it is practically impossible to promote the perfection of another person. 
Virtue is a function of moral awareness and individual choice. You might think that you 
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are promoting his perfection, as a parent might force a child to apologize to someone, but 
perfection is a function of the free will, and so such a parent is only precluding the 
possibility of virtue in this case (if the child is old enough to be virtuous). At this point, 
we might think that it is very strange for Kant to make such a distinction: if we cannot 
possibly promote another person’s virtue, then why should we worry about overstepping 
our boundaries? Is Kant himself going too far in writing about moral theory and giving 
lectures on ethics? As long as people are free to make their own decisions, giving rational 
arguments to sway them, should not be construed as over-stepping the boundaries of 
respect. The point is: What do we need to do in order to make sure that others are free to 
make their own decisions?44 The answer is: respect, and the psychological pre-requisite 
for this is self-respect. When we are sure about our individual worth and have are aware 
that we have tried and will continue to try to do that which we perceive to be the best 
thing, the thing that we have critically determined and continue to examine, then we do 
not need others to agree with us in order to prop up our convictions.45  Of course, 
everyone longs for the perpetual peace of the whole world agreeing with them, but we 
know that the only taste we will get of this is in the cemetery.  
Nevertheless, we must not fall into the trap of thinking that the duty to respect 
others amounts to a duty to leave them alone. The idea that all people have an inviolable 
                                                
44 Up to a certain point, since we obviously would not let someone freely choose to kill another person if 
we could prevent them. 
45 The question of how far to go in trying to affect people’s decision-making is one of primary importance 
for the cultivation of intellectual virtue, treating people as rational beings, and promoting the happiness of 
others. In striving to navigate the path between the paternalism of trying too hard to sway someone and the 
patronization of silently judging someone else’s reasoning to be flawed, we must take into consideration 
our relationship to the person and the role that we tend to play in it. Bowen family systems theory teaches 
us that we might be continually “overfunctioning” or “underfunctioning” in our reasoning capacity vis-à-
vis another person. In many ways, the task of negotiating the need to respect our own reasoning and the 
need to respect another person’s reasoning, while being in communication with each other through 
weathering conflicts, is the primary struggle involved in forging and maintaining relationships.  
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value is most commonly interpreted as yielding a theory of rights, less often is it analyzed 
in terms of the requirement to respect another person him or herself. Still, the “Doctrine 
of Virtue” takes the second formulation of the categorical imperative as its principle; 
there we see that the second formulation has positive implications for action. On the other 
hand, the first half of the Metaphyics of Morals, the “Doctrine of Right” is not based on 
the idea of respect, but the idea of universality. Interpersonal respect is an extremely 
difficult notion to hash out, especially because different relationships call for different 
forms of respect. Nevertheless, Kant goes a considerable distance in helping us 
comprehend what is morally required of us and a morally informed theory of emotional 
intelligence should take us even further.  
Treating people as equals, and overcoming selfishness, is a necessary prerequisite 
for respect. Kant sees respect as a keeping of one’s distance, not literally, but in the sense 
of remembering that someone else is different and separate from oneself. It is contrasted 
with love, the feeling that one is united with another, even though respect is also 
necessary for love.46 Kant argues that lack of respect takes the forms of arrogance, 
defamation, and ridicule.47 Even though Kant makes a strict distinction between moral 
rationality and pragmatic rationality, assigning moral worth only to the former, he 
believes that we must respect human rationality in general and the human ability to 
rationally direct one’s personal conduct. The moral requirement to respect the free choice 
of others has been called “the priority of the right over the good” in Kant’s ethics, 
meaning that it is more important to accord individuals with rights than it is to dictate the 
fulfillment of some notion of goodness. As recent interpreters have argued, this is an 
                                                
46 See MM, §46, 6:469-470. 
47 MM, 6:465. 
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overstatement, but the truth in this reading is that Kant cautions self-criticism and 
egalitarianism.  
Still, moral egalitarianism requires the we engage in moral inquiry, not just 
privately, but publicly, respecting the innate ability of all people to be rational. Kantian 
moral theory assigns significant moral importance to the equal ability of all people to be 
moral, and it is not good enough simply to leave others alone in order to treat people as 
ends in themselves.48 One must not simply refrain from coercing others while seeking 
one’s own goals, but one must work towards creating a moral community, a Kingdom of 
Ends, or cosmopolis, wherein everyone’s necessary ends are fulfilled. It is important to 
consider the ways that promoting the happiness of others and respecting others are two 
sides of the same coin: we cannot promote the happiness of others without doing so 
respectfully, and we cannot respect others without also taking their ends as our own.  
The second and third formulations of the categorical imperative establish positive 
moral ideals that are meant to guide relationships. These ideals are often simplified into 
negative constraints, but in order to be moral we must also engage in the moral inquiry of 
discovering how to respect rational nature, not just in ourselves, but in all people. Respect 
is not a given: we are not born knowing how to respect ourselves and others: we discover 
the needs that are universal as well as idiosyncratic. Along with the positive ends of 
promoting our own perfection and the happiness of others, the Kingdom of Ends 
formulation of the categorical imperative, contrary to the way that it is normally 
interpreted, lays bare the fact that communities are interrelated wholes. The idea that we 
might all pursue our own goals independently and respect others by leaving them alone 
                                                
48 This rights-based way of thinking about moral respect also has the consequence of making caring 
relationships (and the “private sphere”) amoral.  
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betrays a very psychologically and morally bankrupt notion of humanity. Of course, we 
often get caught up in pursuing fame or wealth (although even those goals do not allow 
for leaving others alone, although they most obviously involve using others as means), 
but cultivating virtue requires that we take morality seriously, improving ourselves, 
helping others, and promoting good relationships.  
A community of rational beings requires intellectual communication, which 
requires the ability to negotiate disagreement. Respecting people’s rational ability to 
make their own decisions cannot mean that we ignore their rational decision-making 
processes, treating rationality as though it were fundamentally private.49 Kant argues that 
the duty to respect the humanity of every person entails  
…a duty to respect a human being even in the logical use of his reason, a 
duty not to censure his errors by calling them absurdities, poor judgment 
and so forth, but rather to suppose that his judgment must yet contain 
some truth and to seek this out, uncovering at the same time the deceptive 
illusion … The same thing applies to the censure of vice, which must 
never break out into complete contempt and denial of any moral worth to a 
vicious human being; for on this supposition he could never be improved, 
and this is not consistent with the idea of a human being, who as such (as a 
moral being) can never lose entirely his predisposition to the good. (MM, 
6:463-464.) 
 
This is great advice for teachers, friends, lovers, parents, and political pundits: when you 
think that someone else it wrong, do not jump to character assassinations; try to figure out 
where they are coming from. As easy as this sounds, the psychological reality of 
engaging our intellectual opponents is intellectually and emotionally challenging, even 
exhausting. Nevertheless, accepting this challenge builds emotional intelligence, as some 
psychologists believe that emotional intelligence is itself akin to coping with stress and 
                                                
49 See Habermas’s argument for the priority of dialogical over monadological reason.  
 211 
negotiating conflict.50 Emotional intelligence is a component of rational discussion and 
moral discourse itself. Rational discussion does not mean that the emotions are excluded 
from the discussion. On the contrary, it means that the emotions are included and 
discussed in a healthy and enlightening way. Emotional egalitarianism dovetails with 
moral egalitarianism in the sense that both require an openness to the emotions of others. 
Such is the highest form of emotional intelligence: who could possibly project emotional 
health and intelligence more than someone who can speak respectfully and intimately 
with her intellectual opponents without becoming unnecessarily upset or causing offense? 
Such a person seems like a moral and psychological hero. Conflict is a crucible of both 
virtue and emotional intelligence, and, in this case, virtue and emotional intelligence 
seem to be the same thing.  
 
IV. Pure Practical Reason: The Integration of Emotion and Reason 
As we have seen, Kantian moral theory encourages self-scrutiny, which is the 
basis of self-esteem, emotional universalism, and openness to the emotions of others. 
Kant’s notion of practical reason also includes the idea that scrutinizing one’s 
motivations better creates a harmoniously integrated self, one in which one’s conscious 
motivations and one’s unconscious motivations and preconscious thoughts match up. In 
this way, virtue causes or occasions emotional intelligence. A cognitivist moral theory, 
like Kant’s, requires that morality be based on reasons; a cognitive theory of emotion 
holds that emotions are grounded in reasons. When we put the two together, as they are in 
Kant’s philosophy, we see that morality requires that we uncover the reasons implicit in 
                                                
50 See Zeidner, Matthew, and Roberts, What We Know About Emotional Intelligence (2006); and J. 
Ciarrochi and J. Mayer, eds., Applying Emotional Intelligence (2007). 
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our emotions and morally evaluate them. Furthermore, moral cognition, or thinking about 
the content of the good, is naturally linked to emotional cognition, since emotions are 
essentially evaluative. This joint emotional-rational cognition and evaluation creates a 
more harmoniously unified self, the result of which is, again, self-satisfaction as well as 
psychological ease.51 
For Kant, morality requires that we fulfill our moral duties, but in order to be 
moral, we must fulfill them not begrudgingly or accidentally, but because we actually 
want to, because we respect and value the demands of morality and value morality itself 
and want to do the right thing. Many of us will admit that we often find ourselves 
conforming to moral requirements because those requirements happen to be easy or 
beneficial at a particular time. Although we likely pat ourselves on the back anyway, this 
is not the expression of a genuinely good will. Virtue must instead be the achievement 
and expression of reflective reason. This requirement for reflection extends to emotional 
experience. 
Many moral theorists believe that Kantian moral theory entails that reason and 
emotion be pitted in opposition to each other when it comes to morality. It is definitely 
the case that with the term “inclination” (Neigung) Kant is usually thinking about a 
selfish inclination, and hence something opposed to morality. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, the term emotion (Affect) has a negative connotation for Kant, as does passion 
(Leidung). When Kant talks about emotions he assumes that they are pre-reflective, much 
less the product of rational reflection, as the feeling (Gefühl) of self-esteem is. 
                                                
51 Calhoun discusses possible conflicts between intellectual and experiential beliefs in her “Cognitive 
Emotions?” My discussion here about knowing oneself and acting consistently parallels her discussion 
about working towards aligning experiential beliefs with intellectual beliefs, thereby overcoming emotion-
belief conflicts.  
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Nevertheless, when emotions have been reflected on or are the product of rationality, 
they are praiseworthy. Kantian cognitivism calls for reflection and the production of 
rational emotions. Moral deliberation requires that we reflect on our moral feelings to 
discover and evaluate the reasons that are at their base. There is no reason to think that 
emotional reasons are more likely to be immoral or irrational than our more explicit 
inclinations. In fact, if the moral sense theorists are right, uncovering the reasons beneath 
our emotions, and more effectively acting on them, would help us to be better people.  
In order to fully illustrate the role that moral reasoning plays in harmonizing 
inclination and emotion with reason, we can contrast cognitivism with a moral theory 
that, to my knowledge, no one espouses, but many behaviors reflect, that we can call 
“affectivism” or “inclinationism.” Most often people base their moral decisions on their 
moods or on convenience. For example, I personally believe that I should offer people 
without means of transportation, e.g., hitchhikers and poor people, a ride in my car, 
provided I do not believe that doing so will endanger me. Although, I have fairly well-
developed reasons for this conviction, I hardly ever act on it. My actions in this case, 
either to offer a ride or not to offer a ride, are usually based on mood and inclination. To 
be fair, I have reasons for my failures in every case, e.g., I think that my husband might 
disapprove, I do not want to interact with a stranger, I want to do something else instead 
and without delay, etc…  Still, I do not honestly believe that any of these feelings or 
reasons outweigh the importance of helping others. When I do give a needy person a ride, 
it is because my affects support that outcome, e.g., I am feeling particularly leisurely 
because it is a sunny day and I am not in a rush, or I am feeling particularly loving and 
confident because some of the circumstances in my life support this mood. Hence my 
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moral decision, in this case, is based on my mood, not on my considered moral 
convictions. 
(This example sheds light on the interpretive debate concerning Kant’s examples 
of acting out of duty as opposed to acting in conformity with duty. Many who defend 
Kant argue that, with his example of the person continuing his life against all inclination, 
Kant only means to say that it is in the cases where duty and inclination conflict that we 
can be sure that we are acting from duty. When they are not in conflict, we might still be 
acting from duty, it is just difficult to tell. My example suggests that it is likely the case 
that when inclination and duty coincide we are acting out of duty less often than we 
would like to think.) 
It may seem that someone who unapologetically embraces affectivism is more “in 
touch” with her emotions. My argument is the opposite: that if I were in fact to act on 
principle more often, or all the time, my behavior would be more emotionally intelligent. 
I implicitly value my cognitive (and moral) reasons more than my affective (or amoral or, 
in some cases, immoral) reasons for acting. I feel that the cognitive reasons better 
represent my ideal (or true) self and that affective causes merely represent a fleeting 
whim and a failure to live up to my ideal. When I act on principle, I am pleased with 
myself, and I perceive my failure to so act as a personal flaw, such as cowardice.52  
A cognitivist moral theory promotes emotional intelligence by encouraging us to 
formulate and reevaluate our intellectual principles. Inclinations, even though Kant 
                                                
52 Of course, it is possible that I have merely held this moral ideal unthinkingly for quite some time and that 
it is not really well thought-out and does not really include all of the considerations I would like it to 
include.  In that case, I should test my belief by evaluating the reasons that I have for it. Even if my 
principles are wrong, acting on them helps me to evaluate them. Perhaps, in perpetually offering rides to 
people, I begin to feel taken advantage of.  I therefore begin to doubt whether or not it is good to be 
charitable in this way all the time, and perhaps I decide to qualify, and thereby alter, the principle. 
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defines them as habituated desires (which is close to the definition of passion, as we saw 
in chapter 3), are often more mutable than our more considered principles. When we act 
on these unstable inclination, we do not learn anything about ourselves, or, rather, 
anything about our beliefs. We may discover that we are much more likely to listen to an 
upset friend after we have had a cup of coffee in the morning, but we cannot discover if 
we should have the coffee in the future, if listening to the friend is something good to do. 
We may discover that we like pleasing people by giving them compliments, but without 
an understanding of the principle, or moral reasoning, behind this action, we cannot test 
whether or not this pleasure is something we value, something we should strive for, and if 
it is better or worse than any other kind of pleasure. On the other hand, when we assert a 
conviction and act on it, we are then in a position to learn from our action. If we do not 
feel like following through, we can scrutinize this feeling. Is it because we are having 
trouble seeing ourselves as strong and happy? Or is it because we have some real 
misgivings about the act that might cause us to revise our principles? Either way, we 
learn about ourselves and are pushed to improve.  
Taking morality seriously is, in a sense then, taking ourselves seriously. 
Emotional intelligence appears to require that we act with conviction, which is a part of 
having a strengthened sense of self. We can see this in the fact that the failures to know 
what one wants and to act on this knowledge are related to co-dependent relationships 
and general malaise. The ability to make choices and stand by those choices, because we 
believe them to be better than the opposite, is a large part of the ability to engage in 
emotional commitments, respecting ourselves and others. These commitments are 
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necessary for and expressions of psychological health but are also themselves, in turn, 
often morally required. 
The Aristotelian picture of virtue paints it as something that should become habit.  
Kant rejects this description of virtue because he believes that virtue always requires 
reason. Virtue is not something that we can achieve once and for all; our principles must 
be “continually purified” (MM, 6:383). Virtue is “always in progress and yet always 
starts from the beginning” (MM, 6:409). Since Kant describes inclination as habituated 
desire, basing virtue on habit is akin to basing it on inclination, for Kant, which is 
practically a contradiction.53 Of course, Kant does not believe that we must only act 
begrudgingly in order for our actions to count as virtuous. Critics of Kant object that he 
describes mere continence not virtue, but Kant’s statement that virtue requires constant 
thought, or practical reason, does not mean that he believes that virtuous actions will 
always be difficult for the virtuous person.54 
Kant’s rejection of virtue as habit demonstrates the importance he places on 
rational reflection for virtue. To make virtue unthinking, or automatic, is to rob it both of 
its integrative function and of the merit of rational comprehension of the moral law. 
Making virtue based on habit is like leaving it to the immediacy of sympathy, or another 
“moral sense,” as moral sense theory does, leaving it in the untrustworthy sphere of 
                                                
53 See MM, 6:212. 
54 For the articulation of this criticism, see Annas, The Morality of Happiness, 53. As Baron notes, in 
English, both the words “duty” and “obligation” carry a negative connotation. Baron speculates that for 
many Americans the term duty is associated with military duty. Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost Without 
Apology, 16. It is hard to imagine a use of the word “duty” that is associated with something we actually 
want to do. Kant is well-known for contrasting duty and inclination, and it is this contrast that calls into 
suspicion his insistence that the notion of duty must be at the heart of moral theory. As Paton points out, “in 
the very idea of duty there is the thought of desires and inclinations to be overcome.” (Paton, The 
Categorical Imperative, 46.) Kant’s definition of virtue similarly implies this kind of internal conflict. Yet, 
Auxter points out that the German Verbindlichkeit (obligation), carries a more positive sense of 
boundedness, as “moral … activity is the basis for the tie we feel with others.” Auxter, Kant’s Moral 
Teleology, 163-164. 
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impulse. The pursuit of self-perfection involves the cultivation of the powers of the 
understanding and will “so as to satisfy the requirement of duty”:  
A human being has a duty to carry the cultivation of his will up to the 
purest virtuous disposition, in which the law become also the incentive to 
his actions that conform with duty and he obeys the law from duty. (MM 
6:387.) 
 
In short, the very ideas of the good will and of virtue imply that one wants to be good. 
Does Kant believe that, even though we want to be good, it will always be difficult 
because we will always harbor selfish inclinations?55 Although Kant’s language 
sometimes seems to suggest this, there is no real reason to believe that it is true. Our 
discussion of the original predisposition to good and evil in human nature in chapter 6 
should dispel this idea. Still, virtue, as an expression of the good will, is essentially a 
project of reason, and the idea that we might one day fully achieve virtue and not have to 
think about it any more is, again, a suspicious wish.56  
Virtue is a process of continual rational analysis and decision-making. Pure 
reason is necessary for grasping the moral law, but, because they are wide duties, duties 
of virtue must admit empirical information. Nevertheless, there is no reason to understand 
the word “rational” to mean without emotion. Reasons can be emotionally charged, just 
as emotions presuppose reasons. We must think with emotion, about emotion, through 
emotions, and let our emotions have a say in reason. Any thing less than this is irrational. 
Just as it is obvious that we will always have emotions that we need to experience and 
                                                
55 Many defenders of Kantian ethics argue that moral goodness need not, and indeed should not, be a 
conflict between reason and desire, because a truly good person will achieve a kind of total discipline in 
which desires no longer conflict with morality (See Paton, The Categorical Imperative, 46). I think that 
there is also merit in not overlooking Kant’s language of struggle. 
56 This wish is then easily retro-projected onto Ancient Greece, with its supposedly pre-reflective version of 
virtue, as a kind of paradise lost. It is, of course, ironic that we have the Germans to thank for this variety of 
myth making. See George S. Williamson, The Longing for Myth in Germany: Religion and Aesthetic 
Culture from Romanticism to Nietzsche (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
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think through, Kant is convinced that we will always have inclinations that practical 
reason will need to evaluate and adjust. Kant portrays this process as one of struggle, but 
we will not see this as offensive, if we keep in mind that it is often in fact the case that 
confronting one’s selfish tendencies or resistance to acknowledging certain emotions is, 
in fact, a struggle. It is necessary to recognize the emotional reactions and difficulties that 
are an intimate part of the human condition. Of course, our inclinations are not always 
selfish, as Kant would sometimes have us think, and our emotions are, of course, not 
always based on flawed thinking, but still inclinations and emotions need to be evaluated 
and integrated with conscious reason and conscience. Without this integration, our 
emotions are blind and our cognition empty, or, at least, deficient.  
Allison discusses a sense in which the work of practical reason is psychologically 
integrating: he likens practical reason’s ability to unify inclinations under a maxim to 
speculative reason’s transcendental unity of apperception which unifies all experiences 
under one consciousness (the “I think”).57 Practical reason decides which inclinations it 
will take as motivating forces (see the discussion in chapter 6 of the “Incorporation 
Thesis”). As Sullivan describes it:  
To allow oneself to be ruled by freedom-destroying inclinations is the 
essence of vice. Pure practical reason thereby requires that we test our 
maxims to make sure that they are permissible. Freedom requires us to 
bring all our capacities and inclinations under the rule of reason, but to do 
so calmly so as not to rely unwittingly on inclinations for motivation.58   
 
Nevertheless, there is a difference between mere psychological coherence and moral 
rectitude. Many recent moral theorists argue that immorality is the same as psychological 
                                                
57 Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 40.  
58 Roger Sullivan, Introduction to Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996). 
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incoherence: for example, Velleman makes such an argument.59 Gewirth argues that to 
deny others the right to freedom and well-being is to deny our own such rights and hence 
ultimately threatening to the self.60 The idea of squaring reason and inclination is 
common in moral theory, as is the idea that morality and psychological health are related.  
Working in the Kantian tradition, some theorists interested in the notion of 
autonomy have developed it into the more robust idea of reflectively endorsing one’s 
volitions, in the sense of discovering and acting on one’s “true” desires. Frankfurt has an 
“authenticity” interpretation of autonomy, holding that autonomy requires that one’s 
second-order desires identify with one’s first-order desires.61 Wolf characterizes 
Frankfurt’s theory of freedom as a “Real Self Theory” because he believes, along the 
same lines as Kant’s notion of autonomy, that an action is free if it issues from the true 
self.62 The self of pure reason is our most true self, for Kant, but for Frankfurt the true 
self is more immanent to our desires. We may or may not identify with our desires, but 
those desires that best express the self are those with which we are most involved, to the 
point of having, what he calls “volitional necessity.”63 
Both the means of and motivation for these types of arguments are strange to me.  
A fuller discussion of Kantian autonomy will follow in chapter 6, wherein we will see 
that this tendency to break Kant’s equation between autonomy, pure reason, and the 
categorical imperative is common. Whether or not these attempts to prove that self-
coherence and moral worth are the same thing are successful, they overlook the necessary 
                                                
59 Vellman (1989), 306. 
60 Gewirth (1991), 74. 
61 Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” in The Importance of What We 
Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
62 Susan Wolf, Freedom within Reason (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
63 Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, 86. 
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content of moral reasoning, i.e., the categorical imperative. At the level of morality, 
reason unifies inclination according to the thought of pure lawfulness, or universality. 
Virtue also requires that we adopt virtuous maxims, viz., to perfect ourselves and 
promote the happiness of others. Morality, therefore, requires a higher level of reflection. 
Not only do we consciously decide what we are going to do, as Allison suggests, but we 
question whether or not it is really the right thing to do. Moral deliberation requires that 
we reflect on our emotions, discover their cognitive bases, and then try to square those 
cognitions with comprehension of the moral law, and process of moral deliberation has 
the effect of promoting psychological health. 
It is true that desires and emotions often contain or accompany self-referential 
evaluations, but it seems mistaken to suggest that goals are important because we care 
about them. They are important to us because we care about them, but that conclusion is 
tautological and we need to ask the question “should this be important to me?” Herman 
argues that we ought to be critical of our desires and ends, especially in our intimate 
relationships, but we should not think that moral deliberation must take us away from 
these ends. Instead, it is a part of them, and enhances them.64 On the other hand, 
sympathy and caring can sometimes be false moral impulses: we also need to evaluate 
our emotions with an eye to their effectiveness in promoting good outcomes.65 In some 
ways, as Solomon polemically argues, emotions are acts, and as such, they themselves 
should be morally evaluated. Our feelings about our emotions (or higher-level beliefs) are 
a good place to start when seeking to evaluate our emotions, but moral evaluation must 
                                                
64 Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment, 197-198. 
65 See Diane M. Williamson, “Familial Duties and Emotional Intelligence: A New Foundation for Theory 
and Practice,” in Family Ethics, ed. Stephen Scales, Linda Oravecz, and Adam Potthast (forthcoming). 
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go farther. It is sometimes necessary to bring in transcendent standards, e.g., universality 
and respect, in order to more fully scrutinize and evaluate ourselves.  
Someone might object that in refusing certain inclinations, we are not unifying 
inclination and reason at all, but repressing one, yielding nothing but internal strife. 
Someone might also object that what I am describing is not really a moral phenomenon, 
but simply the product of conscious reflection, and Frankfurt’s notion of second-order 
identification is a kinder and gentler, as well as more truly integrating account of the 
integration of reason and emotion. The retort to both of these suspicions is linked to this 
conviction that consciousness of duty, or compulsion under the moral law, is a “fact of 
reason” and that morality is a natural human calling. Kant calls the moral law a “fact of 
reason.” In other words, we are conscious of moral constraint.66 At the most foundational 
level of his argument Kant appeals to common sentiment.67 People do, in fact, feel the 
authority of morality (a psychological examination of the problems associated with 
denying one’s moral feelings demonstrates this). We might amorally reflect on our 
emotions and integrate them with pragmatic reason, but there is no guarantee that we will 
feel any real identity to this integrated consciousness. On the other hand, there is a sense 
in which Kant’s notion of duty promises to uncover our true selves. The “purity” of moral 
reason refers not merely to the exclusion of empirical determination, but also to its 
superlativeness.68 Our moral/rational consciousness is also the truth of our emotions. 
While we cannot simply assume that our inclinations gracefully bow out as soon as we 
                                                
66 Baier argues that to recognize a reason as a moral reason and yet not act on it is to act irrationally. Baier 
(1978), 249. 
67 Although Kant does try to justify the possible purity of practical reason by arguing that the solution to the 
third Antinomy relies on it See Beck, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, 170-175. 
68 O’Neill argues that all reason, speculative and practical, is subordinate to moral reasoning. Onora 
O’Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989). 
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choose not to follow them, there is no reason to think that they are insensitive to reason or 
essentially stubborn and fixed.69  
We need not think of the struggle between reason and inclination as a violent one. 
Just as one meaning of discipline implies force and punishment, there are also other 
means of discipline that are loving. When we talk of disciplining children we often think 
of spanking—perhaps this the reason so many parents are afraid to discipline—but 
instead of beating down our inclinations we might just as easily talk of helping them 
ascend to the level of principle through reason. Munzel argues that, since Kant believes 
that we have a natural consciousness of our moral capacity and that his theory of human 
nature shows that it is responsive to moral direction; it does not need to be dominated.70 
Indeed, Kant discusses reason much more frequently than he discusses struggle, and yet it 
is often easy for us to overlook the normal means by which reason relates to inclination, 
namely by reasoning. Instead, the notion of discipline that most of us tend to have in 
mind is decidedly irrational.   
In the “Critique of Teleological Judgment,” when referring to man as the ultimate 
purpose of nature, Kant discusses discipline first as the ability to deny oneself, “the 
liberation of the will from the despotism of desire” and then as the ability critically reflect 
on one’s connection to the pursuit of pleasure: 
[W]e allow ourselves to be fettered by the impulses that nature gave us only as guides so 
that we would not neglect or even injure our animal characteristics; whereas in fact we 
are free enough to tighten or to slacken them, to lengthen or to shorten them, as the 
purposes of reason require. (CJ §83) 
                                                
69 Nevertheless, admitting that the emotions are not irrational means that they too must play a role in moral 
deliberation, although not as blind intuitions, but as the markers of well-reflected reasons.  We might liken 
this kind of back and forth characteristic of moral deliberation to Rawls’s notion of the reflective 
equilibrium between moral theory and experience. 
70 Felicitas G. Munzel, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1999), 305. 
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Next Kant discusses the disciplines of art and science for their role in initiating man into 
the realm of his higher purpose. In true Aristotelian fashion, Kant then argues that the 
final purpose of existence “is a purpose that requires no other purpose as a condition of 
its possibility”(CJ §84). Making use of his notion of purity, which will be further 
discussed in the next chapter, Kant implies that moral “unconditioned legislation 
regarding purposes” constitutes the purpose without a purpose or the unconditioned 
condition. Although discipline is at first defined only negatively, in the end it looks to 
moral ends to give it content and inform whether or not we must “tighten or slacken” our 
pursuit of pleasure.  
Grounding morality in a fact of reason has important consequences for our 
discussion of emotional intelligence: it entails that the moral law will always be that 
principle to which we subjectively give the most credence, and if it turns out that we are 
following false moral principles, our confusion should be reflected in a lack of 
endorsement by our own internal moral sense. Kantian moral theory offers us guidance, 
but it cannot think or feel for us. Instead, it acknowledges the real, subjective moral 
situation in which we find ourselves.71 Kant’s notion of conscience should not be 
understood as an immediately transparent internal knowledge, but, again, something that 
requires self-scrutiny and moral deliberation. 
 
The previous section, and this chapter overall, helps us to see that we should not 
always understand moral psychology in opposition to moral theory, as though one is 
                                                
71 Moral theory often errs in transcending this reality, which is also an exigency.  In taking over the 
question of “what should be done?” from the subject, it removes itself from the feeling that something 
needs to be done. Allowing itself to get lost in theoretical debate, it forgets that moral consciousness is not 
only conative, but also a consciousness of compulsion. 
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empirical and the other is normative. The notion of emotional intelligence shows us that 
psychology relies on normativity, and moral behavior must itself be understood 
psychologically. Along these same lines, one might notice in this chapter a lack of 
discussion about specific moral dictates prescribed by the categorical imperative and 
consider it strange, since it is thought that moral theory is supposed to tell us what to do. 
Perhaps, on the other hand, the common criticism that the categorical imperative cannot 
truly guide action is not a criticism at all, but one of the merits of Kantian moral theory. I 
do think that the categorical imperative is sufficient as a principle for guiding reflection; 
nevertheless, guiding reflection should not be misunderstood a prescribing action.72 Kant 
makes this clear in a number of places, most notably with his inclusion of “casuistical 
questions” in the “Doctrine of Virtue” that conspicuously leave out the answers. By 
making morality a function of reason, Kant ensures that moral reasoners will always feel 
the responsibility to think for themselves and will not accept the conclusions of others 
second-hand or be side-tracked from moral action by moral theory.  
In the beginning of this chapter I stated that I agree with the contention of moral 
cognitivism that there really are moral truths. Even the reader who thinks of herself as 
taking morality seriously may wince at the thought that people will inevitably disagree on 
moral matters and these conflicts are only worsened by stubbornness. Moral cognitivism 
must maintain space for people to admit that they are wrong and learn from their 
mistakes. I have perhaps strayed from the spirit of Kantianism by suggesting that one’s 
moral principles are and should be open to revision. Kant never suggests that one can be 
mistaken in her consciousness of the moral law, and he follows the traditional 
                                                
72 See John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2000), 148-149.  
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interpretation of conscience, viz., that it is right. This is where I part company with Kant. 
Nevertheless, after our long discussion of self-struggle and self-scrutiny, we cannot see 
this as a serious disagreement. If we agree that there is a moral law, the addendum that 
we must continually work to find it might be considered minor. It is likely that my 
approach is related to my conviction that the emotions and reason are more enmeshed and 
his is related to his assumption that they are the product of different faculties: if emotion 
and reason are merely different modes of that which is essentially the same 
consciousness, reason cannot be viewed as a pure and unchanging grasp of lawfulness. In 
order to achieve universalism, we must take on another person’s, or many other people’s, 
perspectives, using the same reason that may have been clouded in the first place. In 
theory, universalism yields the most rational and correct viewpoint. In practice, the goal 
of truth is reached only circuitously, if at all, but this does not tarnish the goal itself. 
In the Anthopology, Kant gives three guidelines for achieving wisdom: “1) Think 
for yourself; 2) (in communication with other people) Put yourself in the place of the 
other person; 3) Always think by remaining faithful to your own self” (A §43). He 
reiterates these rules a while later and phrases the third one thusly: “Always think in 
harmony with your own self”(A §59). Here we have a nice summary of the points that 
have been covered in this chapter: scrutinizing oneself is akin to thinking independently, 
albeit in a way that is directed toward oneself; universalizing one’s emotions and maxims 
involves putting oneself in the place of the other person, or, more generally, scrutinizing 
oneself further requires thinking in communication with other people; lastly, practical 
reason involves thinking in harmony with oneself.  
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Although the emphasis in Kant’s philosophy and within Kant scholarship on 
principle and consistency may sometimes overshadow the importance of constantly 
striving toward moral ideals, this chapter has hopefully painted a picture of practical 
reason that is more comfortable with flux and revision. Indeed, in a world where “ought” 
only implies “can try,” we must sacrifice having our actions match up with our principles 
in order to ensure that we can have some grasp on correct principles in the first place. The 
idea of being in harmony with oneself is more hermeneutically helpful than the 
monotonous consistency with which Kantian deonotology is most often associated. This 
is the Pythagorean definition of the healthy soul, which is the goal of both Kantian moral 
theory and the psychology of emotional intelligence.  
In concluding her study of the Metaphysics of Morals, Gregor remarks that “even 
a cursory reading of [it] reveals that Kant’s systematic application of the categorical 
imperative is a far different procedure from that usually attributed to him.” She argues 
that logical consistency is not the criterion of permissibility; instead “a teleological 
consistency between our maxim and our objective, rational ends” is morally required.73 In 
other words, having a virtuous disposition is half the battle. We must have an intellectual 
grasp of moral duty, and we must act on it. As with our discussion of the mistake 
involved in comparing emotional intelligence with the innateness of cognitive 
intelligence, Kant defines virtue in terms of disposition and then precludes the possibility 
of knowing whether or not one does in fact have a virtuous disposition. Virtue, like 
emotional intelligence, must be understood in terms of behavior. It is perhaps the 
abstraction of intention from behavior, as well as neglect of Kant’s theory of virtue, that 
has led moral theory to detach itself from personal relationships and the understanding of 
                                                
73 Gregor, Laws of Freedom, 203. 
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psychology that is required for having them. Reconciling moral theory and moral 
psychology through the moral notion of emotional intelligence will hopefully make moral 
theory more useful and psychology more healthful. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE CONTENT OF KANTIAN “FORMALISM” 
 
 My discussion, in chapter 4, of the emotionally enlightening aspects of Kant’s 
moral theory may have left some readers bewildered. Kant is seldom praised for his 
moral psychology. Quite to the contrary: he has become contemporary moral theory’s 
favorite whipping boy. Even while the Stoics are respected for their theory of emotion, 
while Kant is criticized as ascetic, un-self-aware, even schizophrenic.1 Of course, critics 
of Kant are not without textual ammunition. Kant, like most philosophers, tends to think 
in dichotomies and prefers distinctions to analogies. One dichotomy in particular 
pervades Kant’s opus and seems to preclude a cognitive theory of emotion, making my 
argument that Kant’s moral theory can aid in cultivating emotional intelligence appear 
paradoxical at best: namely his dichotomy between reason, which is often described as 
“pure”; and “sensibility,” which pertains to the empirical, or a posteriori, elements of 
experience. In the context of Kant’s moral theory, this opposition makes its appearance, 
and draws the most criticism, as what is referred to as “Kantian formalism.” Kantian 
formalism has a long history of both critics and defenders. My strategy is different: I 
argue that Kant’s ethics should not be understood as a “formalism” at all and that Kant’s 
remarks about the form of the will and formal principles are better interpreted as a 
restatement of his universalism. To insist on calling Kant’s ethics “formal” is to reify a 
dichotomy that his moral theory can better do without. 
                                                
1 For example: Nussbaum’s Upheavals of Thought and Stocker’s “The Schizophrenia of Modern Moral 
Theory.” 
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 Kant’s moral theory is often called a “formalism,” but the explanation for this 
label is just as often confusing. According to Habermas, formalism requires that moral 
judgments take the “form of unconditionally universal ought statements.”2 This 
explanation fails to differentiate formalism from universalism, i.e., the requirement that 
moral judgments hold for all people. Indeed, when we look closely at Kant’s references 
to form in his practical philosophy,3 we see that his formalism boils down to nothing 
more than a restatement, or attempted deduction, of his universalism. In this chapter I 
examine the variety of ways that Kant attempts to account for the formalism of moral 
decision-making. I argue that the many attempted distinctions between form and matter—
or content, or ends, consequences, incentives, purposes, effects—all fail. 
Furthermore, Kant’s language of form, or the exclusion of the ends from the 
determination of the will, becomes unsustainably conflicted when he introduces his idea 
of the necessary ends of morality. 
Kant’s ethics is, in fact, weaker because of its attempt to explain morality in terms 
of formalism. Not only does Kant make himself vulnerable to the criticism of coldness; 
the argument for formalism also leads him to overlook the distinction between moral and 
pragmatic principles, since both can be formal (a point taken up in the next chapter).4 
After my consideration of the many possible ways of explaining formalism, I discuss the 
connection between the attempted formalism and the tendency to construe the good will 
as merely a gatekeeper of desires that prevents certain desires from being effective. 
Instead, the good will should be seen as itself a desire and the creator of an aggregate of 
                                                
2 Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 64. 
3 It is possible that Kant introduces the term “form” in his moral theory either partly or wholly as a result of 
his desire to establish parallels between his theoretical and practical philosophy. 
4 This problem would similarly follow from employing the idea of form from the first Critique for a 
disanalogous role in the second Critique.  
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morally informed desires: it is itself productive, not just the inhibitor of immoral actions. 
The gatekeeper reading is perhaps responsible for the criticism that Kant lacks an 
adequate moral psychology, a criticism that is misplaced. Focusing instead on Kant’s 
theory of virtue shows us that reason can and must inform the choice of ends; only then is 
emotional intelligence, indeed, virtue itself, even possible.5 
 
I. What Does “Formalism” Mean? 
 Kant’s use of the notion of form, and his alleged formalism, are remarkably 
difficult to pin down. He begin with the insistence that form must be separated from 
content, and the form of universalism is supposedly derived in this way, but as his 
argument progresses, he explains that form and content are necessarily interrelated. Kant 
first introduces the notion of form in the Groundwork when trying to explain the way that 
the good will is unconditionally good irrespective of its “usefulness or fruitfulness” 
(Nützlichkeit oder Fruchtlosigkeit)(G 394). Kant makes use of the notion of form after he 
has given his argument for the special purpose of reason, which has not ended terribly 
successfully (showing only that reason is not very good at seeking happiness, not that 
instinct or any other faculty is better). He writes: 
 From the preceding discussion it is clear that the purposes we may have 
for our actions and their effects as ends and incentives of the will cannot 
give the actions any unconditional and moral worth. Wherein, then, can 
this worth lie, if not in the will in its relation to its hoped for effect? It can 
lie nowhere else than in the principle of the will irrespective of the ends 
which can be realized by such action. For the will stands, as it were, at the 
crossroads halfway between its a priori principle which is formal and its a 
posteriori incentive which is material.  Since it must be determined by 
something, if it is done from duty it must be determined by the formal 
                                                
5 In this way, my interpretation of Kant has much in common with Barbara Herman’s emphasis of practical 
reason. 
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principle of volition as such, since every material principle has been 
withdrawn from it. (G 400) 
 
This picture of the will at a crossroads is quite intriguing. It could be interpreted to mean 
that the will requires both formal and material elements, as Kant seems to argue later, but 
that is not the typical meaning of “being at a crossroads” (auf einem Scheidewege), and 
the following sentence makes it clear that Kant means that we must choose between 
formal (a priori) and material (a posteriori) determination. Still, the fact that the 
divergence of the two roads is simultaneously a coming together foreshadows Kant’s 
later inclusivity. 
For those familiar with the first Critique, wherein Kant insists on the necessary 
unity of the form and content (both in the case of intuition and understanding, as the two 
sets of forms turn out to be interrelated), this use of the notion of form in order to contrast 
form and content, and even rid the latter from the former, is surprising. Drawing on the 
first Critique, Beck’s interpretation of Kantian formalism focuses on the necessary 
interdependence between form and matter, which can be gleaned from pieces of text we 
will consider shortly, especially the second Critique’s presentation of the argument. Beck 
writes: 
[Kant’s] theorem disqualifies only those maxims which are chosen to 
guide conduct because of the content, i.e., because of their reference to an 
object of desire (material) as the determining factor. All maxims have 
material, but only the latter are material maxims. Content (object of 
desire) without form is blind impulse; form without object of desire is 
practically ineffective—this is as true of Kant’s ethics as the 
corresponding sentence in the first Critique is of his theory of knowledge.6  
 
This mutual dependence is not the relationship Kant has in mind when he first brings up 
the notion of form in the Groundwork; the only parallel between the Groundwork’s use of 
                                                
6 Beck, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, 96. 
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the notion of form, as we have just seen it, and the first Critique is that for both the notion 
of form bears a special affinity to the notion of the a priori. 
Kant uses a number of different terms to characterize a posteriori motivation. 
“Material” is given as synonymous with “intended result” (“was aus ihr erfolgen soll”), 
“result” (Erfolg), and the ends or purpose (Zwecke or Absicht) of an action. He quickly 
hones in on the term “effect,” (Wirkung or Wirkungen, which is also translated as 
“consequences”) contrasting those actions that are done to bring about some effect with 
those actions that are done because they conform to a formal principle, which, he argues, 
must be “the conception of law itself”(G 401). This implies that the motive of 
universalism is the only possible a priori determination of the will; yet in the previous 
quote, Kant implies that all principles are formal by defining the formal aspect of the will 
as its principle. Kant later distinguishes between formal and material principles, but here 
this looseness serves his purposes. Indeed, the phrase “the form of the will” is singular. 
The will is essentially the faculty of acting on maxims; the form of the will is a maxim, 
which is a principle or a universal. Therefore, the form of the will is universality.  
The notion of the form of the will is instrumental for introducing the idea of 
universalism and the first formulation of the categorical imperative. The word “form” is 
given as synonymous with the word “principle.” Kant’s argument for, or presentation of, 
the first version of the categorical imperative runs as follows: 
1. A “good will” is something good regardless of consequences.  
2. Motivation by intended consequences constitutes all the possible content of a 
will. 
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3. If we remove all of the possible content from the idea of a will, we are left 
with the form of a will. 
4. The form of a will is universality, or lawfulness, since a will is the faculty of 
acting according to the understanding of laws. 
5. Therefore, a good will is determined not by its content, but by its form, 
universality. 
6. Therefore a good will is a will that conforms to universality.7   
As we see, here Kant’s use of the notion of form is tied to the introduction of the first 
formulation of the categorical imperative and the notion of universality: it refers to the 
form of the will, or universality.8 Furthermore, it is important to note that this use of the 
notion of form specifically requires its opposition to content, regardless of whether we 
call this content the “ends,” “effects,” or “results” of an action.9  
In order to derive universality as the form of the will in this way, Kant must 
conflate a principle with an intention, i.e., he must assume that every intention is 
                                                
7 There are obviously a number of problems with this argument, but we should not feel the need to defend it 
or to criticize Kant on this score. Kant does not even present it as an argument, much less is it a deduction 
of the categorical imperative, as Kant believes the moral law needs no “justification.”  Nor is this the only 
formulation of the moral law, so Kant has other means of convincing us, should this one fail. 
8 It is difficult to state Kant’s formalism at all without resorting to his universalism: in his Introduction to 
the Groundwork, Beck writes, “Since we have, in the examples, taken away the contents of the maxim (the 
wants and desires of the persons), nothing is left to be determined by the law except the form of the maxim; 
its form must be such as to exclude any contents that would prevent the maxim from itself being universal, 
i.e., valid for all persons as rational beings regardless of their specific desires. The maxim must, in effect, 
be capable of being a universal law for all rational beings.” Beck, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason, xiii.  The point seems to be that it is a method of subtraction that leads to universalism, 
following Kant’s presentation of the idea of the form of the will, or universality. 
9 Kant’s third use of the notion of form in the Groundwork is rather different than the preceding.  The 
second expression of the first version of the categorical imperative is the “Law of Nature” formulation.  
Therein, Kant states that “nature” refers to “the existence of things so far as it is determined by universals 
laws;” nature, in this sense, is the form of phenomena (G 421).  This use of the term is clearly distinct from 
the previous because it implies correlation between form and matter much more than contrast.  As we shall 
see, many attempt to defend Kant’s notion of formalism precisely by means of the fact that the notion of 
form seems to require the inclusion of content.  Nevertheless, as we have seen, this is not the meaning of 
“form” of which Kant has heretofore made use, even if it turns out that empirical content is necessary for 
moral decision-making. Kant uses the word again in this sense on G 438.   
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universal or law-like in some way. Here the argument really runs: wills are formed by 
their intentions; intentions are law-like; hence the form of the will is universality. As we 
shall see, if the form of a will is simply its principle, then the distinction between 
“content” and “form” becomes the rather flimsy idea that one comes before and the other 
after action. Since a principle contains reference to the effects of the action, the difference 
between it and its “content” cannot be anything more than modal.  
The fourth use of the term “form” in the Groundwork introduces the idea of 
formal and material principles: “practical principles are formal when they disregard all 
subjective purposes; they are material when they have subjective purposes and thus 
certain incentives as their basis”(G 427). For those familiar with Kant’s moral 
philosophy, it is clear that Kant never means to imply that there is ultimately more than 
one formal principle, the moral law; referring to formal principles highlights all of the 
many actions that can possibly conform to the moral law.  
In the Critique of Practical Reason, wherein Kant devotes even more time to the 
notion of formalism, Kant’s discussion of form is largely focused on the ideas of formal 
and material principles. In the beginning of the “Analytic” Kant lays out three theorems. 
The first theorem states that empirical principles (or principles that presuppose an 
object/matter) lack objective necessity. The second theorem is that “all material 
principles… belong under the general principle of self-love or one’s own 
happiness”(CPrR 22).  
In general, the second Critique’s explanation of formalism is tied much more 
closely to the notions of subjectivity and objectivity. Kant makes use of these notions in 
the Groundwork, but later they come to the forefront. Kant tries to explain the ways that 
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actions undertaken for the sake of some physical objects are subjective, and hence cannot 
be commanded by (objective) practical laws. In his “Comment” on this “Explication” of 
the principles of pure practical reason, Kant argues that the idea of a practical law and the 
idea of validity regardless of consequences are reciprocal concepts. A practical law yields 
exactly that imperative that is not relative to the ends to be achieved by the action and the 
desirability of those ends. Content is a problem because it is subjective, and subjectivity 
evades universality. 
The third theorem follows the presentation of formalism in the Groundwork more 
closely, drawing an equation between a universal law and the form of a principle. Here 
Kant explicitly states that all practical principles have matter, but that only in the case of 
material principles does this matter actually determine the principle. Again, Kant writes 
that if we subtract all of the matter as a possible determining basis of the will, then only 
the form of the will is left, which is “the mere form of a universal legislation”(CPrR 27). 
Therefore, if form and matter are opposed, they are not opposed in competition for a 
place in the will, but merely a place determining the will. The will being at a crossroads 
is therefore a good image since in one sense form and content are united in the will, and 
in another sense they diverge.  
Kant’s distinction between the matter of the will, which is a necessary component 
of the will, and material determination of the will is tricky. It amounts to a distinction 
between the action itself (or the physical goal of the action, that which the action aims to 
bring about materially) and the reason or rational purpose for the action. We might say 
that this is roughly a distinction between the intention and effects of an action. The 
problem is that it seems impossible to formulate an intention for action without reference 
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to an intended effect.10 Indeed, Kant sometimes attempts to distinguish between purposes 
or ends (Zwecke) and effects or consequences (Wirkungen) in order to help articulate the 
difference between the material of the will, which is a necessary component, and material 
determination, which is morally problematic. After introducing the idea in the 
Groundwork that rational being is a necessary end, Kant makes a distinction between the 
taking up of a purpose or an end (Zweck) that is given by reason alone, which still allows 
the ground/motive of the action to be objective, and an end that aims at an effect 
(Wirkung):  
That which serves the will as its objective ground of its self-determination 
is a purpose (Zweck), and if it is given by reason alone it must hold alike 
for all rational beings. On the other hand, that which contains the ground 
of the possibility of the action, whose result is an end, is called the 
means.”(G 427)  
 
It seems as though Kant hopes to make the “purpose” of an action appear as something 
more internal and more closely related to the meaning of “motive.” Kant seems to think 
that he can make the distinction between actions that are the product of a good will and 
those that are not by means of the distinction between “purposes” that are in the mind and 
“effects” that are physical. Instead, the only source for objectivity of the will that Kant 
gives is the universality of the principle of the action. Every physical goal will first be 
mentally comprehended: it will first find a place in the motive and then, when it is 
enacted, it will have physical reality. Of course, some motives are good and some are 
evil, but the distinction between “purposes” and motives that aim at “effects” does not do 
a very good job expressing the content of a good will.  
                                                
10 Herman makes this point in Barbara Herman, Morality as Rationality: A Study of Kant’s Ethics (New 
York: Garland, 1990). 
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The very nature of intentional action involves a motive, which is a mental entity, 
that aims at a physical effect, which is then brought about. (We must not be confused into 
thinking that the fact that actions can have unintended or indirect consequences does not 
change the fact that the purpose of the action must include a reference to the intended 
effects of the action. The idea of intentional action includes only that content that is 
intentional.) If I aim at buying a coat for a homeless person, my object is both 
phenomenal (the coat itself) and noumenal (the idea of the coat as something that can 
help). If the end of my action is another person’s happiness, then my goal must be to 
bring about the objects that are a part of my plan to promote this happiness.11 
Examples of negative duties, whereby we refrain from some action, help 
us illustrate the possibility of making a distinction between choice based on the 
(rational) “purposes” (or motive) and the effects of an action more than positive 
duties do. When we refrain from lying, even though the lie would bring benefit, 
we are not choosing in favor of the consequence of benefit, but we are choosing 
not to lie because doing so is wrong (this is a purely intangible reason, seemingly 
disconnected from a physical effect). On the other hand, when we help someone 
in need, it appears that we do act for the sake of a certain consequence, viz., the 
benefit of the person in need. Still, it is possible to shift our way of thinking and 
argue that negative duties still bring about ends, such as the demonstration of a 
good will, truthfulness in the world, or even the simple act of keeping our mouth 
shut.  
                                                
11 For this reason Herman holds that hypothetical imperatives are just as important for moral reasoning and 
categorical imperatives. I think that it is unnecessary to bring in the term “hypothetical imperative” here to 
describe a part of practical reasoning and that doing so risks taking the term out of context of Kant’s 
distinction, wherein it refers to actions that are undertaken myopically, as it were, only to achieve a 
particular end, not because of a consideration of the universality of the end. 
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Failing to grasp the necessary connection between purpose and effect, taking 
Kant’s formalism at face value, may be the cause for the unnecessarily strong emphasis 
placed on negative duties in accounts of Kant’s ethics. Instead, when we fully understand 
that “purpose” and “effect” are related, we can better understand Kant’s discussion of a 
good will. A good will is something on which we must follow through. If, for example, 
our end is to not overcharge our customers, we cannot rightly boast a good will, unless 
this end is related to further goal to bring about goodness of character and having our 
actions conform to the universal law of morality. Of course, normally we focus much 
more attention on our immediate goals, and this leads us to forget about the role of moral 
principles in our lives. Nevertheless, moral goodness is essentially the adoption of a 
good, pure will, and, in order to test our moral goodness, we must shift our focus away 
from our immediate goals and onto the more distant end of moral goodness. This end, 
even though it is moral-psychological, still requires that we do certain things and bring 
about real effects. Thus, as we have previously discussed, there is the duty to take the 
moral law as one’s end and the duty to self-scrutinize. 
Do we help someone in need in order to bring about the effect of his happiness or 
do we do it because it is the right thing to do? If we understand the necessary relationship 
between motivation and end, this question, as well as Stocker’s example of visiting a 
friend in the hospital purely out of duty, does not make sense.12 It does not make sense 
because the right thing to do is to promote the happiness of others. We promote the 
happiness of others because we care about the happiness of others; we care about the 
happiness of others because we really do care about the happiness of others. We really do 
                                                
12 Michael Stocker, “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” The Journal of Philosophy 73, no. 14 
(1976): 453-466. 
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care about the happiness of others because it is the right thing to do. Nevertheless, it is 
the right thing to do because it is the happiness of others. Imagine someone asking you 
while you are getting clothes together to donate to the needy: Are you doing that because 
you care about the people who need clothes or are you doing it because it is the right 
thing to do? You will most likely answer “both.” They are the same because we have a 
moral compass that informs and guides our feelings and concerns. Such moral direction 
has been operative in our upbringing, and is an inseparable part of our intuition, 
psychology, and development of emotional intelligence.  
Kant continues on to develop the notion of formalism in terms of the distinction 
between motive and incentive. He offers us another distinction: Some purposes are purely 
rational and they offer us motives (Bewegungsgrund) (since the idea of an action without 
any purpose seems self-contradictory), but other purposes, which are empirical and the 
objects of inclination, stand as incentives (Triebfedern).13 Obviously the term “incentive” 
connotes some kind of selfish benefit for Kant. The German, Treibfedern, is related to the 
word for drive or desire, Trieb, and so it is conceptually connected to what Kant 
considers the “lower” or animalistic faculties. In his Lectures on Moral Philosophy, Kant 
distinguished between objective and subjective motives (motivum subjecte movens and 
motivum objecte movens) as those reasons for action that only refer to subjective benefit 
and those reasons that can hold universally. Similarly, in the Preface to the Metaphysics 
of Morals, Kant distinguishes between moral and pathological principles with a reference 
to personal happiness: 
                                                
13 We might also try to make a distinction with the term “interest,” but Kant clearly states that both moral 
and immoral actions are the product of interests: “an interest is that in virtue of which reason becomes 
practical” (G 460). 
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For on the one hand he ought to fulfill his duty without first asking what 
effect this will have on his happiness, and so on moral grounds; but on the 
other hand he can recognize that something is his duty only by whether he 
can count on gaining happiness by doing it, and so in accordance with a 
pathological principle, which is the direct opposite of the moral principle. 
(MM 6:378)  
 
Kant argues that the “consequences” of an action are irrelevant to moral decision-making 
because they are only of interest to the particular actor, not objectively, or universally 
valuable (G 427-428).14 It seems that Kant conflates consequences that benefit the subject 
in a merely selfish way, as he takes personal happiness to, with all consequences. (Kant 
often conflates selfishness and sensuousness because he thinks of sensibility as based on 
instincts for survival.15)  
Even if it were possible to make a distinction between the will having matter and 
the will being determined by that matter, this explanation runs up against even more 
trouble when we consider Kant’s notion of necessary moral ends. Moral worth was to be 
measured without reference to the “ends”(Zwecke) of the action (G 400), or at least these 
ends were not to determine the will, but the idea that rational being is a necessary end for 
the good will calls for a revision of this restriction.  
 
II. The Formalism of Necessary Ends 
Even though the Groundwork and second Critique both contain a discussion of 
necessary ends (since Kant defines virtue as having a good will and a good will is one 
that has pure intentions), Kant most fully develops the idea of the necessary moral ends in 
                                                
14 Beck makes a distinction between the term motive and the term intention. I believe his point is that 
motives can be abstract, e.g., one can have the moral law as a motive. An intention, on the other hand, is 
concrete and to bring about some end. In a moral act, you desire some end only because you have already 
judged it to be moral; hence the judgment guides the intention.   
15 Beck follows Kant in this elision. Beck, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, 216-217. 
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his “Doctrine of Virtue.” It is strange that the “Doctrine of Right” has received more 
attention than Kant’s “Doctrine of Virtue” with its discussion of the necessary, moral 
ends of the will. The “Doctrine of Right” treats only those laws that can be legislated 
externally and so does not truly belong to ethics proper. Nevertheless, there has been a 
strong liberal pull in Kant interpretation.  
In the “Doctrine of Virtue” Kant directly contradicts his previous “formalism” by 
asserting that  
ethics goes beyond [the formal condition of outer freedom dealt with by 
the doctrine of right] and provides a matter (an object of free choice), an 
end of pure reason, which it represents as an end that is also objectively 
necessary, that is, an end that, as far as human beings are concerned, it is a 
duty to have. (MM 6: 381)  
 
Kant argues that if there were no such thing as morally necessary ends, the categorical 
imperative and morality itself would be impossible (MM 6:385). Kant makes this same 
argument in the Groundwork, stating that the idea of a necessary end is required in order 
to be the source of absolute moral value, but there his discussion of formalism 
overshadows it (G 428). Still, he writes that the necessary end of rational being is the 
difference between a hypothetical and categorical imperative.16 In the “Doctrine of 
Virtue” Kant seems to have given up his connection between formalism and morality 
entirely, as he continues to call the doctrine of right a “formal” discipline while ethics is 
“material”:  
Those duties that have to do not so much with a certain end (matter, object 
of choice) as merely with what is formal in the moral determination of the 
will (e.g., that an action in conformity with duty must also be done from 
duty) are not duties of virtue.  Only an end that is also a duty can be called 
a duty of virtue. For this reason there are several duties of virtue (and also 
                                                
16 Contrariwise, Kant argues that hypothetical imperatives necessarily miss their mark as foundations for 
moral worth because, in order to make them into categorical imperatives we must have another law that 
makes their end necessary (G 444).   
 242 
various virtues), whereas for the first kind of duty one (virtuous 
disposition) is thought, which however holds for all actions. (MM 6: 
383)17 
 
Nevertheless, Kant does not consistently attempt to distinguish right from virtue in terms 
of form and matter; the essential distinction is that rights are the object of external 
coercion and virtues can only be the result of “free self-constraint” (MM 6:383). Instead, 
the notion of formalism seems to have fallen away from his moral and political theory.  
In the Groundwork, after describing the rational being and the kingdom of ends 
formulations of the categorical imperative, Kant makes use of the notion of form once 
again in order to explain the relationship between the three formulations of the 
categorical imperative: 
All maxims have:  
1. A form, which consists in universality, and in this 
respect the formula of the moral imperative requires that 
maxims be chosen as though they should hold as 
universal laws of nature. 
2. A material (Maxime) (i.e., an end), and in this respect the 
formula says that the rational being, has by its nature an 
end and thus an end in itself, must serve in every maxim 
as the condition restricting all merely relative and 
arbitrary ends. 
3. A complete determination of all maxims by the formula 
that all maxims which stem from autonomous legislation 
ought to harmonize with a possible realm of ends as with 
a realm of nature.18 (G 436) 
 
                                                
17 Here Kant writes that the duty of right, insofar as the external demands of right are command morally at 
all, is to have the moral disposition. Later Kant writes that this is a duty of virtue. It would seem that having 
duty as one’s action be done from the intention to do one’s duty is an end, although not an external end. 
Nevertheless, the “Doctrine of Virtue shows that ends are both external and internal (or states of mind and 
states of the world). I believe that Kant’s distinction between form and matter still continues to confuse him 
here: now that he is clear that there are necessary moral ends, he has trouble describing the doctrine of right 
without them.  
18 It is interesting to note that Kant uses the word “form” after this, and even once before this as a verb, but 
always in different contexts, not in the service of describing unconditional moral worth.  It is as though 
Kant feels the need to carry through with the introduction of the term, but is no longer committed to its 
original sense.  
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Not only are form and matter mutually implicated, but the tripartite organization 
implies that they are only fully complete when united. Here Kant explains that all 
maxims have an end and that the categorical imperative regulates the choice of 
end.19 Ends can be relative and contingent or morally necessary. The categorical 
imperative regulates the choice of ends, sometimes negatively, forbidding some 
ends, and sometimes positively, guiding the adoption of others.  
 In the second Critique’s presentation of formalism, Kant seems to be aware of the 
problem to which I have pointed, namely the contradiction caused for his notion of 
formalism by the idea of necessary ends. He again makes reference to the distinction 
between formal and material principles, but it has become impossible to articulate what it 
means to determine the will without reference to objects or ends once we have accepted 
that the happiness of others is a necessary end. He has no choice but to reframe his 
argument in terms of his criticism of sympathy:   
Now it is indeed undeniable that any volition must also have an object and 
hence a matter. But the matter is not, just because of this, the determining 
basis and condition of the maxim. For if it is, then the maxim cannot be 
exhibited in universally legislative form, since then the expectation of the 
object’s existence would be the determining cause of the power of choice, 
and the dependence of the power of desire on some thing’s existence 
would have to be laid at the basis of volition—a dependence which can 
always be sought only in empirical conditions and hence can never 
provide the basis for a necessary and universal rule. Thus presumably the 
happiness of other beings can be the object of a rational being’s will. But 
if it were the maxim’s determining basis, then one would have to 
presuppose that we find not only a natural gratification in the well-being 
                                                
19 Herman attempts to maintain a distinction between consequences and ends: “a good will does not ignore 
consequences: good willing is with respect to an end,” but consequences “are not the point at which either 
rationality or moral goodness are assessed;” yet, later she writes: “Consequences do count as morally 
relevant in two ways, then: the consequences we intend count as they appear in our maxims of action, and 
we are required to take sufficient means to promote our ends.” Herman, Morality as Rationality, 288-289. 
Furthermore, in the first chapter of this work she argues that the end of an action is necessary for specifying 
the content of the action. I totally agree, as does Kant. This early study ignores the doctrine of necessary 
ends, but she takes it up in her more recent work. Barbara Herman, “Reasoning to Obligation,” Inquiry 49, 
no. 1 (2006): 44-61. 
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of others but also a need, such as the sympathetic mentality brings with it 
in human beings. But this need I cannot presuppose in every rational being 
(and in God not at all). Hence the mater of the maxim can indeed remain, 
but it must not be the maxim’s condition, for otherwise the maxim would 
not be suitable for a law.”(CPrR 34) 
 
Taking the happiness of others as the determining basis of a maxim now means to be 
pathologically gratified by their happiness and taking it as a rational object of the will 
means that one is intellectually gratified by it (because one cognizes it as a morally 
necessary end). Thereby, formalism develops into the dichotomy between pathological 
and intellectual pleasure, which is itself only comprehensible as the dichotomy between 
selfishness and universalism. Without reference to the idea of universalism, there is 
nothing to specify the reason that one pleasure is lower and the other higher because, of 
course, pathological pleasure is no more pathological than intellectual pleasure is. 
Kant’s argumentative moves in this step of the presentation of formalism are 
winding, so it is necessary for us to examine them slowly and carefully. First, we see his 
objection that materially determined actions cannot be the subject of universal laws. 
Material determination of the will supposedly prevents it from being “exhibited in 
universally legislative form.” For example, if my goal is to get up and make a bottle in 
order to feed my baby for the sake of feeling satisfied that he is happy, the fact that my 
goal is feeling satisfied counts as material determination of the will because it makes the 
action relative to me. We can see that this idea overlaps with Kant’s criticism of 
sympathy: let’s say that I were depressed and knew that I would feel no better after 
feeding him than before. If my goal were only to feel happy, in this superficial sense, then 
I would have no reason to feed him. As we saw from chapter 3, Kant’s criticism of 
sympathy refers to only a totally unthinking version of sympathy. In practice, most 
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people would feel the intellectual/moral feeling of sympathy in this case; in other words, 
they feel happy because they recognize that caring is the right thing to do; feeling happy 
naturally goes along with this. In that case, the parent would still do the right thing even 
if he were depressed, because he is doing it out of proper moral comprehension.  
Still, Kant’s argument that the feeling should not be the thing that determines the 
will is strange. The thinking that happens in a intention takes up the idea of the object; 
feeling pleasure takes up the real object itself—but action also aims at the real object 
itself and brings it into existence. Nor can we class an action as subjective just because it 
refers to the self since the self as a rational being is a necessary moral end. If an action 
evades universality just because it is conditioned by empirical existence, then no action 
could possibly be universal. Again, we must point to a necessary connection between 
purpose and effect. If the parent were making a bottle not to promote the baby’s 
happiness but in order to simply get the kid to shut up, the action clearly loses any moral 
worth it may have had, but not because the “matter” has now determined the will more 
than it did before; instead, it lacks moral worth because the principle has changed and it 
is no longer universalizable. Furthermore, the parent in this case fails to take up the 
necessary end of promoting the happiness of others, specifically his dependents.20 Again, 
we see that Kant’s formalism can be nothing other than universalism.  
 Kant’s criticism of sympathy is the same as his criticism of happiness. Laws, in 
order to be laws, must contain the same content for everyone, or the same “determining 
basis of the will in all cases”(CpR 25). Even though Kant believes that it is natural for all 
people to be pleased with themselves in similar circumstances, such as when they realize 
                                                
20 See Diane M. Williamson, “Familial Duties and Emotional Intelligence,” (forthcoming) for an argument 
that we have the duty to direct our duties toward others in this way. 
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they are morally good, he argues that each person’s idea of happiness is different and tied 
to his or her particular experience of pleasure and gratification. Indeed, we see that Kant 
brings up the notion of sympathy because he takes the sympathetic person to act for the 
pleasure of helping. We are already familiar with Kant’s criticism of sympathy, namely 
that, as a pre-rational impulse, it is not reliable and not a trustworthy guide of action. In 
short, it is simply unrelated to moral goodness. Here Kant adds that it cannot be the 
subject of a moral imperative because, being based on the subjective sense of pleasure, it 
cannot be presupposed in every rational being. Rationality, on the other hand, can be 
presupposed in every rational being, and if sympathy were the product of rationality, such 
as with the rational/moral directive to cultivate sympathy, it could be commanded. As we 
have seen from our discussion of Kant’s philosophy of emotion, Kant understands 
emotions, such as sympathy, to be pre-reflective impulses, and it is impossible to 
rationally command a pre-reflective impulse.  
If we accept his assumption that feelings are pre-reflective impulses, his argument 
for the subjectivity of sympathy is convincing enough, but it is little more than a non 
sequitur for his argument for formalism. Instead, Kant changes the terms of the debate, 
from the existence of ends of the action to the pathological gratification or pleasure taken 
in this end, in order to provide some justification for his previous argument that moral 
decision-making must exclude a consideration of the objects of the action. Instead, the 
“purity” of the principle of volition can and should be defined in terms of its fitness for a 
universal law, not its relationship to its “material.” 
Wood argues that  
the teleology of the Doctrine of Virtue is based not on a material end—an 
end the desire for which grounds our choice of actions, which are valued 
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simply as a means to it—but is rather derived from a formal principle, 
which tells us which ends are objectively worth pursuing and hence gives 
rise to the rational desire for them.21  
 
We can see that Wood reformulates the distinction between material and formal 
determination, whereby the former was determination based on ends, into a distinction 
between material and formal ends in order to preserve Kant’s formalism in the face of the 
necessary ends of the Doctrine of Virtue. Kant does argue that the necessary ends of 
virtue are “set against the end arising from sensible impulses,” but he does not 
reintroduce the language of formalism into his characterization of necessary ends (MM 
6:381). Nevertheless, Wood’s distinction is helpful if it reminds us to trace Kantian 
formalism back to universalism, since formal ends as those that are universalizable.  
Wood’s new distinction, between formal and material ends, seems to be the 
expression of different Kantian themes: his worry over determinism by “sensible 
impulses.” If we adopt certain ends we are not free; instead those ends determine the will, 
not just in the sense of giving content to the will, but in the sense of forcing the will to act 
a certain way. It is no surprise that these ends are said to be the product of the “lower” 
faculty of desire, corresponding to Kant’s notion of heteronomy, whereby some aspects 
of the self that are less properly identified with the self can exercise control over other 
parts of the self, making the whole self not free. On the other hand, the latter parts of the 
self, those which are properly identified with the whole self, can control the “lower” parts 
of self and make the whole self free, even though half of the self is still being controlled. 
We see that, in Wood’s distinction, “formal” and “principle” are functionally 
synonymous, making the issue one of rationality. When a “rational desire” gives rise to 
                                                
21 Allen Wood, “The Final Form of Kant’s Practical Philosophy,” in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, ed. 
Mark Timmons (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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the ends of action, they are acceptable. Of course, the notion of universalizability must be 
built it, but Wood, as well as Kant, means for there to be something more behind the idea 
of formalism: a bifurcation of the self into rational and irrational parts and the assertion 
that the latter rob the self of its freedom. In other words, Kantian formalism leads to 
Kant’s notion of autonomy (which will be discussed in the next chapter).  
In order to understand Kant’s attempted formalism we must focus on the 
“heteronomy” half of his autonomy/heteronomy distinction. Material determination 
entails determination by the “lower” faculty of desire. The essential point of morality 
often seems to be, as Kant writes, “that [man] should not follow his inclinations (LE 122, 
C 27:345). We must examine why this might be the case and what its implications are for 
the relationship between Kantian moral theory and the cultivation of emotional 
intelligence.  
 
III. “Man Should Not Follow His Inclinations” 
As we have seen, Kant turns to the idea of pleasure to make the connection 
between formalism and the lower faculty of desire. Kant writes  
if the desire for this object precedes the practical rule, and is the condition 
for making the rule one’s principle, then… the principle is always 
empirical … Such a relation to the subject is called pleasure in the 
actuality of the object. (CPrR 21)  
 
The principled choice of ends is contrasted to those ends that are chosen because of their 
pleasure. This distinction has been mistakenly interpreted as the injunction that moral 
action cannot be pleasurable, but we can see that such is not what is at stake here. Instead, 
the idea of pleasure is used to refer to an immediate, irrational, and idiosyncratic 
relationship to the object. It is strange to see Kant assume that pleasure must be irrational, 
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as it is well-known that his aesthetic theory discusses not only the intellectual pleasure of 
the aesthetic experience, but also similar intellectual pleasures, such as moral pleasure. 
Perhaps that theory was born to rectify the breach caused by this definition of pleasure.  
 Pleasure is morally permissible when it does not conflict with duty, but it is not 
itself universally commanded. (Such a universal law would be differently worded, not 
“Everyone should have an ice-cream cone now,” but “It’s okay for people to have an ice-
cream cone, if there is no reason not to.”). Still, morally worthy happiness is a necessary 
end of morality, and so any pleasure that it might require can be the subject of a universal 
law, if we assume that certain aspects of the experience of pleasure are universal.  
Unfortunately, this is not Kant’s line of thinking in his derision of pleasure. 
Instead, his discussion of pleasure relies on a confused parallel between the first and 
second Critiques. Kant writes that pleasure requires the existence of the object. Kant 
always opposes form to matter, not content, because matter calls to mind empiricism. 
This description makes sense if we take physical pleasure, or pleasure that requires 
physical, bodily contact with the object (like touch or taste) for all pleasure. It is thereby a 
receptive faculty, and as such it is meant to gesture toward Kant’s theory of sensibility 
from the first Critique (CpR 22). As receptive, it is transitively both unfree and empirical, 
which, in Kant’s sense, means that it is not law-governed. The first Critique offers an 
attempt to explain the possibility and origin of scientific laws by means of the a priori 
structure of experience (the categories of the understanding). Kant assumes that those 
aspects of experience that are externally derived cannot ground lawfulness and those that 
are derived from the universal structures of experience can. Kant’s use of the notion of 
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pleasure in his practical philosophy, then, draws from his theoretical philosophy’s 
definition of sensibility: making pleasure both receptive and unlawful.  
This parallel between sensibility and pleasure (which is standing in for the lower 
faculty of desire) breaks down both because desire is not receptive and because Kant’s 
theoretical and practical philosophies necessarily make use of different notions of 
lawfulness. There is not very much in common between desire for the existence of an 
object and the receptiveness to sensation—that is, if we buy Kant’s argument that 
necessity cannot be grounded a posteriori in the first place. We sometimes use the word 
“feeling” in this ambiguous way to refer to sensations that are both internally and 
externally generated, but the two different senses of feeling are, in fact, very different. An 
internally generated desire for an object does not involve receptivity; it is, of course, an 
active drive. In Kant’s practical philosophy, reason takes the place of the understanding 
in transforming the subjective into the objective. Reason must educate the inclinations, 
sometimes merely acting as a gate-keeper, denying or permitting them, but more often 
reason must mold the inclinations so that they conform to the necessary ends of morality. 
The Understanding of Kant’s theoretical philosophy does not create physical objects, it 
merely represents them. Furthermore, it does not give actual content to sensibility; reason 
does give content to the inclinations—this is the essential definition of practical 
philosophy.22 
Kant’s argument got started on the wrong foot by assuming that desire for the 
existence of an object can be relegated to the “lower” faculty of desire and thereby 
represented as desire for a physical pleasure. Still, “pleasure” is meant to describe the 
                                                
22 See Herman’s discussion of the fact that we are active in regard to our desires. Herman, The Practice of 
Moral Judgment, 194-195. 
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problem with material determination because pleasures are taken to be subjective. In one 
sense of “subjectivity,” pleasures are subjective because they are internal experiences, but 
this sense fails to differentiate pleasure from reasoning. Pleasure, as physical pleasure, is 
subjective in another sense, one that is problematic for moral decision-making, because it 
concerned with the self not just in being a property of the self but because it threatens to 
value the self above everything else. In other words, it is selfish. It often seems that 
selfishness is all that it is behind Kant’s notion of subjectivity.  
Kant’s “second theorem of practical philosophy” defines all material principles as 
principles aimed at “self-love or happiness.” Subjectivity, in this case, is opposed to 
objectivity, because it is connected to aims that are particular to the subject, aims that 
ultimately lead back to the subject himself, his survival and happiness. As we have 
already seen from the connection between Kant’s theory of emotion and his theory of 
inclination, the agent may or may not end up valuing his survival and happiness above 
morality, but in so far as these subjective ends are disconnected from the thought of 
morality, and not synthetically united with it by means of the idea of morally worthy 
happiness, they always threaten to supplant morality.  
In this way, it sometimes seems that “happiness” and “inclination” are terms, 
associated with the “lower” faculty of desire, that are defined by their selfishness and 
short-sightedness.23 They are meant to refer to someone who is limited to the pursuit of 
immediate goals and physical pleasures, rather than someone who takes the time to 
                                                
23 Nevertheless, the problem with subjective principles cannot simply be that they are selfish. Kant, at least 
occasionally, makes a distinction between purely selfish motives and effects in general. Here is writes that 
it does not matter whether the sought after effects are one’s own happiness or the happiness of others: 
neither can be the source of moral goodness (G 401). It is surprising to see Kant stating that taking up the 
end the happiness of others cannot be the source of moral goodness. The notion of morally necessary ends, 
namely, the happiness of others and the perfection of oneself, is not unique to the Metaphysics of Morals. 
Even the Groundwork goes on to explain the necessary end of human dignity as the material of the moral 
law.  
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reflect and form rational principles, much less the rational, moral principle. Just as with 
Kant’s theory of emotion, it is as though there are two levels of happiness and two levels 
of motivation, the first of which must be refined into the second.  
Paton explains Kant’s distinction between the moral motive and the motives of 
inclination as a struggle against “unruly impulses and desires.”24 This seems like a 
strange way to put the point. Of course, Kant defines inclination as opposed to morality, 
but to call inclinations unruly makes it sound as though we have already achieved a good 
will or that inclinations can all be summed up as animal instincts over which we have 
little control. This is not only a false account of badness, it externalizes the source of the 
evil impulse, making it out to be rare and foreign, rather than commonplace. This 
understanding of desire precludes self-criticism. Gregor, on the other hand, recognizes 
that Kant’s definition of virtue as a struggle refers to a struggle of self-improvement: 
As Kant works out the implications of the command to master our feelings 
and inclination, it means that the sensuous appetitive side of our nature is 
not to be suppressed altogether, but rather to be brought under the control 
of pure practical reason. He distinguishes, in general, between feelings and 
inclinations which precede our deliberation about duty and tend to confuse 
it, and those which follow upon our determination of what constitutes our 
duty and can help us to act more effectively in fulfilling it. As our moral 
attitude gathers strength, we gradually free ourselves from the 
uncontrolled uprising of the former, while at the same time we develop 
and put to use such affective capacities as can assist us in carrying out our 
moral purposes. Feelings and inclinations of the second type, cultivated 
and controlled by pure practical reason, are entirely consistent with inner 
freedom.25 
 
                                                
24 H. J. Paton, “Analysis of the Argument,” in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton 
(New York: Harper and Rowe, 1964), 18. 
25 Gregor, Laws of Freedom, 74. To Gregor’s characterization of the positive role that emotion plays in 
Kant’s moral theory, my argument’s emphasis on emotional intelligence contributes a discussion of the 
means by which the first kind of emotions, those that seem unruly, can be understood and translated into 
important psychological insights that aid in cultivating moral emotions. 
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In order to eschew Kant’s seemingly troubling comments on pleasure, inclination, 
and the “lower” faculty of desire, recent interpreters have played up the importance of 
happiness and “freedom” (although not the specifically Kantian sense of freedom, as we 
shall see in the next chapter) in Kant’s philosophy. When reading Kant, it sometimes 
seems as though different texts are the product of very different moods. Sometimes Kant 
chooses to emphasize the corrosive and wayward nature of inclinations, as they compel 
us always toward our selfish and irrational notions of “happiness;” other times Kant 
focuses on true happiness, or morally worthy happiness, and the person whose rational 
desires cheerfully seek the good. Anyone who studies Kant is well acquainted with his 
sunnier disposition as well as with his deprecatory dualisms. 
The Kingdom of Ends formulation of the categorical imperative, as a synthesis of 
the first and second formulations, does a particularly good job of expressing a harmony 
between happiness and morality, as well as the confluence of justice and morality. Kant’s 
notion of the Kingdom of Ends is a vision of the coordination of ends, both moral and 
amoral. In the Kingdom of Ends, people need to use others as means to subjective 
happiness, but they also always treat others as ends-in-themselves. The Kingdom of Ends 
is the vision of the Highest Good instantiated: people are able to achieve happiness—
each in her own individual pursuit—and each person’s happiness is compatible with 
everyone else’s happiness and dignity. Everyone’s happiness is morally worthy because it 
is conditioned upon universal happiness. The Kingdom of Ends ideal should not be 
confused with the “race of devils,” that Kant discusses in “Perpetual Peace,” who are 
made to look as though they are morally good because they are externally constrained by 
well-formed laws (PP 112). Treating someone as an end-in-herself is not a merely 
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negative goal, as we might construe respect as a kind of leaving someone alone, an end is 
a positive determination of the will, and it requires that we follow through with it by 
promoting the happiness of others (as well as our own personal self-perfection). 
Recent interpretive focus on happiness has lead to yet a different version of 
Kantian formalism: one that asserts that inclination plays a necessary role in determining 
the will. Engstrom and Guyer, among others, portray Kant’s formalism as entailing a 
necessary relationship between form and content, the form being universalism and the 
content being any particular inclination (so long as it is sufficiently universalizable). 
Engstrom argues that “Kant locates the form of practical knowledge in the idea of a 
practical law (or what he calls ‘the mere form of universal legislation’), and he identifies 
the matter with the objects to be produced through that knowledge, such as objects of 
sensible desire, the things we find pleasing or agreeable.”26 Guyer agrees with my 
analysis that Kant holds that ends are necessary parts of maxims, but he also agrees with 
Engstrom, that inclinations necessarily make up the material element of the will. This 
argument is not faithful to Kant’s use of the term “inclination” (Neigung), which is 
essentially derisive. Guyer, following Korsgaard, argues that the ultimate end is freedom, 
or the ability of rational beings to set their own ends.  
Does the material aspect of the will always include an end set by sensible desire 
or inclination, making the form of universality the only characteristic of a good will? This 
interpretation implies that the end of an action is conceptually disconnected from its 
moral worth, as though our ends were set independently of any consideration of our 
maxims and their moral fitness, and we, only after the fact, checked to make sure those 
ends were acceptable. Kant writes: 
                                                
26 Engstrom, “Introduction” In The Critique of Practical Reason, xxii. 
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One can think of the relation of end to duty in two ways: one can begin 
with the end and seek out the maxim of actions in conformity with duty or, 
one the other hand, one can begin with the maxim of actions in conformity 
with duty and seek out the end that is also a duty. –The doctrine of right 
takes the first way. … But ethics takes the opposite way. (MM 6: 382)  
 
This distinction makes perfect sense. Furthermore, in his discussion of the difference 
between ethics and the doctrine of right, Kant clarifies his previously held formalism:  
[Ethics] cannot begin with ends that a human being may set for himself 
and in accordance with them prescribe the maxims he is to adopt, that is, 
his duty; for that would be to adopt maxims on empirical grounds, and 
such grounds yield no concept of duty…(MM 6:382)  
 
If I am reading Kant correctly, the idea is that if we simply pursue an end that arises from 
amoral inclination and merely check it with our internal moral censor to make sure it is 
okay, we are not really acting virtuously at all. Our action is permissible, but it has no 
genuine moral worth, and the will is not a good will, because we are not motivated by our 
thought of moral goodness.27  
 Nevertheless, there is textual support in the second Critique for the Engstrom 
reading, and so we are put in the position, when hoping to formulate a characterization of 
Kantian moral theory as a whole, of choosing between two (or more) interpretations of 
Kant on grounds other than textual fidelity. I offer a further reasons for my reading, 
which is one that leaves off with calling Kantian moral theory a “formalism:” it does not 
lead to treating the good will as merely an internal censor but allows the good will the 
power to form ends and act on its own. 
 
                                                
27 Herman refers to this distinction in her “Reasoning to Obligation,” 46. 
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IV. The Good Will Wills The Good 
Liberals have used the notion of formalism to argue that Kant’s ethics excludes a 
substantive notion of the good and that the categorical imperative should be seen as 
merely a gate-keeper, only letting out permissible inclinations. Instead, people may act 
however they like, as long as their actions are constrained by the thought of their possible 
universality, or the respect of the freedom of others. This reading of Kant reads his notion 
of political freedom into the moral notion of autonomy. Even if we ignore everything 
Kant has to say about virtue and the necessary ends of morality, it still seems as though 
this is not a good reading of Kant and not a good moral theory, but a legal theory. Kant’s 
distinction between right and virtue belies this approach. 
I have shown the ways that Kantian moral theory helps to promote emotional 
intelligence. This connection between Kantian moral theory and emotional intelligence 
exists because Kant spent an immense amount of time thinking about psychology and 
pedagogy, giving his lectures on anthropology coterminously with his lectures on moral 
philosophy. If my theory of emotional intelligence has been convincing, we also have it 
as reason to reject the liberal reading of Kantian moral theory. As a moral theory, the 
liberal reading of Kant represents a lack of emotional intelligence. If the conscience is 
merely a censor or gate-keeper of the inclinations and does not actively inform them, we 
are stuck with a dichotomous theory of reason and emotion and no direction for 
cultivating rational and moral emotions. Furthermore, emotional intelligence and 
emotionally intelligent societies are themselves goods that should be furthered by 
individuals. A moral theory that cannot promote any end over any other end cannot 
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recognize this and cannot advocate for psychological health any more than for mental 
disorder.  
It is incomprehensible to me that Kant is faulted for not having an adequate moral 
psychology. Kant’s moral theory is closely intertwined with his moral psychology, but it 
is perhaps the case that Kant’s message is one that is difficult to hear, which is exactly his 
point. Kant’s moral psychology focuses on the difficulty involved in choosing goodness 
over selfishness. It proclaims that we should not be satisfied with our moral worth: we are 
not good enough, we must keep striving. Kant’s emphasis on the difficulty in being good 
is what leads him to consider inclination and passion in an exclusively negative light. 
Kant defines virtue as a (free) self-constraint that is the result of a struggle with immoral 
motivation (see MM 6: 379-382). It is not that Kant believes that humans are innately 
evil, it is just that they are constantly tempted. 
Kant’s primary motive for insisting that the principles of morality be pure is that 
the correct reasons for them will then be grasped and they will be less subject to 
corruption (G 6). He cordons off all thought of possible benefit in his establishment of the 
basis of moral goodness because he believes that the consideration of personal benefit is 
likely to corrupt the moral principle. The moral motive is essentially distinct from other 
inclinations, whether they are selfish or not, and, being distinct, these two types of 
motivation can and do come into conflict.28 Furthermore, being pure, the moral motive is 
always weaker than any other benefit-based inclination that it comes up against it. In 
other words, there is always some advantage on the side of the immoral motive. The 
moral motive, on the other hand, stands alone: there is no reason to follow the moral law 
                                                
28 Kant’s multiple examples of the contrast between duty and inclination help to show us the difference 
between these two motivations, but they do not give us a very good picture of the motive of duty or its 
content, and so they have been misunderstood as arguing that duty can only act when inclination is absent.  
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except for the fact that it is the moral law.29 The harms and benefit alluded to by moral 
reasoning are abstract: it does not matter what I stand to gain from the action now, but 
what might happen if everyone acted this way. Really, it is not a question of benefit at all: 
it is a question of principle. Being disconnected from benefit makes the moral motive 
vulnerable to all sorts of rationalizations: we might object, “Oh, who really knows what’s 
right and wrong anyway?” or “I’m not really hurting anybody,” and these rationalizations 
will probably quiet the conscience. Most of the time, because we have been brought up in 
lawful societies, our inclinations coincide with morality. This helps us to justify small 
moral holidays when our inclinations pull us in the immoral direction.30 Kant writes that 
it is this human tendency of rationalization that makes moral theory (the Critique of 
Practical Reason, in particular) necessary (G 405). 
 
We have seen that Kant’s use of the notion of form is conflicted. First, he uses the 
term to refer to the form of the will, namely universality. This meaning is never far from 
his mind, but he also introduces the distinction between formal and material principles, 
which is based on the argument that determination by the thought of universality is 
different from determination by means of a consideration of the matter of the will. If we 
                                                
29 Galvin addresses Brandt’s criticism that Kant has no account of moral motivation, or that Kant requires 
that morality have no motivation. (This is also the criticism Hegel’s voices by associated Kant with the 
“beautiful soul” of the Phenomenology of Spirit.) Aside from pointing to the “feeling” of respect, as Galvin 
does, we must not be confused into thinking, perhaps with Kant, that Kant needs an account of moral 
motivation, except as a remark about moral psychology. Excluding “inclination” from the ground of the 
moral law does not entail that there is no “inclination” or “motive” or “reason” to act morally or even that 
the moral motive is necessarily weaker than other motives, although Kant worries that the latter is the case. 
Translating his theory into contemporary psychology and philosophy of action confuses the topic further 
because Kant was not interested in the question “how is action possible?” (although it may seem like his 
discussion of freedom should take such an interest, in fact, his arguments often hinge on the assumption 
that it is) but in the question “what is special about moral motivation?” and “what is the content of moral 
imperatives?”  
30 See Robert Gressis’s discussion of Kant’s moral psychology in “How to Be Evil: The Moral Psychology 
of Immorality,” Rethinking Kant: Volume 1, ed. Pablo Muchnik (Cambridge Scholar Publishers, 2008). 
 259 
are to insist on making use of the notion of “formalism” when we describe Kant’s ethics, 
we must remember that it cannot exclude a consideration of “ends” in ethics, since Kant 
most certainly prescribes the necessary end of rational being. My argument has been that, 
if we accept that the ends, whether morally necessary or not, determine the action 
because they give it its content, there is no possible definition of formalism left that 
leaves it distinct from universalism. Since Kantian formalism seems to be nothing more 
than a restatement of universalism, can we not dispense with calling Kantian ethics a 
“formalism” altogether?  
In order to make sense of the references to form in Kant’s practical philosophy, 
we must shift our attention away from the definition of form and toward the definition of 
matter. The idea of “matter” is closely aligned with Kant’s understanding of the “lower” 
faculties of desire, such as inclination.31 Nevertheless, as we have seen, the dichotomy 
between lower and higher faculties does not make as much sense in the context of 
practical philosophy as it does in theoretical philosophy because desire is not empirically 
receptive in the way that sensibility is in theoretical philosophy. Furthermore, this 
dichotomy seems to misstate the role that happiness plays in Kant’s moral philosophy. 
The best way to read Kant’s comments on the “lower” faculty of desire are as an 
expression of his worry about the seemingly endless ability of human psychology to 
rationalize away moral requirements.  
                                                
31 Beck writes, “ ‘Material’ here seems to be equated with ‘object of the lower faculty of desire,’ but the 
connotations of the two words are distinct, and the distinction is of great importance.  ‘Material’ is also 
contrasted with ‘form’ and ‘formal,’ and Kant means here: All practical principles which figure as the 
cognitive component in volition because of their content, i.e., there reference to an object of desire, and not 
because of their form, are empirical…” Beck, Commentary, 96. I maintain that it is not possible to make 
any sense out of Kant’s notion of “material” other than to refer to “object of the lower faculty of desire” 
with the emphasis being on “lower.” 
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The very first page of the Groundwork explains that moral theory is a material, 
not a formal, science because its subject matter is the human will, which is “affected by 
nature.” Louden discusses Kant’s division of moral theory into its pure and impure parts, 
but also argues that Kant’s impure ethics are a necessary and important counterpart to 
that which is most commonly associated with Kant.32 Taking stock of the necessary 
moral ends and Kant’s comments about moral psychology that are aimed at helping us to 
take up these ends may seem to blur the traditional Kantian distinction between the pure 
and the impure, but since both halves are now recognized as vital, the distinction itself is 
becoming less important.
                                                
32 Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
AUTONOMY AND PSYCHOLOGY1 
  
Kant wrote that autonomy is the “supreme principle of ethics” (G 440). Following in step, 
Kant scholars place much emphasis, both interpretive and creative, on the notion of autonomy. 
Like his notion of purity and what is taken to be his “formalism,” Kant’s notion of autonomy is 
thought to involve the exclusion of emotion from morality. Yet the notion of autonomy is more 
popular and is taken to be one of the most important ideas in all of Kant’s thought. Beck argues 
for the importance of the notion of autonomy in the first Critique, even though the word 
“Autonomie” did not come into Kant’s vocabulary until after 1781; Beck holds that “autonomy 
is a fundamental condition of both cognitive and practical activity.”2 Brandom draws a similar 
parallel between alethic and deontic responsibility.3 
Personally, I am in favor of a “back to basics” interpretation of autonomy. When Kant 
first introduces the notion, in the end of the second section of the Groundwork, he defines it in 
terms of universality. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to see that Kant broaches the topic in the 
first place in order to forge a connection between his moral theory and his theory of freedom, and 
thus to effect a transition from the second to the third section of the Groundwork and to the 
second Critique. It would seem that an interpretation of Kant’s notion of autonomy must 
necessarily provide an interpretation of Kant’s theory of freedom; yet the reciprocity of the 
                                                
1 The part of this chapter that discusses the Incorporation Thesis is taken, in part, from my article “The Merits and 
Deficiencies of Kant’s Incorporation Thesis as an Interpretation and Revision,” in Rethinking Kant: Volume 1, ed. 
Pablo Muchnik (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008). 
2 Lewis White Beck, “What Have We Learned?” in Self and Nature in Kant’s Philosophy, ed. Allen Wood (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1984), 23. 
3 Robert Brandom, “Animating Ideas of Idealism: A Semantic Sonata in Kant and Hegel, Lecture Two: Autonomy, 
Community, and Freedom,” presented at Colgate Philosophy Department Symposium, 2008. 
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concepts of freedom and morality need not imply a mutual dependence. In this chapter, I provide 
an interpretation of Kantian autonomy that is open to a variety of interpretations of Kantian 
freedom—in fact, I am open to both compatibilist and incompatibilist interpretations—as long as 
said interpretation does not overlook the fact that autonomy is first and foremost a moral notion.  
The third section of the Groundwork is notoriously difficult to understand. Kant brings up 
the question of the existence of human freedom, but then tells us that we must assume it. He then 
again uses the specter of determinism to attempt to prove the validity of the categorical 
imperative, but then concludes that such a proof is impossible. There are a number of logical and 
philosophical problems with this series of argumentation, but in this chapter I focus on the 
psychological problems with the version of autonomy it develops. Kant insinuates that 
everything that lies outside of pure reason cannot be viewed as properly a part of the self at all. 
Such a view of the self is psychologically unhealthy, and it erects a dangerous moral psychology. 
It is best that we eschew these flights of argumentation and stick to the idea that autonomy can 
be understood in terms of the other formulations of the categorical imperative. 
 
I. The Principle of Autonomy and the Categorical Imperative 
Kant introduces the idea of autonomy in the Groundwork after he has already given (at 
least) three formulations of the categorical imperative. The idea of autonomy is related to the 
third formulation (the Kingdom of Ends formula) because the latter introduces the idea of the 
will as legislative and the former as self-legislative, i.e., both a sovereign and a subject. Kant 
more fully discusses this new term, calling “the autonomy of the will” “the supreme principle of 
ethics” (G440). It may seem strange that he gives us yet another principle of ethics, but if we pay 
close attention to the text, we see that Kant is careful to introduce this new idea only as a 
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restatement of the equivalence of the former three. While discussing the Kingdom of Ends, Kant 
highlights the equation between the universal law formulation and the rational being formulation. 
In affirming a law as valid for all rational beings, we affirm it as valid for ourselves as well as for 
others, and in ensuring that we follow laws to which others, as rational beings, would assent, we 
ensure that we are not treating them as a mere means, but also as ends in themselves (G 438). 
The fullest expression of this idea then comes with the vision of a Kingdom of Ends, wherein 
everyone is both a subject and a law-giver. From the confluence of these ideas, we can derive the 
idea of autonomy, which is, at first, defined in terms of universality: “morality is the relation of 
actions to the autonomy of the will , i.e., to the possible legislation of universal law by means of 
the maxims of the will” (G 339).  
It is strange that at this point Kant takes himself to be, once again, giving definitional 
features of moral theory itself, defining terms like “duty” and “obligation” in terms of 
“autonomy,” and he defines the “holy will” as one that is necessarily in accord with the laws of 
autonomy. This way of explaining autonomy, as it refers to “the laws of autonomy” may strike 
Kant interpreters as unusual because we normally think of autonomy as giving the law to oneself, 
and so forget that it is not meant to refer to just any laws, but only universal, objective laws. 
Kantian autonomy is often explained as the ability of the will to give a/the law to itself; perhaps 
it is more textually accurate to explain it as the quality of the will whereby it is a law in itself. 
Kant writes: 
Autonomy of the will is the property that the will has of being a law to itself 
[dadurch derselbe… ihm selbst ein Gesetz ist] (independently of any property of 
the objects of volition). The principle of autonomy is this: always choose in such 
as way that in the same volition the maxims of the choice are at the same time 
present as universal law. (G 440) 
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Kant goes on to define heteronomy as determination from “anywhere but in the fitness of its 
maxims for its own legislation of universal laws, [such as in] the character of any of its 
objects”(G 441).  
As we discussed in the previous chapter, thinking of universality in terms of the 
exclusion of a consideration of the effect of the action, or, in this case, “the character” of the 
object, runs the risk of vacuity. Nevertheless, Kant does not make that same mistake here; he 
writes,  
for example, I ought to endeavor to promote the happiness of others, not as 
though its realization were any concern of mine (whether by immediate 
inclination or by any satisfaction indirectly gained through reason), but merely 
because a maxim which excludes it cannot be comprehended as a universal law in 
one and the same volition. (G 441) 
 
This passage also allows us to quickly summarize Kant’s theory of emotion and the point of 
chapter 3: feelings can be rational, and rational feelings play an important role in morality, but 
feeling rational feelings should not be the goal of moral action. Proper moral motivation is 
always the comprehension of the moral law and the action’s objective necessity. A moral feeling 
is not problematic as an efficient cause of moral action, as respect is, since the feeling itself, 
being rational, presupposes proper moral comprehension, but if a moral feeling is the final cause 
of moral action, such as with the desire to do a good deed in order to feel good about oneself, the 
moral action is cheapened and loses its moral worth. Of course, we do feel good about ourselves 
when we do a good deed (this is moral self-esteem and a part of morally worthy happiness) but 
that is not the reason that we do the good deed. That would be strange and would even 
undermine the feeling itself.  
 As we have seen, in the second section of the Groundwork, autonomy refers to 
universalism: “an absolutely good will, whose principle must be a categorical imperative, will 
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therefore be indeterminate as regards all objects, and will contain merely the form of willing; and 
indeed that form is autonomy”(G 444).4 In the third section of the Groundwork, Kant attempts to 
use the notion of autonomy to address metaphysical freedom, which he apparently takes to be in 
limbo, even after the first Critique’s hopeful agnosticism. He then uses the idea of freedom to 
provide an argument for the reality of the categorical imperative. Since freedom and morality are 
set up as “reciprocal concepts” it is unclear whether one is to be more basic and play a 
supporting role or if the suggestion is that they are both equally uncertain. If both notions are 
shaky, perhaps Kant hopes to prop them up against each other.  
 The general line of argument, which might be taken either as giving support for the 
reality of freedom or the reality of the categorical imperative, runs thusly: 
1. We think that we are free because we experience ourselves freely making choices. 
2. To be free is to exercise pure reason because all other decisions are determined by 
incentives. 
3. So, if our choices are determined by incentives, and our natural tendency to pursue them, 
they are not free.  
4. The categorical imperative commands that we choose without reference to incentive; 
therefore to be free is to follow the categorical imperative. 
5. Therefore, we affirm the categorical imperative when we affirm the reality of our 
freedom. Likewise, we affirm our freedom when we act morally.  
Obviously, the term “freedom” is used differently in the first premise than in the second. In 
eliding these two senses of freedom (and their corresponding notions of determinism), Kant is 
also eliding between a general, prudential form of decision-making and pure reason. The first 
                                                
4 We see this meaning of autonomy echoed in the preface to the Doctrine of Virtue: “If this distinction is not 
observed, if eudaimonism (the principle of happiness) is set up as the basic principle instead of eleutheronomy (the 
principle of the freedom of eternal lawgiving), the result is euthanasia (easy death) of all morals”(MM 6:378). 
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premise refers to reason in general, or, perhaps, it does not refer to reason at all, but any kind of 
relatively uncoerced choice; the second refers to pure reason. It is unclear whether or not we 
normally assume that we are capable of making a choice without an incentive and, so, whether 
the argument could work without an equivocation. Kant himself recognizes that the idea of 
choosing without incentives is vacuous, and so he qualifies this idea by adding that there is a 
special, moral incentive— respect for the moral law—that is different than other incentives 
because it does not compromise our freedom. Hence it is unclear whether or not even Kant 
thinks that we take ourselves to be capable of making a choice without any incentive.5   
 A weaker and, perhaps, better version of this argument runs: thinking of ourselves 
as free makes us realize that we are autonomous and hence bound by the laws of morality 
(G 453). This argument would be successful if we shared Kant’s view of natural 
determinism and did not take freedom to refer to metaphysical freedom, but just 
relatively uncoerced choices. Another possible argument here is that we have an interest 
in affirming the categorical imperative and acting as it prescribes because in doing so we 
are affirming, or proving, our freedom, or independence from selfish incentives. Of 
course, Kant states that “all the laws that are inseparably bound up with freedom are valid 
just as much as if the will of such a being could be declared to be free in itself for reasons 
that are valid for theoretical philosophy”(G 448). “Such a being” refers to us: rational 
beings with a will, “who cannot act in any way other than under the idea of freedom.” 
This statement lends credence to the latter possibility, i.e., that we have an interest in 
                                                
5 If, by “incentive” we mean a kind of payment, then the moral law cannot be an incentive, but if we mean a reason 
for doing something, then it surely is an incentive. It is relevant to note that Spinoza thought that clear and distinct 
ideas command assent, as well as corollary behaviors. In other words, having a reason for doing something was a 
mark of determinism for Spinoza, but here Kant assumes that there are some kinds are reasons that are non-
deterministic. Nevertheless, Kant’s notion of autonomy certainly represents a heritage from Spinoza’s definition of 
freedom.  
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using morality to prove freedom, although indirectly since this “idea of freedom” 
formulation of the argument suggests a type of compatibilism whereby all of our actions 
are free, because we must assume that they are, whether they are really determined or not.  
 Kant first expresses autonomy in terms of the unity of the different formulations 
of the categorical imperative, but he would not introduce a new term for this unity if it 
were not motivated by his need to re-address his theory of freedom. Autonomy is the link 
that establishes the reciprocity between morality and freedom, as Kant remarks that they 
are “reciprocal concepts” (G 450). In other words, it has one hand in Kant’s moral theory 
and is defined in terms of the categorical imperatives, but it has the other hand in Kant’s 
theory of freedom. This hand gestures toward a Spinozist idea of freedom as accordance 
with one’s true, rational nature.  
 
II. Autonomy and the “True Self” 
Whatever the status of freedom, the argument of the third section does attempt to 
connect impure reason, whether that means prudential reason or decision-making that is 
coerced in some other way, and “alien causes”(fremder Ursachen). In other words, Kant 
brings in the psychological distinction those things that are foreign (fremde) and those 
things that are properly a part of one’s identity as a rational being. The very idea of 
autonomy, of giving or being a law to oneself, implies a division within the self between 
laws/impulses that are better suited to the self because the better express its true nature 
and laws/impulses that are constraining, not freeing, because they do not express the true 
nature of the self.  
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In other words, Kant’s autonomy/heteronomy distinction runs along the lines of 
the distinction between the categorical and hypothetical imperatives, but deeming action 
according to hypothetical imperatives tantamount to determination by “foreign 
influences” (G 448). Our interests, no matter how “rational” in the normal sense of the 
term, are painted as foreign causes. My point in this chapter is simply that this 
characterization is not true: our interests are a part of ourselves, and moral improvement 
requires that we make this realization. Furthermore, rational self-legislation requires that 
the process of reasoning be conscious. I do believe that such is Kant’s final word on the 
subject, but it seems entirely too harsh to conclude that, if we are determined by 
unconscious influences, that they are irrational and immoral. Rather, as I argued in 
chapter 3, it seems that Kant would say that the unconscious can contain rational 
directives that would become moral were they made explicit, but as unconscious they 
remain amoral.  
Kant’s notion of autonomy finds a philosophical predecessor in Spinoza’s 
definition of freedom as that which follows from the nature of the self, i.e., reason, but 
for Spinoza those things that appear not to follow from the nature of the self, viz., passive 
emotions, really are a part of the self, just perceived inadequately. The goal for Spinoza is 
to transform passive emotions into active emotions, or to realize the way that they are 
“self-caused.” There is no such option for Kant, and the adoption of the idea that freedom 
is the causality of reason leaves a rift between the rational and irrational parts of the self 
that cannot be repaired.  
 It would certainly be worrisome if someone really did see herself in this way, 
believing that her most refined reasoning capacities were under her control and the rest to 
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be externally determined. It is one thing to regret one’s actions, it is quite another to not 
see them as freely chosen actions at all. As we will discuss shortly, Kant scholars wish to 
save Kant from this troubling picture of subjectivity by insisting that pragmatic reason is 
a necessary part of healthy and even moral reason. There is definite merit to this line of 
interpretation. Nevertheless, even if we were to redefine the limits of the autonomous self 
and move the boundary further out so that it now includes both moral and pragmatic 
reason, we would still be left with an unhealthy self-schisming. If we believe that all 
natural instinct is an external force that acts on us, taking away our freedom, we have a 
picture of the self in which there is an ineliminable, although compartmentalizable, 
problem. Perhaps some people do, in fact feel this way about their bodies or about their 
emotions. In fact, this picture of the self comes close to being the one assumed by 
Goleman and LeDoux, with their assumption that emotions are innate limbic responses 
that cannot be gotten rid of and can only be controlled. Others like Damasio and 
Greenspan then rush in to defend emotions, arguing that they can be useful, all the while 
still assuming that emotions are “responses,” and thereby more closely relating them to 
the external world than to the subject’s proper self. Whether or not the thing that is to be 
excluded from the self, that which causes heteronomous determination, is taken to be 
necessarily a problem is not as psychologically relevant as the fact that some part of the 
self is viewed as being alien in the first place. Of course, drawing the lines of the self has 
and always will be in contention, but as long as the lines attempt to exclude “the 
physical” or “the unconscious” they risk severing the self in two.  
Of course, dichotomous theories of subjectivity are much more prevalent in the 
history of philosophy than monisms. Allow me to briefly canvass some of the 
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psychological problems of this way of thinking about the self. We might first approach 
this topic through the lens of culpability since this is the issues about which Kant is 
ostensibly most worried. Kant has constructed an interesting, and many would say 
unsuccessful, narrative about moral blame. By creating the space of rational causality he 
means to disallow the excuse that people can never be blamed for their actions because 
there is always an efficient cause operative. Many have argued that this move leads him 
to the conclusion that we are only free when we act morally and so still determined and 
beyond blame when we act immorally.6 Many interpreters turn to what they call Kant’s 
“incorporation thesis,” which will be more fully discussed shortly, to argue that Kant 
believes that we always choose all of our actions and therefore can always be held 
responsible for them. Aside from having other problematic philosophical implications, 
the idea that we choose to follow our inclinations (in the normal sense of making a 
choice, not in the Kantian sense of the noumenal choice of one’s character) does not seem 
related to legal debates about culpability. Yet, the discourse of subjectivity that follows 
from the notion of autonomy has the result of blaming parts of the self for immoral 
choices while all the while letting “the true self” off the hook. If we are 
“heteronomously” determined, we are left with the task of moral “damage control.” If 
one simply tries to control one’s inclinations, it becomes difficult to reflect on one’s 
actions, considering the relationship between pure and impure motivation.  
We are reminded of a situation in which a friend apologizes for an offense, but 
then argues that this way of acting is, for example, just part of her personality and that 
she cannot do anything about it. An apology can only really be acceptable if it contains a 
promise to change in the future—anything less seems like lip-service— and change is 
                                                
6 See, for example, Henry Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 511-16. 
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really only effected through understanding the internal causes that lead to the incident 
and finding a way to alter them. For this reason apologies that promise too much are also 
unacceptable. If the person says, “I’m sorry, I will never hurt your feelings again, I’m just 
going to keep my big mouth shut from now on,” we know that this promise is not a 
realistic consideration of the cause of the problem and hence does nothing to solve it. In 
order to effect moral improvement, we must be able to come to understand the causes of 
our actions. The idea that we are “heteronomously determined” precludes this 
possibility.7 We are able to understand heteronomous causes, using the laws of cause and 
effect, but the point is to change them. Of course, if we were not free to act differently, 
there would be no point of doing moral theory to begin with, but the theory of autonomy 
covers over the fact the choice to follow an incentive is still a choice, and hence not 
qualitatively different from the autonomy of moral reason. In other words, moral 
deliberation must concern itself intimately with heteronomy: these are not two parts of 
the self, or two different faculties, but only two different choices.  
The previous example points to another problem with the idea of autonomy: it 
seems related to low self-esteem. As we discussed in chapter 4, it is not healthy to like 
oneself regardless of the way that one acts. The opposite extreme, and one that similarly 
Kant warns against as immoral, is irrational self-hatred. Yet, the theory of autonomy 
developed in the third section of the Groundwork is a version of irrational self-hatred. 
Even if one achieves a state of perfect control over one’s natural desires, a person who 
ascribes to a Kantian notion of autonomy must still see these desires as problematic, and, 
                                                
7 Another way to phrase this objection is in terms of what has been called Kant’s psychological hedonism: if Kant 
takes us to be naturally selfish and obsessed with the pursuit of pleasure, he should hold that moral improvement is 
impossible, and a moral theory that rules out the possibility of moral improvement seems to be caught in a 
performative contradiction.  
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as Kant frequently writes, must wish to be free of them.8 Accepting that one’s natural 
desires are an essential part of the self does not mean that we cannot believe that these 
desires are never problematic or wrong. As we have discussed, healthy self-esteem 
should be based on healthy self-criticism. Still, the idea of emotional intelligence, with its 
suggestion that the emotions are themselves intelligent, encourages us to assume that our 
inclinations are useful and important until proven otherwise. It does not encourage us to 
act precipitously, but to devote careful attention to our desires, assuming that they contain 
important, although perhaps hidden, information. Kant’s theory of autonomy, with its 
implications of repression and control, encourages the opposite: to assume that the 
desires are guilty of selfishness and immorality. Furthermore, the chance for them to be 
proven innocent is not often explored. This unnecessary harshness toward our own 
desires then encourages us to react with harshness to the emotional expressions of others 
as well as the biological finitude of nature.9  
 
III. Autonomy as Practical Reason 
Although these criticisms of Kant’s theory of autonomy are new, the worry that 
Kant has not given inclination and natural desire a fair shake is certainly not new. Recent 
interpreters have tried to defend or revise Kantianism in light of this worry by playing up 
the importance of prudential reasoning and hypothetical imperatives. In short, they 
defend Kantian autonomy by embracing its elision between moral and prudential 
                                                
8 On the other hand, see Religion, VI, 58, on the vanity and sin of wishing to be free from all inclination.  
9 Kristeva makes this suggestion as it regards the unconscious in her Strangers to Ourselves. Julia Kristeva, 
Strangers to Ourselves (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). 
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reason.10 The problem with this line of interpretation is that it necessarily downplays the 
importance of that which is specifically moral, the categorical imperative. 
Herman’s recent article, “Reasoning to Obligation,” offers the most explicit statement of 
the interpretation that fully embraces the elision between moral and prudential reason.11 Herman 
argues that moral choices are the most rational choices and that immoral choices represent an 
immature and incomplete form of reasoning. Herman has always been interested in showing that 
moral decision-making is a more down-to-earth experience than people usually accuse Kant of 
making it. Her first book, Morality as Rationality (in 1990) argues that the categorical imperative 
and the idea of a hypothetical imperative both offer rules for good reasoning. Her later The 
Practice of Moral Judgment gains considerable ground in moving away from a deontological, 
rights-based understanding of Kantian moral theory and toward accepting that Kant has a theory 
of good willing and virtue.12 Nevertheless, collapsing moral and prudential reasoning is not the 
right interpretative strategy. First, it risks sending us back to a libertarian reading of Kant 
whereby moral reasoning is a process of justifying the abrogation of one person’s freedom for 
the sake of another through a calculus of weighing freedoms. Second, it perhaps confuses a 
phenomenological relationship, to which it is valuable to gesture, with a logical relationship. 
Third, and most importantly, it sucks the life breath out of Kantian moral theory.13 It necessarily 
leads to the attempt to translate that which is good in itself into that which is good for something 
or somebody. It threatens to make Kant over as a Utilitarian. We have already seen that the third 
section of the Groundwork opens the door to such an interpretation because Kant himself relies 
                                                
10 Please see my “Kant’s Occasional—and the Ever-Popular—Elision Between Moral and Practical Reason” (under 
revision). 
11 Barbara Herman, “Reasoning to Obligation,” Inquiry 49, no. 1 (2006): 44-61. 
12 Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). See 
especially chapter 10. 
13 Meerbote makes this same criticism of Irwin’s Green-inspired reading of Kant. See Irwin, Terence, “Morality and 
Personality: Kant and Green” and Meerbote, Ralf, “Kant on Freedom and the Rational and Morally Good Will” in 
Self and Nature in Kant’s Philosophy, Allen W. Wood (ed.) (New York: Cornell University Press, 1984).  
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on such an elision in his argument for the validity of the categorical imperative, but I see no 
reason for following Kant in his confusion.  
The move to subtly (or explicitly, in the case of Herman) ignore Kant’s distinction 
between moral and prudential reasoning, as well as the tendency to interpret Kantian freedom in 
a more prosaic sense is rather popular. Along with this comes the most permissive interpretation 
of Kantian autonomy, as giving a law, any law, to oneself.14 Frequently, such an interpretation 
draws from, what Allison, in his Kant’s Theory of Freedom (also published in 1990), calls, 
Kant’s “Incorporation Thesis.” This name refers to a passage from the Religion essay, wherein 
Kant argues that “an incentive can determine the will to an action only insofar as the individual 
has incorporated it into his maxim” (R 6:24, emphasis mine).15 The idea is that inclinations in 
themselves cannot determine the will, but we must first choose to act on them. Therefore, 
immoral acts are not caused by natural inclinations: they are caused by our choice to follow 
those inclinations. Allison argues that inclinations should be seen as motives, not causes, because 
they do not, as he puts it, “motivate by themselves… but rather [only] as being taken as reasons 
and incorporated into maxims.”16 Allison rightly points out that “among the major consequences 
of the Incorporation Thesis … is the recognition that even heteronomous or non-morally based 
actions are free for Kant in an incompatibilist sense.”17 This consequence is surprising because 
the opposite is often assumed: Kantian freedom is thought to apply only to autonomous acts, i.e., 
                                                
14 Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Paul Guyer, Kant on 
Freedom, Law, and Happiness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Christine Korsgaard, Creating the 
Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
15 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 40. The German text uses the verb aufnehmen, which is translated as “to 
incorporate,” but could easily be translated by a verb such as “to accept,” which goes further in overcoming dualism. 
16 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 51. This terminology is Allison’s, not Kant’s: in the Lectures on Ethics Kant 
distinguishes between objective and subjective motives (motivum subjecte movens and motivum objecte movens) and 
uses the term Motiv to refer generally to all kinds of grounds of action. See J. MacMurray’s introduction to 
Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (New York: Harper and Row, 1963). Kant also uses the 
term “Motiv” in a way contrary to this distinction at G 450.  
17 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 6.  
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ones that conform to the categorical imperative. Instead, Allison argues that “both moral and 
pragmatic or prudential imperatives indicate a causality of reason.”18 
The Incorporation Thesis points to a partial willingness on Kant’s part to do exactly what 
the name describes: to incorporate inclination with rationality by hypothesizing a unified 
decision-maker who must experience all parts of the self. It functions in contemporary 
scholarship to shift interpretive focus away from Kant’s formalism and the corollary 
understanding of freedom in terms of autonomy, with all of the psychological problems that I 
have suggested, toward a redefinition of freedom that takes all actions to be free. The move 
toward a more prosaic understanding of freedom is becoming popular in Kant scholarship. Many 
wish to downplay the idea that freedom is a special property of certain actions that can be 
assumed from our capacity to choose against or without incentives. Guyer makes use of the 
Incorporation Thesis in his Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, in which he argues that 
Kant’s notion of the Highest Good ought to be seen as the goal of moral action and that Kant 
believes that freedom, in the general political sense, is necessary for the happiness prescribed by 
the notion of the Highest Good. Guyer argues that Kant assigns absolute value to freedom, 
understood in this familiar way, and that the value of personal freedom grounds the legitimacy of 
the categorical imperative. In addition to adopting the more general notion of freedom implied 
by the Incorporation Thesis, Guyer makes use of Allison’s formulation of the Incorporation 
Thesis explicitly to support his idea that, for Kant, morality is meant to serve morally worthy 
happiness. The Incorporation Thesis is necessary for this end because it extricates Guyer from 
the objection that Kant believes that happiness, the object of inclination, is inimical to morality, 
the object of freedom. Instead, he holds that inclinations are not immoral per se, just as happiness 
                                                
18 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 35. 
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is not in conflict with morality, but that the natural goal of happiness is very much compatible 
with morality, especially since both require the proper use of reason for their attainment. 
Korsgaard also expands the scope of freedom to include all choices. One overriding 
theme of her Creating the Kingdom of Ends is the idea that humans “confer value on the objects 
of” their “rational choice” and that this fact about the origin of value grounds the status of 
humans as “ends in themselves.”19 She similarly draws from the Religion essay to argue that all 
choices are free actions.20 Guyer and Korsgaard both hope to show that, for Kant, morality 
requires harmonizing inclination with moral ends, instead of totally extirpating inclination from 
decision-making, as some critics fear. The Incorporation Thesis helps in this regard by relieving 
inclination from being the cause of immorality, as the account of heteronomy suggests, and by 
showing that reason always adjudicates the inclinations and therefore can do so in a way that is 
both conducive to morality and conducive to happiness.  
This elision has the effect of downplaying the importance of the categorical imperative 
for Kantian morality. In his attempt to show that the Groundwork demonstrates the Incorporation 
Thesis’s notion of practical agency, Allison agrees with Sidgwick’s interpretation of 
universalizability as a test for rationality.21 Allison then identifies the idea of a universal law with 
the idea of a practical law, and finally conjoins the notion of the categorical imperative with the 
idea of a practical law in general.22 This conclusion follows from the substitution of rational 
agency for moral agency. Allison appears to recognize the distinction between rationality and 
                                                
19 Korsgaard, Kingdom, ix. 
20 In her chapter 6, Korsgaard develops her argument that theoretical knowledge of freedom is neither necessary for 
action not for culpability by pointing out that freedom does not make an action moral, but that morality makes us 
free. This acknowledgement would seem to work against her general emphasis on freedom as the origin of value, 
but she does not consider this point in that context (176-183). 
21 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics. 
22 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 212. 
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morality, but he then collapses it again by defining transcendental freedom as the capacity to 
choose based on a higher-level maxim, not the higher-level moral maxim.23 
In order to understand this interpretive strategy, it is important to be familiar with the 
relevant discussion from the Religion essay and the reason that it lends itself to such an 
interpretation. Only in the Religion essay does normal rational choice become an example of 
moral choice, because Kant is there trying to show that humans can freely choose to be either 
evil or good. Still, the very specific type of choice described therein, which is something like 
religious predetermination or a conversion experience made possible by Grace, is not analogous 
to all choices, nor analogous to choosing autonomously, and therefore cannot be used to support 
the model of normal decision-making the Incorporation Thesis wishes to erect.  
The title of the Religion essay leads one to believe that it will offer an elaboration of 
Kant’s argument that morality leads to a very specific type of religion and a description of such a 
purely moral or rational religion. We are familiar with this idea from the second Critique, 
wherein Kant argues that belief in the Christian god is a necessary part of morality. In a sense, 
then, the title of the Religion essay is misleading: in fact, since Kant had already described 
rational religion in a couple of his other works, the argument that morality requires rational 
religion is largely assumed and relegated to footnotes. Instead, as Kant mentions in the preface to 
the second edition, the goal of the work is to unify reason and scripture: Kant analyzes particular 
ideas from Christian scripture and shows that they lead back to common sense. This explains the 
troubling fact that Kant begins his discussion with many religious assumptions that we do not see 
in his other writings, and it warns us to take the theological ideas Kant eventually reaches with a 
grain of salt. For example, the first section begins with the idea that humans are innately evil, but 
then, while keeping to the expression, Kant explains that this trait only amounts to the potential 
                                                
23 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 208. 
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for evil, though he continues to assume that humans are in some sense born evil and must 
undergo a conversion.24 In this work Kant address many religious ideas, such as heaven and hell, 
the fall, a conversion experience, grace, and church participation.25 
In the first section, in the context of discussing whether or not humans are innately evil, 
Kant argues that immorality is caused by the subject’s free choice, “for otherwise the use or 
abuse of the human being’s power of choice with respect to the moral law could not be imputed 
to him, nor could the good or evil in him be called ‘moral’”(R 6:21). Kant specifically states that 
inclinations and natural impulses cannot be seen as the ground of evil. According to this 
argument, evil is not caused by natural inclination; rather, evil is a result of the choice to value 
the satisfaction of inclination over compliance with the moral law. He explains the difference 
between good and evil characters with reference to the choice of a meta-maxim: the maxim 
either to follow the moral law in everything, or to follow inclination in everything.26 The main 
goal of this part of the essay is to show that evil is not the result of nature, nor is good the result 
of divine dispensation, but that humans are individually responsible for their moral worth. 
Therefore, the proper truth issuing from the idea that humans are innately evil must involve the 
                                                
24 We can see Kant distancing himself from the original scriptural idea of innate evil with his attribution of the idea 
to the “rigorists.” Allison’s statement that Kant identifies himself as a rigorist is wrong. Instead, Kant argues that 
one must be a rigorist when considering morality as a pure idea and one must be a “latitudinarian,” or one who 
affirms that humans are neither all good or all bad, when one considers morality from the point of view of human 
behavior (Rel. 6:25). 
25 There is no reason to think that Kant is straightforwardly advancing any of these religious positions. In the case of 
a religious conversion experience, which implies, as does the choice of a meta-maxim that we shall examine shortly, 
that people are either all good or all bad, we know from Kant’s other works that he explicitly rejects this 
essentialism along with the idea that the task of morality could be completed in one fell swoop, or at all. On the 
contrary, G. Felicitas Munzel accepts this account of a singular, resolute choice in his account of Kantian moral 
character, in G. Felicitas Munzel, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character: The “Critical” Link of Morality, 
Anthropology, and Reflective Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
26 Allison elaborates on the idea of choosing a meta-maxim and assimilates it to the idea that the practical agent 
subsumes inclinations under practical rules or maxims just as the understanding subsumes sensibility under the 
categories of the understanding. Therefore, he makes the free practical agent is an analog to the subject of the 
transcendental unity of apperception: “just as it must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my 
representations in order for them to be ‘mine’… it must be possible for the ‘I take’ to accompany all my inclinations 
if they are to be mine qua rational agent, that is, if they are to provide motives or reasons for acting.” 
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possibility for choice of the impure maxim, so that, when we accept theological notions, we grant 
humans the capacity to choose the pure and good maxim (in a conversion experience) and thus 
hold them responsible for their moral behaviors. 
The choice of a good or evil character described in the Religion essay is in no way 
analogous to normal decision-making. It involves the choice whether or not to follow the moral 
law in everything; it is a meta-choice that happens once or twice in a person’s life.  Kant 
insinuates that it happens at or before birth and then during a conversion. Also, this choice is not 
based on reasons. It is a choice about the relative value of reasons, and, for that reason, Kant 
assumes that it cannot itself be based on reasons. Nor can we be aware of the choice: we can 
never know for sure whether we are of the pure or impure character type. Kant states that, 
although the conversion is a spontaneous revolution, the individual experiences it as a gradual 
change and a result of his constant striving (Rel. 6:48). 
There is clearly interpretive merit to warding off the conclusion that all immoral choices 
are determined. Nevertheless, even within the Religion essay, Kant distances himself from the 
idea that all actions are freely chosen. After the introduction, Kant turns to a discussion of the 
“original predisposition to good in human nature” and argues that we are subject to a three-fold 
determination: as animals, as humans, and as persons (Rel. 6:26). Kant describes the first as 
determination without reason; the second requires rationality, but it is still rationality based on 
inclination, or prudential reasoning; and the third is determination by respect for the moral law. 
Kant continues to describe our inclinational or animalistic nature as arational. Here again Kant 
makes a distinction between rational and prudential reason, as well as animalistic determination, 
and does no re-assert that the ways that we are determined because we are human presuppose a 
rational choice. Contrary to the Incorporation Thesis, he does not here argue that inclination 
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needs the motivating force of reason in order to cause behavior. Then, in a move that also works 
against the Incorporation Thesis, Kant reassigns the ability to motivate to purely moral, not 
broadly practical reason: in a footnote, Kant defends the separation between the second and the 
third form of determination (prudential and moral) by stating that “from the fact that a being has 
reason does not at all follow that … this reason contains a faculty of determining the power of 
choice unconditionally, and hence to be ‘practical’ on its own” (Rel. 6:26, 120). This sentence 
implies that the second kind of determination uses reason but is ultimately caused by inclination 
and does not reach the level of autonomous moral choice, which is the only kind of cause for 
action that operates independently of inclination. Kant writes “Every propensity is either 
physical, i.e. it pertains to a human’s power of choice as a natural being; or moral, i.e., it pertains 
to a human’s power of choice as a moral being,” and he goes on to explain that only the latter is 
free (Rel. 6:31). 
Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, which was published after the 
Religion essay, contains a similar discussion of innate evil. There Kant argues that humans are 
innately good in so far as they have a natural sense of the moral law, but innately evil as they 
naturally desire to choose the satisfaction of their selfish inclinations above following the moral 
law. He writes:  
Here the question is whether man is good by nature or bad by nature, or whether 
by nature he is equally susceptible to one or the other, depending upon which 
guiding hand he happens to fall into (cereus in vitium flecti etc.); in this last 
instance the species itself would have no character. But this last instance is 
contradictory in itself because a being endowed with the faculty of practical 
reason and with consciousness of free-will (a person) sees himself in this 
consciousness, even in the midst of the darkest imaginings, subject to a moral law 
and to the feeling (which is then called moral feeling) that he is treated justly or 
unjustly and that he is treating others justly or unjustly. This is the intelligible 
character of humanity as such, and thus far man is good (by nature) according to 
his inborn gift. But experience also shows that in man there is an inclination to 
desire actively what is unlawful. This is the inclination to evil which arises 
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unavoidably and as soon as man begins to make use of his freedom. Consequently 
the inclination to evil can be regarded as innate. Hence, according to his sensible 
character, man must be judged as being evil (by nature). This is not contradictory 
when we are talking about the character of the species because it can be assumed 
that the species’ natural destiny consists in continual progress toward the better (A 
324). 
 
Note that here, Kant uses the term “freedom” to refer to the freedom to choose evil. Kant goes on 
to write that man is destined to overcome his animalistic selfishness so that the species can 
achieve universalism:  
no matter how great his animalistic inclination may be to abandon himself 
passively to the enticements of ease and comfort, which he calls happiness, he is 
still destined to make himself worthy of humanity by actively struggling with the 
obstacles that cling to him because of the crudity of his nature. (A 325)  
 
As with many of Kant’s works, the Anthropology gives us evidence in support of the 
Incorporation Thesis, as when Kant remarks that the experience of pleasure always involves the 
simultaneous evaluation of that pleasure (A §64), and evidence to deny it, as when Kant writes, 
in direct contradiction to the Religion essay’s account of choosing a meta-maxim, “man never 
sanctions the evil in himself, and so there is actually no evil coming from principles, but only 
from the forsaking of them” (A 293). 
Although the Religion essay has gained a privileged status as evidence that Kant changed 
his mind and improved his moral theory late in his career, this special status is entirely 
unwarranted. The Religion essay is not unique as a location for this kind of back and forth 
between the idea that humans are free by virtue of their humanity and the idea that inclination is 
a cause that usurps true freedom. The published version of Kant’s lectures on ethics, which is 
based on lectures given earlier in his career, displays this same conflict. Even in Kant’s early 
thought we can see the tension between his desire to say that all human action is free and his 
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need to argue that only those actions that express moral necessity are truly free.27 Kant makes the 
same argument in the Lectures as he does in the Religion essay: “because his will is free no man 
can be pathologically compelled. The human will is an arbitrium liberum in that it is not 
determined by stimuli, but the animal will is an arbitrium brutum, and not liberum, because it 
can be determined per stimulos”(L 28).28 Furthermore, “all moral evil springs from freedom; 
otherwise it would not be moral evil. However prone by nature we may be to evil actions, the 
latter have their source in our freedom”(L 67). Then, only a short while later, we see Kant offer 
the same formulation, but this time substituting the Groundwork’s theory of freedom. When 
Kant begins, “man alone is free; his actions are not regulated by any such subjectively 
necessitating principle; if they were he would not be free,” it looks as though he is articulating 
the Incorporation Thesis again, but he continues:  
And what then? If the freedom of man were not kept within bounds by objective 
rules, the result would be the completest savage disorder. There would be no 
certainty that man would not use his powers to destroy himself, his fellows and 
the whole of nature”(L 122).  
 
This is not a picture of man as unfree, but of man as immoral. Kant contrasts freedom understood 
as the absence of lawfulness, which he describes above as the height of immorality and de facto 
lack of freedom, with the understanding of freedom as moral lawfulness. He advances an early 
version of the categorical imperative that expresses this identification: “Let thy procedure be 
such that in all thine actions regularity prevails. What does this restraint imply when applied to 
the individual? That he should not follow his inclinations.” To follow one’s inclinations is not 
only immoral but unfree: “he who subjects his person to his inclinations, acts contrary to the 
                                                
27 The Lectures on Ethics are unique because they do not display the same insistence on incompatibilism that we see 
in the first and second Critiques and the Groundwork. Instead, Kant argues that all actions are determined, but some 
are determined in a way that makes us free: “in the case of a free being an action can be necessary—and necessary 
in the highest possible degree—and yet it need not conflict with freedom”(L 28). Kant states “every obligation is 
either one of duty or one of compulsion”(L 15).  
28 Even this distinction is not unequivocal since, in the previous sentence, Kant states that prudential necessitation is 
determination per stimulos.  
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ends of humanity, for as a free being he must not be subjected to inclinations, but ought to 
determine them in the exercise of his freedom”(L 122). Therefore, for Kant, in at least one sense, 
humans can be and are determined by their inclinations and this determination yields both 
immorality and the lack of the freedom. In the terminology of the Lectures, sensibility can and 
does overpower the understanding (L 45), and the more a man is compelled pathologically the 
less he is free (L 29).  
Contrary to the Incorporation Thesis, Kant’s texts do not unequivocally support the 
conclusion that Kantian moral theory does not take inclination to be in itself corrosive to 
morality and freedom. “Inclination” (Neigung) remains the bad guy of Kantian moral theory, but 
as we saw from chapter 3, Kant’s condemnation of inclination need not spill over into a 
condemnation of feeling, and, from chapter 5, a consideration of the ends of morality, such as the 
happiness of others and our own self-perfection. 
Still, Kant’s ambiguity and ambivalence about freedom runs deep. Just as in the third 
section of the Groundwork, Kant often conflates two senses of freedom: they are, what in the 
Lectures he calls the arbitrium liberum, which, as we just saw, can be dangerous, and the 
freedom we gain from subjecting our wills to the moral law.  
This distinction is what many commentators refer to as the Wille/Willkür distinction. 
Many believe that Kant introduced this distinction late in his writings, with the Religion essay 
and the Metaphysics of Morals, specifically to account for the freedom of evil action.29 As we 
have just seen, however, Kant was aware of this problem from his first professional engagement 
with ethics. Kant uses the term Willkür to refer to the capacity of the subject for free choice, in 
the prosaic sense of freedom (willkürlich means “arbitrary” and so the Willkür, or free will, is 
                                                
29 Allison discusses this mode of interpretation and rejects it. He does not need to take this route of deflating the 
importance of autonomy for Kantian philosophy because he has already defined autonomy as “self-determination” 
in the more general sense entailed by the Incorporation Thesis; Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 95-96.  
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analogous to the arbitrium liberum). Wille denotes freedom in the robust, noumenal sense.30 
Willkür is often referred to as “practical freedom” by commentators, but this may be confusing 
because it is not the freedom of pure practical reason, rather freedom in a prosaic, practical 
sense, as opposed to a metaphysical or noumenal sense. Wille, on the other hand, can be called 
“moral freedom.”  
When Kant describes the choice of a meta-maxim in the Religion essay he usually uses 
the term Wille, but he occasionally refers to Willkür, for example in the statement: “a propensity 
to evil can only attach to the moral faculty of choice (Willkür)”(Rel. 6:31). Kant must refer to 
Willkür here because he describes moral choice with an analogy to normal decision-making in 
order to account for its freedom. This overlap demonstrates exactly the reason that Religion 
essay can be used by those who wish to highlight the role of Willkür in Kant’s moral philosophy 
and downplay the role of the Wille.  
 
V. Autonomy Without Freedom 
Perhaps it is preferable not to call moral freedom “freedom” at all and to just say that 
moral decisions are better than merely prudential decisions. The term “freedom” seems to be 
operating only as an honorific in this sense anyway. In this way, the Kantian notion of autonomy 
is like Aristotle’s notion of human flourishing: it is a vision of that which is most properly and 
excellently human. Moral reasoning is “free,” for Kant, and the highest expression of freedom, 
because it expresses our essence as rational beings, through which we are united in a group with 
all people; it is that through which we really feel free. When Kant is worried about pure reason’s 
ability to be practical, he is not so much worried about the possibility of action in general, but 
                                                
30 George Di Giovanni addresses the issue of the relationship between the two notions in terms of the response of 
German Idealism to Kantianism in his “The First Twenty Years of Critique: The Spinoza Connection,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
 285 
about disproving Hume’s statement that reason is and should be the slave of the passions. 
Heteronomy is a problem not because it entails that we are metaphysically determined, but 
because it is without intrinsic value. Kant’s goal is to show that happiness cannot have value 
without morality. Kant’s argument that nothing is good in itself except for a good will is like 
Aristotle’s argument that the good life is not the life devoted to money-making or fame: our lives 
can only have the mere semblance of worth if they are not based on morality.  
To achieve an emotionally intelligent version of Kantian autonomy, we would merely 
need to free it from the question of freedom. If we take away the idea of heteronomy as the 
contrary to autonomy, the opposite of autonomy would not be external determination; it would 
simply be that one cannot fully affirm one’s choice. We can retain the idea of conscious and 
moral affirmation without denying that selfishness and the unconscious are truly a part of the 
self, and necessarily so. Recognizing our inclinations, or emotions, or desires, or whatever seems 
to be giving us trouble, as still a very real part of the self makes room for intimately and 
sensitively examining this part of the self with the assumption that it contains the possibility for 
reconciliation as well as genuine insight.  
As we have seen, the Incorporation Thesis implies that the extra step of using autonomy 
to define freedom is unnecessary, since we can already state that all of our actions are free on 
separate grounds, by virtue of being caused by prudential reason and not directly by inclination. 
Kant says as much in the Groundwork: “[Man] does not even hold himself responsible for these 
inclinations and impulses and attribute them to him proper self (i.e., his will), though he does 
impute to his will the indulgence which he may grant them when he permits them to influence 
his maxims to the detriment of the rational laws of the will”(G 457-458). In my mind, the most 
important thing about Kant’s discussion of freedom in his practical philosophy is the 
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performance of praising morality: autonomy must be seen as necessarily referring to universality 
as well as subordinating one’s subjective ends to morality. As long as we keep the categorical 
imperative clear, it does not really matter how we sort out Kant’s confusing remarks about 
freedom. Yet, as we saw from the discussion of the Incorporation Thesis, many are interested in 
using what they take to be Kant’s theory of freedom in order to subtly make over his moral 
theory.  
Other than praising moral decision-making as that which is most excellently human, 
interpretations of Kantian freedom seem to merely involve extricating him from it. Even noting 
the existence of the Willkür, it does not seem that Kant has solved his own problem of 
determinism. We must not forget that Kant sets up two different problems of determinism: the 
first comes from his theory of temporality; the second comes from his psychological hedonism. 
Both problems can be solved by means of the Religion essay’s account of predetermining one’s 
life Gesinnung, but this “solution” cannot expand to fit any account of phenomenological 
decision-making. Neither worry should affect the ability to hold people morally responsible, 
since, as Kant notes in the Groundwork, such is an assumption that we make and will continue to 
make whether or not we have consulted philosophy.  
Kant never gives us a good argument that either moral or practical freedom is 
metaphysically free.31 (By “metaphysical freedom” I mean the spontaneous, i.e., uncaused, 
starting of a causal chain.) The third section of the Groundwork seems to suggest that Kant 
believes that autonomy is the cure to determinism. Nevertheless, maybe physical determinism is 
                                                
31 Allison describes the typical problem involved in accepting Kant’s notion of freedom thusly: “either freedom is 
located in some timeless noumenal realm, in which case it may be reconciled with the causality of nature, but only at 
the cost of making the concept both virtually unintelligible and irrelevant to the understanding of human agency, or, 
alternatively, freedom is thought to make a difference in the world, in which case both the notion of its timeless, 
noumenal status and the unrestricted scope within nature of the causal principle must be abandoned” (Allison, 
Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 2). 
 287 
not the worry on Kant’s mind. In the first Critique, Kant explains that all experience is subject 
the laws of cause and effect, or, in other words, determined. Of course, internal and external 
experience are determined in different ways. In arguing against the reality of the will, Spinoza 
gives an argument for rational determinism that makes use of the premise that clear and distinct 
ideas command our assent. In commanding assent, they determine our subsequent thinking and 
behavior. Ideas, not the free will, determine our behavior, he argues. In the first Critique Kant is 
concerned about protecting the possible existence of the free will, and he posits a “noumenon” 
beyond experience. He is sure to note that this “thing-in-itself” underlies both external and 
internal experience,” opening up the possibility that we might be freed from both physical and 
rational determinism.  
Nevertheless, Kant never explicitly voices the worry about rational determinism. His 
theory of autonomy would not entail a solution to this problem since it asserts that it is exactly 
through determination by pure reason that we become free. It might be correct to say that Kant 
abandons the Spinozist notion of rational determinism. Although, if this is the case, it is only 
through a theory of freedom that closely resembles compatibilist Spinoza’s theory of freedom, as 
that which is self-caused and promotes self-preservation, which for Spinoza, is closely aligned 
with pure intuition/reason. If it is true that Kant exchanges his worry about rational determinism 
for a theory of rational freedom, then his only worries left would concern physical determinism 
and a Spinozist pychchological hedonism.  
Support for this line of interpretation might come from the post-first Critique attempts at 
solving the problem of physical determinism. Kant twice suggests Spinozist solutions. In the first 
Critique, the “thing-in-itself” is called a “noumenon” because it is not, in principle, an object of 
experience, but can only be thought. Yet, in his practical philosophy, Kant employs the term 
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“noumenon” in conjunction with his idea of the noumenal, or purely rational, self. Kant later 
suggests that there might be an underlying unity between phenomena and noumena. Of course, 
Spinoza suggests exactly this: that the order of ideas matches the order of events in the world. 
Suggesting that there might be a deeper unity between phenomena and noumena undermines the 
original intention behind postulating the noumenon in the first place, but it does offer a 
competing solution to physical determinism. If Nature is in sympathy with our purposes, and we 
can determine ourselves rationally, than physical determinism loses its sting. Kant’s arguments 
that we can see design in Nature and History similarly suggest that he moves closer to monism. 
Nevertheless, with this monism we would be physically determined and yet rationally free 
because we are free to promote our own rational nature. As Wood notes, this amounts to 
compatibilism, and, for these additional reasons, Kant seems to be fine with it.32  
Of course, Kant is not fine with Spinoza. One problem with speculating about Spinozist 
philosophical heritage is that it cannot be proved. Because he was a heretic, scholars in Christian 
Europe would not acknowledge his influence. Furthermore, Spinoza believes that reason is 
always life-promoting; Kant rejects this naturalism and holds that pragmatic reason is hedonistic, 
but pure reason is not. Maintaining a more Christian notion of God as moral and spiritual being, 
it would have been easy for Kant to accept that pure reason enjoys the same pre-established 
harmony with nature as pragmatic reason does.  
Of course, arguing that Kant is part-Spinozist in a dissertation about emotion certainly 
yields the requirement of comment on possible Spinozist influence on Kant’s theory of emotion. 
Recalling chapter 3: it does not seem that there is much. Kant’s theory of emotion was likely 
formed pre-critically, and therefore long before his theory of autonomy and his flights of 
                                                
32 Allen Wood, “Kant’s Compatibilism,” in Self and Nature in Kant’s Philosophy, ed. Allen Wood (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1984). 
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monism. A Spinozist influence might explain this theory of the unconscious, as well as, more 
importantly, his psychological hedonism and motivate his response to it. Of course, a cognitive 
theory of emotion has monist leanings, and so we might argue that Kant had early sympathies in 
this regard. Nevertheless, his theory of emotion seems to have more in common with the Stoics 
and seems to be more caused by his own vehement rejection of moral sense theory and Hume’s 
assertion that reason is and should be always the slave of the passions.  
On the other hand, we might also read Kant as an incompatibilist. Allison, in his Kant’s 
Transcendental Idealism, argues that the fact that all experience is subject to the category of 
causality does not force us to conclude that Nature really is fully determined. Allison calls the 
thought of “the complete explicability and predictability of humans actions” “merely a regulative 
Idea.”33 This distinction is similar to the distinction between Science assuming that it can find the 
causal laws for everything and Science actually finding causal laws for everything (or everything 
that it covers, as with Newtonian mechanics). This might be helpful for us, but I nevertheless 
think there is plenty of reason to assume that Kant was taking the mechanical model as his model 
for Nature. In the third section of the Groundwork, Kant makes a connection between the 
formality of the moral will (as it is without content) and the rarified source of pure reason that 
transcends empirical experience: 
This thought [of oneself as free from sensible determination] certainly involves 
the idea of an order and legislation different from that of the mechanism of nature 
which applies to the world of sense; and it makes necessary the concept of an 
intelligible world (i.e., the whole of rational beings as things in themselves). But it 
makes not the slightest claim to anything more than to think of such a world as 
regards merely its formal condition… (G 458) 
 
                                                
33 Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1983), 326. One should consult this chapter, “Between Cosmology and Autonomy,” for more of discussion about 
the relationship between determinism and autonomy as Kant portrays it in the first Critique.  
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This interpretation also helps explain Kant’s constant reminder that we can never know for sure 
whether or not our motives were pure: we cannot have this knowledge because we cannot be (or 
can barely be) conscious of pure motives.  
As we can see, there are compelling reasons for a variety of different interpretations of 
Kantian freedom. Returning to my main argument, the best possible revision to Kant’s theory of 
autonomy is to completely divorce it from the question of metaphysical freedom. For some 
reason, when this tie remains un-severed it continually leads to ignoring the fact that autonomy is 
first and foremost a moral notion. Irwin’s Greenian interpretation is a good example of this 
tendency: he starts out by making the distinction between moral and metaphysical freedom, 
arguing that the former is itself sufficient as an account of freedom, and, yet again, moral 
freedom is made over into an amoral notion. Green’s account of morality in terms of rational 
self-satisfaction is nevertheless very attractive because it postulates an internal, developmental 
connection between rational self-realization and impartiality. His account overlaps in an 
interesting way with our earlier discussion of emotional intelligence, which was shown to 
involve impartiality and self-awareness. Revisiting this topic prompts us to revisit the 
relationship between emotional intelligence and morality. Just as emotional intelligence 
expresses psychological well-being, or a unified and higher notion of happiness, Green hopes to 
show that Kant is interested in the intersection between morality and self-satisfaction. If we take 
self-satisfaction to be an essentially normative notion, then it is very much like Kant’s notion of 
autonomy. Still, bringing “self-satisfaction” into morality should not entail overturning the 
distinction between the moral and the prudential, as Green believes that it does.34  
                                                
34 Green argues that Kantian freedom should be understood in terms of long-term goals and rational self-
consciousness. T. H. Green, Collected Works, ed. R. L. Nettleship (London, 1885-88), 117. Irwin restates this 
sentiment in terms of choice that favors one’s “fairly stable desires and aims”; Irwin, “Morality and Personality,” 35. 
 291 
At this point, it is most important that we hold onto the fact that autonomy is a moral 
notion. Should we care about others because they are a means for gaining “self-realization”? No. 
We should care about others because it is the right thing to do. More cautious consideration of 
the link between self-realization and impartiality is necessary to prevent collapsing Kantianism 
into a sophisticated Utilitarianism.  
Does this cautious consideration require some degree of mysticism, or a retreat into 
naturalism? It is difficult to say why or how morality and psychological health are related, why 
morality expresses our “best self,” but it still seems to be the case. Similarly, literature on the 
practical application of emotional intelligence is largely indistinguishable from a commentary of 
the moral and social ills of violence, abuse, disrespect, and addiction. Kant is a good enough 
psychologist (or, as he would say, anthropologist) to see the obvious, but we contemporary moral 
theorists fall into the trap of ignoring psychology and denying that this connection exists just 
because we do not know how to explain it. Kant holds that the moral law is a (natural) “fact of 
reason.”35 This assertion may strike us as horribly unphilosophical, and so it is often ignored, and 
then Kant’s moral theory is ripped from the psychological context in which it belongs.
                                                
In the same vein as those who promote the Incorporation Thesis, Irwin takes as a point for Green’s interpretation 
that it revises Kant’s distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives.  
35 Meerbote makes this point in his commentary on Irwin’s article; Meerbote, “Kant on Freedom,” 72. 
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